[News] Who’s to Blame for the Crisis in Venezuela? Can It Be Solved Through Negotiations?
Anti-Imperialist News
news at freedomarchives.org
Mon Mar 18 11:16:25 EDT 2019
https://venezuelanalysis.com/analysis/14392
Who’s to Blame for the Crisis in Venezuela? Can It Be Solved Through
Negotiations? A Response to Gabriel Hetland and “The Nation”
By Jorge Martin - March 17, 2019
------------------------------------------------------------------------
There is a certain trend of opinion amongst the liberal left,
particularly in the US, which never felt very comfortable with the
Bolivarian revolution. Now, in the midst of a serious and well-organised
attempt by Washington to remove Maduro’s government, they insist on
equally blaming both sides for the crisis, one which in their view can
be resolved through “negotiations between the government and the
opposition”. A chief representative of this point of view is Gabriel
Hetland, who has written several articles on Venezuela for /The Nation/,
/Jacobin /and other left-wing publications.
His latest article, “Venezuela’s Deadly Blackout Highlights the Need for
a Negotiated Resolution of the Crisis
<https://www.thenation.com/article/venezuela-blackout-us-sanctions-maduro/>”,
sums up this argument neatly, so it is useful to analyse it in some
detail. The article is full of inaccuracies and half-truths, but its
main flaw is a mistaken analysis of the situation in Venezuela, one that
avoids a class approach to the different forces involved, from which
Hetland derives a completely utopian solution.
The devil’s in the details
Let’s start with some of the factual inaccuracies. The caption of the
picture illustrating the articles reads: “People collect water from a
leaking pipeline along the Guaire River”, the same line is then used
within the article for effect. It is false. During the blackout there
was lack of water supply as a result. People resorted to collecting
water from /springs coming down the Avila mountain/. Some of these
springs are canalised and then end up in the Guaire River. People were
collecting water from two such springs
<http://albaciudad.org/2019/03/es-falso-que-caraquenos-recogian-agua-del-rio-guaire-lo-hacian-de-una-tuberia-de-aguas-blancas-en-la-rivera-del-rio-videos/> on
the side of the Guaire, /not/from a “leaking pipe”. Water pipes were
actually not carrying water. This might seem like a small detail but it
has a certain importance. The headlines in many of the newspapers
claimed people were collecting water from /the Guaire river itself/,
which is extremely polluted (/El Nuevo Herald/ in Miami said
<https://www.elnuevoherald.com/noticias/mundo/america-latina/venezuela-es/article227462309.html>:
“Desperate Venezuelans collect rotten water in the midst of blackout”).
The mass media exaggerates and sometimes publishes straight lies in
order to fit into a narrative of “harrowing crisis in Venezuela” in
order to justify the “need for foreign intervention” or in any case
“regime change”. Hetland is not new to this business and should know he
needs to check all the details he uses in his story.
Another one. In the opening paragraph of his article, Hetland seeks to
draw attention to how bad and long-lasting the blackout was. He does
mention how “power was intermittently restored on Sunday and Monday in
parts of Caracas and elsewhere,” but then ends the paragraph with a
mention of the /New York Times/ headline: “... with /The New York
Times/ on Monday publishing an article titled “No End in Sight to
Venezuela’s Blackout, Experts Warn.””. What’s the conclusion he wants
the reader to draw? That the blackout is far from over, in fact we don’t
know when power will be restored at all. There is just a small detail:
it does not coincide with the facts. By midnight, 11 March, power had
been restored in Merida, Zulia and Táchira
<https://venezuelanalysis.com/news/14377>, the last remaining states
affected by the blackout. Hetland’s article carries the date of 13
March, when the blackout was already over and there were only a few
smaller towns left affected.
In paragraph two, Hetland states “the most alarming aspect of the
blackout is the lack of power in hospitals.” Of course, the lack of
power in hospitals is alarming and very dangerous. However, all
hospitals in the country have their own independent power generators
that activate in the event of an emergency. A report
<https://docs.wixstatic.com/ugd/0f3ae5_18e3593651044a84911214e279d6c8fa.pdf> by
the opposition-aligned NGO, /Médicos por la Salud/ published on 11 March
in the evening a list of all 32 of the country’s hospitals, with a
detailed explanation of their situation. In all of them, their own power
plants were working with the exception of one where it was working
intermittently. Heltand then adds: “To be blunt: People are dying, and
more will die the longer the blackout continues.” To back up his
assertion he links to a /Reuters /report
<https://lta.reuters.com/articulo/idLTAKBN1QR0WW>, which quotes from
“Medicos por la Salud”, saying that 17 people have died as a result of
problems with electricity supply. When you then look at the NGO’s own
report the picture is less clear. In the report about the state of
hospitals, which I quoted above, of the 32 hospitals listed, all bar two
are marked as “no deceased”, and the other two account for a total of
three people dead. In a separate report
<https://docs.wixstatic.com/ugd/0f3ae5_7fe204d727f24e579dee9b538fcd391c.pdf> by
the same NGO about the number of people who died during the blackout, 24
are listed but no details are given as to the causes of death. So these
could be people who would have died regardless of the blackout. Again,
this might seem a small detail, but details are important, because they
are what build a story. A story can be constructed in two ways. One
would say: “Hospitals dealt with the blackout by using their own
emergency generators, which greatly minimised the dangerous impact of
lack of electricity”. The other says: “the most alarming aspect of the
blackout is the lack of power in hospitals… To be blunt: People are
dying, and more will die”. You are more likely to write the second if
you rely largely or solely on material from /Reuters /and other such
agencies, and you are also more likely to stray from the truth.
What caused the blackout?
Of course, Heltand’s article is built around the blackout and so an
explanation of the causes for it should be given. What does he tell us
about it? He starts by saying there are two competing “narratives”, (a
word I particularly hate), but “neither” he goes on, “ does justice to
Venezuela’s reality.” In Heltand’s opinion: “The blackout and the
broader crisis /are not entirely the fault of Maduro/, nor of the United
States and the domestic opposition. The urgency of the situation demands
recognition of shared responsibility for the crisis.”
But then Hetland states that “only the most myopic analysis could ignore
the government’s clear responsibility for the perilous state of
Venezuela’s electric grid,” and goes on to give as an example: the
scandal of the Tacoma Hydro Plant, a project that was never finished as
a result of corruption. (Even here, he gets some facts wrong, by using a
report that is now outdated). However, the question is, how does a
non-functioning power plant relate to the current blackout? Everyone,
government and opposition, agrees that something went wrong inside the
control centre for the El Guri Hydro complex. The dispute is about /what
/caused the fault. The opposition says it was a wildfire under the main
high power line out of El Guri, while the government claims it was a
cyber attack affecting the SCADA system that regulates the plant, which
produces 80 percent of Venezuela’s power.
What is Heltand’s opinion about this? He does not say. Though he, of
course, mentions the possibility of a cyberattack (quoting an article
from /Forbes/), he does not go into any of the details and his
conclusion is clear:
“Available evidence suggests that the blackout was not caused by
sabotage, but by the electric grid being pushed to the brink by
years of increased use and a lack of investment and maintenance.”
“Available evidence”? Perhaps Heltand knows more than everyone else,
because so far, neither the government nor the opposition have provided
much, if any, evidence to back up their stories. Their arguments are
mostly based on circumstantial evidence. The opposition has not provided
any evidence of the mysterious wildfire that they say affected the 765KV
power line and then caused the El Guri system to shut down, which should
be relatively simple if such a fire had occurred. Furthermore, Guaidó
rejected the idea of a cyber attack, as he alleged that the El Guri
Hydro complex was controlled “analogically”, something that is a
straight lie. All of these things are being widely discussed in
Venezuela, with claims and counter-claims being made. Heltand ignores
all of this and simply claims that “available evidence suggests that the
blackout was not caused by sabotage”, without even mentioning what is
this “available evidence” he bases himself upon, or providing any useful
links as a reference.
In fact, he has already decided on an explanation that fits his
“narrative” and has written a story that ignores the available evidence.
Just to cover himself, after having declared what the cause of the
blackout is he adds: “getting to the bottom of the blackout is
important; journalists based in Venezuela should investigate the
possible causes”. Yes, Mr Hetland, getting to the bottom of the blackout
is important, jumpìng to conclusions based on preconceived ideas does
not help. “Journalists based in Venezuela” have already done a very good
job of attempting to establish what actually happened, and this article
in /15 y Último/
<http://www.15yultimo.com/2019/03/11/apagon-en-venezuela-superiguanas-o-cyber-ataque/>is
perhaps one of the best efforts. It was published on 11 March, two days
before Hetland’s article was published in /The Nation/.
The “path of negotiation”
However, the main problem with Heltand’s article lies in the conclusions
he draws:
“Calls for military intervention must be rejected. One must
recognize, however, the untenability of the status quo. The
combination of Maduro’s repressive and inept rule and debilitating
US sanctions has brought Venezuela to the edge of catastrophe. The
longer the situation continues, the worse things will get.”
Yes, on one thing we can certainly agree. The situation in Venezuela is
bad and has significantly worsened over the last four or five years.
But what is the “plausible path for resolving Venezuela’s crisis” that
he proposes? First of all, he accepts the premise that a “peaceful
transition” needs to take place and this must be through “free and fair
elections”. Here we see how our liberal critic in fact accepts all of
the premises of “regime change” on which US imperialism bases its
current assault on Venezuela. Washington too says it is for a “peaceful
transition” and above all for “free elections”. In fact, this is
precisely what, nominally, they are trying to achieve with their policy
of diplomatic pressure, sanctions and the threat of military
intervention. Hetland therefore assumes, without explaining why, that
the presidential elections in 2018 were not free and fair and that
therefore Maduro is an illegitimate president, otherwise, why should
there be new elections when he was just sworn-in in January? Our liberal
friend finds himself firmly in the camp of the Venezuelan opposition and
US imperialism. His disagreement with imperialism seems to be just
tactical, he does not think that this outcome can or should be achieved
through sanctions or military action. He seems to will the ends but not
the means.
How does he think this can be achieved then? “The only real hope for
Venezuela’s future is the path of negotiations between the government
and the opposition.” This is completely utopian and ignores Venezuela’s
recent past. In fact, over the years, there have been many negotiations
between the government and the opposition. The current attempt by
imperialism is not the first. Already, in April 2002, the opposition
carried out a US-backed coup, barely three years into the Chavez
government. When President Chavez was returned to power by a mass
movement of the poor, what did he do? He called on the opposition to the
negotiating table. How did they respond? By immediately starting to
prepare for another coup, this time in the form of the sabotage of the
oil industry and a bosses’ lockout, which lasted from December 2002
until February 2003 and nearly crippled the economy. The opposition does
not want negotiations, they want to crush the Bolivarian Revolution by
any means necessary. If they think they can achieve this via
negotiations, they will not object, as long as their objectives are
guaranteed.
The most recent attempt at negotiations was the 2016-17 talks in the
Dominican Republic, brokered amongst others by the former
social-democratic president of Spain Zapatero. The main demand of the
opposition in those talks was precisely “free and fair” early
presidential elections. When it seemed that an agreeable compromise had
been reached
<https://twitter.com/osmarycnn/status/961402963125301251/> and even a
date for the elections had been fixed, then the opposition, under
pressure from Bogotá and Washington, decided to walk out of the talks
<https://venezuelanalysis.com/News/13647>. Zapatero was fuming and he
advised the government to go ahead with the elections on the agreed
date. The election, in which a section of the opposition (led by Henri
Falcon) participated, did take place, Maduro won and Zapatero, who acted
as an observer
<https://www.telesurenglish.net/news/Zapatero-On-Elections-Now-The-Venezuelan-People-Must-Speak-20180518-0012.html>,
vouched for the process
<https://www.efe.com/efe/america/politica/observadores-reconocen-la-reeleccion-de-maduro-en-medio-del-ruido-internacional/20000035-3622996>.
But, all of this appears to be a closed book to Hetland.
And who is the government supposed to negotiate with? Throughout his
article and in other writings, Hetland insists on establishing a
difference between “radical sectors of the opposition” or “sectors of
the far-right opposition” and the opposition as a whole. In practice, on
the ground, such a difference does not exist. The current coup attempt
led in Venezuela by Guaidó is backed by /all /the opposition parties
represented in the National Assembly. The 2016 violent riots, which
Hetland mentions in his article, were also part of a /joint/ and
/united/campaign by the opposition as a whole. The bulk of the
opposition, under pressure from Washington, boycotted the presidential
election and expelled Henri Falcón from the MUD (Democratic Unity
Roundtable) for taking part in it.
In any case, how are these negotiations going to happen? The government
has said repeatedly that it is prepared to negotiate (even with Trump),
but the opposition has rejected any advances. Hetland suggests that
perhaps the EU’s International Contact Group could make this happen.
This is either naïve or seriously dangerous. The main EU countries are
completely subordinate to Washington’s strategy on Venezuela. It was
Spanish president Sanchez who issued an eight-day ultimatum to Maduro to
call presidential elections. He was then joined by France, the UK,
Germany and the majority of EU members, who went on to recognise Guaidó
as the “legitimate president” of Venezuela. The ICG was only created in
order to destroy Mexico’s independent initiative to find a negotiated
solution. When the ICG representatives arrived in Montevideo, the
Uruguayan government, under pressure, abandoned its independent position
and left Mexico on its own.
You cannot have half a revolution
To add to Hetland’s mythical unicorn of a “democratic opposition” he
then adds that, once the US is removed from the equation (how? By whom?)
then we can hope (hope springs eternal in the liberal breasts) for “a
growth of a much broader opposition movement, one in which the voices of
the popular classes could have much more weight.” This is perhaps the
crux of the matter. The main problem in Hetland’s approach is the lack
of any discussion of the class nature of this conflict.
The Venezuelan opposition, and behind it Washington, represents the
interests of the country’s oligarchy: the rich and wealthy families that
have ruled Venezuela for over a 100 years and playing a subordinate role
to US imperialism. Their mass base of support is mainly drawn from the
middle-class and upper-middle-class areas in the east of Caracas and
other major cities. Chavismo has its roots amongst the working class,
the poor peasants and the urban poor.
The opposition supporters have an irrational hatred, a primal fear, of
the chavista masses. During the violent opposition rioting in 2016, a
young man, Orlando Figuera, was burnt alive and died as a result. His
“crime”? Being dark-skinned and therefore looking both poor and like a
chavista. Certainly, in this opposition, the voices of the popular
classes have no weight. For good reason, most of the Venezuelan poor and
the working class have a healthy class instinct, and they reject an
opposition that they correctly see as representing /Los Amos del Valle/,
the age-old oligarchy, abiding by the interests of imperialism.
The Maduro government has had a policy of attempting to compromise with
and make concessions to the ruling class. This has eroded popular
support for the Bolivarian Revolution. What “progressives” need to
discuss is the root cause of the crisis in Venezuela, and on that basis,
discuss a solution that benefits the country’s working people.
The frightful economic crisis from which Venezuela is suffering was
triggered in 2014 by the collapse in the price of oil, and has been
aggravated by some of the government’s policy decisions (deficit
financing, paying the foreign debt), widespread corruption /and US
sanctions/. But its root cause are the well-meaning attempts of the
Bolivarian government to regulate the capitalist economy (through price
and foreign exchange controls, and robust labour and trade union
legislation) in order to protect the interests of the many. This does
not work. Capitalism cannot be regulated. If such a thing is attempted,
capitalists resort to any measures necessary (legal or illegal) to
circumvent such controls, establish systems by which they end up
benefiting from them (foreign currency speculation, black marketeering,
hoarding) and generally resort to sabotage (investment strikes and
capital flight). Venezuela is a textbook case of this.
There are therefore only two solutions to the untenable status quo
Hetland talks about. One resolves the crisis in the benefit of the
capitalist class and imperialism. That is the one advocated by Guaidó in
his “Plan País”, with the backing of the US. It involves privatising
state-owned companies, opening up the public sector to private capital,
and above all “opening up” the oil industry (which is what John Bolton
demanded). This would mean making the poor and workers pay the full
price of the crisis. That is the opposition’s programme, and it
certainly does not give any weight to “the voices of the popular classes”.
The other solution would be based on pursuing genuine revolutionary
policies in the benefit of the majority, a return to the tasks that
Chavez announced but left unfinished: a socialist economy and a
“communal state”. A socialist economy would require the expropriation of
the multinationals and the main capitalist groups in Venezuela, as well
as the latifundia, in order to create a democratic plan of production
under workers’ control to satisfy the needs of the majority. A communal
state would imply putting power in the hands of workers committees,
peasant committees and neighbourhood councils, so that the people can rule.
Hetland seems to perceive only a handful of actors in Venezuela: the US,
the far-right opposition, a mythical “democratic” opposition and the
Maduro government. However, there is also a chavista revolutionary
movement, which is not the same as the government. This can be found in
the El Maizal, in organisations like Alexis Vive, in the few remaining
experiences of workers’ control and in the tens-of-thousands of poor and
working-class Venezuelans who have come out in the last few weeks to
oppose imperialist intervention, but you will not find it in the pages
of the mass media in the US. They are in different degrees critical of
the Maduro government as a whole or at least of some of its worst
aspects (corruption, bureaucracy, etc), but they know full well that the
coming to power of Guaidó, on the back of an imperialist intervention,
would be a major disaster.
What progressives in the US should do is, first and foremost, oppose the
imperialist policies of their government (including sanctions and
military intervention). This should be done, not just through writing
articles but by organising a mass campaign in the streets and a mass
education campaign amongst students and workers. That campaign must
distance itself from and challenge the main premises that imperialism is
using to justify its intervention. It does not mean suspending criticism
of the Maduro government, but that criticism should be made from the
point of view of the interests of Venezuelan workers and peasants, not
with a view to pleasing liberal academics in the USA. Of course, such a
campaign needs to offer an analysis of what has gone wrong in Venezuela,
but that analysis needs to be firmly based on a class perspective, not
on the utopian idea that EU-brokered talks can somehow resolve the
conflict between the interests of the Venezuelan workers and poor and
those of the oligarchy and imperialism.
/The views expressed in this article are the author's own and do not
necessarily reflect those of the Venezuelanalysis editorial staff./
--
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