[News] Iran poised to unleash strategic military surprises if Israel ignites fire again

[Anti-Imperialist News]

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<https://www.presstv.ir/Detail/2025/07/03/750532/Iran-poised-to-unleash-strategic-military-surprises-if-Israel-ignites-fire-again>
Iran poised to unleash strategic military surprises if Israel ignites fire
again
Presstv
July 3, 2025
------------------------------

*By Mohammad Molaei*

*Experience has shown that the Zionist regime has never adhered to
ceasefire agreements, not in Gaza and not in Lebanon. So, naturally, Iran
remains fully prepared if the regime again resorts to foolhardy military
adventurism after unilaterally declaring a truce.*
[image: ccd9a5b4-2017-4e21-8425-960224753262.jpg]

The arrival of military cargo aircraft from the United States and other
allies to the occupied territories in recent days is a clear indication
that something is fishy. Although detailed information about Israel’s
military contracts following the 12-day war of aggression against Iran is
unavailable due to confidentiality, credible reports provide some details
of these preparations.

According to reports, the United States has sent more missile defense
systems worth hundreds of millions of dollars to strengthen Israel’s air
defense, which was weakened in the recent war.

Furthermore, according to the US Department of the Treasury, the country
has approved the sale of $510 million worth of ammunition to Israel. This
package includes 3,840 guidance kits for 2,000-pound bunker-buster bombs
(BLU-109) and 3,280 satellite-guidance kits for 500-pound bombs (MK82).

The contract includes logistical, technical, and engineering support, with
Boeing as the primary contractor. The rapid transfer of part of this
equipment from US military stockpiles to Israel indicates the urgent need
for the Israeli Air Force to reinforce its military capabilities.

Additionally, reports indicate an increase in joint Israeli-American
military exercises and deployment of advanced radar systems in the occupied
territories, all suggesting readiness for another potential confrontation
with the Islamic Republic.

Reports of increased simulated air strike exercises against distant
targets, deployment of AN/TPY-2 radars linked to the THAAD system, and
reinforcement of Israeli military bases in the occupied territories further
confirm this trend. These measures were undertaken not only to rebuild
Israel’s military capabilities after the 12-day war but also to indicate
planning for offensive operations.

On June 13, 2025, the Israeli regime launched an unprovoked and unlawful
military aggression on Iran, targeting its military and nuclear
installations and assassinating many senior military commanders, nuclear
scientists, as well as ordinary civilians.

In the initial hours, Israel’s war minister Israel Katz declared a state of
emergency across the occupied territories, indicating Israel’s readiness
for a rapid Iranian military response.

Hours after the Israeli aggression, Iran responded by launching suicide
drones toward the occupied territories. These drones were designed to
engage the Israeli defense systems, especially the Iron Dome, to create an
opportunity for partial reconstruction of Iran’s air defenses.

It was followed by the first wave of missile attacks. These attacks, part
of the “True Promise 3” operation, involved ballistic and hypersonic
missiles from various Iranian bases in cities such as Tehran, Isfahan,
Kermanshah, Shiraz, and Tabriz.

During 12 days of the imposed war, Iran launched over 500 ballistic,
cruise, and hypersonic missiles in 22 operational waves. These included
missiles such as “Emad” with pinpoint accuracy, “Kheibar Shekan” with high
maneuverability, “Haj Qasem” with medium range, and for the first time,
“Sejjil” with a range of 2,000 kilometers and hypersonic speed. These
strikes had profound and multifaceted impacts on Israel’s
military-industrial infrastructure.

*Impact of Iranian retaliation*

These retaliatory attacks targeted the Bazan oil refinery in Haifa Bay,
which produced 200,000 barrels of oil per day and supplied over 60 percent
of Israel’s fuel consumption, including gasoline, diesel, and jet fuel.
They also caused extensive fires in storage tanks, destruction of
pipelines, and a complete halt in refinery operations. Bazan Company
announced that returning to normal operations by October 2025 is impossible
due to the need for major repairs and infrastructure reconstruction.

The crisis forced the Zionist regime to import up to 110,000 barrels of
fuel daily. Considering global oil prices, this daily import imposed an
approximately $8 million financial burden on Israel’s economy. At the same
time, global concerns about a potential closure of the Strait of Hormuz—the
main route for 20% of the world’s oil—led to a 12% increase in global oil
prices, impacting energy markets in Europe and Asia.

The Haifa power plant, with a capacity of 1,020 megawatts and supplying
about 7 to 8 percent of Israel’s electricity, was targeted by Iranian
ballistic missiles, resulting in the destruction of internal stations and
widespread outages in northern regions. The Leviathan gas platform, which
provides 40% of Israel’s electricity through natural gas, also suffered
severe damage to extraction and transmission infrastructure, causing a 30%
reduction in output. This vulnerability led to intermittent power outages
in Haifa, Tel Aviv, and surrounding areas.

In response, Israel turned to renewable energy development and increased
the share of solar power in its energy mix from 10% to 40%. However,
disruptions in the global supply chain and difficulties importing solar
equipment due to sanctions and regional tensions delayed new projects by up
to two years, imposing an annual cost of approximately $300 million on the
regime’s economy. This trend also eroded foreign investor confidence in
Israel’s energy market.

In terms of human and material losses, Iranian retaliatory attacks claimed
several lives, though due to sweeping censorship, the actual death toll is
not known. Hebrew media such as Haaretz and Yedioth Ahronoth reported
massive damage to approximately 32,000 structures in Tel Aviv, Haifa, Bat
Yam, and Petah Tikva – most of them military-industrial sites embedded in
residential areas.

While Hebrew sources claimed that only 34 out of about 500 missiles
launched by Iran penetrated Israeli defense systems, this figure is
inconsistent with the reported extent of damage. Accepting Israel’s claims
would imply that each missile, on average, damaged 941 homes, which is
logically improbable given the destructive capacity, geographical
dispersion, and population density of targeted areas. This contradiction
sparked widespread criticism in Israeli media and military circles.

*Failure of Israeli air defenses*

>From a psychological and political perspective, the inability of Israel’s
advanced defense systems to intercept Iranian hypersonic missiles such as
“Kheibar Shekan” and “Sejjil,” with high accuracy and speeds exceeding Mach
5, undermined the regime’s military prestige. Reports of failures in the
Iron Dome, David’s Sling, and Arrow 3 systems against Iran’s simultaneous
multi-layered attacks triggered a wave of domestic criticism against
Netanyahu’s war cabinet.

The psychological pressure from these attacks led to the temporary
migration of approximately 50,000 people from northern areas to central and
southern occupied territories, increasing public anxiety and reducing trust
in military and political institutions.

Iranian attacks on Haifa port—the largest commercial port in the occupied
territories—also disrupted supply chains for essential goods such as food
and medical equipment, increasing import prices by 15%, which imposed
additional pressure on households.

Ultimately, Iran, by executing 22 waves of missile and drone attacks, using
satellite intelligence, intelligence networks, and precise coordination
among combat units, succeeded in imposing unprecedented military, economic,
and psychological costs on the Zionist regime.

The unilateral ceasefire declared by the United States on behalf of the
regime on June 24, 2025 reflected Israel’s inability to continue the
aggression beyond 12 days. This development strengthened Iran’s deterrence
power in the region and had broad geopolitical consequences, including
reinforcing the axis of resistance and increasing global attention to
Iran’s military capabilities.

Experience has shown that in the event of a ceasefire violation by the
Zionist regime and renewed attacks on Iranian soil, the armed forces of the
Islamic Republic, especially the Islamic Revolution Guards Corps (IRGC),
possess multiple options—leveraging advanced military capabilities and
modern strategies—to inflict heavy damage on Israel’s infrastructure and
interests, potentially altering the regional balance of power significantly.

Analysis of images released from boosters of missiles launched towards the
occupied territories, which fell in target areas after warhead release,
indicates that during the first three days of the 12-day war (June 13 to
July 25, 2025), the IRGC employed advanced solid-fuel missiles.

However, in the following days, it deliberately used liquid-fuel missiles
with older technology. This intelligent and strategic choice reflects the
preservation of modern missiles for more critical phases of the war.
Notably, no reports have emerged of the destruction of solid-fuel missile
launchers, suggesting that Iran has reserved these weapons for intensified
stages, particularly if Israel attacks key infrastructure such as oil
facilities in Khuzestan or power plants.

Past Iranian strikes on the Bazan refinery demonstrated the vulnerability
of Israel’s traditional energy infrastructure. Therefore, if the war
resumes, Iran will likely target alternative Israeli infrastructure such as
solar farms in the Negev Desert and central regions.

These facilities, due to their dispersion, dependency on imported
equipment, and lack of effective defense systems, represent vulnerable
targets. Their destruction could cause wider blackouts and impose
additional psychological and economic pressure on Israeli settler society.

Comparison of operations “True Promise 1 and 2” with “True Promise 3”
reveals significant advancements in Iran’s missile accuracy. Use of
hypersonic missiles such as “Sejjil” and “Kheibar Shekan,” with pinpoint
accuracy and speeds exceeding Mach 5, has rendered Israel’s advanced
defense systems—Iron Dome, David’s Sling, and Arrow 3—ineffective against
simultaneous multi-layered attacks.

*Upcoming surprises for the enemy*

This progress enables Iran, in case of escalation, to deploy the preserved
solid-fuel missiles to deliver devastating shocks to Israel’s critical
infrastructure, particularly remaining refineries, Haifa’s ammonia tanks,
and offshore gas platforms like Leviathan and Tamar.

Beyond missiles, Iran can deploy advanced drones such as “Shahed-149” and
“Arash-2,” boasting ranges over 2,000 kilometers and capable of carrying
heavy warheads. These drones fly at low altitudes and on unconventional
paths to evade Israeli radar systems, enabling targeting of command
centers, Nevatim and Ramon airbases, and even the Dimona nuclear facility.

Moreover, according to regional sources, Iran is likely to employ cyber
capabilities concurrently with physical attacks. Cyberattacks on
electricity grids, communications, and banking systems could multiply the
effectiveness of missile strikes and extensively disrupt Israel’s
infrastructure. Previously, cyberattacks attributed to Iran caused
malfunctions in Israeli banking and digital systems.

Within this framework, Iran may engage the Axis of Resistance, particularly
Hezbollah in Lebanon, to launch missile and rocket attacks from the
northern front. This would force the Zionist regime to divide its defensive
resources across multiple fronts, significantly reducing the overall
effectiveness of its defense systems.

Hezbollah, with an arsenal exceeding 150,000 rockets and missiles, is
capable of targeting Haifa, Acre, and other northern cities, while Iran
targets Tel Aviv and occupied Al-Quds from its own territory.

This multifaceted strategy—a combination of solid-fuel missiles, offensive
drones, cyberattacks, and proxy operations—entangles the Zionist regime in
a war of attrition. Simultaneous disruption of energy, economic, and
military infrastructures will further undermine public trust in Netanyahu’s
cabinet.

Furthermore, if Israeli attacks continue, Iran may employ its space
capabilities, such as the Noor-2 and Noor-3 satellites, to gather
real-time, precise intelligence on Israeli military movements. This
capability allows Iran to deliver rapid, accurate responses based on real
data to the regime’s maneuvers.

In the event of ceasefire violations by the Zionist regime and renewed
attacks on Iranian territory, China—as a key strategic partner of the
Islamic Republic—can play a vital role in bolstering Iran’s deterrence
capabilities by supplying advanced weaponry.

These include long-range air defense systems, microwave anti-drone
technologies, electronic warfare systems, and advanced drones and missiles.

China, which purchases a large portion of Iran’s exported oil and has made
key investments in projects like the North-South Corridor, has expanded its
military cooperation with Iran in recent years. In the event of an all-out
war, the likelihood of China providing strategic arms to Iran is high.

One of the most important weapons China could provide is the HQ-9 air
defense system; comparable to the Russian S-300, it has a range of 200
kilometers and can simultaneously engage up to 12 targets—including fighter
jets, cruise missiles, and short-range ballistic missiles—significantly
enhancing Iran’s defense against Israeli air attacks. Its HT-233 radar can
detect targets up to 300 kilometers away and neutralize multilayered
threats promptly.

Additionally, microwave anti-quadcopter systems such as the LD-2000,
designed by China, use high-power waves to disrupt or destroy light
reconnaissance drones like Hermes 450 and Heron TP within a 5-kilometer
radius. These systems can increase the security of Iran’s missile bases in
mountainous regions and curb Israeli reconnaissance and attack threats.

China can also supply advanced electronic warfare systems such as the Type
928D. By jamming enemy radars like Israel’s AN/TPY-2 and satellite-guided
precision bomb systems like JDAM, these systems can significantly reduce
the accuracy of Israeli strikes on Iranian infrastructure, providing Iran
with the necessary window for an effective response.

Among other armaments China might supply are advanced drones such as the
CH-5 Rainbow. With a 6,500-kilometer range, the ability to carry one ton of
munitions, and 60-hour flight endurance, these drones would be highly
effective for reconnaissance and offensive operations against sensitive
targets within the occupied territories, including airbases, energy
infrastructure, and command centers. Equipped with laser guidance and
artificial intelligence systems, these drones can execute precision strikes
that saturate and overwhelm Israeli defense systems.

The combination of these weapons with advanced missiles and cyber
operations will present the Zionist regime with a multifaceted, attritional
challenge. The HQ-9 system increases Iran’s active defense capabilities,
creating space for focused counterattacks. Anti-drone systems ensure base
security, while electronic warfare equipment disrupts enemy navigation
systems, facilitating accurate Iranian retaliatory strikes.

*Strait of Hormuz – a key card*

Alongside all these capabilities, the Islamic Republic of Iran holds a
critical geopolitical lever: the Strait of Hormuz. This strategic waterway,
through which approximately 20 million barrels of oil—about 20% of global
traded oil—pass daily, represents a powerful card Iran can play. In case of
escalating tensions, it could become a significant pressure point to shock
global energy markets.

According to reports, after the initial Israeli attacks on June 13, 2025,
Iran loaded naval mines onto its vessels in the Persian Gulf and prepared
for mining the Strait of Hormuz. Although this measure has not yet been
operationalized, it signals Tehran’s determination to employ geopolitical
tools in response to potential acts of aggression in the future.

The Strait of Hormuz, with a narrowest width of only 33 kilometers, plays a
critical role in the transportation of crude oil and liquefied natural gas
from OPEC member countries such as Iran, Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Kuwait, and
Iraq. Any disruption along this route—such as mine-laying or seizure of oil
tankers—could drive oil prices from around $74 to between $120 and $150 per
barrel, and in worst-case scenarios, even up to $400. Banks such as
JPMorgan and Citibank have warned that such a spike in oil prices could
raise global inflation rates by up to 2%, and in the United States,
inflation could surge as high as 18%.

This energy crisis would challenge the economies of countries dependent on
energy imports, including the United States, China, India, Japan, and
Europe. In Europe, gasoline prices could rise beyond €2.5 per liter,
causing major German and Italian industries to experience blackouts and
production declines. In the U.S., increased energy and transportation costs
could depress stock markets by up to 8% and sharply boost consumer
inflation.

Iran, possessing over 5,000 naval mines—especially modern magnetic and
pressure-sensitive types—and with the capability to rapidly deploy them via
fast boats and Ghadir- and Fateh-class submarines, can turn the Strait of
Hormuz into a critical chokepoint for the global economy.

This measure, combined with missile attacks on Israel’s energy
infrastructure, could exert additional economic pressure on the United
States and weaken Washington’s diplomatic ability to provide unconditional
support to Israel.

*A full bag of surprises *

Overall, Iran’s potential surprises in the event of a ceasefire violation
are not limited to deploying more precise and faster weapons; rather, they
reflect a comprehensive and multidimensional strategy that combines
military, intelligence, cyber, proxy, and geopolitical tools to place
unprecedented pressure on the Zionist regime and shift the regional balance
in Iran’s favor.

Among other potential surprises in case of ceasefire violation by the
Zionist regime is the use of special operations and field missions inside
enemy territory. Some intelligence sources report the readiness of the IRGC
Quds Force to carry out sabotage operations against critical Israeli
facilities, including power transmission lines, ammunition depots, and
cyber infrastructure.

These operations could coincide with missile and drone attacks to increase
pressure on the Zionist regime and cause widespread disruption in Israel’s
military command and control. Especially given unconfirmed reports of
infiltration around Haifa and Tel Aviv, it is likely that in the case of
renewed war, these capabilities will be used as surprising and
unpredictable weapons.

Alongside these direct actions, Iran could benefit from unexpected support
by groups and networks in the region that have not yet played a direct role
in this war. For example, some security analysts believe that if the
Zionist regime attacks Iran again, groups in Jordan, the occupied West
Bank, or even in southern Syria and the Sinai Desert might, spontaneously
or with Iranian intelligence backing, target Israeli logistical routes or
military bases.

This would open new heterogeneous fronts against Israel and double the
regime’s need to disperse its forces. These informal supports, together
with Iran’s direct and indirect capabilities, could provide a more complete
picture of a “multi-layered siege” strategy against the Zionist regime— a
strategy that uses not only firepower but also regional infiltration and
mobilization.

To sum it up, if the Zionist regime violates the ceasefire and renews
attacks against Iranian soil, it will face not only a widespread missile
and drone response but also a set of strategic surprises ranging from
special operations deep within the occupied territories to cyberattacks,
utilization of space capabilities, activation of Axis of Resistance
capacities, and even leveraging geopolitical tools such as the Strait of
Hormuz.

The combination of these elements, with potential military support from
powers like China and mobilization of hidden regional networks, could
create a complex and multidimensional equation of Iran’s active deterrence
against Israeli aggression — an equation that not only changes the regional
balance of power in Tehran’s favor but also sends a clear message to all
regional and extra-regional actors: Iran is not only fully prepared to
defend itself but also capable of making the cost of any aggression
unbearable for its enemies.

*Mohammad Molaei** is a Tehran-based military affairs analyst.*

*(The views expressed in this article are author's own and do not
necessarily reflect those of Press TV)*
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