[News] Tehran to Trump: Strike Iran, ignite the region

[Anti-Imperialist News]

 Tehran to Trump: Strike Iran, ignite the region

Iran is signaling that a US strike would not stay limited, but would ripple
across West Asia in ways Washington may not be prepared to absorb

Mohamad Hasan Sweidan <https://thecradle.co/authors/mohamad-hasan-sweidan>

FEB 25, 2026 -
https://thecradle.co/articles/tehran-to-trump-strike-iran-ignite-the-region
Photo Credit: The Cradle

In a post on his X account late last week, Ebrahim Rezaei, spokesperson for
the Iranian parliament’s National Security and Foreign Policy Committee,
described <https://x.com/EbrahimRezaei14/status/2025671785325154501?> the
talks scheduled for tomorrow between Tehran and Washington as a “test” for
US President Donald Trump. According to Rezaei, those discussions will
determine “whether American soldiers go to hell or return to America.”

Rezaei’s high-pitched rhetoric forms part of a steady stream of escalating
rhetoric and signaling from Iranian officials over recent weeks. They
reflect a high level of Iranian readiness to enter what officials describe
as a “battle of existence” if the US imposes it on Tehran.

For that reason, it is necessary to examine what options may be on the
table in Tehran should Trump decide to move from pressure to direct
military confrontation.

*Is war Trump’s preferred option? *

Trump is not the reckless madman he sometimes portrays himself to be. He
performs unpredictably. That performance serves a purpose. He is, in fact,
highly attentive to cost. What distinguishes him from other US presidents
is not the absence of calculation, but the criteria guiding it.

Trump is less concerned with institutional legitimacy, alliance consensus,
or international law. He is concerned with how his presidency is remembered
and whether his decisions produce visible results at an acceptable price.
High cost is the only reliable brake.

In Venezuela, Washington pursued regime change
<https://thecradle.co/articles/us-openly-admits-goal-of-maduros-abduction-to-take-the-oil>
and intensified economic warfare but avoided direct military intervention
that would have imposed immediate and measurable losses. In Yemen, the
Trump administration reduced
<https://thecradle.co/articles/us-ceasefire-in-yemen-retreat-masquerading-as-restraint>
overt US military exposure once it became clear that escalation would not
guarantee strategic success at a manageable cost.

In Lebanon and Gaza, Washington has repeatedly sought to prevent expansion
into a full regional war that would force direct US engagement. In Ukraine,
Trump has publicly questioned indefinite commitments and signaled a
preference for recalibration rather than open-ended entanglement.

The pattern is consistent. Trump escalates rhetorically, reinforces the
credibility of his threats, and amplifies uncertainty. Then he weighs two
questions: Can I impose a clear political outcome? And what will this cost
me politically, militarily, and economically?

In the Iranian case, those costs extend far beyond the initial strike.

They include: potential retaliation against US military bases
<https://thecradle.co/articles/if-the-us-targets-iran-gulf-states-face-a-choice>
across West Asia; the security of Israel; the effect of war
<https://thecradle.co/articles/war-on-iran-the-fuse-to-a-global-crisis> on
oil prices and global markets; domestic political pressure if US casualties
rise; and the danger of sliding into a prolonged regional war without a
defined endpoint.

Recent US defense planning in West Asia has emphasized reliance on regional
partners rather than direct, large-scale US engagement. The preference has
been to confront Tehran indirectly, primarily through support for Tel Aviv.

Inside Washington, the central debate is not whether the US has the
capability to strike Iran. It does. The deeper concern is whether such a
strike could produce a durable political reality – whether it would deter
Tehran, extract concessions, or alter behavior without triggering sustained
escalation.

That uncertainty
<https://thecradle.co/articles/anticipating-war-voices-from-iranian-society>
defines the current moment.

*Tehran studies the White House*

Rather than operating blindly, Iranian decision-makers understand Trump’s
sensitivity to cost and escalation. Their response has been to increase the
perceived price of any US military move before it occurs.

The clearest warning has come from Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, who stated
<https://thecradle.co/articles/supreme-leader-warns-of-regional-war-if-iran-comes-under-us-attack>,
“The US should know that if they start a war this time, it would be a
regional war.” That formulation is precise. It signals that any
confrontation would not remain confined to a narrow exchange.

Iran’s response, as indicated, would not be limited to Israel or to
isolated US facilities. It would expand across a wider regional target bank
that includes US interests and infrastructure throughout West Asia.

A second message came in institutional form. Tehran announced the formation
of a Defense Council
<https://thecradle.co/articles/trump-redeploys-uss-gerald-ford-to-west-asia-in-pressure-campaign-against-iran>
and appointed Ali Shamkhani as its secretary. Shamkhani is one of the most
experienced figures in Iran’s security establishment.

He has served as defense minister, secretary of the Supreme National
Security Council, commander within both Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guard
Corps (IRGC) and the regular armed forces, and senior advisor to the
Supreme Leader.

The responsibilities
<https://www.tasnimnews.ir/en/news/2026/02/06/3509906/shamkhani-appointed-secretary-of-iran-s-defense-council?>
assigned to the Defense Council include “designing and comprehensively
strengthening defense preparedness, developing mechanisms to confront
emerging threats … setting frameworks for defense diplomacy, and organizing
activities related to strategic communications and cognitive warfare within
the strategic defense sphere.”

Its composition is notable. The council includes representatives of the
supreme leader, the intelligence minister, the chief of staff, the IRGC
commander, the commander of the regular army, and the head of Khatam
al-Anbiya Central Headquarters. Compared with the Supreme National Security
Council (which managed the 12-day US-Israeli war on Iran
<https://thecradle.co/articles/iran-and-israel-at-war>), this structure is
more explicitly militarized and less politically weighted.

In practical terms, any future confrontation would be directed primarily by
Iran’s military establishment, with the IRGC at the center of operational
planning.

In Washington and Tel Aviv, the IRGC is often characterized as the most
uncompromising institution within Iran’s power structure. Its prominence in
the new configuration will be read as preparation for decisive escalation.

Poll
If the US strikes Iran, what happens next?
Iran retaliates directly but avoids widening the war
The conflict spreads across West Asia within days
Washington limits escalation and seeks rapid de-escalation
A prolonged regional war becomes unavoidable


*The Strait of Hormuz card*

Iran has also revived one of its most consequential strategic levers:
the Strait
of Hormuz
<https://thecradle.co/articles/a-global-oil-and-gas-catastrophe-has-been-averted-for-now>
.

On 17 February, Iranian state media reported that naval forces temporarily
closed the strait during military exercises
<https://thecradle.co/articles-id/35990>. IRGC Navy Commander Alireza
Tangsiri emphasized that the authority to close Hormuz rests with senior
leadership and that Iran’s forces are prepared to execute such a decision
if ordered.

Approximately 20 percent of global oil flows transit this narrow waterway.
Even a limited disruption would send immediate shockwaves through energy
markets and global supply chains.

The signal is unmistakable. A war with Iran would not remain confined to
missile exchanges. It would rapidly translate into economic destabilization
with global repercussions.

*Expanding the battlefield*

Beyond official statements, indirect messaging has reportedly targeted
regional states hosting US military infrastructure.

In a televised segment aired on Ofogh TV, a channel affiliated with Iran’s
state broadcasting authority, commentators warned
<https://x.com/dzama44/status/2018826900999643342?> that the UAE could fall
within Iran’s target bank if Washington launches military operations from
its territory. The segment drew a distinction between the Emirati
population and what it described as an “American UAE” – portraying the
country’s strategic infrastructure as an extension of US regional power.

The rhetoric went further, referring to the UAE as the “51st state” of the
US and outlining potential targets tied to US commercial and military
presence, including hubs in Dubai and the Jebel Ali area.

Reports have also indicated that Tehran conveyed warnings to Lebanon and
Jordan that facilities used to support US military operations could be
drawn into confrontation if war erupts. In Lebanon, Hamat Air Base has been
highlighted. In Jordan, Muwaffaq Salti Air Base remains a critical site for
US and coalition forces.

If conflict escalates, Iran’s initial focus would likely be US military
assets across the region – air bases, command centers, logistics
facilities, and naval deployments.

Al-Udeid Air Base <https://thecradle.co/articles-id/36097> in Qatar, which
hosts forward US Central Command (CENTCOM) operations, is strategically
significant. The US Fifth Fleet headquarters in Bahrain is another central
node. Additional US facilities in Iraq and Syria would also be vulnerable.

This indicates that Tehran’s strategy encompasses defending its territory
while expanding its response to include maritime domains and areas hosting
US bases, and that its messaging has extended to regional partners and
allied movements. As outlined in an analysis
<https://english.khamenei.ir/news/12099/To-the-farthest-reaches-of-the-battlefield>
published on the supreme leader’s official website titled “In the event of
any enemy aggression, what will Iran’s strategy be?”, Tehran warns that
past red lines would be fundamentally redrawn and the battlefield would
extend far beyond previous boundaries. “If Iranian territory or the lives
of its citizens are harmed, American interests and personnel would not be
safe anywhere,” the statement says. Unlike during the 12‑day June war, when
Iran acted alone, any future conflict would confront the enemy across
multiple fronts and diverse zones of engagement.

At the same time, Israel remains central to Tehran’s calculus. Iranian
officials, including the defense minister in May 2025, have stated that any
US attack would trigger strikes against US and Israeli “interests, bases,
and forces.” The language intentionally extends beyond purely military
targets.

*Deterrence through escalation*

A confrontation between Washington and Tehran would ultimately hinge on
cost, not capability alone.

Trump’s strategy relies on pressure calibrated just below the threshold of
uncontrollable escalation. The objective is to extract concessions while
avoiding a conflict that expands beyond defined limits. Tehran’s response
has been to signal that such limits cannot be assumed.

Any strike, in its view, would trigger reactions across multiple fronts,
drawing in US positions, regional infrastructure, and energy routes that
anchor global markets.

Both capitals are studying the other’s pressure points. Washington projects
force from afar and depends on a network of bases and regional partners.
Iran sits inside the geography of confrontation itself, surrounded by US
installations, allied movements, maritime chokepoints, and critical energy
corridors.

Should Trump judge the blowback manageable, he may act. Should Tehran
succeed in convincing him that escalation would spread quickly and
unpredictably, restraint may prevail.

The upcoming talks will revolve around these calculations. Each side is
measuring how far the other is prepared to go – and what it is willing to
risk.
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