[News] Vietnam Will Win: Leadership and Democracy

[Anti-Imperialist News]

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<https://www.counterpunch.org/2018/02/14/vietnam-will-win-leadership-and-democracy/> 



  Vietnam Will Win: Leadership and Democracy

by /*Wilfred Burchett - February 14, 2018
*/
------------------------------------------------------------------------

To mark the 50th Anniversary of the 1968 Têt Offensive, CounterPunch is 
serializing Wilfred Burchett’s /Vietnam Will Win/(Guardian Books, New 
York, 1968) over the next few weeks. Readers can judge for themselves 
the validity of the facts, observations, analysis, conclusions, 
predictions and so on made by the author. The books is based on several 
visits to the Liberated Zones controlled by the National Liberation 
Front (‘Viet Cong’) of South Vietnam in 1963-64, 1964-65 and in 1966-67 
and close contacts with the NLF leadership, resistance fighters and 
ordinary folk. Wilfred Burchett’s engagement with Vietnam began in March 
1954, when he met and interviewed President Ho Chi Minh in his jungle 
headquarters in Thai Nguyen, on the eve of the battle of Dien Bien Phu. 
He was also on intimate terms with General Vo Nguyen Giap, Prime 
Minister Pham Van Dong and most of the leadership of the Democratic 
Republic of Vietnam during the country’s struggle against French 
colonialism and American imperial aggression. Wilfred Burchett was not 
writing history as a historian, with the benefit of hindsight, access to 
archives etc. He was reporting history as it was unfolding, often in 
dangerous places. He was an on-the-spot reporter, an eyewitness to 
history. In his reporting, he followed his own convictions, political 
and moral. The book he wrote after his first two visits to the Liberated 
Zones, /Vietnam: Inside Story of the Guerilla War/(International 
Publishers, New York, 1965) concludes with this short sentence: “The 
best they [the Americans] can do is to go home.” /Vietnam Will Win/ 
confirms that.

Unfortunately, it took another seven years (1968-75) of death and 
devastation – and the extension of the war into Cambodia and Laos – for 
the U.S. to finally leave Vietnam in ignominy in April 1975. So here, 
chapter by chapter, Wilfred Burchett exposes the futility of fighting a 
people united in their struggle for independence, liberty and unity. It 
also explains, soberly and factually, why they were winning and how they 
won.

/George Burchett, Hanoi/

*Leadership and Democracy*

Deep in the jungle, there was a full-scale model of a corner of a 
military post surrounded by rows of barbed wire leading to a moat and a 
section of two-yard-high earthen ramparts studded with watchtowers. 
Inside the ramparts an inner system of trenches and fire-points 
zigzagged back toward bamboo and thatch barracks, arms depots, radio 
center and a headquarters building dominating the others. I had seen the 
whole complex set out in a sandpit model a few days earlier and listened 
to explanations of the nature of the buildings and the disposition of 
the defenses. What I was looking at now was an exact replica of a 
fortress in nearby Binh Duong province marked down for attack.

I stood with the commander and the political officer of the regiment 
assigned to the job. We were a few yards away from a key blockhouse 
which dominated this part of the ramparts. The surrounding jungle was 
completely quiet except for the chatter of flocks of parrots and the 
flute-like chirruping of a couple of gibbons. Apart from my companions, 
there was not a soul to be seen. At the sound of a whistle three men 
bent double with the weight of heavy charges dashed forward, fixing 
“satchel charges” against the first row of plaited creepers which 
represented the “barbed wire.” Within the twinkling of an eye they laid 
their charges and tiny red flags and faded away. A shot from the 
direction of a watchtower warned they had been spotted. A volley of 
machine-gun fire-both shot and volley simulated by banging on empty 
condensed-milk cans-replied, and another trio dashed forward to repeat 
the “satchel charge” operation at any second, then the third row, each 
time planting the little red flags to mark the “gaps” while 
machine-gunners propelled by their elbows moved up close to the “gaps” 
that would have been torn in the barbed wire by the “satchel charges.” 
Assault troops followed, hugging the ground and almost invisible as they 
snaked forward in the dim light filtering through the heavy jungle canopy.

“Machine guns” were rat-tatting away in all directions as the last trio 
dashed through the “gaps” and placed a massive pack charge against the 
base of the blockhouse, hurling in a couple of grenades and dashing back 
before the “explosion.” A real bugle sounded and the first wave of 
assault troops rushed through the breach, the leading trio carrying an 
ingenious combination bridge-ladder bamboo scaling device, a key weapon 
in the main assault. As the bridge section was hurled across to straddle 
the moat, the ladder hinged to it automatically swung up to come to rest 
against the blockhouse wall, the first assault troops clambering over it 
the moment it hit the wall.

The rapidity with which the bridge-ladder was hurled against the walls 
and the first shock wave was over the top, hurling dummy hand grenades, 
had to be seen to be believed. Within seconds the first and succeeding 
waves were fanning out along the inner trenches and heavy machine guns 
had been set up on the ruins of the blockhouse aimed at the watchtowers, 
while 57-mm bazookas were trained on the inner defense installations. 
The assault developed at lightning speed, troops spreading out in a 
dozen directions but converging around the main defense positions. 
Whistles, bugle calls, shouts indicated that a position had been taken, 
reinforcements were needed or there was a wounded man.

Regimental commander Truong – I never learned his full name – stood 
straight as a ramrod checking the various phases with a stopwatch, like 
an Olympic trainer. When the NLF flag fluttered atop the headquarters 
building, he looked at his watch and said, “Eight-and-a-half minutes. 
Not bad for the first time. We usually like to complete such operations 
in 15 minutes and with average opposition, that is about what this one 
will take, unless there are surprises. Within minutes of the flag’s 
appearance, a group had formed around one perspiring, stocky young man 
who I had noticed as particularly active in urging the assault teams 
forward. By the time we got there an animated discussion seemed to me to 
be getting quite heated. I asked what was going on.

“The commander of the assault company is being severely criticized by 
some of the men,” he replied, “because in earlier briefings and in the 
sandpit model, one machine-gun position had been overlooked according to 
the defense dispositions here and the layout of the trenches did not 
correspond exactly. The team that was supposed to seize the radio room 
as first priority did not make it in time because of this. Such errors 
can be costly. Our attacks depend on split-second timing, taking the 
defenders by surprise and completing the operation seconds before the 
enemy has time to react.”

All around the “compound” there were smaller groups engaged in similar 
intense discussions. At one group the medium-weapons support platoon was 
being criticized because one of their machine guns had not been moved 
forward at the same rhythm as the shock troops despite urgent whistles 
from the latter when the unsuspected “enemy” machine gun was discovered.

“We will have a summing up discussion afterward,” Truong said. “But 
sometimes unbeknown to the lower echelon commanders we include small 
errors like the enemy machine gun and the trench layout mistakes in 
order to check the vigilance of the troops, to encourage their critical 
faculties and also their capacity and initiative in adapting themselves 
to unexpected situations. We don’t want an army of automatons, but teams 
of intelligent, adaptable human beings. We develop fighters of high 
morale and of great courage, but courage should be used intelligently. 
‘Courage with intelligence’ – that is one of our slogans. Our troops 
should be ready to lay down their lives at any moment if absolutely 
necessary, but they are absolutely not to sacrifice their lives 
uselessly. ‘Determined to fight, determined to win,’ is one of our main 
slogans, but fight to win and live to fight and win again and again is 
also an essential concept in our ideological training. For a higher 
cadre to endanger the lives of the men under his command through 
carelessness is unpardonable and that is why we encourage the strongest 
criticism during the preparatory phases of an operation, from the men 
who have to face the enemy bullets. Apart from anything else, this is 
also a good way of training future cadres drawn from the ranks.”

Later I watched a heavy-weapons support company assigned to the assault 
battalion – the regiment’s remaining two battalions were to be deployed 
to ambush enemy reinforcements – go through training exercises. There 
was the same extreme realism, the same insistence on perfection of 
movement and split-second timing, ability to change positions under 
enemy fire, to respond to urgent signals from the assault forces, speed 
in assembling and dismantling mortars and heavy machine guns on their 
base plates and tripods and in changing positions by the anti-aircraft 
gunners, as model planes strung high up in the trees and manipulated by 
jungle creepers circled and dived.

A couple of days previously I had been with the same men, grouped around 
a sand pit model of the whole triangular system of forts that was to be 
attacked. Among the obstacles were three tiers of barbed-wire fences, a 
yard-and-a-half-deep moat and two-yard-high earthen ramparts. I took 
part for only a few hours in a discussion that would last several days. 
We were interrupted briefly by planes that bombed the area, the first of 
the bombs landing a hundred yards or so from the sandpit, but the 
U.S.-Saigon command was obviously not aware of what was going on as the 
planes never returned.

The main problem being discussed while I was there was whether the 
attack should be concentrated on one blockhouse with diversionary 
attacks on others, or whether there should be concentrated attacks on 
several simultaneously.

Specialists on demolitions and on cutting gaps in the rows of barbed 
wire and the chief of the heavy-weapons platoon were listened to with 
great attention when they outlined the problems from their viewpoint. A 
scout who had conducted reconnaissance missions was questioned several 
times on details of the fortifications, including the exact depth and 
width of the moat, the height of the ear them ramparts.

“The bridge-ladders for crossing the moat and scaling the walls are 
built specifically for each operation,” explained Truong. “They are 
based on absolutely precise reconnaissance: the bridge section must be 
of the exact width and the ladder section the exact height required, 
otherwise the scaling operation, a key part of the assault, can turn 
into a disaster. They also have to be light enough to be carried by two 
men, but strong enough to support a man on every rung. After the 
operation we take them apart and use them as stretchers.”

During the discussions over the sandpit and later after the mock 
assault, it was impressive to see the complete equality between 
commanders and men, the freedom with which the rank and file criticized 
their superiors, and the natural way in which the latter accepted this 
criticism, patiently replying point by point until everyone was satisfied.

Thuong Chien, the regiment’s political officer, explained that in 
discussions before an operation, commanders and men were on an 
absolutely equal footing; that as long as any rank-and-file soldier 
raised any objection to an operational plan, discussion must continue 
until he was satisfied. During the operation discipline was total, the 
rank and file were expected to carry out allotted tasks and execute 
every command of their superiors without fail. But after the action was 
over, commanders and men were back on the same equal basis, in the 
critical summing-up sessions which followed each operation.

“In that way we combine democracy with leadership,” Thuong Chien said, 
and he went on to outline some basic precepts of the Liberation Army. 
“Commanders and rank and file are of the same social and class origin, 
mainly peasants. We are united by hatred of the oppressors and foreign 
aggressors. We live, study and fight together. Morale is high primarily 
because of the complete democracy within our armed forces. You have seen 
part of a typical nonoperational discussion. Often it is only after 
long, complex discussions that unify of views is achieved. In this way 
the rank and file know that nothing is being imposed from above, that 
every suggestion to avoid losses while keeping the main aim in view is 
welcomed. The command has the benefit of the ideas of the whole 
collective. Such discussions are a concrete expression of courage and 
intelligence. For every action that we plan, similar discussions take 
place at which every phase of the projected operation is analyzed – the 
preparation, the actual attack, the results. From such critical 
summing-up meetings we draw conclusions for the next action. Everyone 
takes part and this produces the best resulting line with an old 
Vietnamese saying, ‘Three idiots make one wise man.'”

For several weeks on each of two different occasions, I lived and 
traveled with regular Liberation Army units, spending part of the time 
at regimental, battalion and company headquarters, and in one regiment I 
spent several days living and traveling with a ten-man squad. The unity 
and harmony within the various units, the relations between commanders 
and men were something wonderful to behold. I have shared a soldier’s 
life with armies in many parts of the world, starting in 1941 with the 
Kuomintang troops during the Sino-Japanese war, and with the troops of 
many other armies since, in over a quarter of a century of reporting 
wars. But I have never experienced the quality of relations that exist 
within the ranks of the NLF forces in South Vietnam. To say that they 
are those that exist between members of an ideally happy family may seem 
banal, but it is difficult to think of a better comparison, especially 
in illustrating the solicitude that commanders at every level display 
towards men under their command and the affectionate relations between 
the rank and file themselves and between them and their commanders. The 
fact that commanders and men dress alike, eat the same food, sleep in 
the same sort of hammocks, share the same bamboo huts in base areas and 
are in general indistinguishable was impressive enough; even more 
striking was the complete equality of men and officers in every 
circumstance. In the very lively discussions which often took place, it 
was impossible to decide who was the commander and who the commanded.

Did such familiarity and equal status result in any loss of respect or 
lack of confidence in the leadership at various levels? I was assured it 
did not. On the contrary, a commander was there just because he had the 
confidence of his men, was elected by them, and had proved himself. The 
moment he lost the confidence of his men, he could be removed by 
majority decision of those he commanded.

A day or two after having joined the ten-man squad, after our evening 
meal of rice and salted fish, most of the squad members joined others 
from the platoon to which the squad was attached, and set off, myself 
and my interpreter following them down a narrow jungle trail to a little 
clearing, where everyone squatted down on his heels with a tiny bottle 
lamp in front of him. Although it was a clear night, one had to strain 
his eyes to spot even a single star glinting through the thick leafy 
canopy. The participants were platoon members of the Liberation Youth 
Association. Each pulled out a small notebook, and one, who my 
interpreter whispered was the ‘chin tri vien’ (political 
representative), spoke for a few minutes in a low voice. In the same 
subdued tones, others followed in what was obviously a very serious 
discussion. Although this was a base camp, there was an enemy post less 
than two miles away. I asked why they did not meet in the bamboo 
barracks. “Other comrades need to rest; we are meeting in a rest period 
when noise is not permitted,” the interpreter whispered back.

The theme of the discussion was the difficulty in getting to real grips 
with the enemy. It was around the beginning of 1965 when the Saigon 
forces were in full disintegration following the Binh Gia defeat. “The 
enemy is no longer falling for our tactics of attacking enemy posts and 
wiping out enemy reinforcements,” the interpreter said, summarizing the 
gist of the discussion. “In recent weeks they tend to cut their losses 
and when we attack a post, the enemy command prefers to lose it and 
abandon territory rather than lose more effectives by sending 
reinforcements to fall into our ambushes. But to win the war we have to 
wipe out the enemy forces. They have even withdrawn from a number of 
smaller posts that we intended to attack, abandoning lots of territory 
and concentrating in bigger posts with a battalion or more in each. The 
enemy’s divisional commanders are trying to preserve their troops in 
this way. This is a new situation for our forces and the ‘chinh tri 
vien’ says we will have to adopt new tactics. We shall have to go after 
the enemy in his garrisons; we can no longer count on him coming to us, 
his morale is too low. We must be prepared to go right into their posts, 
even big complexes of posts, and destroy them. To do this we must 
improve our technique, face up to new problems. We must perfect the 
speediest and most efficient way of laying mines, achieve greater 
precision in coordinated assaults and acquire the technique of rapid and 
complete destruction of the enemy’s artillery positions inside the posts 
We must be prepared to move more swiftly than ever, especially after the 
attack, because these big posts are further away from our jungle bases 
than those we have been attacking till now. Our troops should be able to 
travel lighter after an attack because from now on we need no longer pay 
attention to carrying off enemy arms but to wiping out his effectives 
and his artillery and base installations.”

The rest of the discussion was of a technical nature, everyone taking 
part by raising his notebook when he wanted to speak. From then on the 
only difference between men and commander was that the ‘chinh tri vien’ 
decided who spoke in case two raised their notebooks at the same time. 
The platoon’s military commander took his turn with the others and apart 
from the fact that he seemed to be listened to with a little more 
deference, he could not have been spotted. Suggestions were made to 
lighten equipment by having the kitchen staff prepare meals in advance 
at the closest possible point consistent with safety to the takeoff 
place for the attack, so that the troops would not have to carry 
rations. The food could even be left in a cache with a guard. A 
demolitions expert pointed out that as heavier charges would be 
necessary to blow up such bases, the comrades in the regimental arsenal 
should try to produce more powerful explosives without increasing the 
weight. Someone suggested that as the enemy’s morale was obviously low, 
those in charge of propaganda should redouble their efforts to reach the 
puppet troops in their new bases to warn them they would not be safe 
there and had better think of deserting. Several disagreed with this and 
said that it was better not to warn the enemy of what was in store for 
him but first make sure of dealing a very heavy blow, wiping out one of 
the big bases and then using the result to carry out propaganda in the 
others. It was agreed to ask the company commander to arrange more 
frequent meetings at company level as soon as the lust of the new type 
of targets was selected. This was the only decision taken. The meeting 
lasted just one hour, then all of them pocketed their books, picked up 
their lamps and went back to the barracks.

“Discussion on this will continue now every night among the entire 
squad, not just those who are Liberation Youth Association members,” 
explained my interpreter. “The war is really entering a new phase and 
everyone will be expected to make his contribution to how the new 
problems should be tackled. The political representative will make a 
report on this meeting to the ‘chinh tri vien’ at company level, and he 
will make a synthesis report of the discussant of the three platoons 
directly to the regimental command. A similar synthesis report at 
regimental level will go directly to our high command.”

Back at the regimental command, relating my impressions of the excellent 
relations between commanders and men and the very high morale of the 
troops at every echelon down to the squad, the political officer, Thuong 
Chien, said that in the viewpoint of the high command, the “three major 
factors in still further improving the fighting spirit of the Liberation 
Army are to give correct leadership and correct political education; to 
pay great attention to improving tactics and technique; and to pay great 
attention to constantly raising the material and cultural living 
standards of the troops, ensuring a steady improvement in everything 
from food and sports to poetry and music.”

As for the high morale, he added, “This is because of correct 
leadership at the top which directs political education based on a clear 
distinction between enemy and friends. This is the greatest source of 
our troops’ combativity. A logical consequence of this is that we are 
based on the people. We fight for the cause of the people and we are 
supported on every hand by the people. This support has been a great 
factor in our rapid development and a great source of satisfaction to 
our fighting men.

“Commanders and men have all risen from the ranks of the people. None of 
us have been formed in academies or institutes. The question of superior 
morale is one of political and ideological attitude. That is why we 
never cease stressing the importance of political leadership and 
education and genuine democracy within our armed forces. Only when a 
fighter has correct politics and ideology can he freely accept the 
absolute iron discipline which we demand on the battlefield; only when a 
commander has correct politics and ideology can he behave like a real 
leader of men on the battlefield and freely accept the democratic spirit 
we demand off the battlefield.”

This combination of leadership and democracy obviously has nothing in 
common with the sort of example cited by Régis Debray in /Revolution in 
the Revolution 
<https://www.amazon.com/exec/obidos/ASIN/0394171217/counterpunchmaga>, 
/in which combatants during the Spanish Civil War “argued about their 
officer’s orders in the heat of battle, refusing to attack such and such 
a position, or to withdraw at a given moment, holding meetings under 
enemy fire to decide what tactic to follow…”[1] <#_edn1> Leadership on 
the battlefield in South Vietnam means that the commander directs the 
implementation of decisions arrived at by the most democratic process 
possible, every detail of which has been agreed on beforehand by those 
taking part in the attack. If the decisions are wrong it is a collective 
responsibility. If the implementation fails due to bad leadership, the 
leader will be changed.

One thing noted during actions in which I involuntarily took part, due 
to surprise encounters with U.S.-Saigon troops, as well as in training 
exercises and barracks life, was the absence of the sergeant’s bark. In 
action everyone seemed to know what he had to do, even in a surprise 
situation, and commands were like urgent exchanges of a few words at a 
noise level just sufficient for the communications to be understood. 
Whistles are used for obviously coded signals and bugles for assault. 
One rarely hears a shouted command, doubtless partly because of long 
years of living “integrated with the enemy,” as one commander expressed 
it, but also because discipline and confidence in the leaders is such 
that a commander does not have to shout in order to impress. The 
quietness with which everything is handled among the NLF units is a 
characteristic that has impressed all who have visited them. It is 
something very special, and inseparable from the harmonious relations 
between commanders and men, which in turn is a consequence of the 
constant stress on ideological attitudes.

Virtually every regimental, battalion and company commander of the 
Liberation Army with whom I talked had started as a rank-and-file 
soldier in the self defense guerrillas, proving himself first of all as 
a guerrilla leader and then graduating through the regional troops to 
the regular army. By the time he took over a platoon or a company of the 
Liberation Army, he was a veteran resourceful commander of a quality, 
even from a purely military viewpoint, infinitely superior to his 
opposite number in the Saigon forces or in the U.S. Army when it arrived.

There are three types of armed forces. Local self-defense guerrillas 
whose main job is to defend their own villages, pin down local enemy 
forces in nearby posts, keep those posts permanently encircled, carry 
out propaganda and “persuasion” work among the enemy. In early 1965, as 
the Saigon forces were withdrawn from encircled posts all over the 
country, and the military tasks of the self-defense guerrillas became 
much lighter, the young women started taking over, releasing men for 
service in the regional troops and the regular army. In the early days 
of the insurrection, women served also in the latter two bodies, but 
from 1965 onward they were encouraged to go back and form the backbone 
of the self-defense guerrillas and production teams. The self-defense 
guerrillas are part-time soldiers, serving in rotation in tasks which 
demand permanent posting of troops, such as encirclement of enemy posts, 
but otherwise taking part in production. They are armed mainly with 
rifles, but by 1965 there was a sprinkling of automatic weapons in every 
village and plenty of hand grenades and mines. Most villages have their 
own small arsenals for at least making mines. The local guerrillas are 
responsible also for maintaining and constantly extending the “passive” 
explosive “booby traps” to “platoons” of bee-handlers releasing swarms 
of vicious outsize bees to attack hostile intruders.

Regional troops are full-time soldiers, much better armed than the 
self-defense guerrillas and functioning in a defined geographical area, 
usually a district or group of districts. Their job is to deal with 
enemy forces stationed in the same area, break up enemy raids, lay 
ambushes, encircle bases, attack posts within the region. The regular 
Liberation Army deals with the enemy’s mobile reserves, initiates 
offensive operations and attacks major enemy concentrations. When the 
enemy employs mobile forces in a sweep operation into NLF-controlled 
territory, then all three branches of the NLF forces coordinate their 
activities. Each branch has its standard assigned role, valid for whole 
phases of the war, and it changes only when the situation changes.

In step with the development of the “mind behind the gun,” there was 
also a steady evolution of military tactics, each phase of which a 
commander had to master before he could become even a platoon leader. 
After the transition from passive to active defense, there were 
diversionary actions in one area to prevent the enemy from concentrating 
on one particular village or district. After strategic hamlets were set 
up under the guns of military posts in their immediate vicinity, there 
were night attacks against these posts. For the NLF forces this 
represented a big step forward. And as the regular forces developed, 
there was a combination of night attacks by regional troops and 
self-defense guerrillas on enemy posts with major battles waged the 
following day by the regular army, usually fighting from fixed 
positions, as they ambushed enemy reinforcements with the “attack enemy 
posts – wipe out enemy reinforcements” tactics. At the battle of Binh 
Gia, the Liberation Army went over to war of movement and had clear-cut 
victories in several classical daytime battles. By that time (the first 
weeks of 1965), the Liberation Army was making skillful use of feint 
attacks and diversionary actions, maneuvering enemy battalions into 
positions that enabled them to launch the decisive attacks, usually with 
such a sudden and devastating concentration of fire that the outcome was 
decided in the first few minutes of-the action.

Every new phase required new qualities of leadership, new demands on 
grasp, initiative, ingenuity and intelligence. If a commander could not 
keep up with the new tasks, he dropped back into the ranks with no hard 
feelings, and another came forward.

This was possible because of the complete unity of aims of the whole 
collective. Promotion does not come easily. Soldiers advance in as tough 
a military school as the world has ever known, and perhaps the toughest. 
South Vietnam’s peasant guerrillas, who have been fighting off and on 
four more than a quarter of a century, provide the Liberation Army with 
inexhaustible, rich resources of unequalled leadership cadres.

Within the Liberation Army, general education goes hand in hand with 
military and political training, and this facilitates the grasping of 
modern techniques. No book-learning alone, no military academy, could 
provide the qualities of leadership that experience and political and 
military training have given commanders in the NLF forces. And no armed 
forces, except those fighting on for such just aims, could dare to 
introduce the same system of democratic leadership as the guideline for 
its armed forces.

*Notes.*

[1] <#_ednref1> Translation from Régis Debray, /Révolution dans la 
Révolution/, Paris, François Maspero, 1967, p. 124.

/George Burchett comment: I was present when Régis Debray 
<https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/R%C3%A9gis_Debray> and my father first 
met in our flat in Paris. My father apologized for criticizing him in 
his book while he was in prison in Bolivia and unable to respond. They 
became excellent friends./

*NEXT: Chapter 5 – Winning Hearts and Minds*


  Vietnam Will Win: Leadership and Democracy
  <https://www.counterpunch.org/2018/02/14/vietnam-will-win-leadership-and-democracy/>

February 14, 2018 by Wilfred Burchett 
<https://www.counterpunch.org/author/wilfred-burchett/>


  Vietnam Will Win: Building an Army
  <https://www.counterpunch.org/2018/02/12/vietnam-will-win-building-an-army/>

February 12, 2018 by Wilfred Burchett 
<https://www.counterpunch.org/author/wilfred-burchett/>


  Vietnam Will Win: the Making of a Soldier
  <https://www.counterpunch.org/2018/02/09/vietnam-will-win-the-making-of-a-soldier/>

February 9, 2018 by Wilfred Burchett 
<https://www.counterpunch.org/author/wilfred-burchett/>


  Vietnam Will Win: the Politics of Strategy
  <https://www.counterpunch.org/2018/02/07/vietnam-will-win-the-politics-of-strategy/>

February 7, 2018 by Wilfred Burchett 
<https://www.counterpunch.org/author/wilfred-burchett/>


  Vietnam Will Win: Introduction
  <https://www.counterpunch.org/2018/02/02/vietnam-will-win-introduction/>

February 2, 2018 by Wilfred Burchett 
<https://www.counterpunch.org/author/wilfred-burchett/>

**

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