[News] Erdogan's double game: Praising Palestine, aiding Israel

[Anti-Imperialist News]

 Erdogan's double game: Praising Palestine, aiding Israel

While the Turkish president loudly praises the Palestinian resistance, he
is quietly and ferociously pursuing pro-Israel economic and energy policies.

Mohamad Hasan Sweidan
<https://new.thecradle.co/authors/mohamad-hasan-sweidan>

JAN 18, 2024 -
https://new.thecradle.co/articles/erdogans-double-game-praising-palestine-aiding-israel
Photo Credit: The Cradle

Once idolized for schooling then-Israeli Prime Minister Shimon Peres on war
crimes before famously storming off at the 2009 Davos Summit
<https://new.thecradle.co/articles-id/11079>, Turkish President Recep
Tayyip Erdogan has once again struck out by ordering
<https://www.middleeasteye.net/news/erdogan-orders-officials-skip-davos-over-gaza-war-report>
officials to boycott
<https://www.middleeasteye.net/news/erdogan-orders-officials-skip-davos-over-gaza-war-report>
this year’s World Economic Forum (WEF) over Israel’s genocidal war in Gaza.


Anyone who has paid attention to Erdogan's statements since the onset of
the war could be forgiven for thinking that Turkiye is at the forefront of
nations opposing Israel and championing the Palestinian cause
<https://www.lemonde.fr/en/international/article/2023/10/30/turkish-president-erdogan-champions-the-palestinian-cause-fiercely-attacks-israel_6213559_4.html>.
Few around the world are as willing to adopt as sharp a rhetoric against
Tel Aviv's policies as the populist Turkish head of state is.

*Erdogan designates Israel a ‘terror state’ *

However, even by Erdogan's standards, his language took a sharp turn
following Operation Al-Aqsa Flood on 7 October and the subsequent Israeli
military assault on Gaza, when he dubbed Israel a “terror state
<https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/11/15/turkeys-erdogan-calls-israel-a-terror-state-criticises-the-west>
.”

The Turkish president even lashed out at his NATO partners, saying: “While
we curse the Israeli administration, we do not forget those who openly
support these massacres and those who go out of their way to legitimize
them,” in reference to the US and other western allies of Israel, before
proclaiming: “We are faced with a genocide” in Gaza.

Initially, Erdogan cautioned for calm and emphasized the importance of
preserving civilian lives on both sides, in a likely effort to mitigate
Ankara’s well-established relations
<https://www.middleeastmonitor.com/20210614-the-only-turkish-boots-on-the-ground-in-palestine-are-on-israeli-soldiers-feet/>
with Tel Aviv and the west. However, as shocking images of Israeli
atrocities began circulating widely on social media and as public sentiment
in Turkiye began shifting, Erdogan's rhetoric evolved to reflect the same
concerns.

Fueled by unexpected support from Turkiye’s secular opposition in favor of
Palestinians, Erdogan abandoned his earlier, measured tone and embraced a
more characteristic, high-ceilinged rhetoric. Demanding an end to the
massacres committed by the occupation state, Erdogan not only led street
demonstrations against Israel but also criticized its supporters.

Yet, true to Erdogan's style, the lofty rhetoric has not translated into
tangible action. Instead, it appears designed to manage Turkish public
opinion and underscore Ankara's potential role in any resolution of the
conflict. Recognizing the likelihood of a domestic political shift in
Israel that would end Benjamin Netanyahu
<https://new.thecradle.co/articles/the-war-within-israels-war-cabinet>'s
political career, Erdogan has strategically focused his attacks on the
Israeli prime minister – even comparing Netanyahu to Adolf Hitler
<https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/turkeys-erdogan-says-israeli-pm-netanyahu-no-different-hitler-2023-12-27/>
– while maintaining normal trade relations with the Israeli government.

*Blanking Bibi, but money talks *

In a bold move on 3 November, while recalling the Turkish ambassador to
Israel, Erdogan declared
<https://www.timesofisrael.com/erdogan-says-netanyahu-no-longer-someone-turkey-can-talk-to-we-have-written-him-off/>:
“Netanyahu is no longer someone we can talk to. We have written him off.”
Despite this diplomatic disavowal, trade between Turkiye and Israel
continues to flourish, with Turkish exports to Israel spiking by 34.8
percent
<https://www.turkishminute.com/2024/01/04/turkish-export-israel-rise-by-34-8-pct-from-november-december/>
in December – from $319.5 million in November to $430.6 million in December
– surpassing even the pre-conflict level of $408.3 million.

Crucially, Turkiye remains a key player in Israel's oil supply chain, with
approximately 4 percent coming from Azerbaijan via Turkiye. Despite calls
from Iran to halt oil and food exports
<https://www.telegraph.co.uk/world-news/2023/11/01/iran-supreme-leader-calls-for-oil-food-to-be-blocked-israel/>
to Israel in solidarity with the Palestinians, Ankara persists in
maintaining its strategic interests with Tel Aviv through realpolitik
shrouded in diplomatic ambiguity.

Following his West Asia tour
<https://www.state.gov/secretary-antony-j-blinken-remarks-to-the-press-20/>,
US Secretary of State Antony Blinken disclosed that there was a shared goal
among the various countries he visited, including Turkiye, for Israel to
live in peace, a united West Bank and Gaza under Palestinian leadership,
regional integration, and the establishment of an independent Palestinian
state.

“I also found across the board that the countries we visited, the leaders
we spend time with, are prepared to make the necessary commitments, to make
the hard decisions to advance all of these objectives, to advance this
vision for the region.”

*Factors affecting the Turkish position*

Turkiye’s stance on the current war in occupied Palestine is shaped by a
complex interplay of internal and external factors that have influenced its
foreign policy for years. Key elements include the economic crisis since
2018, a surge in nationalism within Turkiye, the impact of global power
dynamics (involving the US, China, and Russia) on the West Asian region,
strained relations between Erdogan and the west, and Ankara’s pursuit of
"strategic independence."

Economically, Turkiye faced a serious crisis last year, marked by a 35
percent
<https://capex.com/eu/overview/turkish-lira-forecast-and-price-prediction>
devaluation of the Turkish lira and an inflation rate of 62 percent.
Depleting $26 billion
<https://www.ft.com/content/e1e897ab-b68e-48cb-a053-f17a322b949c> in
foreign currency reserves to support the lira and address a substantial
current account deficit exacerbated the situation.

An opinion poll conducted in early November, after the start of the war on
Gaza, showed that 70 percent of Turks believe that the economy is Turkiye's
biggest problem, followed by unemployment at 6.2 percent. The same poll
also showed that 57.5 percent of respondents believe that the economic
situation in Turkiye would worsen in 2024.

Interestingly, events in Gaza were absent from most Turkish opinion polls
in favor of basic living issues. Ankara has a clear interest in this:
maintaining economic ties with Israel directly impacts Erdogan's position
on the war.

Domestically, nationalist sentiment has gained momentum in the past few
years, evident in recent election results where nationalists
constituted a quarter
of the voter turnout <https://www.trtworld.com/elections/turkiye/2023>.
Erdogan has responded to the trend – caused largely by his unsuccessful
Syria foreign policy, which saw millions of Syrian refugees flood Turkiye's
borders – by amplifying the role of the Organization of Turkish States
(OTS) and emphasizing a vision for the Turkish century
<https://www.politico.eu/article/turkish-century-elections-recep-tayyip-erdogan-mustafa-kemal-ataturk/>
rooted in nationalism rather than Islamism.

Be that as it may, the priority of Turkish nationalists is the state, not
the nation. Therefore, they prefer not to antagonize Israel because of the
prospect of possible cooperation with it, especially in the field of
energy.

Erdogan's restoration of relations with Israel aligns with his vision of
Turkiye as a vital energy transit hub
<https://new.thecradle.co/articles/the-eastern-mediterranean-quartet-big-talk-less-action>
from West Asia to Europe, with proposed routes including: the EastMed
pipeline linking Israel to Greece, then Europe; a 300 kilometer pipeline
connecting occupied Palestinian gas fields in the eastern Mediterranean to
a gas liquefaction facility in Cyprus; and an underwater pipeline
connecting Turkiye to natural gas fields in occupied Palestine.

*Rhetoric versus Realism *

As the country approaches municipal elections in March, Erdogan aims to
secure the recovery of his party's political losses in Istanbul and Ankara,
making it imperative to insulate the impact of the Gaza conflict from
domestic concerns. A recent poll indicates minimal support for Hamas among
Turks, with a majority preferring a neutral position
<https://www.pism.pl/publications/t%C3%BCrkiye-seeks-mediator-role-in-israel-hamas-war>
.

On the international stage, the shift in US focus away from West Asia due
to great power competition in the Asia Pacific has prompted allies,
including Turkiye, to compromise some longstanding policies. Last year saw
increased region-wide rapprochement with Syria, an Iranian–Saudi agreement,
and Turkiye settling differences with the UAE, Saudi Arabia, Israel, and
Egypt.

Finally, tensions between Erdogan and the west, coupled with its impact on
the Turkish economy, have led the Turkish president to modify some
positions to appease western powers. Despite Erdogan's pursuit of strategic
independence, which seeks autonomy in foreign policy, the need for
co-existence with, and concessions to the Atlanticists remains evident, as
seen in Turkish policy toward the war in Gaza.

As the first Muslim state to recognize Israel in 1949, just a year after
the founding of the occupation state, Turkiye has long positioned itself as
an important ally of the west in the region.

While Erdogan's rhetoric may superficially mimic that of the region's Axis
of Resistance, in practice, he is unlikely to significantly alter Turkiye’s
geopolitical alignment on the Palestinian issue. His natural position
continues to lie within the western axis, particularly when money is at
stake.
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