[News] COVID-19 and Circuits of Capital

[Anti-Imperialist News]

https://monthlyreview.org/2020/03/27/covid-19-and-circuits-of-capital/
*COVID-19 and Circuits of Capital*

[image: SARS-CoV-2, COVID-19]
<https://monthlyreview.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/03/Coronavirus_COVID-19_virus.jpg>

March 28, 2020

Rob Wallace is an evolutionary epidemiologist who has consulted with the
Food and Agriculture Organization and Centers for Disease Control and
Prevention. Alex Liebman is a PhD student in human geography at Rutgers
University, with a MSc in agronomy from the University of Minnesota. Luis
Fernando Chaves is a disease ecologist and was a Senior Researcher at the
Costa Rican Institute for Research and Education on Nutrition and Health in
Tres Rios, Costa Rica. Rodrick Wallace is a research scientist in the
Division of Epidemiology of the New York State Psychiatric Institute at
Columbia University.

They appreciate perspicacious comments from Kenichi Okamoto.

*Calculation*

COVID-19, the illness caused by coronavirus SARS-CoV-2, the second severe
acute respiratory syndrome virus since 2002, is now officially a pandemic.
As of late March, whole cities are sheltered in place and, one by one,
hospitals are lighting up in medical gridlock brought about by surges in
patients.

China, its initial outbreak in contraction, presently breathes easier.1
South Korea and Singapore as well. Europe, especially Italy and Spain, but
increasingly other countries, already bends under the weight of deaths
still early in the outbreak. Latin America and Africa are only now
beginning to accumulate cases, some countries preparing better than others.
In the United States, a bellwether if only as the richest country in the
history of the world, the near future looks bleak. The outbreak is not
slated to peak stateside until May and already health care workers and
hospital visitors are fist fighting over access to the dwindling supply of
personal protection equipment.2 Nurses, to whom the Centers for Disease
Control and Protection (CDC) has appallingly recommended using bandanas and
scarves as masks, have already declared that “the system is doomed.”3

The U.S. administration meanwhile continues to outbid individual states for
basic medical equipment that it refused to purchase for them in the first
place. It has also announced a border crackdown as a public health
intervention while the virus rages on ill-addressed inside the country.4

An epidemiology team at Imperial College projected that the best campaign
in *mitigation*—flattening the plotted curve of accumulating cases by
quarantining detected cases and socially distancing the elderly—would still
leave the United States with 1.1 million dead and a case burden eight times
the country’s total critical care beds.5 Disease *suppression*, looking to
end the outbreak, would take public health further into a China-style case
(and family member) quarantine and community-wide distancing, including
closing down institutions. That would bring the United States down to a
projected range of around 200,000 deaths.

The Imperial College group estimates a successful campaign in suppression
would have to be pursued for at least eighteen months, carrying an overhead
in economic contraction and decay in community services. The team proposed
balancing the demands of disease control and economy by toggling in and out
of community quarantine, as triggered by a set level of critical care beds
filled.

Other modelers have pushed back. A group led by Nassim Taleb of *Black Swan*
fame declares the Imperial College model fails to include contact tracing
and door-to-door monitoring.6 Their counterpoint misses that the outbreak
has broken past many governments’ willingness to engage that kind of *cordon
sanitaire*. It will not be until the outbreak begins its decline when many
countries will view such measures, hopefully with a functional and accurate
test, as appropriate. As one droll put it: “Coronavirus is too radical.
America needs a more moderate virus that we can respond to incrementally.”7

The Taleb group notes the Imperial team’s refusal to investigate under what
conditions the virus can be driven to extinction. Such extirpation does not
mean zero cases, but enough isolation that single cases are not likely to
produce new chains of infection. Only 5 percent of susceptibles in contact
with a case in China were subsequently infected. In effect, the Taleb team
favors China’s suppression program, going all out fast enough to drive the
outbreak to extinction without getting into a marathon dance toggling
between disease control and ensuring the economy no labor shortage. In
other words, China’s strict (and resource-intensive) approach frees its
population from the months-long—or even years-long—sequestration in which
the Imperial team recommends other countries partake.

Mathematical epidemiologist Rodrick Wallace, one of us, overturns the
modeling table entirely. Modeling emergencies, however necessary, miss when
and where to begin. Structural causes are as much part of the emergency.
Including them helps us figure out how best to respond moving forward
beyond just restarting the economy that produced the damage. “If
firefighters are given sufficient resources,” writes Wallace,

under normal conditions, most fires, most often, can be contained with
minimal casualties and property destruction. However, that containment is
critically dependent on a far less romantic, but no less heroic enterprise,
the persistent, ongoing, regulatory efforts that limit building hazard
through code development and enforcement, and that also ensure firefighting,
sanitation, and building preservation resources are supplied to all at
needed levels.…

Context counts for pandemic infection, and current political structures
that allow multinational agricultural enterprises to privatize profits while
externalizing and socializing costs, must become subject to “code
enforcement” that reinternalizes those costs if truly mass-fatal pandemic
disease is to be avoided in the near future.8

The failure to prepare for and react to the outbreak did not just start in
December when countries around the world failed to respond once COVID-19
spilled out of Wuhan. In the United States, for instance, it did not start
when Donald Trump dismantled his national security team’s pandemic
preparation team or left seven hundred CDC positions unfilled.9 Nor did it
start when feds failed to act on the results of a 2017 pandemic simulation
showing the country was unprepared.10 Nor when, as stated in a *Reuters*
headline, the United States “axed CDC expert job in China months before
virus outbreak,” although missing the early direct contact from a U.S.
expert on the ground in China certainly weakened the U.S. response. Nor did
it start with the unfortunate decision not to use the already available
test kits provided by the World Health Organization. Together, the delays
in early information and total miss in testing will undoubtedly be
responsible for many, probably thousands, of lost lives.11

The failures were actually programmed decades ago as the shared commons of
public health were simultaneously neglected and monetized.12 A country
captured by a regimen of individualized, just-in-time epidemiology—an utter
contradiction—with barely enough hospital beds and equipment for normal
operations, is by definition unable to marshal the resources necessary to
pursue a China brand of suppression.

Following up the Taleb team’s point about model strategies in more
explicitly political terms, disease ecologist Luis Fernando Chaves, another
coauthor of this article, references dialectical biologists Richard Levins
and Richard Lewontin to concur that “letting the numbers speak” only masks
all the assumptions folded in beforehand.13 Models such as the Imperial
study explicitly limit the scope of analysis to narrowly tailored questions
framed within the dominant social order. By design, they fail to capture
the broader market forces driving outbreaks and the political decisions
underlying interventions.

Consciously or not, the resulting projections set securing health for all
in second place, including the many thousands of the most vulnerable who
would be killed should a country toggle between disease control and the
economy. The Foucaultian vision of a state acting on a population in its
own interests only represents an update, albeit a more benign one, of the
Malthusian push for herd immunity that Britain’s Tory government and now
the Netherlands proposed—letting the virus burn through the population
unimpeded.14 There is little evidence beyond an ideological hope that herd
immunity would guarantee stopping the outbreak. The virus may readily
evolve out from underneath the population’s immune blanket.

*Intervention*

What should be done instead? First, we need to grasp that, in responding to
the emergency the right way, we will still be engaging in both necessity
and danger.

We need to nationalize hospitals as Spain did in response to the outbreak.15
We need to supercharge testing in volume and turnaround as Senegal has.16
We need to socialize pharmaceuticals.17 We need to enforce maximum
protections for medical staff to slow staff decay. We must secure the right
to repair for ventilators and other medical machinery.18 We need to start
mass-producing cocktails of antivirals such as remdesivir and old-school
antimalarial chloroquine (and any other drugs that appear promising) while
we conduct clinical trials testing whether they work beyond the laboratory.
19 A planning system should be implemented to (1) force companies to
produce the needed ventilators and personal protection equipment required
by health care workers and (2) prioritize allocation to places with the
greatest needs.

We must establish a massive pandemic corps to provide the work force—from
research to care—that approaches the order of demand the virus (and any
other pathogen to come) is placing on us. Match the caseload with the
number of critical care beds, staffing, and equipment necessary so that
suppression can bridge the present numbers gap. In other words, we cannot
accept the idea of merely surviving COVID-19’s ongoing air attack only to
return later to contact tracing and case isolation to drive the outbreak
below its threshold. We must hire enough people to identify COVID-19
home-by-home right now and equip them with the needed protective gear, such
as adequate masks. Along the way, we need to suspend a society organized
around expropriation, from landlords up through sanctions on other
countries, so that people can survive both the disease and its cure.

Until such a program can be implemented, however, the greater populace is
left largely abandoned. Even as continued pressure must be brought to bear
on recalcitrant governments, in the spirit of a largely lost tradition in
proletarian organizing going back 150 years, everyday people who are able
should join emerging mutual aid groups and neighborhood brigades.20
Professional public health staff that unions can spare should train these
groups to keep acts of kindness from spreading the virus.

The insistence that we fold the virus’s structural origins into emergency
planning offers us a key to parlaying every step forward into protecting
people before profits.

One of many perils lies in normalizing the “batshit crazy” presently
underway, a serendipitous characterization given the syndrome that patients
suffer—proverbial bat shit in the lungs. We need to retain the shock we
received when we learned another SARS virus emerged out of its wildlife
refugia and in a matter of eight weeks splattered itself across humanity.21
The virus emerged at one terminus of a regional supply line in exotic
foods, successfully setting off a human-to-human chain of infections at the
other end in Wuhan, China.22 From there, the outbreak both diffused locally
and hopped onto planes and trains, spreading out across the globe through a
web structured by travel connections and down a hierarchy from larger to
smaller cities.23

Other than describing the wild food market in the typical orientalism,
little effort has been expended on the most obvious of questions. How did
the exotic food sector arrive at a standing where it could sell its wares
alongside more traditional livestock in the largest market in Wuhan? The
animals were not being sold off the back of a truck or in an alleyway.
Think of the permits and payments (and deregulation thereof) involved.24
Well beyond fisheries, worldwide wild food is an increasingly formalized
sector, evermore capitalized by the same sources backing industrial
production.25 Although nowhere near similar in the magnitude of output, the
distinction is now more opaque.

The overlapping economic geography extends back from the Wuhan market to
the hinterlands where exotic and traditional foods are raised by operations
bordering the edge of a contracting wilderness.26 As industrial production
encroaches on the last of the forest, wild food operations must cut farther
in to raise their delicacies or raid the last stands. As a result, the most
exotic of pathogens, in this case bat-hosted SARS-2, find their way onto a
truck, whether in food animals or the labor tending them, shotgun from one
end of a lengthening periurban circuit to the other before hitting the
world stage.27

*Infiltration*

The connection bears elaboration, as much in helping us plan forward during
this outbreak as in understanding how humanity maneuvered itself into such
a trap.

Some pathogens emerge right out of centers of production. Foodborne
bacteria such as *Salmonella* and *Campylobacter* come to mind. But many
like COVID-19 originate on the frontiers of capital production. Indeed, at
least 60 percent of novel human pathogens emerge by spilling over from wild
animals to local human communities (before the more successful ones spread
to the rest of the world).28

A number of luminaries in the field of ecohealth, some funded in part by
Colgate-Palmolive and Johnson & Johnson, companies driving the bleeding
edge of agribusiness-led deforestation, produced a global map based on
previous outbreaks back to 1940 intimating where new pathogens are likely
to emerge moving forward.29 The warmer the color on the map, the more
likely a new pathogen should emerge there. But in confusing such *absolute
geographies*, the team’s map—red hot in China, India, Indonesia, and parts
of Latin America and Africa—missed a critical point. Focusing on outbreak
zones ignores the relations shared by global economic actors that shape
epidemiologies.30 The capital interests backing development- and
production-induced changes in land use and disease emergence in
underdeveloped parts of the globe reward efforts that pin responsibility
for outbreaks on indigenous populations and their so-deemed “dirty”
cultural practices.31 Prepping bushmeat and home burials are two practices
blamed for the emergence of new pathogens. Plotting *relational geographies*,
in contrast, suddenly turns New York, London, and Hong Kong, key sources of
global capital, into three of the world’s worst hotspots instead.

Outbreak zones meanwhile are no longer even organized under traditional
polities. Unequal ecological exchange—redirecting the worst damage from
industrial agriculture to the Global South—has moved out of solely
stripping localities of resources by state-led imperialism and into new
complexes across scale and commodity.32 Agribusiness is reconfiguring their
extractivist operations into spatially discontinuous networks across
territories of differing scales.33 A series of multinational-based “Soybean
Republics,” for instance, now range across Bolivia, Paraguay, Argentina,
and Brazil. The new geography is embodied by changes in company management
structure, capitalization, subcontracting, supply chain substitutions,
leasing, and transnational land pooling.34 In straddling national borders,
these “commodity countries,” flexibly embedded across ecologies and
political borders, are producing new epidemiologies along the way.35

For instance, despite a general shift in population from commoditized rural
areas to urban slums that continues today across the globe, the rural-urban
divide driving much of the discussion around disease emergence misses
rural-destined labor and the rapid growth of rural towns into periurban
*desakotas* (city villages) or *zwischenstadt* (in-between cities). Mike
Davis and others have identified how these newly urbanizing landscapes act
as both local markets and regional hubs for global agricultural commodities
passing through.36 Some such regions have even gone “post-agricultural.”37
As a result, forest disease dynamics, the pathogens’ primeval sources, are
no longer constrained to the hinterlands alone. Their associated
epidemiologies have themselves turned relational, felt across time and
space. A SARS can suddenly find itself spilling over into humans in the big
city only a few days out of its bat cave.

Ecosystems in which such “wild” viruses were in part controlled by the
complexities of the tropical forest are being drastically streamlined by
capital-led deforestation and, at the other end of periurban development,
by deficits in public health and environmental sanitation.38 While many
sylvatic pathogens are dying off with their host species as a result, a
subset of infections that once burned out relatively quickly in the forest,
if only by an irregular rate of encountering their typical host species,
are now propagating across susceptible human populations whose
vulnerability to infection is often exacerbated in cities by austerity
programs and corrupted regulation. Even in the face of efficacious
vaccines, the resulting outbreaks are characterized by greater extent,
duration, and momentum. What were once local spillovers are now epidemics
trawling their way through global webs of travel and trade.39

By this parallax effect—by a change in the environmental background
alone—old standards such as Ebola, Zika, malaria, and yellow fever,
evolving comparatively little, have all made sharp turns into regional
threats.40 They have suddenly moved from spilling over into remote
villagers now and again to infecting thousands in capital cities. In
something of the other ecological direction, even wild animals, routinely
longtime disease reservoirs, are suffering blowback. Their populations
fragmented by deforestation, native New World monkeys susceptible to
wildtype yellow fever, to which they had been exposed for at least a
hundred years, are losing their herd immunity and dying in the hundreds of
thousands.41

*Expansion*

If by its global expansion alone, commodity agriculture serves as both
propulsion for and nexus through which pathogens of diverse origins migrate
from the most remote reservoirs to the most international of population
centers.42 It is here, and along the way, where novel pathogens infiltrate
agriculture’s gated communities. The lengthier the associated supply chains
and the greater the extent of adjunct deforestation, the more diverse (and
exotic) the zoonotic pathogens that enter the food chain. Among recent
emergent and reemergent farm and foodborne pathogens, originating from
across the anthropogenic domain, are African swine fever, *Campylobacter*,
*Cryptosporidium*, *Cyclospora*, Ebola Reston, *E. coli* O157:H7,
foot-and-mouth disease, hepatitis E, *Listeria*, Nipah virus, Q fever,
*Salmonella*, *Vibrio*, *Yersinia*, and a variety of novel influenza
variants, including H1N1 (2009), H1N2v, H3N2v, H5N1, H5N2, H5Nx, H6N1,
H7N1, H7N3, H7N7, H7N9, and H9N2.43

However unintended, the entirety of the production line is organized around
practices that accelerate the evolution of pathogen virulence and
subsequent transmission.44 Growing genetic monocultures—food animals and
plants with nearly identical genomes—removes immune firebreaks that in more
diverse populations slow down transmission.45 Pathogens now can just
quickly evolve around the commonplace host immune genotypes. Meanwhile,
crowded conditions depress immune response.46 Larger farm animal population
sizes and densities of factory farms facilitate greater transmission and
recurrent infection.47 High throughput, a part of any industrial
production, provides a continually renewed supply of susceptibles at barn,
farm, and regional levels, removing the cap on the evolution of pathogen
deadliness.48 Housing a lot of animals together rewards those strains that
can burn through them best. Decreasing the age of slaughter—to six weeks in
chickens—is likely to select for pathogens able to survive more robust
immune systems.49 Lengthening the geographic extent of live animal trade
and export has increased the diversity of genomic segments that their
associated pathogens exchange, increasing the rate at which disease agents
explore their evolutionary possibilities.50

While pathogen evolution rockets forward in all these ways, there is,
however, little to no intervention, even at the industry’s own demand, save
what is required to rescue any one quarter’s fiscal margins from the sudden
emergency of an outbreak.51 The trend tends toward fewer government
inspections of farms and processing plants, legislation *against*
government surveillance and activist exposé, and legislation against even
reporting on the specifics of deadly outbreaks in media outlets. Despite
recent court victories against pesticide and hog pollution, the private
command of production remains entirely focused on profit. The damages
caused by the outbreaks that result are externalized to livestock, crops,
wildlife, workers, local and national governments, public health systems,
and alternate agrosystems abroad as a matter of national priority. In the
United States, the CDC reports foodborne outbreaks are expanding in the
numbers of states impacted and people infected.52

That is, capital’s alienation is parsing out in pathogens’ favor. While the
public interest is filtered out at the farm and food factory gate,
pathogens bleed past the biosecurity that industry is willing to pay for
and back out to the public. Everyday production represents a lucrative
moral hazard eating through our shared health commons.

*Liberation*

There is a telling irony in New York, one of the largest cities in the
world, sheltering in place against COVID-19, a hemisphere away from the
virus’s origins. Millions of New Yorkers are hiding out in housing stock
overseen until recently by one Alicia Glen, until 2018 the city’s deputy
mayor for housing and economic development.53 Glen is a former Goldman
Sachs executive who oversaw the investment company’s Urban Investment
Group, which finances projects in the kinds of communities the firm’s other
units help redline.54

Glen, of course, is not in any way personally to blame for the outbreak,
but is more a symbol of a connection that hits closer to home. Three years
before the city hired her, upon a housing crisis and Great Recession in
part its own making, her former employer, along with JPMorgan, Bank of
America, Citigroup, Wells Fargo & Co., and Morgan Stanley, took 63 percent
of the resulting federal emergency loan financing.55 Goldman Sachs, cleared
of overhead, moved to diversifying its holdings out of the crisis. Goldman
Sachs took 60 percent stock in Shuanghui Investment and Development, part
of the giant Chinese agribusiness that bought U.S.-based Smithfield Foods,
the largest hog producer in the world.56 For $300 million, it also scored
out-and-out ownership of ten poultry farms in Fujian and Hunan, one
province over from Wuhan and well within the city’s wild foods catchment.57
It invested up to another $300 million alongside Deutsche Bank in hog
raising in the same provinces.58

The relational geographies explored above have circulated all the way back.
There is the pandemic presently sickening Glen’s constituencies
apartment-to-apartment across New York, the largest U.S. COVID-19
epicenter. But we need also to acknowledge that the loop of causes of the
outbreak in part extended out from New York to begin with, however minor in
this instance Goldman Sachs’ investment may be for a system the size of
China’s agriculture.

Nationalistic finger pointing, from Trump’s racist “China virus” and across
the liberal continuum, obscures the interlocking global directorates of
state and capital.59 “Enemy brothers,” Karl Marx described them.60 The
death and damage borne by working people on the battlefield, in the
economy, and now on their couches fighting to catch their breath manifest
both the competition among elites maneuvering for dwindling natural
resources and the means shared in dividing and conquering the mass of
humanity caught in the gears of these machinations.

Indeed, a pandemic that arises out of the capitalist mode of production and
that the state is expected to manage on one end can offer an opportunity
from which the system’s managers and beneficiaries can prosper on the
other. In mid-February, five U.S. senators and twenty House members dumped
millions of dollars in personally held stock in industries likely to be
damaged in the oncoming pandemic.61 The politicos based their insider
trading on nonpublic intelligence, even as some of the representatives
continued to publicly repeat regime missives that the pandemic served no
such threat.

Beyond such crass smash-and-grabs, the corruption stateside is systemic, a
marker of the end of the U.S. cycle of accumulation when capital cashes out.

There is something comparatively anachronistic in efforts to keep the spout
on even if organized around reifying finance over the reality of the
primary ecologies (and related epidemiologies) on which it is based. For
Goldman Sachs itself, the pandemic, as crises before, offers “room to grow”:

We share the optimism of the various vaccine experts and researchers at
biotech companies based on the good progress that has been made on various
therapies and vaccines so far. We believe that fear will abate at the first
significant evidence of such progress.…

Trying to trade to a possible downside target when the year-end target is
substantially higher is appropriate for day traders, momentum followers,
and some hedge fund managers, but not for long-term investors. Of equal
importance, there is no guarantee that the market reaches the lower levels
that may be used as justification for selling today. On the other hand, we
are more confident that the market will eventually reach the higher target
given the resiliency and preeminence of the US economy.

And finally, we actually think that current levels provide an opportunity
to slowly add to the risk levels of a portfolio. For those who may be
sitting on excess cash and have staying power with the right strategic
asset allocation, this is the time to start incrementally adding to S&P
equities.62

Appalled by the ongoing carnage, people the world over draw different
conclusions.63 The circuits of capital and production that pathogens mark
like radioactive tags one after the other are thought unconscionable.

How to characterize such systems beyond, as we did above, the episodic and
circumstantial? Our group is in the midst of deriving a model that
outstrips efforts by the modern colonial medicine found in ecohealth and
One Health that continues to blame the indigenous and local smallholders
for the deforestation that leads to the emergence of deadly diseases.64

Our general theory of neoliberal disease emergence, including, yes, in
China, combines:

   - global circuits of capital;
   - deployment of said capital destroying regional environmental
   complexity that keeps virulent pathogen population growth in check;
   - the resulting increases in the rates and taxonomic breadth of
   spillover events;
   - the expanding periurban commodity circuits shipping these newly
   spilled over pathogens in livestock and labor from the deepest hinterland
   to regional cities;
   - the growing global travel (and livestock trade) networks that deliver
   the pathogens from said cities to the rest of the world in record time;
   - the ways these networks lower transmission friction, selecting for the
   evolution of greater pathogen deadliness in both livestock and people;
   - and, among other impositions, the dearth of reproduction on-site in
   industrial livestock, removing natural selection as an ecosystems service
   that provides real-time (and nearly free) disease protection.

The underlying operative premise is that the cause of COVID-19 and other
such pathogens is not found just in the object of any one infectious agent
or its clinical course, but also in the field of ecosystemic relations that
capital and other structural causes have pinned back to their own advantage.
65 The wide variety of pathogens, representing different taxa, source
hosts, modes of transmission, clinical courses, and epidemiological
outcomes, all the earmarks that send us running wild-eyed to our search
engines upon each outbreak, mark different parts and pathways along the
same kinds of circuits of land use and value accumulation.

A general program of intervention runs in parallel far beyond a particular
virus.

To avoid the worst outcomes here on out, *disalienation* offers the next
great human transition: abandoning settler ideologies, reintroducing
humanity back into Earth’s cycles of regeneration, and rediscovering our
sense of individuation in multitudes beyond the capital state.66 However,
economism, the belief that all causes are economic alone, will not be
liberation enough. Global capitalism is a many-headed hydra, appropriating,
internalizing, and ordering multiple layers of social relation.67
Capitalism operates across complex and interlinked terrains of race, class,
and gender in the course of actualizing regional value regimes place to
place.

At the risk of accepting the precepts of what historian Donna Haraway
dismissed as salvation history—“can we defuse the bomb in
time?”—disalienation must dismantle these multifold hierarchies of
oppression and the locale-specific ways they interact with accumulation.68
Along the way, we must navigate out of capital’s expansive reappropriations
across productive, social, and symbolic materialisms.69 That is, out of
what sums up to a totalitarianism. Capitalism commodifies everything—Mars
exploration here, sleep there, lithium lagoons, ventilator repair, even
sustainability itself, and on and on, these many permutations are found
well beyond the factory and farm. All the ways nearly everyone everywhere
is subjected to the market, which during a time like this is increasingly
anthropomorphized by politicians, could not be clearer.70

In short, a successful intervention keeping any one of the many pathogens
queuing up across the agroeconomic circuit from killing a billion people
must walk through the door of a global clash with capital and its local
representatives, however much any individual foot soldier of the
bourgeoisie, Glen among them, attempts to mitigate the damage. As our group
describes in some of our latest work, agribusiness is at war with public
health.71 And public health is losing.

Should, however, greater humanity win such a generational conflict, we can
replug ourselves back into a planetary metabolism that, however differently
expressed place to place, reconnects our ecologies and our economies.72
Such ideals are more than matters of the utopian. In doing so, we converge
on immediate solutions. We protect the forest complexity that keeps deadly
pathogens from lining up hosts for a straight shot onto the world’s travel
network.73 We reintroduce the livestock and crop diversities, and
reintegrate animal and crop farming at scales that keep pathogens from
ramping up in virulence and geographic extent.74 We allow our food animals
to reproduce onsite, restarting the natural selection that allows immune
evolution to track pathogens in real time. Big picture, we stop treating
nature and community, so full of all we need to survive, as just another
competitor to be run off by the market.

The way out is nothing short of birthing a world (or perhaps more along the
lines of returning back to Earth). It will also help solve—sleeves rolled
up—many of our most pressing problems. None of us stuck in our living rooms
from New York to Beijing, or, worse, mourning our dead, want to go through
such an outbreak again. Yes, infectious diseases, for most of human history
our greatest source of premature mortality, will remain a threat. But given
the bestiary of pathogens now in circulation, the worst spilling over now
almost annually, we are likely facing another deadly pandemic in far
shorter time than the hundred-year lull since 1918. Can we fundamentally
adjust the modes by which we appropriate nature and arrive at more of a
truce with these infections?

*Notes*

   1. ↩ Max Roser, Hannah Ritchie, and Esteban Ortiz-Ospina, “Coronavirus
   Disease (COVID-19)—Statistics and Research
   <https://ourworldindata.org/coronavirus#growth-country-by-country-view>,”
   *Our World in Data*, accessed March 22, 2020.
   2. ↩ Brian M. Rosenthal, Joseph Goldstein, and Michael Rothfeld,
“Coronavirus
   in N.Y.: ‘Deluge’ of Cases Begins Hitting Hospitals
   <https://www.nytimes.com/2020/03/20/nyregion/ny-coronavirus-hospitals.html>,”
   *New York Times*, March 20, 2020.
   3. ↩ Hannah Rappleye, Andrew W. Lehren, Laura Stricklet, and Sarah
   Fitzpatrick, “’The System Is Doomed’: Doctors, Nurses, Sound off in NBC
   News Coronavirus Survey
   <https://www.nbcnews.com/news/us-news/system-doomed-doctors-nurses-sound-nbc-news-coronavirus-survey-n1164841>,”
   *NBC News*, March 20, 2020.
   4. ↩ Eliza Relman, “The Federal Government Outbid States on Critical
   Coronavirus Supplies After Trump Told Governors to Get Their Own Medical
   Equipment
   <https://www.businessinsider.com/coronavirus-trump-outbid-states-on-medical-supplies-2020-3>,”
   *Business Insider*, March 20, 2020; David Oliver, “Trump Announces
   U.S.-Mexico Border Closure to Stem Spread of Coronavirus
   <https://www.usatoday.com/story/travel/news/2020/03/19/u-s-mexico-officials-look-ban-non-essential-travel-across-border/2874497001/>,”
   *USA Today*, March 19, 2020.
   5. ↩ Neil M. Ferguson et al. on behalf of the Imperial College COVID-19
   Response Team, “Impact of Non-Pharmaceutical Interventions (NPIs) to
   Reduce COVID-19 Mortality and Healthcare Demand
   <https://www.imperial.ac.uk/media/imperial-college/medicine/sph/ide/gida-fellowships/Imperial-College-COVID19-NPI-modelling-16-03-2020.pdf>,”
   March 16, 2020.
   6. ↩ Nassim Nicholas Taleb, *The Black Swan* (New York: Random House,
   2007); Chen Shen, Nassim Nicholas Taleb, and Yaneer Bar-Yam, “Review of
   Ferguson et al. ‘Impact of Non-Pharmaceutical Interventions
   <https://necsi.edu/review-of-ferguson-et-al-impact-of-non-pharmaceutical-interventions>,’”
   *New England Complex Systems Institute*, March 17, 2020.
   7. ↩ NewTmrw, Twitter post
   <https://twitter.com/NewTmrw/status/1241532936760909825>, March 21, 2020.
   8. ↩ Rodrick Wallace, “Pandemic Firefighting vs. Pandemic Fire
   Prevention” (unpublished manuscript, March 20, 2020). Available upon
   request.
   9. ↩ Jonathan Allen, “Trump’s Not Worried About Coronavirus: But His
   Scientists Are
   <https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/white-house/trump-s-not-worried-about-coronavirus-his-scientists-are-n1143911>,”
   *NBC News*, February 26, 2020; Deb Riechmann, “Trump Disbanded NSC
   Pandemic Unit That Experts Had Praised
   <https://apnews.com/ce014d94b64e98b7203b873e56f80e9a>,” *AP News*, March
   14, 2020.
   10. ↩ David E. Sanger, Eric Lipton, Eileen Sullivan, and Michael
   Crowley, “Before Virus Outbreak, a Cascade of Warnings Went Unheeded
   <https://www.nytimes.com/2020/03/19/us/politics/trump-coronavirus-outbreak.html>,”
   *New York Times*, March 19, 2020.
   11. ↩ Marisa Taylor, “Exclusive: U.S. Axed CDC Expert Job in China
   Months Before Virus Outbreak
   <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-health-coronavirus-china-cdc-exclusiv/exclusive-us-axed-cdc-expert-job-in-china-months-before-virus-outbreak-idUSKBN21910S>,”
   *Reuters*, March 22, 2020.
   12. ↩ Howard Waitzkin, ed., *Health Care Under the Knife: Moving Beyond
   Capitalism for Our Health*
   <https://monthlyreview.org/product/health_care_under_the_knife/> (New
   York: Monthly Review Press, 2018).
   13. ↩ Richard Lewontin and Richard Levins, “Let the Numbers Speak
   <https://doi.org/10.2190/0D66-KFBJ-VYVH-9A8J>,” *International Journal
   of Health Services* 30, no. 4 (2000): 873–77.
   14. ↩ Owen Matthews, “Britain Drops Its Go-It-Alone Approach to
   Coronavirus
   <https://foreignpolicy.com/2020/03/17/britain-uk-coronavirus-response-johnson-drops-go-it-alone>,”
   *Foreign Policy*, March 17, 2020; Rob Wallace, “Pandemic Strike
   <http://unevenearth.org/2020/03/pandemic-strike>,” *Uneven Earth*, March
   16, 2020; Isabel Frey, “‘Herd Immunity’ Is Epidemiological Neoliberalism
   <https://thequarantimes.wordpress.com/2020/03/19/herd-immunity-is-epidemiological-neoliberalism/>,”
   *Quarantimes*, March 19, 2020.
   15. ↩ Adam Payne, “Spain Has Nationalized All of Its Private Hospitals
   as the Country Goes into Coronavirus Lockdown
   <https://www.businessinsider.com/coronavirus-spain-nationalises-private-hospitals-emergency-covid-19-lockdown-2020-3>,”
   *Business Insider*, March 16, 2020.
   16. ↩ Jeva Lange, “Senegal Is Reportedly Turning Coronavirus Tests
   Around ‘within 4 Hours’ While Americans Might Wait a Week
   <https://news.yahoo.com/senegal-reportedly-turning-coronavirus-tests-165224221.html>,”
   *Yahoo News*, March 12, 2020.
   17. ↩ Steph Sterling and Julie Margetta Morgan, *New Rules for the 21st
   Century: Corporate Power, Public Power, and the Future of Prescription Drug
   Policy in the United States*
   <https://rooseveltinstitute.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/10/Pharma-Issue-brief-New-Rules-201910.pdf>
   (New York: Roosevelt Institute, 2019).
   18. ↩ Jason Koebler, “Hospitals Need to Repair Ventilators:
   Manufacturers Are Making That Impossible
   <https://www.vice.com/en_us/article/wxekgx/hospitals-need-to-repair-ventilators-manufacturers-are-making-that-impossible>,”
   *Vice*, March 18, 2020.
   19. ↩ Manli Wang et al., “Remdesivir and Chloroquine Effectively Inhibit
   the Recently Emerged Novel Coronavirus (2019-nCoV) In Vitro
   <https://doi.org/10.1038/s41422-020-0282-0>,” *Cell Research* 30 (2020):
   269–71.
   20. ↩ “Autonomous Groups Are Mobilizing Mutual Aid Initiatives to Combat
   the Coronavirus
   <https://itsgoingdown.org/autonomous-groups-are-mobilizing-mutual-aid-initiatives-to-combat-the-coronavirus>,”
   *It’s Going Down*, March 20, 2020.
   21. ↩ Kristian G. Andersen, Andrew Rambaut, W. Ian Lipkin, Edward C.
   Holmes, and Robert F. Garry, “The Proximal Origin of SARS-CoV-2
   <https://doi.org/10.1038/s41591-020-0820-9>,” *Nature Medicine* (2020).
   22. ↩ Rob Wallace, “Notes on a Novel Coronavirus
   <https://mronline.org/2020/01/29/notes-on-a-novel-coronavirus>,” *MR
   Online*, January 29, 2020.
   23. ↩ Marius Gilbert et al., “Preparedness and Vulnerability of African
   Countries Against Importations of COVID-19: A Modelling Study
   <https://doi.org/10.1016/S0140-6736(20)30411-6>,” *Lancet* 395, no.
   10227 (2020): 871–77.
   24. ↩ Juanjuan Sun, “The Regulation of ‘Novel Food’ in China: The
   Tendency of Deregulation,” *European Food and Feed Law Review* 10, no. 6
   (2015): 442–48.
   25. ↩ Emma G. E. Brooks, Scott I. Robertson, and Diana J. Bell, “The
   Conservation Impact of Commercial Wildlife Farming of Porcupines in Vietnam
   <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.biocon.2010.07.030>,” *Biological
   Conservation* 143, no. 11 (2010): 2808–14.
   26. ↩ Mindi Schneider, “Wasting the Rural: Meat, Manure, and the
   Politics of Agro-Industrialization in Contemporary China
   <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geoforum.2015.12.001>,” *Geoforum* 78 (2017):
   89–97.
   27. ↩ Robert G. Wallace, Luke Bergmann, Lenny Hogerwerf, Marius Gilbert,
   “Are Influenzas in Southern China Byproducts of the Region’s Globalising
   Historical Present?,” in *Influenza and Public Health: Learning from
   Past Pandemics*, ed. Jennifer Gunn, Tamara Giles-Vernick, and Susan
   Craddock (London: Routledge, 2010); Alessandro Broglia and Christian Kapel,
   “Changing Dietary Habits in a Changing World: Emerging Drivers for the
   Transmission of Foodborne Parasitic Zoonoses
   <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.vetpar.2011.07.011>,” *Veterinary
   Parasitology* 182, no. 1 (2011): 2–13.
   28. ↩ David Molyneux et al., “Zoonoses and Marginalised Infectious
   Diseases of Poverty: Where Do We Stand?
   <https://doi.org/10.1186/1756-3305-4-106>,” *Parasites & Vectors* 4, no.
   106 (2011).
   29. ↩ Stephen S. Morse et al., “Prediction and Prevention of the Next
   Pandemic Zoonosis <https://doi.org/10.1016/S0140-6736(12)61684-5>,”
   *Lancet* 380, no. 9857 (2012): 1956–65; Rob Wallace, *Big Farms Make Big
   Flu: Dispatches on Infectious Disease, Agribusiness, and the Nature of
   Science* <https://monthlyreview.org/product/big_farms_make_big_flu/>
   (New York: Monthly Review Press, 2016).
   30. ↩ Robert G. Wallace et al., “The Dawn of Structural One Health: A
   New Science Tracking Disease Emergence Along Circuits of Capital
   <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.socscimed.2014.09.047>,” *Social Science &
   Medicine* 129 (2015): 68–77; Wallace, *Big Farms Make Big Flu*.
   31. ↩ Steven Cummins, Sarah Curtis, Ana V. Diez-Roux, and Sally
   Macintyre, “Understanding and Representing ‘Place’ in Health Research: A
   Relational Approach
<https://doi.org/10.1016/j.socscimed.2007.05.036>,” *Social
   Science & Medicine* 65, no. 9 (2007): 1825–38; Luke Bergmann and Mollie
   Holmberg, “Land in Motion,” *Annals of the American Association of
   Geographer*, 106, no. 4 (2016): 932–56; Luke Bergmann, “Towards Economic
   Geographies Beyond the Nature-Society Divide
   <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geoforum.2016.12.002>,” *Geoforum* 85 (2017):
   324–35.
   32. ↩ Andrew K. Jorgenson, “Unequal Ecological Exchange and
   Environmental Degradation: A Theoretical Proposition and Cross-National
   Study of Deforestation, 1990–2000
   <https://doi.org/10.1526/003601106781262016>,” *Rural Sociology* 71, no.
   4 (2006): 685–712; Becky Mansfield, Darla K. Munroe, and Kendra
McSweeney, “Does
   Economic Growth Cause Environmental Recovery? Geographical Explanations of
   Forest Regrowth
<https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1749-8198.2010.00320.x>,” *Geography
   Compass* 4, no. 5 (2010): 416–27; Susanna B. Hecht, “Forests Lost and
   Found in Tropical Latin America: The Woodland ‘Green Revolution
   <https://doi.org/10.1080/03066150.2014.917371>,’” *Journal of Peasant
   Studies* 41, no. 5 (2014): 877–909; Gustavo de L. T. Oliveira, “The
   Geopolitics of Brazilian Soybeans
   <https://doi.org/10.1080/03066150.2014.992337>,” *Journal of Peasant
   Studies* 43, no. 2 (2016): 348–72.
   33. ↩ Mariano Turzi, “The Soybean Republic
   <http://yalejournal.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/09/6.Articles_Turzi.pdf>,”
   *Yale Journal of International Affairs* 6, no. 2 (2011); Rogério
   Haesbaert, *El Mito de la Desterritorialización: Del ‘Fin de Los
   Territorios’ a la Multiterritorialidad* (Mexico City: Siglo Veintiuno,
   2011); Clara Craviotti, “Which Territorial Embeddedness? Territorial
   Relationships of Recently Internationalized Firms of the Soybean Chain
   <https://doi.org/10.1080/03066150.2015.1119121>,” *Journal of Peasant
   Studies* 43, no. 2 (2016): 331–47.
   34. ↩ Wendy Jepson, Christian Brannstrom, and Anthony Filippi, “Access
   Regimes and Regional Land Change in the Brazilian Cerrado, 1972–2002
   <https://doi.org/10.1080/00045600903378960>,” *Annals of the Association
   of American Geographers* 100, no. 1 (2010): 87–111; Patrick Meyfroidt et
   al., “Multiple Pathways of Commodity Crop Expansion in Tropical Forest
   Landscapes <http://dx.doi.org/10.1088/1748-9326/9/7/074012>,” *Environmental
   Research Letters* 9, no 7 (2014); Oliveira, “The Geopolitics of
   Brazilian Soybeans”; Javier Godar, “Balancing Detail and Scale in Assessing
   Transparency to Improve the Governance of Agricultural Commodity Supply
   Chains,” *Environmental Research Letters* 11, no. 3 (2016).
   35. ↩ Rodrick Wallace et al., *Clear-Cutting Disease Control:
   Capital-Led Deforestation, Public Health Austerity, and Vector-Borne
   Infection* (Basel: Springer, 2018).
   36. ↩ Mike Davis, *Planet of Slums* (New York: Verso, 2016); Marcus
   Moench & Dipak Gyawali, *Desakota: Reinterpreting the Urban-Rural
   Continuum*
   <https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/57a08ba0e5274a27b2000c67/FinalReport_Desakota-PartI.pdf>
   (Kathmandu: Institute for Social and Environmental Transition, 2008);
   Hecht, “Forests Lost and Found in Tropical Latin America.”
   37. ↩ Ariel E. Lugo, “The Emerging Era of Novel Tropical Forests
   <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1744-7429.2009.00550.x>,” *Biotropica* 41,
   no. 5 (2009): 589–91.
   38. ↩ Robert G. Wallace and Rodrick Wallace, eds., *Neoliberal Ebola:
   Modeling Disease Emergence from Finance to Forest and Farm* (Basel:
   Springer, 2016); Wallace et al., *Clear-Cutting Disease Control*;
   Giorgos Kallis and Erik Swyngedouw, “Do Bees Produce Value? A Conversation
   Between an Ecological Economist and a Marxist Geographer,” *Capitalism
   Nature Socialism* 29, no. 3 (2018): 36–50.
   39. ↩ Robert G. Wallace et al., “Did Neoliberalizing West African
   Forests Produce a New Niche for Ebola?
   <https://doi.org/10.1177%2F0020731415611644>,” *International Journal of
   Health Services* 46, no. 1 (2016): 149–65.
   40. ↩ Wallace and Wallace, *Neoliberal Ebola*.
   41. ↩ . Júlio César Bicca-Marques and David Santos de Freitas, “The Role
   of Monkeys, Mosquitoes, and Humans in the Occurrence of a Yellow Fever
   Outbreak in a Fragmented Landscape in South Brazil: Protecting Howler
   Monkeys Is a Matter of Public Health
   <https://doi.org/10.1177%2F194008291000300107>,” *Tropical Conservation
   Science* 3, no. 1 (2010): 78–89; Júlio César Bicca-Marques et al., “Yellow
   Fever Threatens Atlantic Forest Primates
   <http://advances.sciencemag.org/content/3/1/e1600946/tab-e-letters>,”
*Science
   Advances* e-letter, May 25, 2017; Luciana Inés Oklander et al., “Genetic
   Structure in the Southernmost Populations of Black-and-Gold Howler
Monkeys (*Alouatta
   caraya*) and Its Conservation Implications
   <https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0185867>,” *PLoS ONE* 12, no. 10
   (2017); Natália Coelho Couto de Azevedo Fernandes et al., “Outbreak of
   Yellow Fever Among Nonhuman Primates, Espirito Santo, Brazil, 2017
   <https://dx.doi.org/10.3201%2Feid2312.170685>,” *Emerging Infectious
   Diseases* 23, no. 12 (2017): 2038–41; Daiana Mir, “Phylodynamics of
   Yellow Fever Virus in the Americas: New Insights into the Origin of the
   2017 Brazilian Outbreak
<https://doi.org/10.1038/s41598-017-07873-7>,” *Scientific
   Reports* 7, no. 1 (2017).
   42. ↩ Mike Davis, *The Monster at Our Door: The Global Threat of Avian
   Flu* (New York: New Press, 2005); Jay P. Graham et al., “The
   Animal-Human Interface and Infectious Disease in Industrial Food Animal
   Production: Rethinking Biosecurity and Biocontainment
   <https://doi.org/10.1177%2F003335490812300309>,” *Public Health Reports*
   123, no. 3 (2008): 282–99; Bryony A. Jones et al., “Zoonosis Emergence
   Linked to Agricultural Intensification and Environmental Change
   <https://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.1208059110>,” *PNAS*110, no. 21 (2013):
   8399–404; Marco Liverani et al., “Understanding and Managing Zoonotic
   Risk in the New Livestock Industries
   <https://doi.org/10.1289/ehp.1206001>,” *Environmental Health
   Perspectives* 121, no, 8 (2013); Anneke Engering, Lenny Hogerwerf, and
   Jan Slingenbergh, “Pathogen-Host-Environment Interplay and Disease
   Emergence <https://doi.org/10.1038/emi.2013.5>,” *Emerging Microbes and
   Infections* 2, no. 1 (2013); *World Livestock 2013: Changing Disease
   Landscapes* <http://www.fao.org/3/i3440e/i3440e.pdf> (Rome: Food and
   Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, 2013).
   43. ↩ Robert V. Tauxe, “Emerging Foodborne Diseases: An Evolving Public
   Health Challenge <https://dx.doi.org/10.3201/eid0304.970403>,” *Emerging
   Infectious Diseases* 3, no. 4 (1997): 425–34; Wallace and Wallace,
*Neoliberal
   Ebola*; Ellyn P. Marder et al., “Preliminary Incidence and Trends of
   Infections with Pathogens Transmitted Commonly Through Food—Foodborne
   Diseases Active Surveillance Network, 10 U.S. Sites, 2006–2017,” *Morbidity
   and Mortality Weekly Report* 67, no. 11 (2018): 324–28.
   44. ↩ Robert G. Wallace, “Breeding Influenza: The Political Virology of
   Offshore Farming <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-8330.2009.00702.x>,”
   *Antipode* 41, no. 5 (2009): 916–51; Robert G. Wallace et al.,
   “Industrial Agricultural Environments,” in *The Routledge Handbook of
   Biosecurity and Invasive Species*, ed. Juliet Fall, Robert Francis,
   Martin A. Schlaepfer, and Kezia Barker (New York: Routledge, forthcoming).
   45. ↩ John H. Vandermeer, *The Ecology of Agroecosystems* (Sudbury, MA:
   Jones and Bartlett, 2011); Peter H. Thrall et al., “Evolution in
   Agriculture: The Application of Evolutionary Approaches to the Management
   of Biotic Interactions in Agro-Ecosystems
   <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1752-4571.2010.00179.x>,” *Evolutionary
   Applications* 4, no. 2 (2011): 200–15; R. Ford Denison, *Darwinian
   Agriculture: How Understanding Evolution Can Improve Agriculture*
   (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2012); Marius Gilbert, Xiangming
   Xiao, and Timothy Paul Robinson, “Intensifying Poultry Production Systems
   and the Emergence of Avian Influenza in China: A ‘One Health/Ecohealth’
   Epitome,” *Archives of Public Health* 75 (2017).
   46. ↩ Mohammad Houshmar et al., “Effects of Prebiotic, Protein Level,
   and Stocking Density on Performance, Immunity, and Stress Indicators of
   Broilers <https://doi.org/10.3382/ps.2010-01050>,” *Poultry Science* 91,
   no. 2 (2012): 393–401; A. V. S. Gomes et al., “Overcrowding Stress
   Decreases Macrophage Activity and Increases Salmonella Enteritidis Invasion
   in Broiler Chickens <https://doi.org/10.1080/03079457.2013.874006>,” *Avian
   Pathology* 43, no. 1 (2014): 82–90; Peyman Yarahmadi , Hamed Kolangi
   Miandare, Sahel Fayaz, and Christopher Marlowe A. Caipang, “Increased
   Stocking Density Causes Changes in Expression of Selected Stress- and
   Immune-Related Genes, Humoral Innate Immune Parameters and Stress Responses
   of Rainbow Trout (*Oncorhynchus mykiss*)
   <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.fsi.2015.11.007>,” *Fish & Shellfish
   Immunology* 48 (2016): 43–53; Wenjia Li et al., “Effect of Stocking
   Density and Alpha-Lipoic Acid on the Growth Performance, Physiological and
   Oxidative Stress and Immune Response of Broilers
   <https://doi.org/10.5713/ajas.18.0939>,” *Asian-Australasian Journal of
   Animal Studies* 32, no, 12 (2019).
   47. ↩ Virginia E. Pitzer et al., “High Turnover Drives Prolonged
   Persistence of Influenza in Managed Pig Herds
   <https://doi.org/10.1098/rsif.2016.0138>,” *Journal of the Royal Society
   Interface* 13, no. 119 (2016); Richard K. Gast et al., “Frequency and
   Duration of Fecal Shedding of *Salmonella* Enteritidis by Experimentally
   Infected Laying Hens Housed in Enriched Colony Cages at Different Stocking
   Densities <https://doi.org/10.3389/fvets.2017.00047>,” *Frontiers in
   Veterinary Science* (2017); Andres Diaz et al., “Multiple Genome
   Constellations of Similar and Distinct Influenza A Viruses Co-Circulate in
   Pigs During Epidemic Events <https://doi.org/10.1038/s41598-017-11272-3>,”
   *Scientific Reports* 7 (2017).
   48. ↩ Katherine E. Atkins et al., “Modelling Marek’s Disease Virus (MDV)
   Infection: Parameter Estimates for Mortality Rate and Infectiousness
   <https://doi.org/10.1186/1746-6148-7-70>,” *BMC Veterinary Research* 7,
   no. 70 (2011); John Allen and Stephanie Lavau, “‘Just-in-Time’ Disease:
   Biosecurity, Poultry and Power
   <https://doi.org/10.1080/17530350.2014.904243>,” *Journal of Cultural
   Economy* 8, no. 3 (2015): 342–60; Pitzer et al., “High Turnover Drives
   Prolonged Persistence of Influenza in Managed Pig Herds”; Mary A. Rogalski,
   “Human Drivers of Ecological and Evolutionary Dynamics in Emerging and
   Disappearing Infectious Disease Systems
   <https://doi.org/10.1098/rstb.2016.0043>,” *Philosophical Transactions
   of the Royal Society B* 372, no. 1712 (2017).
   49. ↩ Wallace, “Breeding Influenza”; Katherine E. Atkins et al.,
“Vaccination
   and Reduced Cohort Duration Can Drive Virulence Evolution: Marek’s Disease
   Virus and Industrialized Agriculture
   <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1558-5646.2012.01803.x>,” *Evolution* 67, no.
   3 (2013): 851–60; Adèle Mennerat, Mathias Stølen Ugelvik, Camilla Håkonsrud
   Jensen, and Arne Skorping, “Invest More and Die Faster: The Life History
   of a Parasite on Intensive Farms
<https://doi.org/10.1111/eva.12488>,” *Evolutionary
   Applications*10, no. 9 (2017): 890–96.
   50. ↩ Martha I. Nelson et al., “Spatial Dynamics of Human-Origin H1
   Influenza A Virus in North American Swine
   <https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.ppat.1002077>,” *PLoS Pathogens* 7, no.
   6 (2011); Trevon L. Fuller et al., “Predicting Hotspots for Influenza
   Virus Reassortment <https://dx.doi.org/10.3201%2Feid1904.120903>,” *Emerging
   Infectious Diseases* 19, no. 4 (2013): 581–88; Rodrick Wallace and
   Robert G. Wallace, “Blowback: New Formal Perspectives on
   Agriculturally-Driven Pathogen Evolution and Spread
   <https://doi.org/10.1017/S0950268814000077>,” *Epidemiology and
   Infection* 143, no. 10 (2014): 2068–80; Ignacio Mena et al., “Origins of
   the 2009 H1N1 Influenza Pandemic in Swine in Mexico
   <https://doi.org/10.7554/eLife.16777.001>,” *eLife* 5 (2016); Martha I.
   Nelson et al., “Human-Origin Influenza A(H3N2) Reassortant Viruses in
   Swine, Southeast Mexico
<https://dx.doi.org/10.3201%2Feid2504.180779>,” *Emerging
   Infectious Diseases* 25, no. 4 (2019): 691–700.
   51. ↩ Wallace, *Big Farms Make Big Flu*, 192–201.
   52. ↩ “Safer Food Saves Lives
   <https://www.cdc.gov/vitalsigns/foodsafety-2015/index.html>,” Centers
   for Disease Control and Prevention, November 3, 2015; Lena H. Sun, “Big
   and Deadly: Major Foodborne Outbreaks Spike Sharply
   <https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/to-your-health/wp/2015/11/03/major-foodborne-outbreaks-in-u-s-have-tripled-in-last-20-years/>,”
   *Washington Post*, November 3, 2015; Mike Stobbe, “CDC: More Food
   Poisoning Outbreaks Cross State Lines
   <https://www.ksl.com/article/37217542/cdc-more-food-poisoning-outbreaks-cross-state-lines>,”
   *KSL*, November 3, 2015.
   53. ↩ Sally Goldenberg, “Alicia Glen, Who Oversaw de Blasio’s Affordable
   Housing Plan and Embattled NYCHA, to Depart City Hall
   <https://www.politico.com/states/new-york/city-hall/story/2018/12/19/alicia-glen-who-oversaw-de-blasios-affordable-housing-plan-and-embattled-nycha-to-depart-city-hall-760480>,”
   *Politico*, December 19, 2018.
   54. ↩ Gary A. Dymski, “Racial Exclusion and the Political Economy of the
   Subprime Crisis
   <https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/dbf5/8b9405f9ffc25ad045811cb9bfb4bfd4c78e.pdf>,”
   *Historical Materialism* 17 (2009): 149–79; Harold C. Barnett, “The
   Securitization of Mortgage Fraud
   <https://doi.org/10.1108/S1521-6136(2011)0000016007>,” *Sociology of
   Crime, Law and Deviance* 16 (2011): 65–84.
   55. ↩ Bob Ivry, Bradley Keoun, and Phil Kuntz, “Secret Fed Loans Gave
   Banks $13 Billion Undisclosed to Congress
   <https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2011-11-28/secret-fed-loans-undisclosed-to-congress-gave-banks-13-billion-in-income>,”
   *Bloomberg*, November 21, 2011.
   56. ↩ Michael J. de la Merced and David Barboza, “Needing Pork, China Is
   to Buy a U.S. Supplier
   <https://dealbook.nytimes.com/2013/05/29/smithfield-to-be-sold-to-shuanghui-group-of-china/>,”
   *New York Times*, May 29, 2013.
   57. ↩ “Goldman Sachs Pays US$300m for Poultry Farms
   <https://www.scmp.com/article/647749/goldman-sachs-pays-us300m-poultry-farms>,”
   *South China Morning Post*, August 4, 2008.
   58. ↩ “Goldman Sachs Invests in Chinese Pig Farming
   <https://thepigsite.com/news/2008/08/goldman-sachs-invests-in-chinese-pig-farming-1>,”
   *Pig Site*, August 5, 2008.
   59. ↩ Katie Rogers, Lara Jakes, Ana Swanson, “Trump Defends Using
   ‘Chinese Virus’ Label, Ignoring Growing Criticism
   <https://www.nytimes.com/2020/03/18/us/politics/china-virus.html>,” *New
   York Times*, March 18, 2020.
   60. ↩ Karl Marx, *Capital: A Critique of Political Economy*, vol. 3 (New
   York: Penguin, 1993), 362.
   61. ↩ Eric Lipton, Nicholas Fandos, Sharon LaFraniere, and Julian E.
   Barnes, “Stock Sales by Senator Richard Burr Ignite Political Uproar
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   62. ↩ Sharmin Mossavar-Rahmani et al., “ISG Insight: From *Room to Grow*
   to *Room to Fall*
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   63. ↩ “Corona Crisis: Resistance in a Time of Pandemic
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   *Marx21*, March 21, 2020; International Assembly of the Peoples and
   Tricontinental Institute for Social Research, “In Light of the Global
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   <https://www.thetricontinental.org/declaration-covid19/>,”
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   64. ↩ Wallace et al., “The Dawn of Structural One Health.”
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   a New Niche for Ebola?”; Wallace et al., *Clear-Cutting Disease Control*.
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Weston, *The
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   Bellamy Foster, “Marx, Value, and Nature
   <https://doi.org/10.14452/MR-070-03-2018-07_6>,” *Monthly Review* 70,
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   Accumulation*(New York: Autonomedia, 2004); Anna Tsing, “Supply Chains
   and the Human Condition
<https://doi.org/10.1080/08935690902743088>,” *Rethinking
   Marxism* 21, no. 2 (2009): 148–76; Glen Sean Coulthard, *Red Skin, White
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   70. ↩ Franco Berardi, *The Soul at Work: From Alienation to Autonomy*
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   71. ↩ Rodrick Wallace, Alex Liebman, Luke Bergmann, and Robert G.
   Wallace, “Agribusiness vs. Public Health: Disease Control in
   Resource-Asymmetric Conflict
   <https://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/hal-02513883>,” submitted for
   publication, 2020, available at https://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr.
   72. ↩ Robert G. Wallace, Kenichi Okamoto, and Alex Liebman, “Earth, the
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   73. ↩ Wallace et al., *Clear-Cutting Disease Control*.
   74. ↩ Wallace et al., “Industrial Agricultural Environments.”

2020 <https://monthlyreview.org/archives/2020/>, Volume 72, Issue 01 (May
2020) <https://monthlyreview.org/archives/2020/volume-72-issue-01-may/>
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