[News] Beijing moves to contain Mossad’s expanding reach in Iran

[Anti-Imperialist News]

 Beijing moves to contain Mossad’s expanding reach in Iran

Israeli intelligence operations inside Iran have alarmed Beijing, which saw
them as a new model of intelligence warfare, prompting deeper
technological, security, and strategic cooperation with Tehran.

Nadia Helmy <https://thecradle.co/authors/nadia-helmy>

FEB 17, 2026 -
https://thecradle.co/articles/beijing-moves-to-contain-mossads-expanding-reach-in-iran
Photo Credit: The Cradle

Chinese military experts and intelligence agencies increasingly describe
Mossad’s deep infiltration into Iran as opening a “Pandora’s box” of global
security risks.

>From Beijing’s perspective, Israeli and US intelligence operations –
particularly those expanding after 2015 and accelerating through 2025–2026
– mark the evolution of a new battlespace. Mossad’s ability to embed agents
<https://thecradle.co/articles/iran-dismantles-mossad-linked-cell-active-during-12-day-war>,
compromise sensitive databases, disable radar networks, and facilitate
precision strikes from inside
<https://thecradle.co/articles/israel-behind-mysterious-blasts-across-iran-since-end-of-12-day-war-report>
Iranian territory is interpreted as a shift toward what Chinese analysts
call
<https://www.spsnavalforces.com/story/?id=802&h=Chinas-Strategy-of-Informationised-and-Intelligent-Warfare>
‘Informationized and Intelligent’ Warfare.

This represents the convergence of cyber sabotage, internal recruitment,
technological penetration, and operational coordination – a hybrid model in
which intelligence operations hollow out defensive infrastructure before
kinetic action begins.

For China, the implications extend well beyond Iran.

*Intelligence warfare as a precursor *

Within Chinese security discourse, Israel’s operations in Iran are
frequently cited as evidence that intelligence warfare now precedes kinetic
engagement.

Military expert Fu Qianshao, a former analyst in the Chinese Air Force,
characterized Mossad’s success in planting agents and disabling Iranian
radar and air defense systems from within as a “new pattern of intelligence
warfare.” The June 2025 Israeli strikes on the Islamic Republic, which
reportedly faced minimal resistance due to compromised systems, reinforced
this assessment.

Fu argued that such tactics transcend traditional battlefield engagement.
Instead of confronting air defenses externally, Mossad undermined them
internally – neutralizing deterrence before aircraft entered contested
airspace.

Another Chinese military expert, Yan Wei, echoed this concern, emphasizing
that the penetration of sensitive Iranian facilities exposed structural
weaknesses rather than merely technological gaps. Legal safeguards and
routine security protocols, he suggested, are insufficient against
intelligence operations that exploit bureaucratic vulnerabilities and
internal access points.

Professor Li Li, a Chinese expert on West Asian affairs, has pointed to
Israeli cyber operations targeting research centers and infrastructure as
evidence of intelligence warfare functioning as a force multiplier. Unlike
conventional attacks, these operations blur the line between espionage and
sabotage, complicating retaliation.

Tian Wenlin, director of the Institute of Middle Eastern Studies at Renmin
University, warned that sustained intelligence incursions could pressure
Tehran to accelerate its nuclear capabilities as a defensive countermeasure.

*Structural vulnerabilities and strategic lessons*

Chinese analysts have argued that Mossad’s operations revealed structural
vulnerabilities within Iranian security and administrative systems. In
commentary across Chinese military and policy platforms, the breaches have
been cited as evidence of weaknesses in digital infrastructure and internal
safeguards.

The breaches exposed weaknesses in internal vetting, digital security, and
inter-agency coordination. In Beijing, the episode was read as a warning –
a reminder that intelligence warfare can exploit administrative seams as
effectively as battlefield vulnerabilities.

If a state with extensive security institutions can face such penetration,
similar methods could target strategic infrastructure elsewhere, including
trade and energy corridors linked to the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI
<https://thecradle.co/articles/:~:text=Iran%2C%20sanctions%2C%20and%20energy%20pressure%20points&text=For%20Beijing%2C%20this%20energy%20corridor,node%20in%20>
).

The key takeaway in Chinese policy circles is preventative. Sovereignty in
the digital era depends as much on system integrity as on military
capability.

*Iran’s role in Belt and Road*

China’s engagement with Iran rests on long-term
<https://thecradle.co/articles-id/5008> strategic planning.

Iran occupies a central geographic position linking East Asia to West Asia
and onward to Europe. Maritime routes through the Strait of Hormuz and Bab
al-Mandab remain essential
<https://thecradle.co/articles/war-on-iran-the-fuse-to-a-global-crisis> to
Chinese energy security and commercial flows.

Instability inside Iran would ripple across these corridors. For Beijing,
disruptions would not be confined to regional politics; they would directly
affect supply chains and infrastructure investments embedded within the BRI.

Chinese officials have therefore consistently reiterated support for Iran’s
sovereignty while opposing what they describe as unilateral pressure.

*Activating counterintelligence coordination*

As reports of Israeli intelligence penetration intensified through 2025 and
into early 2026, Beijing deepened its counterintelligence coordination with
Tehran. Chinese security institutions moved from monitoring Mossad’s
methods to analyzing their structural implications, treating Iran’s
experience as a live operational case.

Beginning in January 2026, cooperation reportedly expanded to include joint
assessments of infiltration pathways, digital vulnerabilities, and
administrative access points exploited by foreign intelligence services.
The breaches were understood not as isolated incidents but as indicators of
systemic exposure requiring institutional response.

Through the Ninth Bureau
<https://moderndiplomacy.eu/2026/02/06/how-chinas-ninth-bureau-counters-mossad-operations-in-mideast/>
of the Chinese Ministry of State Security, China began implementing a
comprehensive strategy in January 2026 to dismantle Israeli and US spy
networks in Iran. As China strengthens Iran's digital sovereignty, Beijing
is urging Tehran to abandon western software and replace it with secure,
encrypted Chinese systems that are difficult to penetrate, essentially
building a digital “Great Wall.”

The objective extended beyond immediate breach containment. It centered on
insulating critical infrastructure that underpins Belt and Road trade
corridors from sustained intelligence disruption.

China also promoted integration of its BeiDou navigation system
<https://defencesecurityasia.com/en/iran-abandons-us-gps-china-beidou-middle-east-security/#:~:text=On%20June%2023%2C%202025%2C%20Iran%20formally%20deactivated,completing%20the%20transition%20to%20BeiDou%20for%20both>
as an alternative to western GPS platforms, reducing exposure to signal
interference and enhancing guidance independence for missile and drone
systems. Radar upgrades, including platforms such as the YLC-8B, reportedly
strengthened detection capabilities, including against stealth aircraft.

Advanced air defense systems, including the HQ-9B, further reinforced
airspace monitoring capacity. Cooperation has also extended
<https://thecradle.co/articles/israel-anxious-over-chinese-support-for-iranian-missile-program-report>
to missile infrastructure components and technical systems supporting
deterrence resilience.

Space-based surveillance capabilities, linked to Chinese satellite
networks, reportedly enhanced monitoring capacity and reconnaissance
support.

*Embedding Iran within a broader security architecture*

Beyond bilateral coordination, Beijing has sought to situate Iran within
broader multilateral security mechanisms through the Shanghai Cooperation
Organization (SCO).

The SCO’s formal security architecture centers on its Regional
Anti-Terrorist Structure (RATS
<https://thecradle.co/articles/sahand-2025-iran-hosts-first-sco-drill-on-its-soil-marking-a-new-era-in-eurasian-security>),
headquartered in Tashkent, which coordinates intelligence sharing and
counterterrorism cooperation among member states. Although originally
designed to address extremist threats, the framework provides institutional
channels for information exchange on cross-border security risks.

Chinese policy commentary has increasingly framed the SCO as more than a
counterterrorism platform. In the context of intelligence penetration and
covert destabilization campaigns, Beijing has emphasized the organization’s
potential as a vehicle for deeper security coordination
<https://thecradle.co/articles/ten-defense-ministers-walk-into-a-room-in-china#:~:text=So%20the%20SCO%20today%20promotes,Russia%E2%80%93China%20get%20on%20board>
and collective resilience against external interference.

While the SCO does not publicly maintain a mandate targeting specific
intelligence services, its expanding cooperation mechanisms – particularly
after Iran’s accession as a full member
<https://thecradle.co/articles-id/6171> in 2023 – have strengthened
Tehran’s integration into a broader Eurasian security network.

Embedding Iran within this framework serves both operational and political
functions: it distributes counterintelligence awareness multilaterally and
signals that intelligence pressure on Tehran resonates beyond bilateral
relations.

*Economic reinforcement and long-term commitments*

Security coordination forms only one layer of Beijing’s approach. Economic
integration provides another.

China remains Iran’s largest trading partner. Iranian exports to China –
largely energy – have approached $22 billion annually, while imports from
China stand at roughly $15 billion. The 25-year comprehensive cooperation
agreement between the two countries envisions long-term Chinese investment
in Iranian oil, gas, infrastructure, and industrial sectors, with projected
figures often cited in the $300–$400 billion range over time.

In parallel, Beijing has employed alternative
<https://thecradle.co/articles/swifts-decline-how-global-powers-are-escaping-the-dollar-trap#:~:text=China%20launched%20the%20Cross%2DBorder,SWIFT's%20most%20serious%20rival%20yet.>
financing mechanisms designed to reduce exposure to sanctions pressure
<https://thecradle.co/articles/china-trades-infrastructure-projects-for-iranian-oil-to-bypass-us-sanctions-report>.
Barter arrangements linking oil exports to infrastructure development
projects, including transportation networks and industrial facilities,
allow transactions to continue outside traditional financial channels.

Economic continuity reinforces strategic stability. Trade flows and
infrastructure commitments create buffers that help absorb the impact of
sustained political and intelligence pressure.

Poll
Is China’s expanding security cooperation with Iran a defensive move – or
the start of a deeper geopolitical alignment?
Primarily about protecting Belt and Road investments
A step toward a formal China–Iran security bloc
A necessary defensive response to intelligence warfare
A calculated move that avoids direct confrontation with the US

37 votes, 6 days and 2 hours left

*Diplomatic positioning and strategic restraint*

China has consistently voiced diplomatic support for Iran in international
forums, emphasizing principles of sovereignty, non-interference, and
opposition to unilateral coercive measures. Beijing has criticized strikes
on Iranian facilities and warned against escalation that could destabilize
regional trade routes.

At the same time, Chinese officials avoid language that commits China to
direct military defense of Tehran. The posture is deliberate. China
strengthens institutional resilience, supports technological substitution,
deepens economic integration, and expands diplomatic backing – while
preserving distance from open confrontation with Israel or the
US. Strategic caution remains central to Beijing’s calculus.

*A layered response in a hybrid battlespace*

Israeli intelligence operations inside Iran are widely interpreted in
Chinese commentary as illustrative of how modern conflict unfolds.
Intelligence warfare – combining cyber access, human networks,
administrative penetration, and precision enablement – reshapes the
strategic environment before conventional escalation becomes visible.

Beijing’s response reflects this assessment. Digital insulation, navigation
substitution, radar modernization, satellite-supported monitoring,
multilateral coordination through the SCO, and long-term economic
engagement form a layered counterstrategy.

In this framework, resilience takes precedence over retaliation. The
objective is to reinforce systems rather than escalate confrontation.

China’s engagement in Iran, therefore, carries dual significance. It
reinforces a strategic partner facing sustained intelligence pressure while
refining Beijing’s own understanding of hybrid conflict and systemic
vulnerability.

The contest unfolding is structural. Sovereignty in this environment
depends on hardened infrastructure, secure networks, and institutional
coordination as much as on military platforms.

Containment, insulation, and calibration define Beijing’s approach – a
measured effort to limit intelligence penetration while maintaining broader
strategic balance.
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