[News] Military Coup in Egypt - Requiem for a Revolution that Never Was
Anti-Imperialist News
news at freedomarchives.org
Thu Jul 18 11:44:11 EDT 2013
http://www.counterpunch.org/2013/07/18/requiem-for-a-revolution-that-never-was/
July 18, 2013
*The Military Coup in Egypt*
Requiem for a Revolution that Never Was
by AJAMU BARAKA
/"Sometimes people hold a core belief that is very strong. When they
are presented with evidence that works against that belief, the new
evidence cannot be accepted. It would create a feeling that is
extremely uncomfortable, called cognitive dissonance. And because it
is so important to protect the core belief, they will rationalize,
ignore and even deny anything that doesn't fit in with the core
belief." /
- Frantz Fanon, /The Wretched of the Earth/
As the military in Egypt consolidates its putsch against the leadership
and political structures of the Muslim Brotherhood, it should be obvious
that the initial narrative rationalizing intervention by the military as
a necessary corrective to a "revolutionary process" has lost all
credibility. Yet many liberals and radicals appear united in a fanciful
reading of the events in Egypt that not only legitimizes the coup but
characterizes the collection of small-minded state-capitalists thugs who
make up the top officer corps of the military as part of the people and
the revolutionary process.
From bourgeois intellectual hacks like Isabel Coleman to venerable
Marxist materialists like Samir Amin, who implied that the Egyptian army
was a neutral class force, the emotional response to seeing hundreds of
thousands of people on the streets seems to have created a case of
temporary insanity, or as Frantz Fanon refers to it as -- cognitive
dissonance. This can be the only explanation for the theoretical and
rhetorical acrobatics many are engaged in to reconcile their beliefs in
democratic rights and revolutionary transformation with what is
occurring right before their eyes in Egypt.
*A revolution in name only *
The popular use and acceptance of the term revolution to describe the
events in Egypt over the last two years demonstrates the effectiveness
of global liberal discourse to "de-radicalize," with the collusion of
some radicals, even the term "revolution."
Eschewing the romanticism associated with revolution and the
sentimentality connected to seeing the "masses in motion," it has to be
concluded that between February 2011, when Mubarak was ousted, and July
3, 2013, when the military officially reassumed power, there was no
revolutionary process at all, in the sense that there was no transfer of
power away from the class forces that dominated Egyptian society. No
restructuring of the state; no new democratic institutions and
structures created to represent the will and interests of the new
progressive social bloc of students, workers, farmers, women's
organizations etc.; and no deep social transformation. In fact, the
rapes and sexual assaults that occurred during the recent mobilizations
were a graphic reminder that sexist and patriarchal ideas still ruled,
untouched by this so-called revolutionary process.
A revolutionary process is a process by which structures of power are
created by a broad mass of people that allow them to eventually
transform every aspect of their society --- from the structure and role
of the State and the organization of the economy to inter-personal
relations --- all with a view to eliminating all forms of oppression.
There were some important organizational advances made by some elements
of the labor movement in Egypt, including the creation of independent
trade unions. However, the organizational imperative for revolutionary
change that requires the building of popular structures to sustain mass
struggle and represent dual power, was not as strong as it should have
been in Egypt.
Early 2011 in Egypt saw mass agitation for social change and a mass
rebellion against a dictatorship that galvanized previously disparate
social forces and classes --- Westernized secular liberals, labor rights
activists, radical students, women's rights activists and Islamic
fundamentalists --- into one oppositional social bloc. The initial
demand was for the end of the Mubarak dictatorship and the creation of a
democratic system that respected democratic rights --- the essential
component of an authentic national democratic revolutionary process.
However, the maturation of this process was arrested due to three
factors: (i) the seizure of power by the Supreme Council of Armed Forces
(SCAF) on February 11, (ii) the channeling of mass dissent primarily
into the electoral process, and (iii) the failure of the oppositional
forces to organize sustainable mass structures to safeguard and
consolidate the developing revolutionary situation.
The concern with characterizing the nature of mass struggle in Egypt and
in Tunisia that eventually was branded as the "Arab spring," is not
driven by a desire for some kind of neat, categorical purity that
abstracts complex social phenomenon from its historical context. But
instead the concern is the need to differentiate politically and
programmatically the specific political challenges and tasks between an
insurrectionary phase of struggle and one that has entered a
pre-revolutionary or revolutionary phase.
This is important because the liberal appropriation of the term
"revolution" to describe everything from the events in Libya and Syria
to the Green movement in Iran not only distorts social reality but also
advances a dangerous narrative. That narrative suggests that
revolutionary change takes place as a result of spectacle. It devalues
organizing and building structures from the bottom up as unnecessary
because it is the theater that is important; the episodic show; the
display that refutes Gil Scott Heron's admonition that "the revolution
will not be televised!"
The perverted logic of this approach is reflected in both the failure of
the opposition to organize itself beyond the spontaneous mobilizations
of 2011 and the knowledge of Morsi's opponents, the Tamarod --- thanks
to signals from their patrons in the U.S. --- that if they demonstrated
significant street opposition to President Morsi the U.S. would have the
cover to support intervention by the military.
*The military's pre-emptive strike against revolution*
To have a clearer view of the current situation in Egypt, we must debunk
the nonsensical, a-historical gibberish that suggests that the Egyptian
military is a neutral, grand mediator of contending social and political
forces, and stepped into the political scene in January 2011 and again
July 2^nd as a national patriotic force allied with the interests of the
"people."
The reality is that what we have witnessed in Egypt is a lateral
transfer of power, in class terms, from the civilians in the Mubarak
government, representing capitalist interests tied to the State, to the
military, which has similar economic interests, with their enterprises
and retired officer corps populating companies connected to the State
sector. In fact, under President Morsi, the military never really went
away. It maintained an independent space in the Egyptian state and
economy. Critical ministerial positions in the Morsi cabinet, such as
the Interior Ministry, Defense and Suez Canal Authority, were given to
individuals associated with the Mubarak regime that were allied with the
military. And the Egyptian Supreme Constitutional Court, populated by
Mubarak-era appointees, was the main instrument used by the military to
limit and control any efforts to restructure the state or expand Morsi's
power.
For U.S. policy-makers, the Muslim Brotherhood and the Morsi government
were never seen as an alternative to Hosni Mubarak. Despite the
repression meted out to members of the Muslim Brotherhood by the Mubarak
regime, it was well understood that the Brotherhood was part of the
Egyptian economic elite and open to doing business with the West.
Therefore, Morsi was seen as an acceptable and safe civilian face to
replace Mubarak while the U.S. continued its influence behind the scenes
through the military.
Both the U.S. government and the Egyptian military had objective
interests in making sure that the power of the Morsi Presidency remained
more symbolic than real. The military, working through the
Constitutional Court and the bureaucracy, made sure that President Morsi
and the Muslim Brotherhood only had nominal control of the State. Morsi
did not control the intelligence or security apparatus, the police, the
diplomatic corps, or the bureaucracy, which was still staffed with
Mubarak holdovers.
In fact, one of the major sources of tension between the military and
the Muslim Brotherhood was the threat --- and real moves --- made by the
Morsi government to use their nominal state power to curtail the
economic activity of the military, which holds interests controlling
anything from 15 to 40 percent of the economy, in favor of the interests
of the Muslim Brotherhood itself, representing sectors of the
competitive capitalist class.
One way of looking at the assault on the Muslim Brotherhood is that it
was nothing more than a militarized solution to an intra-bourgeois class
struggle within the context of Egyptian society, and had nothing to do
with the interests of the fragmented and institutionally-weak opposition.
So the idea that the military, as a neutral force, allied itself with
"the people" and only stepped in to resolve a political crisis is
nothing more than a petit-bourgeois fantasy.
The class-based, social and economic interests of the military mean that
it will oppose any fundamental transformation of the Egyptian economy
and society, the ostensible aim of the "revolution." Significantly, this
means that the power of the military is going to have to be broken if
there is to be any prospect of revolutionary change in Egypt.
*A National Democratic Revolution: One step forward, three steps back*
This analysis, however, should not be read to suggest that the people
were just bit-players in a drama directed by powers they had no control
over. The mass rebellion in Egypt created a crisis of governance for the
corrupt elite that were in power and their U.S. patron. The demand for
the end of the dictatorship was an awesome demonstration of people-power
that created the potential for revolutionary change. The problem was
that the dictatorship had severely undermined the ability of alternative
popular forces to develop and acquire the political experience and
institutional foundations that would have positioned them to better push
for progressive change and curtail the power of the military.
Unfortunately for Egypt, the force that had the longest experience in
political opposition and organizational development was the Muslim
Brotherhood.
The call by a sector of the "people" for the Morsi government to step
down was a legitimate demand that expressed the position of a portion of
the population that was dissatisfied with the policies and direction of
the country. Yet, when the Egyptian military --- a military that has not
demonstrated any propensity for supporting democratic reforms ---
intimated that it would step in, the mass position should have been "no
to military intervention, change only by democratic means" --- a
position that a more mature and authentically independent movement might
have assumed if it was not being manipulated by powerful elite forces
internally and externally.
It was wishful thinking that bordered on the psychotic for liberal and
radical forces in the country and their allies outside to believe that a
democratic process could be developed that reflected the interests of
the broad sectors of Egyptian society while disenfranchising the Muslim
Brotherhood, a social force that many conservatively suggest still
commands the support of at least a third of the Egyptian population, and
is the largest political organization in the country. Liberals and some
radicals that supported the coup did not understand that the
construction of the "people" is a social/historical process that
requires both struggle and engagement. Not understanding this basic
principle has resulted in the killing of the national democratic
revolution in its infancy.
The powerful national elites that bankrolled the anti-Morsi campaign and
their external allies, including Saudi Arabia and the U.S., have
successfully set in motion a counter-revolutionary process that will
fragment the opposition and marginalize any radical elements. The
Egyptian elite understood much more clearly than the Tamarod or the
National Salvation Front that a revolutionary process would entail the
development of a political program that has as its objectives the
subordination of the military to the people, the public appropriation of
state capitalist sector and the rejection of neoliberal capitalist
development. Because of that understanding, they moved with textbook
precision over the last year and a half to protect their interests.
Sadly, the liberal and radical collusion with the anti-democratic forces
of the Egyptian military and economic elite has provided legitimacy for
the same retrograde forces that dominated Egyptian society under Mubarak
to continue that domination, but this time in the name of "revolution."
/*Ajamu Baraka* is a human rights activist and veteran of the Black
Liberation Movement. He is currently a fellow at the Institute for
Policy Studies. Baraka can be reached at www. Ajamubaraka.com
<http://www.%20Ajamubaraka.com>
/
--
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