[News] Is West Asia on the Brink of War or a Strategic Standoff?

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Analysis: Is West Asia on the Brink of War or a Strategic Standoff?
Ali Jezzini
February 18, 2026
------------------------------

Tensions in West Asia rise as US-Israeli deployments expand, with scenarios
ranging from status quo to limited strikes or full war. What will happen?

   - [image: Analysis]
   <https://alpha-en-media.almayadeen.net/media/image/2026/2/17/a3b5bd7f-78f6-4663-b689-8c0ff76590a7.png?width=1000>
   What the model presents is simply an attempt to outline the options
   available to the various players; it does not imply inevitability.
   Ultimately, such models cannot measure many critical variables, most
   importantly, the resilience of the Iranian people, their cohesion, and
   their capacity to endure sacrifice (Illustrated by Mahdi Rteil to *Al
   Mayadeen English*)

The following analysis examines the evolving military posture in West Asia
amid rising tensions between the United States, the Israeli occupation, and
Iran. Building on a previous assessment, it shifts focus from detailed
force positioning to the broader strategic picture, exploring what current
deployments signify and outlining the most probable scenarios in the coming
days.

Through a combination of force analysis, escalation pathways, and a
game-theory framework, the article evaluates possible outcomes ranging from
continued status quo to limited strikes or full-scale war, while
considering the political, economic, and strategic constraints shaping each
actor’s decisions.
Force disposition update

Up to this moment, there has been no large-scale evacuation of bases in the
Gulf. There remains a significant deployment of refueling aircraft, large
drones, electronic warfare platforms, and signals intelligence assets. At
Muwaffaq al-Salti Air Base, the number of aircraft has increased as follows:

   - 24xF-15E: Most likely interceptors or offensive in later stages
   - 30xF-35A: Stealth aircraft for ground attacks and especially the
   destruction of air defenses
   - 6xEA-18G: Electronic warfare aircraft.
   - 12xA-10C: Ground attack aircraft that will use their slow speed and
   30mm cannon to intercept attacking drones.
   - 36xF-16: Same as F-15s.
   - 12xF-22s: Air superiority fighter for deep penetration and leading
   sorties.

Additionally, several extra Patriot batteries have been deployed across
Gulf states to defend against Iranian short-range ballistic missiles. An
image has circulated showing a Patriot battery at Al Udeid Air Base in
Qatar. The surrounding Gulf states will most likely play a role in
intercepting Iranian drones targeting American bases.

The US aircraft carrier USS Abraham Lincoln remains in the Arabian Sea,
sailing no closer than 500–600 km from Iranian coasts, and at times
increasing that distance to 800–1,000 km. Such distances do not allow
offensive operations from the carrier without aerial refueling, except
through air-launched long-range munitions such as the JASSM and similar
long-range munitions.

As for the aircraft carrier USS Gerald R. Ford, there is no confirmed
information. It is rumored to have begun sailing toward West Asia and would
require approximately a week to reach the Mediterranean. Most likely, it
would position itself for air defense operations through its destroyers and
missile strikes if it remains west of the occupied Palestinian coasts.

Numerous shipments of unidentified equipment from Russia and China have
arrived in Iran. While some were confirmed to be upgraded Mi-28NME
helicopters, which would be important for intercepting suicide drones and
rapid intervention in the event of a landing, it is likely that most
shipments relate to radar systems, electronic warfare, or air defense
capabilities in general, rather than fully integrated systems.

An air engagement occurred recently when American forces shot down a drone
that the Islamic Revolution Guard Corps identified as a Shahed-129
<https://english.almayadeen.net/news/politics/irgc-drone-completes-lawful-recon-mission-before-contact-los>,
which was reportedly pursuing the Abraham Lincoln carrier group in the
Arabian Sea. Notably, the drone was flying roughly 700 km from Iranian
coasts, beyond the line-of-sight guidance limits of approximately 200 km.
This suggests it was either connected to a chain of relay drones or
equipped with satellite communications enabling operations at that range.

It is important to note that the key element currently lacking in Iran’s
targeting strategy is ISR, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance,
particularly at extended ranges. The persistent publication of Chinese
civilian satellite imagery may indicate possible future Chinese support in
this domain, support that China could plausibly deny. In practice, such
assistance would be more valuable than any individual weapons system that
will most likely require training.
A game theory model

If we apply a game theory model, which was constructed using the previously
mentioned data and the risks and payoffs every party expects, or tries to
avoid, the results are as follows:

   - Option A is a continuation of the status quo, including US presence
   and pressure.
   - Option B is limited strikes with escalation potential.
   - Option C is a full-scale war.

Payoffs are between -10 as a minimum and +10 as a maximum.

The model accounts for Israeli sensitivity to time constraints and concerns
that the strategic window may not recur (Trump’s exceptionalism, US
strategic pivot eastward, diminishing public support, etc.). The results
suggest the United States prefers Option A, though Israelis lose slightly
under this scenario.

Option B slightly benefits the Israeli regime and less so the United
States, excluding considerations of regime change. I modeled two
regime-change probabilities: 10% under limited strikes and 50% if
decision-makers believed the odds were high. The overall calculations did
not change significantly, except for Iran, which, in reality, prefers open
war over that particular scenario.

*Original Strategic Equilibrium Summary*
*Option * *US* *Israeli regime* *Iran*
*A* +2.8 -0.5 +2.5
*B* +1 +0.45 -4
*C* -7 -8 -4

*Adjusted to 50% possibilty of regime change to simulate high US-Israeli
hopes, Israeli expectations if B*
*Option* *US* *Israeli regime* *Iran*
*A* +2.8 -0.5 +2.5
*B (P regime change=50%)* +1.38 +1.75 -5.95
*C* -7 -8 -4 Possible battle scenarios

During the writing of the article previously published on January 23
<https://english.almayadeen.net/news/politics/analysis--why-us-using-jordan-as-main-base-in-possible-attac>,
amid a limited American presence and rumors of a January 14 possible strike
<https://www.theguardian.com/world/live/2026/jan/14/iran-protests-live-updates-trump-us-action-death-toll-protester-executions-erfan-soltani>,
US aircraft numbers were insufficient except for launches from outside
Iranian airspace during heightened Iranian alert.

At that time, large-scale air defenses and electronic intelligence assets
were not fully deployed. The previous assessment then was that the
probability of a strike was moderate, and that an Iranian response
targeting Muwaffaq al-Salti base in Jordan appeared to align with possible
American preferences, treating the base as a “punching bag” for a limited
exchange while shielding the Israeli regime from consequences.

Iran’s message was clear: any strike would mean full war. That message
altered the American position and caused Trump to reconsider.

Currently, forces are still not on the scale of the Gulf War or the
invasion of Iraq, when 5 US aircraft carrier groups participated, nor the
1991 Gulf War, where 6 participated, but the present posture enables
scenarios A and B, and could lead to C despite the US trying to avoid it.

Trump undoubtedly prefers to extract concessions without war, yet he is
unlikely to secure concessions regarding the total halt of Iran's nuclear
program. The more probable scenario appears to involve a campaign lasting
several days or weeks, structured around successive stages/goals depending
on outcomes of the previous stage:

   1. Destroying Iranian air defenses to ensure operational freedom.
   2. Disrupting ballistic missile launches, reducing launch capacity as
   much as possible, and intercepting most missiles, particularly those
   targeting vulnerable areas within the occupied territories.
   3. Activating intelligence cells to destroy related equipment.
   4. Conduct assassination or sabotage operations similar to prior
   disruptions during internet shutdowns.
   5. Work toward regime change in Iran or impose destabilizing conditions
   similar to Lebanon’s, leading to internal fragmentation and loss of
   legitimacy.

All these steps are extremely difficult and uncertain. They could produce
disastrous outcomes if Iran remains resilient, preserves launch capability,
exhausts air defenses, or succeeds in destroying air defense radar systems,
particularly in the Gulf, where strong intelligence could make such actions
feasible.

*The scenario is still unclear, and there are three main possibilities if
the strike occurs:*

*1-* An Israeli initial attack, as happened in the previous 12-day war. The
United States hopes in this case that Iran will not strike Gulf and
Jordanian airports, as these airports carry out intelligence duties,
refueling, and serve as launch points for aircraft that will intercept
Iranian drones without their hangars and runways being exposed to danger
and without the risk of rising oil prices or destabilizing these countries.
It is highly unlikely that the Iranians would do that, because it would
resemble fighting with one hand tied behind your back.

If “Israel” achieves good results, the United States intervenes and works
through the steps mentioned previously with minimal costs. If it fails and
is struck, America intervenes by threatening to use its forces to obtain a
ceasefire, as it did previously, playing the role of mediator and saying
that we are only protecting oil. This scenario is likely if the strike
occurs because it is the least damaging to America and its allies, but the
most harmful to Iran if successful.

*2- *A comprehensive joint American-Israeli operation from the start, and
this would lead to a comprehensive Iranian response across the region if
early success in destroying Iranian forces is not achieved, especially
since the arsenal designated for dealing with American forces in the Gulf
is completely different from that designated for the Israelis in terms of
missiles, munitions, operations, and intelligence.

It is highly unlikely that such a scenario would not be read by the
Iranians as a full regime-change war, leading ultimately to what was stated
in outcome C. It is a very dangerous outcome for the Americans more than
the Israelis themselves, and looking at Trump’s precedents in dealing with
major risks, he appears to try to avoid high-risk actions. He may see this
as “Israel’s” battle; "let it attack while we defend," which strengthens
the first scenario.

*3-* The salami-slicing strategy, meaning continuously tightening the siege
on the Iranians and beginning to confiscate Iranian oil ships, as was done
with Venezuela, given that 80% of Iranian oil exports go to China. This
scenario was presented to Trump previously, according to the *Wall Street
Journal*, and he rejected it earlier because of the countermeasures the
Iranians could take that would raise oil prices. Here, oil is a sensitive
issue because any prolonged rise toward $90–100 per barrel threatens
America with economic recession, a disastrous scenario ahead of the
midterms.

This strategy could be accompanied by threats of brute force in case of an
Iranian response, or promises, for example, that some settlement could be
reached in case of no Iranian response, relying on what the US might
perceive as divisions within the Iranian elite. This is what the Biden
administration did during the first year after the al-Aqsa Flood with the
Iranians, as in Lebanon, and the result overall was clear. In light of
that, the Iranians continue to show that this scenario would lead to
retaliation, even if it causes a comprehensive war.

Up to this moment, the Iranians are sending messages that all roads lead
either to an agreement or to outcome C, full war, where everyone loses,
with major differences in losses as shown in the model. We may disagree on
the numbers, so the matter is not one of madness or merely a martyrdom
mentality as some Western analysts describe it, but rather rational
calculation.
Limits of war modeling and the illusion of strategic certainty

What the model presents is simply an attempt to outline the options
available to the various players; it does not imply inevitability.
Ultimately, such models cannot measure many critical variables, most
importantly, the resilience of the Iranian people, their cohesion, and
their capacity to endure sacrifice. If numerical models were fully
reliable, US Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara would not have resigned
during the Vietnam War. Coming from Ford with a data-driven mindset, he
left the administration in humiliation after his calculations failed to
account for the Vietnamese willingness to sacrifice for their freedom and
independence.

I believe that a significant portion of Israeli confidence does not stem
solely from intelligence networks inside Iran or from access to specific
knowledge. Iranian losses would certainly occur and are almost inevitable.
However, this confidence may also reflect excessive self-assurance, a sense
of grandiosity after recent achievements, and even a religious conviction
that this could be the decisive war after which they will dominate West
Asia, coupled with a genuine fear that the current opportunity may not
present itself again.

The Americans, in contrast, appear far less prudent. I believe they
genuinely assume that a substantial bloc of Iranians would align with their
strikes and are waiting for them eagerly. This tendency is common among
major powers, not just individuals, to indulge in wishful thinking. Such
assumptions often lead to catastrophic miscalculations, with leaders
overrelying on projections of their own expectations and underestimating an
adversary’s willingness and ability to endure hardship, at the expense of
material realities and adequate preparation.

The probability of war is not certain, but it now exceeds fifty percent.
Military positioning is nearing completion, particularly with the
withdrawal of the Boeing RC-135 air defense reconnaissance aircraft from
Qatar to Crete and the deployment of E-3 AWACS aircraft to the region.

In any case, under these variables and in the event of a major blow to the
United States, the regional viability of “Israel” would be called into
question amid potential American retrenchment. Only God knows how such a
war would unfold if it occurs. Personally, I believe the best scenario
would not see war break out. The resistance axis requires several years to
rebuild what it has lost, and during that period, and this is not merely my
assessment, the United States will likely be compelled to reduce its
presence in the region. That is why “Israel” is working toward reducing its
dependence on America, aiming in the future, in cooperation with local
allies such as India, Ethiopia, and European states, to dominate the region
independently.
Conclusion

In conclusion, the current moment represents a highly unstable strategic
intersection rather than an inevitable march toward war. The military
positioning underway expands the range of possibilities without
guaranteeing any specific outcome.

While limited confrontation may appear manageable on paper, the margins for
miscalculation are thin, and escalation dynamics are difficult to control
once activated, since Iran might prefer a total war if it reads the current
goals of US and Israeli attacks as regime change, a goal that US and
Israeli officials spared no opportunity declare as a main goal of any
military actions.

Each actor is weighing time, deterrence credibility, domestic constraints,
and regional balance differently, creating asymmetry in risk tolerance and
strategic preference. Ultimately, endurance, political cohesion, and the
ability to absorb sustained costs will matter more than opening strikes or
technological advantages.

Whether events move toward negotiation or confrontation will depend not
only on military capability, but on judgment, restraint, and the accuracy,
or inaccuracy, of each side’s assumptions about the other.
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