[News] The Democratic Fraud and the Universalist Alternative
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Thu Nov 24 16:02:28 EST 2011
The Democratic Fraud and the Universalist Alternative | by Samir Amin
http://www.amandlapublishers.co.za/analysis/916-the-democratic-fraud-and-the-universalist-alternative--by-samir-amin-
1. THE DEMOCRATIC FRAUD CHALLENGES US TO INVENT TOMORROWS DEMOCRACY
Universal suffrage is a recent conquest,
beginning with workers struggles in a few
European countries (England, France, Holland, and
Belgium) and then progressively extending
throughout the world. Today, everywhere on the
planet, it goes without saying that the demand
for delegating supreme power to an honestly
elected, multiparty assembly defines the
democratic aspiration and guarantees its realizationor so it is claimed.
Marx himself put great hopes on such universal
suffrage as a possible peaceful path to
socialism. Yet, I have noted that on this score
Marxs expectations were refuted by history (cf. Marx et la démocratie).
I think that the reason for the failure of
electoral democracy to produce real change is not
hard to find: all hitherto existing societies
have been based on a dual system of exploitation
of labor (in various forms) and of concentration
of the states powers on behalf of the ruling
class. This fundamental reality results in a
relative depoliticization/disacculturation of
very large segments of society. And this result,
broadly designed and implemented to fulfill the
systemic function expected of it, is
simultaneously the condition for reproduction of
the system without changes other than those it
can control and absorbthe condition of its
stability. What is called the grass roots, so
to speak, signifies a country in deep slumber.
Elections by universal suffrage under these
conditions are guaranteed to produce a sure
victory for conservatism, albeit sometimes a reformist conservatism.
This is why never in history has there been real
change resulting from this mode of governance
based on consensus (i.e. the absence of
change). All changes tending toward real social
transformation, even radical reforms, have
resulted from struggles waged by what, in
electoral terms, may appear to be minorities.
Without the initiative of such minorities, the
motive force of society, no change is possible.
Such struggles, engaged in by such minorities,
always end upwhen the alternatives proposed are
clearly and correctly definedby carrying along
(previously silent) majorities and may by
universal suffrage receive ratification, which
arrives afternever beforevictory.
In our contemporary world consensus (its
boundaries defined by universal suffrage) is more
conservative than ever. In the centers of the
world-system the consensus is pro-imperialist.
Not in the sense that it implies hatred or
contempt for the other peoples who are its
victims, but in the everyday sense that the
permanence of the flow of imperialist rent is
accepted because that is the condition for
overall social reproduction, the guarantor of its
opulence in contrast to the poverty of the
others. In the peripheries, the responses of
peoples to the challenge (pauperization resulting
from the process of capitalist/imperialist
accumulation) is still muddled, in the sense that
they are fated always to carry with them a dose
of retrograde illusions of a return to a better past.
In these conditions, recourse to elections is
always conceived by the dominant powers as the
best possible way to rein in the movement, to end
the possibility that the struggles become
radicalized. In 1968 some said that elections
are for assholes, and that view was not
unconfirmed by the facts. An elected assembly,
right awayas today in Tunisia and Egyptserves
only to put an end to disorder, to restore
stability. To change everything so that nothing changes.
So should we give up on elections? Not at all.
But how to bring together new, rich, inventive
forms of democratization through which elections
can be used in a way other than is conceived by
the conservative forces? Such is the challenge.
THE DEMOCRATIC FARCES STAGE SCENERY
This stage scenery was invented by the Founding
Fathers of the United States, with the very
clearly expressed intention of keeping electoral
democracy from becoming an instrument that could
be used by the people to call in question the
social order based on private property (and slavery!).
With that in mind, their Constitution was based
on (indirect) election of a president (a sort of
elective monarch) holding in his hands some
essential powers. Presidential election campaigns
under these conditions naturally gravitate to
bipartisanism, which tends progressively to
become what it now is: the expression of a
single party. Of course, ever since the end of
the nineteenth century this has represented the
interest of monopoly capital, addressing itself
to clienteles that view themselves as having differing interests.
The democratic fraud then displays itself as
offering alternatives (in this case, the
Democrats and the Republicans) that cannot ever
rise to the level required by a real alternative
(offering the possibility of new, radically
different, options). But without the presence of
real alternative perspectives democracy is
nonexistent. The farce is based on consensus(!)
ideology, which excludes by definition serious
conflicts between interests and between visions
of the future. The invention of party primaries
inviting the whole electorate (whether its
components are said to be leftist or rightist!)
to express its choices of candidates for the two
false adversaries accentuates still further that
deviation so annihilating for the meaning of elections.
Jean Monnet, a true anti-democrat is honored
today in Brussels, where his intentions to copy
the U.S. model were fully understood, as the
founder of the new European democracy. Monnet
deployed all his efforts, which were scrupulously
implemented in the European Union, to deprive
elected assemblies of their powers and transfer
them to committees of technocrats.
To be sure, the democratic fraud works without
big problems in the opulent societies of the
imperialist triad (the United States, Western
Europe, and Japan) precisely because it is
underwritten by the imperialist rent (see my book
The Law of Worldwide Value). But its persuasive
authority is also bolstered by the consensus
individualist ideology; by the respect for
rights (themselves acquired by struggles, as we
are never told), and by the institution of an
independent judiciary (even though that of the
United States is partially basedas in most of
the sovereign stateson elected judges who have
to finance their election campaigns by appealing
to the ruling class and its opinion-makers); and
by the complex structure of the pyramidal
institutions charged with guaranteeing rights.
Historically, continental Europe has not long
experienced the calm waters of the democratic
farce. In the nineteenth century (and even up to
1945) struggles for democracy, both those
inspired by the capitalist and middle-class
bourgeoisies and those expressing the working
masses, ran up against resistance from the
anciens régimes. Hence their chaotic pattern of
advances and retreats. Marx thought that such
resistance was an obstacle fortunately unknown in
the United States. He was wrong, and
underestimated the extent to which, in a pure
capitalist system (like that of the United States
in comparison to Europe) the overdetermination
of political processes, that is to say the
automatic conformity of changes in the
ideological and political superstructure to those
required for management of society by the
capitalist monopolies, would inevitably lead to
what conventional sociologists call
totalitarianism. This is a term that applies
even more to the capitalist imperialist world
than anywhere else. (I here refer back to what I
have written elsewhere about overdetermination
and the openings which it makes available.)
In nineteenth century Europe (and also, though to
a lesser degree, in the United States) the
historical coalitions put together to ensure the
power of capital were, by the force of
circumstancethe diversity of classes and of
sub-classescomplex and changeable. Accordingly,
electoral combats could sometimes appear to be
really democratic. But over time, as the
diversity of capitalist coalitions gave way to
the domination of monopoly capital, those
appearances dwindled away. The Liberal Virus (as
one of my books is titled) did the rest: Europe
aligned itself more and more on the U.S. model.
Conflicts among the major capitalist powers
helped cement the components of the historical
coalitions, bringing about, by way of
nationalism, the domination of capital. It even
happenedGermany and Italy being particularly
exemplarythat national consensus was made to
replace the democratic program of the bourgeois revolution.
This deformation of democracy is now virtually
complete. The Communist parties of the Third
International tried in their way to oppose it,
even though their alternative (modeled on the
USSR) remained of questionable attractiveness.
Having failed to build lasting alternative
coalitions, they ended up capitulatingsubmitting
to the system of democratic electoral farce. So
doing, the part of the radical left consisting of
their heirs (in Europe, the United Left
grouping in the Strasbourg parliament) gave up
any perspective of real electoral victory. It
is happy to survive on the second-class seats
allotted to minorities (at most 510% of the
voting population). Transformed into coteries
of elected representatives whose sole
concerntaking the place of strategyis to hang
on to these wretched places in the system, this
radical left gives up on really being anything of
the sort. That this plays into the hands of
neofascist demagogues is, in these conditions, unsurprising.
A discourse styling itself postmodernist, which
quite simply refuses to recognize the scope of
the democratic farces destructive effects,
incorporates submission to it. What matter
elections, they say, what counts is elsewhere: in
civil society (a muddled concept to which I
shall return) where individuals are what the
liberal virus claims themfalselyto be, the
active subjects of history. Antonio Negris
philosophy, which I have criticized elsewhere,
is an expression of this desertion.
But the democratic farce, unchallenged in the
opulent societies of the imperialist triad, does
not work in the systems peripheries. There, in
the storm zone, the established order does not
enjoy any legitimacy sufficient to stabilize
society. Does the possibility of a real
alternative then reveal itself in the watermark
of the paper on which the Southern awakenings
that characterized the twentieth century (and
which go on making their way in the twenty-first
century) are written by history?
THEORIES AND PRACTICES OF THE VANGUARDS AND OF THE ENLIGHTENED DESPOTISMS
The current storm is not synonymous with
revolution, but is only the potential carrier of revolutionary advances.
Not simple are the responses of the peripheral
peoples, whether inspired by radical socialist
idealsat first, anyway (Russia, China, Vietnam,
and Cuba)or by national liberation and social
progress (in Latin America, in Asia and Africa
during the Bandung period). They bring, to
varying degrees, components with a universalist
and progressive outlook together with others of a
deeply retrogressive nature. To unravel the
conflicting and/or complementary interferences
among these tendencies will help us to
formulatefurther on in this textsome possible
forms of genuine democratic advances.
The historical Marxisms of the Third
International (Russian Marxism-Leninism and
Chinese Maoism) deliberately and completely
rejected any retrograde outlook. They chose to
look toward the future, in what was in the full
sense of the term a universalist emancipating
spirit. This option was undoubtedly made easier,
in Russia, by a long preparatory period in which
the (bourgeois) Westernizers vanquished the
Slavophile and Eurasian allies of the
autocracy; in China, by the Taiping Uprising (I
here refer you to my work: The Paris Commune and the Taiping Revolution).
At the same time, those historical Marxisms
committed themselves to a certain
conceptualization of the role of vanguards in
social transformation. They gave an
institutionalized form to that option, symbolized
as The Party. It cannot be said that this
option was ineffective. Quite to the contrary, it
was certainly at the origin of the victory of
those revolutions. The hypothesis that the
minority vanguard would win support from the
immense majority proved to be well founded. But
it is equally true that later history showed the
limits of such effectiveness. For it is certain
that maintenance of centralized power in the
hands of these vanguards was far from
uninvolved in the subsequent derailment of the
socialist systems that they claimed to have established.
Did enlightened despotism constitute the theory
and practice of those historical Marxisms? One
can say so only on condition of specifying what
were andprogressivelybecame the aims of those
enlightened despotisms. In any case, they were
resolutely opposed to völkisch nostalgia. Their
behavior in regard to religionwhich they viewed
as nothing but obscurantismtestifies to that. I
have expressed myself elsewhere (
Linternationale de lobscurantisme) about the
qualifications which need be appended to that judgment.
The vanguard concept was also broadly adopted
elsewhere beyond those (Chinese and Russian)
revolutionary societies. It was the basis for the
Communist parties of the whole world as they
existed between 1920 and 1980. It found its place
in the contemporary national/populist third-world regimes.
Moreover, this vanguard concept gave decisive
importance to theory and ideology, implying in
turn putting similar importance on the role of
(revolutionary) intellectuals or, rather, of
the intelligentsia. Intelligentsia is not
synonymous with the educated middle classes,
still less with the managers, bureaucrats,
technocrats, or professoriate (in Anglo-Saxon
jargon, the elites). It refers to a social
group that emerges as such in some societies
under specific conditions and becomes then an
active, sometimes decisive, agent. Outside Russia
and China, analogous formations could be
recognized in France, in Italy, and perhaps in
other countriesbut certainly not in Great
Britain, the United States, nor generally in northern Europe.
In France, during most of the twentieth century,
the intelligentsia held a major place in the
countrys history, as, for that matter, is
recognized by the best historians. This was,
perhaps, an indirect effect of the Paris Commune
during which the ideal of building a more
advanced stage of civilization beyond capitalism
found expression as nowhere else (see my article on the Commune).
In Italy the post-fascist Communist Party had an
analogous function. As Luciana Castillana lucidly
analyzes it, the Communistsa vanguard strongly
supported by the working class but always an
electoral minoritywere actually the sole makers
of Italian democracy. They exercised in
oppositionat the timea real power in society
much greater than when associated with
government subsequently! Their actual suicide,
inexplicable otherwise than as result of the
mediocrity of their post-Berlinguer leadership,
buried with them both the Italian State and Italian democracy.
This intelligentsia phenomenon never existed in
the United States nor in Protestant Northern
Europe. What is called there the elitethe
terminology is significantscarcely comprises
anyone but lackeys (including reforming ones)
of the system. The empiricist/pragmatist
philosophy, holding the entire stage as far as
social thought is concerned, has certainly
reinforced the conservative effects of the
Protestant Reformationwhose critique I stated in
Eurocentrism. Rudolf Rocker, the German
anarchist, is one of the few European thinkers to
have expressed a judgment close to mine; but
since Weber (and despite Marx) it is has been
fashionable to unthinkingly celebrate the Reformation as a progressive advance.
In the peripheral societies in general, beyond
the flagrant cases of Russia and China, and for
the same reasons, the initiatives taken by
vanguards, often intelligentsia-like, profited
from the adhesion and support of broad popular
majorities. The most frequent form of those
political crystallizations whose interventions
were decisive for the Southern Awakening was
that of populism. A theory and practice scoffed
at by the (Anglo-Saxon style, i.e., pro-system)
elites, but defended and accordingly
rehabilitated by Ernesto Laclau with solid
arguments that I will very largely make my own.
Of course, there are as many populisms as there
are historical experiences that can be called
such. Populisms are often linked to charismatic
figures whose thought is accepted, undiscussed,
as authoritative. The real social and national
advances linked to them under some specific
conditions have led me to term them
national/populist regimes. But it must be
understood that those advances were never based
on ordinary bourgeois democratic
practicesstill less on the inception of
practices going still further, like those
possible ones which I will outline further on in
this text. Such was the case in Ataturks Turkey,
probably the initiator of this model in the
Middle East, and later in Nassers Egypt, the
Baathist (Iraqi and Syrian) regimes in their
initial stages, and Algeria under the FLN. During
the 1940s and 1950s, under different conditions,
similar experiments were undertaken in Latin
America. This formula, because it answers to
real needs and possibilities, is far from having
lost its chance of renewal. So I gladly use the
term national/populist for certain ongoing
experiments in Latin America without neglecting
to point out that on the level of democratization
they have incontestably entered on advances
unknown to those earlier national/populisms.
I have put forward analyses dealing with the
reasons for the success of advances realized in
this domain by several Middle-Eastern countries
(Afghanistan, South Yemen, Sudan, and Iraq) which
appeared more promising than others, and also the
causes of their tragic failures.
Whatever the case, one must be on guard against
generalizations and simplifications like those of
most Western commentators, who look only at the
democracy question as boiled down to the
formula that I have described as the democratic
farce. In the peripheral countries the farce
sometimes appears as a fantastic burlesque.
Without being democrats some leaders,
charismatic or not, of national/populist regimes
have been progressive big reformers. Nasser was
exemplary of these. But others have scarcely been
anything but incoherent clowns (Khaddafi) or
ordinary unenlightened despots (quite
uncharismatic, to boot) like Ben Ali, Mubarak,
and many others. For that matter, those dictators
initiated no national/populist experiments. All
they did was to organize the pillage of their
countries by mafias personally associated with
them. Thus, like Suharto and Marcos, they were
simply executive agents of the imperialist powers
which, moreover, hailed them and supported their powers to the very end.
THE IDEOLOGY OF CULTURAL NOSTALGIA, ENEMY OF DEMOCRACY
The specific limits of each and of all
national/populist experiments worthy of the name
populist originate in the objective conditions
characterizing the societies comprising the
periphery of todays capitalist/imperialist
worldconditions obviously diverse. But beyond
that diversity some major converging factors shed
some light on the reasons for those experiments
successes and then for their retrogressions.
That aspirations for a Return to the Past
persist is not the result of thoroughgoing
backwardness (as in the usual discourse on this
subject) among the peoples involved. Their
persistence gives a correct measure of the
challenge to be confronted. All the peoples and
nations of the peripheries were not only subject
to fierce economic exploitation by imperialist
capital: they were, by the same token, equally
subjected to cultural aggression. With the
greatest contempt the dignity of their cultures,
their languages, their customs, and their
histories were negated. There is nothing
surprising in these victims of external or
internal colonialism (notably the Indian
populations of the Americas) naturally linking
their political and social liberation to the
restoration of their national dignity.
But in turn, these legitimate aspirations are a
temptation to look exclusively toward the past in
hope of there finding the solution to todays and
tomorrows problems. So there is a real risk of
seeing the movements of awakening and liberation
among these peoples getting stuck in tragic blind
alleys as soon as they mistake retrogressive
nostalgia for their sought-for highroad of renewal.
The history of contemporary Egypt illustrates
perfectly the transformation from a necessary
complementarity between a universalist vision
open to the future, yet linked to the restoration
of past dignity, into a conflict between two
options formulated in absolute terms: either
Westernize! (in the common usage of that term,
implying denial of the past) or else (uncritically) Back To The Past!
The Viceroy Mohamed Ali (18041849) and, until
the 1870s, the Khedives, chose a modernization
that would be open to the adoption of formulas
reflecting European models. It cannot be said
that this choice was one of Westernization on
the cheap. The heads of the Egyptian state gave
the highest importance to modern
industrialization of the country as against
merely adopting the European model of consumer
markets. They committed themselves to
assimilation of European models, linking it with
renewal of their national culture to whose
evolution in a secular direction it would
contribute. Their attempts to support linguistic
renovation bear witness to that. Of course, their
European model was that of capitalism and no
doubt they had no accurate conception of the
imperialist nature of European capitalism. But
they should bear no reproach for that. When
Khedive Ismail proclaimed his aim to make Egypt
into a European country, he was fifty years
ahead of Ataturk. He saw Europeanization as
part of national rebirth, not as a renunciation of it.
The inadequacies of that epochs cultural Nahda
(its inability to grasp the meaning of the
European Renaissance), and the retrograde
nostalgia embodied in its main conceptson which
I have expressed myself elsewhereare no mystery.
Indeed, it is precisely this retrograde outlook
which was to take hold over the national-renewal
movement at the end of the nineteenth century. I
have put forward an explanation for this: with
the defeat of the modernist project that had
held the scene from 1800 to 1870 Egypt was
plunged into regression. But the ideology that
tried to counter that decline took shape in this
retrogressive period and was marked by all the
birth defects implicit in that fact. Moustapha
Kamel and Mohamed Farid, the founders of the new
National Party (Al hisb al watani), chose
back-to-the-past as the focal point of their
combatas their Ottomanist (seeking the support
of Istanbul against the English) illusions, as well as others, reveal.
History was to prove the futility of that option.
The popular and national revolution of 19191920
was not led by the Nationalist Party but by its
modernist rival, the Wafd. Taha Hussein even
adopted the slogan of Khedive IsmailEuropeanize
Egyptand to that end supported the formation of
a new university to marginalize Al Azhar.
The retrograde tendency, legacy of the
Nationalist Party, then slipped into
insignificance. Its leader, Ahmad Hussein, was in
the 1930s merely the head of a minuscule,
pro-fascist, party. But this tendency was to
undergo a strong revival among the group of Free
Officers that overthrew the monarchy in 1952.
The ambiguity of the Nasserist project resulted
from this regression in the debate over the
nature of the challenge to be confronted. Nasser
tried to link a certain industrialization-based
modernization, once again not on the cheap, with
support to retrograde cultural illusions. It
mattered little that the Nasserists thought of
their project as being within a socialist
(obviously beyond a nineteenth century ken)
perspective. Their attraction to völkisch
cultural illusion was always there. This was
demonstrated by their choices concerning the
modernization of Al Azhar, of which I did a critique.
Currently, the conflict between the modernist,
universalist visions of some and the integrally
medievalistic visions of others holds
center-stage in Egypt. The former are
henceforward advocated mainly by the radical left
(in Egypt the communist tradition, powerful in
the immediate years after Second World War) and
getting a broad audience among the enlightened
middle classes, the labor unions, and, even more
so, by the new generations. The back-to-the-past
vision has slipped even further to the right with
the Muslim Brotherhood, and has adopted its
stance from the most archaic conception of Islam,
the Wahhabism promoted by the Saudis.
It is not very difficult to contrast the
evolution that shut Egypt into its blind alley to
the path chosen by China since the Taiping
revolution, taken up and deepened by Maoism: that
the construction of the future starts with
radical critique of the past. Emergence into
the modern worldand, accordingly, deploying
effective responses to its challenges including
entrance onto the path of democratization,
guidelines for which I will put forward further
on in this texthas as its precondition the
refusal to allow retrograde cultural nostalgia to
obscure the central focus of renewal.
So it is not by chance that China finds itself at
the vanguard of todays emerging countries. Nor
is it by chance that in the Middle East it is
Turkey, not Egypt, that is pedaling in the race.
Turkey, even that of the Islamist AKP, profits
from Kemalisms earlier breakaway. But there is a
decisive difference between China and Turkey;
Chinas modernist option is supposed to reflect
a socialist perspective (and China is in a
hegemonic conflict with the United States, that
is to say, with the collective imperialism of the
Triad) conveying a chance for progress. While the
modernity option of todays Turkey, in which no
escape from the logic of contemporary
globalization is envisaged, has no future. It
seems successful, but only provisionally so.
In all the countries of the broader South (the
peripheries) the combination of modernist and
retrogressive tendencies, obviously in very
diverse forms, is to be found. The confusion
resulting from this association finds one of its
most striking displays in the profusion of inept
discourses about supposed democratic forms in
past societies, uncritically praised to the
skies. Thus independent India sings praises to
the panchayat, Muslims to the shura, and Africans
to the Speaking Tree, as though these outlived
social forms had anything to do with the
challenges of the modern world. Is India really
the biggest (in number of voters) democracy in
the world? Well, this electoral democracy is and
will remain a farce until radical criticism of
the caste system (a very real legacy of its past)
has been carried through to the end: the
abolition of the castes themselves. Shura remains
the vehicle for implementation of Sharia (Islamic
canonical law), interpreted in that words most
reactionary sensethe enemy of democracy.
The Latin American peoples are today confronted
with the same problem. It is easy, once one
realizes the nature of Iberian internal
colonialism, to understand the legitimacy of the
indigenist demands. Still, some of those
indigenist discourses are very uncritical of
the Indian pasts at issue. But others are indeed
critical and propose concepts linking in a
radically progressive way the requirements of
universalism to the potential to be found in the
evolution of their historical legacy. In this
regard, the current Bolivian discussions are
probably able to make a rich contribution.
François Houtart (El concepto de Sumak Kawsay)
has made an enlightening critical analysis of the
indigenist discourse in question. All ambiguity
vanishes in the light of this remarkable study,
which reviews what, as it seems to me, is
probably the totality of discourse on this subject.
The contributiona negative oneof retrograde
cultural illusion in relation to the construction
of the modern world, such as it is, cannot be
attributed primarily to the peoples of the
periphery. In Europe, outside its northwestern
quadrant, the bourgeoisies were too weak to carry
out revolutions like those of England and France.
The national goal, especially in Germany and
Italy and, later, elsewhere in the eastern and
southern parts of the continent, functioned as
means of popular mobilization while screening off
the nature of such nationalism as a compromise,
half bourgeois/half ancien régime. The retrograde
cultural illusions in these cases were not so
much religious as ethnic, and were based on
an ethnocentric definition of the nation
(Germany) or on a mythologized reading of Roman
history (Italy). Fascism and Nazismthere is the
disaster that illustrates the arch-reactionary,
surely anti-democratic, nature of völkisch
cultural nostalgia in its national forms.
2. THE UNIVERSALIST ALTERNATIVE: FULL AND
AUTHENTIC DEMOCRATIZATION AND THE SOCIALIST PERSPECTIVE
I am going to speak here of democratization, not
of democracy. The latter, reduced as it is to
formulas imposed by the dominant powers, is a
farce, as I have said (in The Democratic Fraud
Challenges Us to Invent Tomorrows Democracysee
above). The electoral farce produces an impotent
pseudo-parliament and a government responsible
only to the IMF and the WTO, the instruments of
the imperialist triads monopolies. The
democratic farce is then capped off with a
human-rightsish discourse on the right to
proteston condition that protest never gets
close to mounting a real challenge to the supreme
power of the monopolies. Beyond that line it is
to be labeled terrorism and criminalized.
Democratization, in contrast, considered as full
and completethat is, democratization involving
all aspects of social life including, of course,
economic managementcan only be an unending and
unbounded process, the result of popular
struggles and popular inventiveness.
Democratization has no meaning, no reality,
unless it mobilizes those inventive powers in the
perspective of building a more advanced stage of
human civilization. Thus, it can never be clothed
in a rigid, formulaic, ready-to-wear outfit.
Nevertheless, it is no less necessary to trace
out the governing lines of movement for its
general direction and the definition of the
strategic objectives for its possible stages.
The fight for democratization is a combat. It
therefore requires mobilization, organization,
strategic vision, tactical sense, choice of
actions, and politicization of struggles.
Undoubtedly these forms of activity cannot be
decreed in advance starting from sanctified
dogma. But the need to identify them is
unavoidable. For it really is a matter of driving
back the established systems of power with the
perspective of replacing them with a different
system of powers. Undoubtedly any sanctified
formula of the revolution which would completely
and at once substitute the power of the people
for the capitalist order is to be abandoned.
Revolutionary advances are possible, on the basis
of the development of real, new, peoples powers
that would drive back those power centers that
continue to protect the principles underlying and
reproducing social inequality. Besides which,
Marx never expounded any theory of the great day
of revolution and definitive solutions; to the
contrary, he always insisted that revolution is a
long transition marked by a conflict between
powersthe former ones in decline and the new powers on the rise.
To give up on the question of power is to throw
out the baby with the bathwater. Only someone of
extreme naïvete could ever believe that society
can be transformed without destroying, albeit
progressively, the established system of power.
As long as the established powers remain what
they are, social change, far from dispossessing
them, leaves them able to co-opt it, to take it
over, to make it reinforce, rather than weaken,
capitalist power. The sad fate of
environmentalism, made into a new field for the
expansion of capital, bears witness. To dodge the
question of power is to place social movements in
a situation in which they cannot go on the
offensive because they are forced to remain on
the defensive in resistance to the attacks of the
power-holders who, as such, retain the
initiative. Nothing astonishing, then, in Antonio
Negri, the prophet of that modish anti-power
litany, fleeing back from Marx to St. Francis of
Assisi, his original starting point. Nor anything
surprising in that his theses should be played up by the New York Times.
I will here put forward several major strategic
objectives for the theoretical and political
discussion about social and political struggles
(inseparable one from the other), which must
perpetually confront the practical problems of
those struggles, of their successes and failures.
First of all, to reinforce the powers of workers
in their workplaces, in their daily struggles
against capital. That, it is said, is what they
have trade-unions for. Indeed, but only if the
unions are real instrumentalities for
strugglewhich they scarcely ever are any more,
especially the big unions that are supposedly
powerful because they group together large
majorities among their target groups of workers.
Such seeming strength derived from numbers is
really their weakness, because those unions
believe themselves bound to make only consensus
demands that are extremely modest.
What reason is there to be astonished that the
working classes of Germany and Great Britain
(called strong union countries) have accepted
the drastic downward adjustments imposed by
capital over the course of the last thirty years
whereas the French unions, grouping as members
only minorities of the class and thus supposedly
weak, have better (or less badly) resisted such
adjustments? This reality simply reminds us that
organizations of activists, by definition
minoritarian (since it is impossible that the
class as a whole should be made up of activists),
are more able than mass (and thus made up
largely of non-activists) unions to lead majorities into struggle.
Another possible field of struggle to establish
new forms of power is that of local government. I
certainly want to avoid hasty generalizations in
this areaeither by affirming that
decentralization is always a gain for democracy
or, on the other hand, that centralization is
needed to change the power-structure.
Decentralization may well be co-opted by local
notables, often no less reactionary than the
agents of the central power. But it can also, as
a result of the strategic actions of progressive
forces in struggle and of local
conditionssometimes favorable, sometimes
unfavorablefill out or substitute for general
advances in the creation of new popular power structures.
The Paris Commune understood this and so
projected a federation of Communes. The
communards knew that on this question they were
carrying forward the tradition of the Mountain
(Jacobins) of Year One (1793). For the latter,
contrary to what is unreflectingly said (how
often do we hear that the Jacobin centralists
completed the work of the Monarchy!), were
federalists (is the Fête de la Fédération to be
forgotten?). Centralization was the later work
of the Thermidorian Reaction, capped off by Bonaparte.
But decentralization is still a dubious term if
it is counterposed as an absolute to another
absolute, that of centralization. The challenge
confronting the struggle for democratization is
to link the two concepts to each other.
The problem of multiplelocal and centralpower
centers is of crucial importance for those
countries that, for various historical reasons,
exist as heterogeneous agglomerations. In the
Andean countries, and more generally in Latin
Americawhich ought to be termed Indo/Afro/Latin
Americathe construction of specific power
structures (specific here denoting that they
are endowed with areas of genuine autonomy) is
the necessary condition for the rebirth of the
Indian nations, without which social emancipation has scarcely any meaning.
Feminism and environmentalism are likewise fields
of conflict between social forces whose
perspective is that of overall social
emancipation and the conservative or reformist
power centers consecrated to the perpetuation of
the conditions for perpetual reproduction of the
capitalist system. It is certainly out of place
to treat them as specialized struggles, because
the apparently specialized demands that they put
forward are inseparable from overall social
transformation. However, not all movements that
consider themselves feminist or environmentalist see matters that way.
Coherent linkage of struggles in the diverse
fields mentioned hereas well as othersrequires
constructing institutionalized forms of their
interdependence. It is a matter, again, of
displaying creative imagination. There is no need
to wait for permission from the actual laws to
start setting up institutionalized systems
(informal, maybe illegal), by permanent and de
facto compulsory employer/employee negotiation,
for example, to impose equality between men and
women, or to subject all important public or
private investment decisions to thorough environmental review.
Real advances in the directions here advocated
would create a duality of powerslike that which
Marx envisioned for the long socialist transition
to the higher stage of human civilization,
communism. They would allow elections by
universal suffrage to go in a direction quite
different from that offered by
democracy-as-farce. But in this case, as in
others, truly meaningful elections can take place
only after victory, not before.
The propositions put forward hereand many other
possible oneshave no place in the dominant
discourse about civil society. Rather, they run
counter to that discourse whichrather like
postmodernist ravings à la Negriis the direct
heir of the U.S. consensus ideological
tradition. A discourse promoted, uncritically
repeated, by tens of thousands of NGOs and by
their requisite representatives at all the Social
Forums. Were dealing with an ideology that
accepts the existing regime (i.e. monopoly
capitalism) in all its essentials. It thus has a
useful role to play on behalf of capitalist
power. It keeps its gears provided with oil. It
pretends to change the world while promoting a
sort of opposition with no power to change anything.
THREE CONCLUSIONS
The virus of liberalism still has devastating
effects. It has resulted in an ideological
adjustment perfectly fitted to promoting the
expansion of capitalism, an expansion becoming
ever more barbaric. It has persuaded big
majorities, even among the younger generation,
that they have to content themselves with living
in the present moment, to grasp whatever is
immediately at hand, to forget the past, and to
pay no heed to the futureon the pretext that
utopian imaginings might produce monsters. It has
convinced them that the established system allows
the flourishing of the individual (which it
really does not). Pretentious, supposedly novel,
academic formulationspostmodernism,
postcolonialism, cultural studies, Negri-like
animadversionsconfer patents of legitimacy to
capitulation of the critical spirit and the inventive imagination.
The disarray stemming from such interiorized
submission is certainly among the causes of the
religious revival. By that I refer to the
recrudescence of conservative and reactionary
interpretations, religious and quasi-religious,
ritualistic and communitarian. As I have
written, the One God (monotheism) remarries with
alacrity the One Mammon (moneytheism). Of course
I exclude from this judgment those
interpretations of religion that deploy their
sense of spirituality to justify taking sides
with all social forces struggling for
emancipation. But the former are dominant, the
latter a minority and often marginalized. Other,
no less reactionary, ideological formulas make up
in the same way for the void left by the liberal
virus. Of this, nationalisms and ethnic or
quasi-ethnic communalisms are splendid examples.
Diversity is, most fortunately, one of the
worlds finest realities. But its thoughtless
praise entails dangerous confusions. For my part,
I have suggested making conspicuous the
heritage-diversities which are what they are, and
can only be distinguished as positive for the
project of emancipation after being critically
examined. I want to avoid confusing such
diversity of heritage with the diversity of
formulations that look toward invention of the
future and toward emancipation. For in that
regard there is as much diversity both of
analyses, with their underlying cultural and
ideological bases, and of proposals for strategic lines of struggle.
The First International counted Marx, Bakunin,
and followers of Proudhon within its ranks. A
fifth international will likewise have to choose
diversity as its trump suit. I envisage that it
cannot exclude: it must be a regroupment of the
various schools of Marxists (including even
marked dogmatists); of authentic radical
reformers who nevertheless prefer to concentrate
on goals that are possible in the short term,
rather than on distant perspectives; of
liberation theologians; of thinkers and activists
promoting national renewal within the perspective
of universal emancipation; and of feminists and
environmentalists who likewise are committed to
that perspective. To become clearly conscious of
the imperialist nature of the established system
is the fundamental condition without which there
is no possibility of such a regroupment of
activists really working together for a single
cause. A fifth international cannot but be
clearly anti-imperialist. It cannot content
itself with remaining at the level of
humanitarian interventions like those that the
dominant powers offer in place of solidarity and
support to the liberation struggles of the
peripherys peoples, nations, and states. And
even beyond such regroupment, broad alliances
will have to be sought with all democratic forces
and movements struggling against democracy-farces betrayals.
If I insist on the anti-imperialist dimension of
the combat to be waged, it is because that is the
condition without which no convergence is
possible between the struggles within the North
and those within the South of the planet. I have
already said that the weaknessand that is the
least one can sayof Northern anti-imperialist
consciousness was the main reason for the limited
nature of the advances that the peripherys
peoples have hitherto been able to realize, and then of their retrogression.
The construction of a perspective of convergent
struggles runs up against difficulties whose
mortal peril to it must not be underestimated.
In the North it runs up against the still broad
adhesion to the consensus ideology that
legitimizes the democratic farce and is made
acceptable thanks to the corrupting effects of
the imperialist rent. Nevertheless, the ongoing
offensive of monopoly capital against the
Northern workers themselves might well help them
to become conscious that the imperialist
monopolies are indeed their common enemy.
Will the unfolding movements toward organized and
politicized reconstruction go so far as to
understand and teach that the capitalist
monopolies are to be expropriated, nationalized
in order to be socialized? Until that breaking
point has been reached the ultimate power of the
capitalist/imperialist monopolies will remain
untouched. Any defeats that the South might
inflict on those monopolies, reducing the amounts
siphoned from them in imperialist rent, can only
increase the chances of Northern peoples getting out of their rut.
But in the South it still runs up against
conflicting expressions of an envisioned future:
universalist or backward-looking? Until that
conflict has been decided in favor of the former,
whatever the Southern peoples might gain in their
liberation struggles will remain fragile, limited, and vulnerable.
Only serious advances North and South in the
directions here indicated will make it possible
for the progressive historic bloc to be born.
Freedom Archives
522 Valencia Street
San Francisco, CA 94110
415 863-9977
www.Freedomarchives.org
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