[News] Orchestrating a Civic Coup in Bolivia
Anti-Imperialist News
news at freedomarchives.org
Tue Nov 18 12:09:46 EST 2008
http://www.counterpunch.org/burbach11182008.html
November 18, 2008
How Bush Tried to Bring Down Evo Morales
Orchestrating a Civic Coup in Bolivia
By ROGER BURBACH
Evo Morales is the latest democratically-elected
Latin American president to be the target of a US
plot to destabilize and overthrow his government.
On September 10, 2008 Morales expelled US
Ambassador Philip Goldberg because he is
conspiring against democracy and seeking the division of Bolivia.
Observers of US-Latin American policy tend to
view the crisis in US-Bolivian relations as due
to a policy of neglect and ineptness towards
Latin America because of US involvement in the
wars in the Middle East and Central Asia. In
fact, the Bolivia coup attempt was a conscious
policy rooted in US hostility towards Morales,
his political party the Movement Towards
Socialism (MAS) and the social movements that are aligned with him.
The US embassy is historically used to calling
the shots in Bolivia, violating our sovereignty,
treating us like a banana republic, says Gustavo
Guzman, who was expelled as Bolivian ambassador
to Washington following Goldbergs removal. In
2002, when Morales narrowly lost his first bid
for the presidency, US ambassador Manuel Rocha
openly campaigned against him, threatening, if
you elect those who want Bolivia to become a
major cocaine exporter again, this will endanger
the future of US assistance to Bolivia. Because
he led the Cocaleros Federation prior to assuming
the presidency, the US State Department called
Morales an illegal coca agitator.Morales
advocated Coca Yes, Cocaine No, and called
which for an end to violent U.S.-sponsored coca
eradication raids, and for the right of Bolivian
peasants to grow coca for domestic consumption,
medicinal uses and even for export as an herb in tea and other products.
When Morales triumphed in the next presidential
election, says Guzman, it represented a defeat
for the United States. Shortly after his
inauguration, Morales received a call from George
Bush, offering to help "bring a better life to
Bolivians." Morales asked Bush to reduce US trade
barriers for Bolivian products, and suggested
that he come for a visit. Bush did not reply. As
Guzman notes, the United States was trying to
woo Morales with polite and banal comments to
keep him from aligning with Venezuelan President
Hugo Chávez. David Greenlee, the US ambassador
prior to Goldberg, expressed his "preoccupation"
with Bolivia's foreign alliances, while Secretary
of Defense Donald Rumsfeld and others at the
Pentagon began talking about "security concerns" in Bolivia.
Assistant Secretary of State Thomas Shannon, the
highest ranking US official to attend Morales
inauguration, declared a willingness to dialogue
with Morales. In fact, what followed were almost
three years of diplomatic wrangling while the
U.S. provided direct and covert assistance to the
opposition movement centered in the four eastern
departments of Bolivia known as La Media Luna.
Dominated by agro-industrial interests, the
departments began a drive for regional autonomy
soon after Morales, the first Indian president in
Bolivian history took office. (About 55% of the
countrys population is Indian.) Headed by
departmental prefects (governors) and large
landowners, the autonomy movement has been
determined to stymie Morales plans for national
agrarian reform, and bent on taking control of
the substantial hydro-carbon resources located in the Media Luna.
The Bush administration has pursued a two-track
policy similar to the strategy the United States
employed to overthrow the democratically-elected
government of Salvador Allende in Chile in 1973.
The diplomatic negotiations initiated by Shannon
centered almost exclusively on differences over
drug policies, with the Bush administration
continually threatening to cut or curtail
economic assistance and preferential trade if
Bolivia did not abide by the US policy of coca
eradication and criminalization. At the same
time, the United States through its embassy in La
Paz and the Agency for International Development
(USAID), funded political forces that opposed
Morales and MAS. The US Drug Enforcement
Administration (DEA), with 37 in-country agents,
appears to have acted like the CIA in Bolivia,
gathering intelligence and engaging in
clandestine political operations with the opposition.
Intervention is evident from the very start of
the Morales administration, with early USAID
activities through the Office of Transition
Initiatives (OTI). After Morales took office,
USAID documents state the OTI set out to provide
support to fledgling regional governments.
Altogether the OTI funneled 116 grants for
$4,451,249 to help departmental governments
operate more strategically. In an effort to
establish expedient political ties, the OTI also
brought departmental prefects to meet with US governors.
The National Endowment for Democracy (NED),
founded as a semi-public institute during the
Reagan years, has been particularly active in
Bolivia. It funds a number of groups and
organizations with a clear political bias, among
them the Institute of Pedagogical and Social
Investigation. The Institute opposed Morales in
the 2005 elections, declaring in a project
summary report to the U.S. embassy that Morales
and MAS are an anti-democratic, radical
opposition that doesnt represent the majority.
NED support of the Institutes activities
continued into 2006, when the Institute filed a
report saying it intended to contribute to
improved municipal development through efficient
and effective social monitoring. (6)
In the Media Luna, USAID tried to organize
Indians opposed to the Confederation of the
Indigenous Peoples of Eastern Bolivia (CIDOB),
which is allied with MAS and Morales. Media Luna
leaders were particularly concerned about CIBODs
capacity to mobilize and move in from the
countryside to encircle departmental capitals
when the prefects leaders orchestrated
activities against the Morales government,
particularly in the department of Santa Cruz.
Working out of the U.S. embassy, the Strategy and
Operations Office and the Strategic Team of
Integral Development for USAID set up a meeting
between Ambassador Goldberg and Indian groups in
February, 2007. Internal emails from USAID
officers who helped organize the event reveal
that they only invited Indians opposed to CIDOB
who lacked experience and were immature
politically. One of the officers recommended
that these Indians be given field radios to facilitate communications.
In late 2007, the US embassy began moving openly
to meet with the right-wing opposition in Media
Luna. Ambassador Goldberg was photographed in
Santa Cruz with a leading business magnate who
backs the autonomy movement, and a well-known
Colombian narco-trafficker who had been detained
by the local police. Morales, in revealing the
photo, said the trafficker was linked to right
wing para-military organizations in Colombia. In
response, the US embassy asserted that it
couldnt vet everyone who appeared in a photo with the ambassador.
Then in January, 2008, the Embassy was caught
giving aid to a special intelligence unit of the
Bolivian police force. The embassy rationalized
its assistance by saying the U.S. government has
a long history of helping the National Police of
Bolivia in diverse programs. U.S.-Bolivian
relations were next roiled in February, when it
was revealed that Peace Corps volunteers and a
Fulbright scholar had been pressured by an
embassy official to keep tabs on Venezuelans and
Cubans in the country. This violated the founding
statutes of the Peace Corps, which prohibit any
intelligence activities by volunteers.
During 2007, political tensions in Bolivia had
centered on the Constituent Assembly meeting in
Sucre that had been mandated by a national
referendum to draw up a new constitution to
transform the countrys institutions. When the
Assembly began voting on the final draft in
December 2007, the opposition violently took over
the streets and all of the major public buildings
in Sucre, using dynamite and Molotov cocktails,
demanding the resignation of the shitty Indian
Morales. Parts of the city were in flames, and
members of the assembly, including its President
Silvia Lazarte, were assaulted in the streets.
Then the political leaders and business
organizations in Santa Cruz and other cities in
the Media Luna began to openly call for autonomy
and secession from the central Bolivian
government. Branko Marinkovic, the leading
business magnate and largest landowner in the
Media Luna, led the opposition as head of the
Pro-Santa Cruz Civic Committee, declaring, the
fight has begun for our autonomy and liberty.
Along with Santa Cruz, civic committees in the
other major cities of Media Luna joined the call
and began meeting together along with the prefects.
Simultaneously, the Bush administration first
brandished the aid weapon to show its support of
the civic committees opposed to the government,
says Guzman. The Millennium Challenge Corporation
(MCC), set up in 2004 as a U.S. government agency
to work with some of the poorest countries in
the world, had been on the brink of approving
$584 million to fund the construction of a major
highway linking northern Bolivia to the rest of
the country, as well as to make investments in agricultural projects.
Yet in a letter to Morales in December 2007, the
MCC stated that while it recognizes your
countrys performance on our 17 indicators
the
current state of the U.S.-Bolivian relationship
is not consistent with such a working
partnership. A separate report by the MCC was
even more blunt: The project was postponed
because of adverse conditions, including unrest
surrounding the Constitution Assembly process.
When the Constituent Assembly approved the final
draft of the new constitution in December 2007,
the Bolivian Congress needed to approve it with a
national referendum. Knowing that he did not have
the votes, Morales declared dead or alive, I
will have a new constitution for the country,
and called for public pressure on Congress.
Asserting he was acting as a dictator, the
civic committees and the departmental prefects of
Media Luna, along with their political allies in
the Bolivian Senate, refused to schedule the
referendum. They instead organized departmental
referendums for autonomy, which they
overwhelmingly won in May. The referendums were
ruled unconstitutional by the National Electoral
Council, and the voting conditions were less than
auspicious, with no official electoral monitors
and pro-autonomy forces intimidating and
physically assaulting those who opposed the vote.
Choosing the democratic road rather than force to
annul the departmental referendums, Morales then
put his presidency on the line with a recall
referendum in which his mandate, as well as those
of the prefects seeking autonomy, could be
revoked. On August 10, 2008, voters gave Morales
a resounding two-thirds of the national vote,
with even the Media Luna department of Pando
giving him just over 50 percent. However, the
insurgent prefects also had their mandates
renewed. Basing their actions on the illegal May
plebiscites, the prefects then decided to strike
for autonomy, moving first to take control of
Santa Cruz, the richest of the four departments.
The Cruceno Youth Union (UJC), shock troops
allied with the Civic Committee, roamed the
streets of the departmental capital and
surrounding towns, attacking and repressing any
opposition by local social movements and
MAS-allied organizations, and sacking government
buildings, including the agrarian reform office.
Simultaneously, the Civic Committees began sewing
economic instability, seeking to weaken the
Morales government much like the CIA-backed
opposition did against Chilean President Salvador
Allende in the early 1970s. As in Chile, the
business elites and allied truckers engaged in
strikes, withholding or refusing to ship
produce to urban markets in the western Andes
(where the Indian population is concentrated),
while selling commodities on the black market at
high prices. The Confederation of Private
Businesses of Bolivia called for a national
producers shutdown if the government refused to
change its economic policies.
This became known as an attempt at a civic
coup. The strategy of the autonomy movement was
to take complete control of the Media Luna,
provoke a national crisis to destabilize the
government, and convince the army to remain
neutral or move against Morales. The major of
Santa Cruz, Percy Fernandez, had already called
on the military to overthrow Morales' "useless
government" just before the August referendum.
The United States was openly involved in
orchestrating this rebellion. Ambassador Goldberg
flew to Santa Cruz on August 25 to meet with
Ruben Costas, Morales main antagonist and the
prefect of Santa Cruz, who became the de facto
leader of the rebellious prefects and the
autonomy movement in general. After Goldberg
left, Costas declared himself governor of the
autonomous department of Santa Cruz, and ordered
the take over of national government offices,
including those collecting tax revenues. It was
this visit with Costas that Morales cited as the
reason for declaring Ambassador Goldberg persona
non grata on September 10. After his expulsion,
the rebellion began to unravel, notes Guzman.
On September 11, in the department of Pando, a
para-military militia with machine guns attacked
pro-Morales Indians near the capital of El
Cobija, resulting in at least 13 deaths. In a
separate action, three policemen were kidnapped.
The next day Morales declared a state of siege in
Pando, and dispatched the army to move on Cobija
in order to retake its airport, which had been
occupied by right wing bands. Army units were
also sent to guard the natural gas oleoducts, one
of which had been seized by the autonomy
movement, cutting the flow of gas to neighboring Brazil and Argentina.
The violent attacks in Pando precipitated a
national mobilization of indigenous peoples and
social movements, as well as a sense of outrage
in neighboring countries. On September 15,
Chilean President Michelle Bachelet called an
emergency meeting in Santiago of the Union of
South American Nations (UNASUR) to discuss the
Bolivian crisis. The resulting Declaration of La
Moneda, signed by the twelve UNASUR governments,
expressed their full and decided support for the
constitutional government of President Evo
Morales, and warned that their respective
governments will not recognize any situation
that entails an attempt for a civil coup that
ruptures the institutional order, or that
compromises the territorial integrity of the
Republic of Bolivia. Morales, who participated
in the meeting, thanked UNASUR for its support,
declaring: For the first time in South
Americans history, the countries of our region
are deciding how to resolve our problems without
the presence of the United States.
Paying no attention to the declaration of support
by UNASUR, President Bush upped the ante the
following week by suspending the Andean Trade
Preference Act, asserting Bolivia has failed to
cooperate with the United States on important
efforts to fight drug trafficking. The trade
act, dating from 1991, eliminates tariffs on
imports of textiles, jewelry, wood and other
products from Colombia, Ecuador, Peru and
Bolivia, in exchange for cooperation with the US
war on drugs. It is estimated that 20,000 to
30,000 workers will lose their jobs, and more
than $70 million in exports will be priced out of the US market.
Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice proclaimed
there was no ideological test for cooperation
and friendship with the United States that led
to the trade cutoff with Bolivia. This statement
was a diplomatic lie: For 2006, Morales first
year in office, the U.S. Office of National Drug
Control Policy reported that coca cultivation was
statistically unchanged as compared to the 2005
estimate. For 2007 the United Nations reported
an increase of just 5 percent in, Coca
Cultivation in the Andean Region: A Survey of
Bolivia, Colombia and Peru. This data, however,
stood in sharp contrast to Colombia, which
registered an increase of coca cultivation by 27
percent, despite the Colombian governments
strong alliance with the U.S. on coca eradication efforts.
The UNASUR declaration, along with the state of
siege in Pando and the nationwide repudiation of
the massacre of Indians, compelled the prefects
of Media Luna to call off their rebellion. They
agreed to a dialogue with Morales over the new
constitution and the issue of autonomy. But the
discussions in late September went nowhere, even
though the Morales government agreed to
incorporate some limited amendments concerning
departmental autonomy into the new constitution.
The department prefects also demanded that the
agrarian reform clauses in the new constitution
be eliminated, but on this point Morales, backed
by MAS and the social movements, refused to back
down. On October 5, the negotiations collapsed.
Morales then announced that he would ask Congress
to set the date for the public referendum on the
new constitution. The social movements mobilized
from around the country, and over 50,000
demonstrators descended on La Paz, surrounding
Congress as it was meeting. The right wing
fragmented, and on Oct. 20, Congress approved the
referendum on the new constitution, which is scheduled for Jan. 25, 2009.
Then on November 1, Morales released a bomb shell
by announcing the indefinite suspension of the
activities of the US Drug Enforcement
Administration in Bolivia, and the expulsion of
the 37 DEA agents from the country. Agents of
the DEA carried out political espionage,
including the financing of delinquent groups,
Morales declared. He pointed toa key U.S.
operative involved in these activities: Steven
Faucette, the regional agent of the DEA in Santa
Cruz, who on a diplomatic mission of the U.S.
embassy made trips to Trinidad and Riberalta
[cities in the Media Luna provinces of Beni and
Pando, respectively] with the objective of
financing the Civics who were committed to carrying out a civic coup.
Morales went on to disclose that a plane with
North American registry called Super King had
flown to airports in the Media Luna without
registering flight plans or providing
notification of the cargo it transferred to pick
up vehicles when it landed on the runway, in
clear violation of our national sovereignty.
Bolivian intelligence also discovered seven
security houses run by the US that carried out
political espionage, including telephone
surveillance of political, police and military authorities.
The DEA and its 37 agents were expelled from the
country. The Bolivian government appropriated
what amounted to a DEA military arsenal,
including airplanes, boats, ground transport
vehicles, communications equipment and one thousand M-16 machine guns.
The civic coup has failed. No longer able to turn
to the US embassy, the opposition is in disarray,
with the leading rightwing party split into four
factions. The referendum on the constitution will
likely be approved by a wide margin. Evo has
rallied the social movements and the country to
break US historic domination of Bolivia. With his
trip to Washington D.C., Morales is hoping to
open up a dialogue with the incoming
administration of President-elect Barack Obama
that will lead to a restoration of full trade
relations, a recognition of Bolivias right to
determine its own policies on drugs, agrarian
reform and gas nationalization, and mutual respect between the two nations.
Roger Burbach is Director of the Center for the
Study of the Americas (CENSA) based in Berkeley,
CA. He has written extensively on Latin America
and is the author of
<http://www.amazon.com/exec/obidos/ASIN/1842774352/counterpunchmaga>The
Pinochet Affair: State Terrorism and Global Justice.
Freedom Archives
522 Valencia Street
San Francisco, CA 94110
415 863-9977
www.Freedomarchives.org
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