[News] Shock without awe - Zionism and its horror

[Anti-Imperialist News]

https://www.radicalphilosophy.com/article/shock-without-awe
Summer 2024 - Radical Philosophy

Shockwithoutawe

*Zionismanditshorror***

*Abdaljawad****Omar*

On27June1976,thePopularFrontfortheLiberationof Palestine,in conjunction 
with their German allies from the RedArmy Faction,orchestrated a daring 
operation thatseized,inmid-flight,anAirbusA300enroutefrom 
TelAvivtoParis.TheyredirectedtheplanetowardsLibya and then guided it to 
its final stage in Uganda,finding sanctuary at Entebbe Airport.A mere 
week later, the 
commandosoftheIsraelieliteunitSayeretMatkalundertookastillmoredaringextractionoperation.Itinvolved 
a radar-evading flight spanning over 2000 
miles,camouflage,swiftanddecisiveaction,pre-preparedescape routes and 
minimal casualties.^1 The meticulously 
executedmanoeuvreculminatedinaresoundingtriumph for the Israeli special 
forces.

Entebbedoesnotstandaloneasanisolatedinstance 
withinthearchiveofIsrael’sspecialmilitaryoperations. 
Itfiguresinsteadasanexemplarycaseofamoregeneral strategy, 
auseofforcethatfullysucceededinevokinga mixofaweandterror.^2 
Suchoperationssimultaneously elicit horror at the spectacle of violence 
together with admirationfortheirmeticulousexecutionand,ultimately, also 
for their instrumental success.The aesthetics of such military 
operations play a crucial role in evoking these powerful emotions. The 
symbolic substance they helptoconvey– heroicsinthefaceofadversity, 
overcomingresistance,eventualtriumph– haveplayedafound2ational role in 
the formation of Israeli identity around military power and its 
exercise. They have also helped turn its aesthetic effects into 
mythological narratives, narratives that have been well used to attract 
new settlers,entrench and reinforce the support from imperial centres, 
and solidify its primary social base. These 
operationsalsoinduceasenseofaweandterroramongthe 
ArabandPalestinianmassesandcontributetotheconception of an Israeli 
military that is undefeatable. This 
conceptionisreinforcedwitheverynewbattle,operation and war.

These ‘splendid’ spectacles, mediated through the 
apparatusofmilitaryoperationsandlarge-scalebattles, appear also as 
retrospective evidence of 
the‘righteousness’ofIsrael’ssettler-colonialproject. 
Suchretrospectivelegitimationfindssupportnotonlyinthenotionthat ‘might 
is right’ but also in the aesthetic effects that Israeli 
militarypowercanevoke– bothwithinitsownsociety, against its enemies, and 
in the impression it leaves on distant observers, both friend and enemy 
alike.Here, the technology and operational dimensions of military power 
transcend mere instrumentality or tactical out- comes. The capacity to 
reach,strike,generateor extract 
targets,toenactviolencewithprecisionandrapidity, to 
winwarsspectacularly, operatesnotonlyasademonstration of power but as a 
performative act of demobilisation, fracturing Palestinian andArab 
resistance and eroding their will to resist. It has also built a cult of 
victory that seesinperpetualwarnotonlythemeanstofendoffenemies or deter 
them but a recurrent testing of Israeli 
poweranditsabilitytoovercomeallformsofresistance, 
confirmedthroughendlessstreamsofbattles,special operations and 
large-scale wars.^3


  Militaryaesthetics

The nexus between aesthetics and war is a domain fraught with profound 
philosophical contention,^4 not 
leastinresponsestotheriseoffascismintheearlytwentieth century. Walter 
Benjamin traces the phenomenon 
ofGermanfascismtoadistincteffacementoftheinherent cruelty and stark 
reality of war,elevating it instead to 
aglorifiedpursuitthatultimatelyfindsitspurposewithin itself, 
inacelebrationof‘warforwar’ssake’.^5 Sucherasureofwar’scruelty, 
itsbloodyandbone-breakingreality, is necessary for the propagation of 
war as an honourable national pursuit.For Benjamin, such pursuit not 
onlyremainsblindtotheabjecthorrorsofwar, andnot 
onlyservestoperpetuatepropertyrelationswithinfascistregimes;itfundamentallyignoresthepivotalroleof 
technologyinmediatingtherawexperiencesofwarand ideological claims to 
heroism. For Benjamin,the 
glorificationofwarwithinmanyGermanintellectualcircles 
beliesthelossofheroicsthatnewtechnologiesandmechanical weapons systems 
effaced.^6 It also redirects the struggle from internal civil 
conflicts(conflicts regarding 
socialandeconomicemancipation)towardsanexternal enemy, 
whileignoringthegrowingrelianceontechnology in its celebration of 
heroics invested in machinery 
andmunitions.Thisdiversionpermitsthetruefightfor 
socialandpoliticalemancipationtobesquanderedona false battlefield.^7

What emerges as most significant in Benjamin’s analysis is the way 
intellectual circles, even those directly scarred by war, grappled with 
the experience of their encounterwithcombat. 
HeunveilsadisturbingaestheticisationwithinGermanintellectualdiscourseaboutthe 
FirstWorldWar, wherebythestingofdefeatwasnotonly 
disregardedbutsubtlytransmutedintoacatalystforfuture wars. It is within 
this nexus between interpretations 
ofdefeatandglorificationofwarthattheseedsforrenewed 
warweresown,asombretestamenttotheperilous 
interplaybetweenreificationofwarandtherelentless 
drivetowardsanotherencounterwithvastdevastation. The aestheticisation of 
war in works by Ernst Jünger and 
others,itsmystification,emergesasapeculiarresponse from a nation 
markedby defeat that now internalises this 
defeataspartofitsveryessence.Yet,thisglorification is not merely a 
retrospective veneer or mystification, as 
Benjamincontends;italsospringsdirectlyfromtheraw experience of war 
itself.This is an element that 
Benjaminoverlooks.Withinthechaosandtheabyssofwar, there lurks an element 
of the sublime.^8

Inhisbook/TheWarriors: ReflectionsonMeninBattle /(1959), J. Glenn Gray 
evokes a feeling of the sublime in war that possesses an ‘ecstatic 
character’, where ecstasyis understood in its original Greek meaning as 
‘a state of beingoutsidetheself.’^9 
Evenamidstthemundanecuriositiesofbattlethereisamomentarysuppressionofthe 
ego,aslightdissolutionoftheself’sbarriers. However, 
thispalesincomparisontothemorerarefiedstatesof awe that soldiers 
sometimes experience. These moments of ecstasy bring a deep 
satisfaction,stemming from the 
consciousnessof‘apoweroutsideuswithwhichwecan merge in the relation of 
parts to whole.’^10 As Gray 
emphasises,inthisstatethesoldier’sfeelingsoftriumphor depression are 
suspended, replaced by a pervasive sense ofwonder.^11 
Thiswondersatisfiesbecauseitreassures the individual of their place 
within the larger 
world,mitigatingtheisolationandinsufficiencyoftheego.What especially 
intrigues Gray is the way it also enables the idea of brotherhood to 
attain its highest articulation. 
UnlikeJüngerandhiscohort,Graywasnotawarenthusiast. As HannahArendt 
writes in her foreword to the book, quotingGrayhimself, 
hisreflection‘makesopposition to war forceful’, and it does so‘by not 
just warning us, butmakingusunderstand“whythereisinmanytoday as great a 
fear of a sterile and unexciting peace as of a great war”.’^12

Recognising the ecstatic feeling and sublime 
momentspromptedbywardoesnotnecessarilynegateits horrors.For Gray, it 
also highlights certain aspects of war that make it an alluring 
object.This acknowledgment addresses the allure that war holds for 
soldiers, commanders and those who identify with the war effort, 
whoviewandperceiveitseffectsasspectators. Thispull 
towardswarfindsparallelsinvariousliberal,democratic, 
settler-colonialandotherpoliticalformations. InIsrael, the pull is 
central to the formation of ‘Israeli-ness’, to the constitution of 
Israeli identity and its perpetuation 
asastate,societyandeconomymadeandremadebywar. In other words, at the 
heart of my discussion here lies the notion of ‘Israeli-ness’, a 
construct forged through the phenomenological and aesthetic resonances 
of its military praxis.

The choreographed movements of soldiers and armoured vehicles,the 
interwoven technology,the valour 
displayedbyitsforces,thecapacitytoinscribeitspower 
throughitsaestheticeffectsandperformance,theassassinationsofPalestinianleadersandactivists,thecovert 
operationsbyundercoverunitsinthelabyrinthinespaces of refugee camps and 
dense urban area, all the grand 
militaryengagementsagainstArabarmies,culminating in spectacular 
victories,function not just as displays of dominance, they also open a 
narrative space in which thestate’sveryidentitymightbereinscribed. 
Thesetriumphs, alongside the systematic exclusionary measures 
andregularrecoursetolethalforcethatstructureevery- 
daylifeforPalestinians,underscoretheaestheticnature 
ofIsraelimilitaryoperationsanditsperpetualyearning for spectacular 
victories. It is an intricate interweaving 
offorceandfinesse.Inthisperformance,theIsraelimilitary not only seeks to 
overcome resistance,but also to inspireaweandwonder, 
andtoreinforceaunifiedsense of self-identity that spans whirlwind 
encounters in operations, battles and wars.

The allure of war for Israel,and more precisely for 
Israeli-ness,liesintheabilitytoelicitamomentofexaltation, of ecstasy – 
what Amos Oz called, commenting on the 1967 war, ‘the orgy of 
victory.’^13 What is at issuearemomentswhenanationfacingaperceivedand 
overhyped abyss is instead lifted by the power to 
surprise,killandwin.^14 Thispursuitofamilitarysublime, 
andconsequentlyvictory,iscentraltoIsrael’shistorical 
constitutionandtoitscontinualaspirationforwar–an 
elusiveandperpetualsearchfortotalvictorymarkedby 
creative,innovativeanddaringmilitaryoperations.Here, the destructiveness 
of war is paradoxically coupled 
withadriveforanartistic,almostdivine,formofrealisation, where the 
horrors of war are transmuted into a narrative of sublime self-assertion.

Since the beginning of Israel’s onslaught on Gaza, however, Israel has 
lost its once-potent ability to 
deliver‘awe-inspiring’operations.Goneisthecapacityto land a decisive, 
silencing blow upon its enemies, rendering them mute and incapable of 
further resistance. Instead, Israel has pivoted to a different regime of 
the sublime–one marked by an obscene enjoyment of death and destruction 
pure and simple. This shift involves a brazenly unapologetic, shameless 
transgression of established norms,laws and the codesof war. The 
spectacle of power is now mediated through advancedAI and 
representationalmedia,operationalisedprimarilythrough an utterly 
dominant air force.

Therecentfailureto‘awe’ iscertainlynottotal,since Israel retains the 
ability to induce forms of pure affective negativity, such as fear, 
disgust, anger and feelings of hopelessness and insignificance in the 
presence of an overwhelmingdisplayoffirepower.Butitnowfailsto 
inspireenjoymentinitsownoperationaldesign,itscreative use of military 
power,its intelligence and precision and rapid dominance.It is a form of 
militarism that simplyunleashesforcewithoutconstraints,orthatonly 
acknowledges such constraints by announcing that it 
intendstotransgressthem–asinthecaseofShifaHospital,or the destruction of 
universities,or the targeting of sanctuaries, and the near destruction 
of Gaza as a whole.

ThisobsceneenjoymentnowcentresonIsrael’sability to transgress all 
apparent limits,to both declare /and /desecrate sanctuaries,and to 
violate the law of sanctuary itself.No longer does the regime seek to 
inspire awe; instead, it simply shocks without the accompanying 
reverence,indulginginagrotesquedisplayofunrestrained brutality.The 
public consumption of these massacres 
marksatroublingturningpoint,astheaestheticsofmilitary operationsfeed 
intoa darkpleasure,stripping away 
theformerveneerofheroicsandreplacingitwithabrutal,unvarnished lust for 
domination. This is a military performance that relishes in the act of 
transgression itself, a spectacle that sows pure fear and horror, at the 
expense of its historic cultivation of disciplined and awe- inspiring 
militarism.


  Sublimedomination

A decade before Operation Entebbe, back in October 
1967,thedynamicsofMiddleEasterngeopoliticswereindelibly altered. The 
Israeli military,employing a combination of airpower, strategic surprise 
and audacious rapid manoeuvring,succeededindecimatingtheArabarmies 
withinsixdays. Thisswiftanddecisivewar,knownasthe 
Six-DayWar,becameetchedinthecollectivememoryof 
Israelisasamiraculousevent–analmostdivinevindication of their historical 
claims over Palestine. As Tom Segev points out in his book /1967/,the 
triumph in the war reversedanambientmoodofhopelessness,apervading 
feeling of doom among Israelis that had preceded it. It 
wasdeclaredasevidenceofthe‘handofgod’byIsrael’s newspaper /Yediot 
Ahronoth/.^15

TheaircampaigndecimatedtheEgyptianairforce, gaining air superiority that 
would prove to be the key to Israel’s tactical and operational 
advantage.On the ground, the Israeli forces executed a blitzkrieg across 
theSinaiPeninsulathatlefttheEgyptianarmyindisarray.^16 In the north, the 
formidable Syrian tanks posed


IsraeliattackonEgyptianairforcebase,June1967;source:WikimediaCommons

asignificantthreatfromthehighgroundsoftheGolan 
Heights.Yetheretoo,theIsraeliforcesmanagedtofend 
offtheSyrianincursions,securingabufferzoneinaplace 
thathadlongbeenasourceofhostility, abufferzonein which Israel could then 
build settlements and later officially annex as part of its 
territory.^17 And in the east, the rapid takeover of the West Bank 
underscored the agility and the sheer momentum with which Israel 
operated by weaponising surprise and superior firepower. The territorial 
gains made during those six days were staggering, expanding the settler 
colony’s borders and reshaping the regional map in ways that continue to 
have far-reaching implications.

As Palestinian accounts of the 1967 war confirm, when tanks came rolling 
from the east into Nablus, Palestinians went to greet them, believing 
they mustbeJordanianandIraqitanks– onlytodiscoverthatthey 
wereIsraelitanksthathadmanoeuvredbehindJordanian lines.^18 Therapidity, 
surpriseandimpactofthisvictory on cultural representations and 
understandings of collectiveidentity, 
bothforIsraelisandPalestinians,cannot be underestimated. Although the 
Nakba saw harrowing massacres combined with fierce Palestinian 
resistance and an extensive ethnic cleansing campaign, the Naksa 
canbeseenasmoreofaNakbathantheNakbaitself, precisely on account of the 
sublime character of the victory. The only difference that rendered it 
more tolerable for Palestinians was the emergence of a new revolutionary 
projectembodiedbythe/fida’i/– afigureofself-sacrifice that emerged to 
take centre stage in the fight against Zionist colonisation at the very 
moment the Arab armies themselvesfaltered.^19 
Butalso,thecollectivelessonsof the Nakba played a crucial role in 
limiting the mass expulsion of Palestinians from their homeland, as many 
insisted on staying put,in exactly the sameway that hundreds of 
thousands of people have also refused to leave North Gaza in this 
current phase of the war.

For many Israelis, the 1967 war transcended mere 
militarytriumph.Itwasperceivedasaprovidentialevent, 
onethatmadewarandvictorysynonymous,encouraging 
awidespreadintoxicationwithpower.Unlikeothermythologisationsthathave 
beenwoveninto Israeliidentity, 
suchasTel-Hai,thefallofMasada,oreventheWarsaw 
Ghettouprising,thiswasnotanethicalormoralvictory (a celebration of the 
power of rebellion even if miscarried, or an exploration of the heroism 
of tragic heroes, alongwiththeirethicalimplications) – itwasinstead a 
purely military victory, a sublime moment that left Israelis in awe of 
their own technological and military 
prowess,theingenuityoftheirmilitarydesignandtheir sheer operational 
supremacy.^20 It was an Event that 
retroactivelyaffirmedtherighttotheland,mediated through the spectacle of 
victory and its breathtaking speed. 
Italsoincludedwithinitsveryinvocationofthe miraculous and providential 
that sublime element which 
remainedinessenceunrepresentable,excessiveandun-capturable.^21

These narratives of national survival and the 
possibilityoftheirmythologisationbornfromsublimevictories attempt to 
depict the undepictable.They strive 
toarticulatetheexperienceofstandingoutsideoneself, and to celebrate an 
agential sublimity produced by Israel’s military prowess and its 
effects.Lyotard, in his explorationoftheKantiansublime,elucidateshowthis 
overwhelming emotion, which he describes as ‘strong and 
equivocal’,encompasses both pleasure and pain.^22 
Thisemotiondisruptsthebasicrealityandphysicalmaterialityofwhatwasknownbeforetheencounter,andis 
triggered by an experience of the immensity of nature, 
orbyagrandconcept,orbyastrikingsceneorimage.In 
suchmoments,whentheimaginationisunabletofully grasp what lays before it, 
a feeling of bewilderment or 
wonderarises,asuspensionoftheabilitytounderstand and comprehend. This 
failure to grasp the vastness of the object was central to the Romantic 
rendition of the sublime, for instance in the work of Edmund Burke.^23

Kant expanded the reach of the sublime, however, 
whenhesituateditnotonlyinwhatliesoutsidethesubject,but also in the 
inward movement of the mind per- formed by the subject in relation to 
the supersensible.^24 Andwhatchangesiftheencounterwiththesupersensible 
is itself the product of an agent? What if it retains 
thecharacterofanunexpectedencounter, onethat fulfills 
theecstaticsuspensionoftheego,yetretainsanagential source?

Israel’s militarism embodies a paradoxical 
suspension,wherebytheimagination’scapacitytoapprehend is simultaneously 
arrested and inscribed as an artefact of its own creative force and 
agency.This militarism entwines the roles of artist and spectator, where 
the artistbothcreatesyetstandsinaweofhisowncreation. Mythologisation 
emerges as a secondary effect of this encounter with the 
supersensible,through which textual, artistic and other expressive forms 
are deployed to extricateeventsfromtheirhistoricalspecificity.^25 Thisin 
turn enables a national identity to oscillate between a 
propensityforwarandanunderlyingdreadofpeaceor political engagement with 
its adversaries. This in turn reinforces a permanent quest for victory, 
where victory is notonly‘sufficient’ orpragmatic,butalsoanaffirmation of 
a creative agency at play.^26

EarlyZionists,epitomisedbyZe’evJabotinsky’sarticulation of the‘Iron 
Wall’(1923),construed war as an 
exigencybornefromPalestinianresistanceandtheirrefusal to relinquish 
their land. This militaristic mode of thinking has since evolved into an 
active operational strategyvis-à-visthePalestinians.Itfindsexpression 
inquotidiancolonialterror, inadvancedtechnologiesof 
surveillanceandassault,andnowinagenocidalwarin Gaza. The Iron Wall has 
historically anchored itself in deterrence and territorial expansion, 
underscoring the fundamentalconflictbetweenIsraeliterritorialclaims 
andPalestinianindigeneity. Itisawallthatinprinciple seeks to engrave the 
Arab and Palestinian consciousness with the permanence of Israel’s 
existence, an indelible factresistanttonegation. However, 
itisalsomorethan simplyawallfacingthePalestiniansorArabs. TheIron 
Wallisnotsolelyadefensivestructure;ittranscendsthe 
simplisticfunctionofabarrieranddivider. Itembodies 
thepotentialtosurpassitsownpresentpinnacle,torise above its current 
state.^27

Thelogicofthiswallalsohelpstosecuretheother- 
wisecircularargumentdefendedinJabotinsky’streatise on the‘ethics of the 
Iron Wall.’ Here Jabotinsky boldly 
assertsthat‘ifZionismisjust,thenjusticemustberealisedwithouttakingintoconsiderationanyone’sconsent 
orlackofconsent.’^28 Theaestheticisationofmilitaryoperations, the 
meticulous choreography of power, and the 
ongoingreificationoftheIronWallallservetoreinforce 
aformofethicalreassuranceorsolacethatisdeeplyen- 
twinedwithZionistideology, andgroundedinIsraelis’ capacity to emerge 
victorious,and to silence or punish thosewho do notconsent.This solaceis 
derivedfrom the ability to impose a self-referential and self-sustaining 
justice,perpetuating a vision of sovereignty that is unchallenged by the 
realities and voices of those on the other side of the wall.

Yet the wall, like any wall, has two sides.Military power not only sears 
the consciousness of Palestinians 
andthelargerArabworldbutalsoservestobothconstitute Israeli-ness and 
resolve the ethical contradictions and implications inherent in Zionism, 
i.e.fundamentally and dramatically to re-orient the consciousness of 
Israelis.As Talal Asad points out in his recent reflections on the 
genocide in Gaza,the new Jew or the new 
‘Hebrew’thatIsraelconstitutedwasattractivetothediasporic Jew not only on 
account of their‘eternal victim status’, or on account of the history of 
antisemitism in Europe, as a Jewish solidarity that arose out of the 
experienceoftheHolocaustandwaschanneledthrougha 
yearningforthenationalhomeembodiedinIsrael. The new state was attractive 
precisely for the /power /that it was capable of mustering,the sublime 
nature of its military and the spectacular nature of its victories. 
AsAsad makes clear, ‘Israel’s many political, cultural and technological 
achievements merely reinforce its transnational 
standing,andcontributetothedesireofJewstoidentify strongly with Israel.’^29

Conversely, whenWalidDaqqaendeavouredtodelineate the methodologies that 
transformed the practices of Israeli torture during the Second 
Intifada,he sought to encapsulate the intersection of shock and what he 
termed the ‘searing of consciousness’ of Palestinians.^30 
ForDaqqa,theincursionsintoPalestiniancities,camps and villages 
transcended the mere material and direct 
objectiveofarrestingorkillingresistancefighters. These 
operations,drivenbytheformidableforceofairpower, 
armouredvehiclesandD9bulldozers,unfoldedasaform of ‘extreme horror’ 
intended to shock the Palestinians. 
Thegoalwastodeliverthesortofoverwhelmingshock that might render 
Palestinians malleable, soft and 
impressionable.Disenchantedwiththeircapacitytoresist, Palestinians could 
then be expected to give up, and to initiate a process of healing in 
accordance with terms, discourses and politics defined broadly by the 
Israeli colonial apparatus.

Daqqa challenged a more widespread interpretation 
amongmanyPalestiniananalystsatthathistoricaljuncture(SecondIntifada),whotendedtoassumethatIsrael 
had gone mad. In Daqqa’s view,this presumed madness did not signify a 
loss of reason but rather represented a calculated deployment, aimed not 
only at dismantlingtheresistancebutalsoaterodingitsspiritualfoundations 
– the virtues and political conceptions 
underpinningresistance.TheprimarybattlegroundforDaqqa 
wasthePalestinianfacultyofrepresentationandperception of the world,the 
way they try to make the world intelligible. He saw that Israel’s 
(perfectly rational) objectivewastoshockthePalestiniansandrenderthem 
docilebyattackingtheinwardmovementofthesubject.The‘shatteringexperience’offacingtheshockof 
unconstrained military force would enable Israel to 
saturatethePalestinianswithitsowninterpretationand expressions of its 
victory. This ‘searing of consciousness’ sought to induce a state of 
acquiescence among Palestinians,leading to a gradual self-effacement.^31


  Warringperceptions

‘Thereisnowar… withoutrepresentation’, PaulVirilio asserted in his 
exploration of cinematic techniques in warfare. He emphasised that‘no 
sophisticated weaponry existswithoutpsychologicalmystification.’^32 
ForVirilio,weapons,andbyextensionmilitaryoperationsand tactics, are not 
merely tools of destruction but also instruments of perception. He 
showed how these objects of war are also‘stimulants that affect the 
human sensory andneurologicalsystems,influencingreactionsandeven the 
perceptual processes involved in the identification and differentiation 
of objects.’^33

In particular, from the initial use of missiles in World 
WarTwotothecatastrophicflashofHiroshima,Virilio illustrates a paradigm 
shift where the‘theatre weapon’ supplants the traditional‘theatre of 
operations.’^34 This shiftmarksasignificantchangeinthehistoryofwar- 
fare,emphasisingtheevolutionofperceptualfieldsover tangible territorial 
or political gains.Virilio’s concept 
ofthetheatreweaponunderscoreshowwarfarehasincreasingly relied on the 
manipulation and control of perception. The term itself reveals the 
essence of modern combat:an ongoing use of military power not merely for 
physical territory or economic resources but for the dominance of 
immaterial perceptual realms. The manipulation of perceptions becomes a 
strategic objective in and of itself.

TheShockand Awedoctrineofthe1990sstandsasa 
testamenttotheaestheticandperceptualdesignsofmilitarystrategyanditsattempttodominateontheleverof 
perceptions.Thisdoctrineemergedinthetwilightofthe ColdWar, 
aspiringtodisplayasanitised,swift,economicalandformidableuseofsuperiorfirepowerinnewly 
one-sidedorasymmetricalimperialconflicts.^35 Itwas intended to overcome 
the bloody and failed history of engagements like Vietnam, where the 
combination of an indomitable Vietnamese will to resist coupled with 
highAmericancasualtiesandalargeandgrowinganti- 
warmovementintheUnitedStatesforcedtheempireto withdraw and cut its 
losses. The impact ofVietnam on the ways the United States would 
reconceptualise its war machinewasandremainstremendous.^36 
Thenewpriorities would be avoidance of long intractable battles, clear 
definition of strategic objectives,rapidness and speed, 
andthetendencytorelymoreemphaticallyonairpower 
andotherformsofremotefirepower.

Thesenewdoctrinesalsotooktheircuefromalong history of military 
manoeuvres, surprise attacks and other ways of using overwhelming force 
to secure victory.The rapid fall of France under the surprise of the 
German Blitzkrieg, the dropping of nuclear weapons on Hiroshima and 
Nagasaki, or even the Tet offensive launched by the North Vietnamese 
army would all serve asexamplesofoperationswheretheuseofdevastating 
weapons or rapid operations ultimately eroded the 
enemy’swilltofight.ShockandAwewouldbethought of as a solution to the 
various challenges facing further 
deploymentofWesternmilitaries,forinstanceasaway of warding off domestic 
opposition while serving and 
preservingtheeconomicintereststhatdependedonthe persistence of war.^37

The doctrine explicitly sought to recreate through military power a 
sublime experience and spectacle.^38 
Thenexusbetweenaestheticeffectsandwarhasbecome 
central,investingtheaestheticdimensionwithpractical and even ethical 
consequences. These shifts were also intimately tied to media and 
control of information, or managementofthisflow.Theshockandawewould 
presumablytake placeonthebattlefield,but itseffects 
couldbeamplifiedbyintroducingcinematictechniques whereby images and 
narrativesofwars werecurated and reframed,and reinforced through media 
representations. Theconceptofamediatedsublimeinvolvescreatingan 
awe-inspiring perception of power by simultaneously downplaying the 
horrors of war and emphasising sanitised, grandiose images of might and 
grandeur.This strategy aims to efface the atrocities while magnifying 
the war’s evocative and majestic aspects.

Intrinsictobotheffects-basedoperationsandshock and awe campaigns was the 
appearance of a suitably sanitised, ordered, precise and rapid war. The 
new militarylogicreflectsKant’srenditionofthesublimeinwar, which he also 
insisted must be ordered and fall within rules and norms.^39 This notion 
itself harbours a profound 
contradiction,forthesublime,initsessence,liesoutside form. Lyotard 
elucidates this paradox in his discussion of 
thesublime,assertingthatthesublimeindeedinvolves 
asacrificeoftheaesthetic.Thisaporiabetweenthesublime being contingent on 
an ordered war and the sublime 
asasacrificeoftheaestheticiscentraltocontemporary discourseontechnology, 
aestheticsandwar. Itgestures towardsanotherdimensionofsublimityinwar: 
thepotential for destruction must encompass elements beyond 
themerecapacitytokill,maimorreducecitiestorubble. 
Thisappliesparticularlywhenthiscapacityfordestruction is associated with 
a military machine that engages in expressly‘calculative’ thinking– 
amodeofthoughtthat estrangesthehumanfromthebattlefieldand,toevoke 
Heideggerianterms,rendersthebattlefieldas/Enframing (Gestell) /and as 
‘standing reserve’ or /Bestand/.^40

In one sense,the doctrine of Shock andAwe promisedtheimpossible. 
Itwascharacterisedbyaprofound mismatch between its conceptual foundation 
and the grim reality of war, a discrepancy that was apparent in the 
actual operation and representation of American and 
BritishforcesintheFirstGulfWar. 
Here,warwastrans-figuredintoamediaspectacle,wherethecuratingand 
editingofwar’sbrutalconsequencesonitsvictimswere 
obfuscatedandremovedfromthepublic’sgaze.Within this curated media 
spectacle,American and British forces wouldindeedfollow‘therulesofwar’, 
butthevastdestruction on the ground, and the thousands of Iraqis 
killedandinjured,wouldremainfirmlyoutofview. The wide-scale bombings 
were broadcast without the visceral imagery of the suffering bodies, 
sanitising the horrors 
ofwarfortheglobalaudienceandensuringthatnosignificantresistancewouldarise. 
Thetheatreofweapons is a theatre that insists on showcasing the grandeur 
of explosions while suppressing the actual experience of 
thosesufferingtheconsequencesofits fire.Themystificationofairpower, 
thecapacitytofightwarsfromadistance,therelianceoncinematicmedia 
techniques,andsoon,ledJeanBaudrillardfamouslyto propose that the First 
Gulf War ‘never took place’:it was less a war than an attempt by the 
Americanempiretoperpetuateitslogicofdeterrencethroughthe 
useofshockandawe, targetednotsomuchattheIraqi regime as at the 
spectators watching the unfolding images play out on TV.^41 This 
simulacrum of war, or ‘non-war’ as Baudrillard calls it, would reassure 
those identifying with the empire, and shelter them in the 
safetyofmilitarysupremacy– butitwasalsoawarthat weaponised images to 
create a /spectacle /of awe, representing the Iraqis killed as little 
more than extras hovering on the edges of the show.

Such artifice, however, becomes increasingly un- 
tenableinaneraofubiquitouscellphonesandtheconsequently immediate, 
unfiltered dissemination of raw 
imagesfollowingeachbombingorattack.Thisproblem is particularly evident 
in the context of Israel’s current assaultonGaza. 
Theunmediateddisplayofdevastation 
nowconfrontsthespectatorwiththeinescapablereality of human suffering.

In response to this grim reality and the failure to 
conductmilitaryoperationsthatcanevokeaweinaway 
thatisbothsufficientlyoverwhelming/and///sufficiently sanitised,the 
ongoing war in Gaza has instead taken a 
shapethatopenlyaffirmsthedevastationitiscausing. It binds two logics 
together, a logic of deterrence premised 
onthecapacitytoevokehorrorandcelebrateitseffects, 
andalogicofpunishmentadaptedfromthefamiliarimage of the Iron Wall. These 
logics are applied through various devices,including the appropriation 
of representationalmedia,the/Matrix/-likecapabilitiesembedded in 
command-and-control centres in Israel,the deliberate 
maintenanceofdistancefromthebattlefield,andthe 
utilisationofAIbothtogenerateendlesslistsoftargets 
andtodirectdronesandfighterjetstowardsthem.^42 Each of these simulacra 
highlight the fact that Israel’s familiar sense of itself as defined by 
a heroic engagement with sacrifice and as exemplified through daring, 
boldand creative operations, now belongs mainly to the past. In the 
phantasmagoric realms of warfare, these 
simulatedcodificationsperformadisavowal,recastingthe 
sublimenotasanencounterwithself-loss(whetheragonising or ecstatic) but 
as a manifestation of imaginary omnipotence– an omnipotence that fully 
embraces the notionthatwarisindeedhell,andaffirmsitrepeatedly. 
ThecurrentspectacleofwarinGaza, therefore, elicits either an obscene 
enjoyment in the spectacle of 
asymmetricpunishmentorsilentcomplicityinitsoccurrence 
andunfoldingamongIsraelisocietywritlarge.October 
7thmarkedapivotalmomentwhenthesymbolicandimaginaryfabricunderlyingacoretenetofIsraeliidentity– 
the sublime object of its ideology embodied in the Iron Wall and its own 
invincibility– was shattered.Israel’s ‘operationalart’, 
toborrowatermfrommilitarystudies, 
isnowbeingreframedawayfromasacrificialandheroic sublime into a regime of 
sublime horror that lacks any sortofgrandeurormagnificence. 
Virilio’sobservation rings true:the theatre of weapons unleashed on Gaza 
combineswiththegenerativecapacityofAItoarticulate 
acoldlymechanicalcodeoftargetingcenteredonwide-scalebombardmentandthemasskillingofPalestinians. 
Israel no longer seeks to curate its war, rather it has 
chosentooverflowthesenseswithendlessstreamsof visceralimagery, 
confirmingitsreadinessandcapacity to engage in an obscene and shameless 
genocide.


  Israel’soperationalartlessness

After October 7th,Israel embarked on strategies of 
annihilationinGaza,viewingthemasessentialresponses 
tobreachesinbothitsphysicalandideological fortifications, and to the 
erosion of its existential certainty.^43 This turn towards mere 
obliteration of the enemy starkly contradicted Israel’s carefully 
cultivated image of‘military excellence.’In the 1990s, amidst 
apprehensions aboutpeaceandconfrontingunconventionalchallenges from 
groups like Hezbollah, Hamas and Islamic Jihad, the Israeli military 
elevated the quality and tone of its intellectualinquiry, 
delvingdeeplyintotheoperational complexities of warfare, appropriating 
elements from systems theory and post-structural theories of space. 
Among the prominent figures to emerge as a pivotal intellectual 
synthesiser and innovator in operational 
theorywasShimonNaveh,founderandformerdirectorof Israel’s Operational 
Theory Research Institute (OTRI), which was itself part of its National 
Defence College.^44

The definition of political objectives remains primary; operational 
inquiry then focuses on the method by which these objectives can be 
achieved,the‘how’of 
warfare.Theintricateselectionofendsandmeansencompasses institutional 
actors,geopolitical conditions, political factions and internal 
strife,socio-economic limitations or catalysts, and crucially, the 
availability of weapons and technology. The fundamental role of 
operationalartistoenableananalyticalinventoryofthese 
variouscomponentssoastoprovidesolutionsthatover- come the various 
challenges faced by commanders. To 
thisend,NavehandhiscolleaguesatOTRIsoughttorejuvenateaspectsofSovietoperationaltheory, 
inparticular itsemphasisonconductinganalysisthatexaminesparts in 
relation to the whole.^45 The fervour surrounding the 
operationaldimensioncoincidedbothwithIsrael’snewly 
vehementrefusalofthepoliticalcompromisesthatwould be required to end its 
protracted occupation, and with theemergenceofirregular, 
asymmetricadversariesthat began steadily to undermine its capacity for 
definitive victories.^46

Thefixation on ‘military excellence’ in Israeli military discourse 
reveals a broader sentiment permeating thearmedforces– 
asenseofdiminishingprowess.This 
sentimentarisesfromacomplexinterplayoffactors: a lowering of existential 
anxiety following peace treaties with Egypt and Jordan, the tumultuous 
Oslo peace process juxtaposed with the brutal crackdowns during the 
First Intifada (when the Israeli military infamously ‘broke the bones’ 
of Palestinian protesters and employed deadly violence against unarmed 
protestors), and the riseofadeptguerrillaforcesinLebanonandPalestine.^47 
The Israeli military, grappling with the need to reclaim its 
self-fashioned mantle of excellence, embarked on a 
questfornewoperationalmodes,solutionsandtechnologies.Navehandhiscohortemergedasaninfluential 
current within the Israeli army, advocating for innovative approaches to 
warfare and operations. Eyal Weizman, in hisbook/HollowLand/, 
showshowNaveh’svisionforOTRI offered a framework for‘operational 
architects’within the Israeli military.^48 However, the initial 
enthusiasm that surrounded OTRI proved to be overblown,and for a time 
Naveh and his followers were blamed for the Israeli military’s setbacks 
in Lebanon in 2006.^49

Seeking to grasp, appropriate, synthesise and develop new modes of 
operation that would set bench- marks for other armies and secure 
military objectivesin any conflict,Israel now found itself thoroughly 
en- snared in the operational dimension of warfare – a space 
wedgedbetweenpoliticalambitionsandtacticalmanoeuvres.Thiscommitmenttooperational‘engagement’ 
alsoreflectedabroadermalaisewithinIsrael,andreflected 
aretreatawayfromdiplomacy, negotiationsand the delineation of clear 
political goals (beyond the perpetuation of a status quo based on 
expanding illegal settlements and quelling Palestinian resistance). The 
military assumed primary responsibility for maintaining order and 
advocated purely military solutions that obscured the necessity for 
political engagement. The operational dimension was therefore taken to 
be a silver bullet, the means through which Israel could avoid any 
compromises, while solidifying its permanent hold on historic Palestine.

Underthepressureoffierceresistance,Israelwas 
confrontedbytheneedtomakeunilateralwithdrawals from Lebanon in 2000 and 
Gaza in 2006.At the same time, it sought to hobble Palestinian 
resistance in the WestBankandensuretheriseofacollaborativeregime, 
institutionalisedinthePalestinianNationalAuthority.^50 
ItwouldnowconcentrateoncolonisingtheWestBank, besieging Gaza and keeping 
Lebanon at arm’s length through a policy of deterrence.Meanwhile OTRI 
and thesoldiersandcommandersinfluencedbythemwere busy exploringthe 
reinterpretations of spaceproposed 
bytheiroperationalarchitects,exemplifiedbynew capacities for‘walking 
through walls’, and new forms of systems analysis and dialectical 
cognition.^51

By contrast, other currents within the Israeli military would insist on 
simplicity, and doubling-down on Israelistrength,itssheerfirepower. 
FollowingitswarinLebanonin2006,Israel introducedtheinfamousDahiya 
Doctrine.This doctrine targeted civilians and civilian infrastructure as 
crucial nodes in any war effort.The 
newcampaignsdidnotseektotargettheresistance-fighters specifically so 
much as the society from which 
theirresistancearose.Thedoctrinesanctionedrecourse 
tocalibratedmassacresandtolevelsofdestructionthat 
canbequicklyrelaxedandintensified,dependingonthe 
evolvingbalanceofdeterrence.Asufficientlypunishing and deadly campaign 
against civilians would compel resistance forces to give up or 
surrender, thereby endingconflictswithouthavingtoaddresstheunderlying 
political grievances.

WithintheIsraelimilitary,adebateragedforsome years, especially after the 
2006 Lebanon war, between 
thesetwocontrastingyetequallylethalideologies:the 
simplisticyetdeadlyapproachembodiedbytheDahiya 
doctrine,andthecomplexlexiconofoperationalartthat was led by those close 
to OTRI.The former was rooted in 
olderdoctrinesofairpowerthathademergedinEurope 
intheearlytwentiethcentury, asameansofby-passing the obstacles posed by 
trench warfare.Airpower and longer-distance firepower strategies aimed 
to exploit theirnewspatialdimensions,allowingforcestoflyabove 
andacrossbattlefields,andtotargetcivilianspacesdeep within enemy 
territory. Warfare was no longer conceived 
merelyasaclashbetweenmilitaryforcesbutasatotalisingconflictenvelopingtheentiresocio-economicfabricofthewarringnations.^52 
ClusteredaroundOTRI,the 
secondandmorefuture-orientedcurrentwithinIsrael’s military employed 
systems theory, post-structural theory and architectural theory to 
rethink military operations. Naveh would soon emphasise the importance 
and relevance of both systems theory and dialectical thinking in 
conceiving operational art,and its acceptance of continuous change.^53

The debate between these two currents was,in many ways, also aesthetic – 
a clash between strategies of sheer horror and brutality on the one 
hand, embodied inthepursuitofannihilationthroughconceptionofcalibrated 
and intensifying destruction, and on the other, 
approachesthataimedtointegrateelementsofwarfare 
capableofinducingoperationalshockandawe,thereby 
restoringIsrael’sreputationformilitaryexcellence.The intellectual 
dimensions of the debate began to fade as Israel turned its focus to 
developing new technologies 
suchasAItargetingandmissiledefensesystems,along with innovative 
networked systems concepts aimed at optimisingtheirmilitaryefficacy, 
especiallyinground manoeuvres– forinstance,theIsraelimilitary’sconcept 
of‘LandAhead.’^54 AvivKochavi,apromisingyoungcommander during the Second 
Intifada and a key proponent of Naveh’s ‘operational architects’, rose 
to become Israel’s chief of staff by 2019 (through to 2023).In addition 
to cultivating a charismatic presence and some impressive rhetorical 
skills, Kochavi has long emphasised the need to foreground change and 
evolution within Israel’s armed forces. He has prioritised the pursuit 
of decisive victories and highlighted the pivotal roles of 
intelligence,technological innovation and systemic 
investigations.ThelanguageofOTRI,systemstheoryand 
post-structuralismhadreturnedtoIsraelimilitarydiscourse,albeitinasomewhatsimplifiedform.

In theyearsfollowing the 2006 Lebanon WarIsrael 
revelledinitsmeansofannihilation,whichitperceived 
astheonlywinningstrategiestohaveemergedfromits conflict with 
Hezbollah.This approach maintained a constantdeterrentcapacity, 
generallysufficienttokeep Hezbollahatbay. 
InGaza,asimilarstanceledtorepeated military engagements, operations that 
Israel came to dub ‘mowing the grass.’The goal was to maintain a purely 
militaryequilibrium,indefinitely. Punitivefirepower campaigns and small 
operations targeting tunnels 
ensuredthatPalestinianresistancecouldneitherchallenge 
thestatusquonorpushtheconflictfrommilitaryter- rain (where Israel 
remained strong) back onto political terrain (where Israel could still 
be challenged). In this 
context,Israeldoubleddownonvariousdefensivetechnologies,surrounding 
itself with new layers of protection – 
securitywallsandfences,sensors,radarsandmissilede- 
fencesystemssuchastheIronDome. Inhisroleaschief of /Aman /(Israel’s 
Military Intelligence),Kochavi played a crucial role in enhancing cyber 
capabilities, representationalmedia,intelligencegatheringandmilitarised 
AI.^55 Politically, this military stance was not aimed at disrupting the 
status quo but rather at maintaining Israel’s ability to colonise the 
West Bank at minimal cost, 
withouthavingtofacesignificantpoliticalengagement or resistance.

However,onceKochaviassumedcommandofIsrael’s military in 2019, he began 
to argue that Israel should 
nolongerbecontentwithmerelymaintainingthisequilibrium.It was time to go 
back on the offensive.This 
againrequireddevelopingalethalarmythatisbothinnovativeandawe-inspiring,whilealsocentralisingthe 
roleofthecommanderindirectingthecomponentsofa highly technological and 
integrated force.

Kochavidrawsacompellingparallelbetweentherole 
ofamilitarycommanderandtheworkofanartist,illustrating how both require a 
blend of creativity and critical 
reflection.Inhisobservations,Kochavihighlightshowan 
artistexperiencesapeakmomentofidentificationwith their creation upon its 
completion,only to later engage in 
aprocessofself-criticismanddistancing. Thisreflective 
process,whichpromptstheartisttorevisitandcritically evaluate their past 
work,encourages continuous learning andimprovement.Similarly, 
Kochavisuggeststhatmilitarycommandersshouldembracethisartisticmindset, 
recognising that their strategic decisions and operational plans are not 
static but subject to ongoing critique and adaptation. Just as artists 
question their past creations, 
commandersmustconstantlyreassesstheiractionsand the changing dynamics 
within their organisations.Of the idealcommander, 
Kochaviwrites:‘anypersonwhocreates is familiar with the tendencies of 
artists who reach thepeakoftheiridentificationwiththeirworkatthe 
momentofitscompletion… Thencomestheprocessof “distancing”fromthework… 
Yearslater, theartistmay 
findthemselvescriticallyasking,“Icreatedthat?”Thisis 
agoodqualitythatpromoteslearning.’^56 Inotherwords, 
theidealcommanderisonewhoisawareofthesystem they lead, and who is able 
to devise the most effective operations from out of the various 
components of the systems available.

In 2021, Israel sought to confound Palestinian 
resistanceinGazathroughitsso-called‘MetroOperation.’ The strategy was 
deceptively straightforward:leak 
intentionsofagroundinvasionofGazatotheforeignpress, 
therebycompellingPalestinianfighterstoseekrefuge in an already 
compromised tunnel network, which Israel then planned to obliterate with 
its airpower. This operation exemplified the convergence of Israel’s 
advanced technological capabilities – geo-location, surveillance, 
sensory technologies, ‘matrix capability’, intelligenceandairpower– 
andtheprecisionrequiredfor subterranean targeting.^57 The operation 
maintained a safedistancefromthebattlefieldanddidnotriskthe lives of 
Israeli soldiers. It was built on past intelligence 
ofPalestinianfightermovements,whocouldbeexpected 
totakerefugeintunnels.Byturningthetunnelnetwork into a death trap,the 
goalwas to allow Israel to shakethe 
foundationsofPalestiniandefensivestrategies. Instead of the tunnels 
serving as a refuge, they would become 
graveyards.Nonetheless,afterthesmokecleared,Israel was obliged to admit 
that few ‘combatants’ had been killed in its operation.

ForfiguressuchasKochaviandmuchoftheIsraeli 
highcommand,thenotionofoperationalartisinscribed within a technical 
framework but it also requires the infusion of creative imagination.^58 
This creative imagination becomes the locus for the emergence of new 
ideasandrepresentations,centraltotheconceptionofa 
militaryforcethatoperatesnotmerelyasanefficientma- 
chinebutasanentitycapableofspectacular, deceptive, creative and exalting 
operations.^59 The military force 
operateshereasbothmachineandmore-than-machine, 
orasKochaviemphasises,echoingNaveh,a‘system’. The essence of victory is 
neither fully technical nor wholly 
imaginativebutoscillatesbetweenthesetwopoles,continuouslyredefinedbytheexigenciesofwarfareandthe 
imperativesofinnovation. Ittransformsthebattlefield into a space of 
poetic engagement, in which the lines 
betweenrealityandrepresentationblur, andwherethe 
performativeenactmentofpowerbecomestheultimate testament to military 
prowess.

However, this artistic and adaptive vision is today starkly belied by 
Israel’s actual practice in the current phase of itswar in Gaza. The 
military /machine /has now whollyovershadowedthecommander-/artist/, 
therebylimitinganyroleforoperationalart.Theconflicthashigh- 
lightedarelianceonsheerdestructivepoweroverstrategic ingenuity and 
creativity.Although it remains in 
constantflux,themilitarysystemnowfunctionsinways 
moreakintoHeidegger’sconceptof‘standingreserve’, 
anditfiguresmainlyasamerestockpileofresources and capacities on standby 
for instrumental use, lacking intrinsic purpose and no longer able to 
induce an experience of the sublime or enable true creativity. In 
Gaza,the army’s alignment with advanced technology and‘calculative 
thinking’has led to an operational mode 
inwhichhumanshavetoadjusttomachinesratherthan vice-versa. 
Ratherthandrawonadynamicinterplayof imaginationandmachinery, 
militaryoperationsarebe- coming more and more mechanical,a mere exercise 
of force.

The bombardment of sanctuaries in Rafah, the destruction of 
universities, mosques and churches, even 
thebreachofdiplomaticnormsthroughattacksonembassies– all these acts of 
wanton destruction epitomise the chaotic nature of the strategy 
currently being pursuedbytheIsraelimilitary. Itreflectsanewdominance of 
calculative thinking, guided by algorithmic and instrumental 
rationality.This approach strips away an 
essentiallegitimisingmechanismintheeyesofobservers and supporters,it 
eliminates that‘aesthetic’ impact ofmilitary operationsthatwas 
soessentialtotheolder aspiration to military excellence. Instead of 
fostering a creative,innovative and awe-inspiring militarism,it just 
invokes sheer horror.

Ratherthan daring heroism,Israel now resorts to the banality and 
imbecility of pushing a button and 
unleashingforce.TheDahiyadoctrinefirsttriumphedinside Israel in 2006, 
but its further consolidation in 2023-24 
exposesthetruthoftheIsraelimilitaryforalltosee. To theworldandtoitself, 
Israelnowappearsasithasalways appearedtousPalestinians: 
asaregimeofpureterror.


  Shockwithoutawe

Inoneoftheraremomentsofthecurrentcampaignthat 
soughttoreaffirmaclearsenseofIsraeli-ness,on8June 2024, Israeli special 
forces launched a daring mission 
withinthedenseconfinesoftheNuseiratrefugeecamp 
torescuefourIsraelicaptives.Thisoperation,whichthe Israeli media hailed 
as a resounding success, was swiftly compared to the Entebbe raid 
or‘Operation Thunderbolt’ 
of1976,ignitingawaveofnationalexaltationandwide- spread celebration 
among the many Israelis desperate 
forsomesignthatmightconfirmtheirnation’songoing militarist ingenuity and 
creativity. The Israeli minister of defence called it ‘one of the most 
extraordinary operations’that he has witnessed in more than 50 years.^60 
To extricate their forces and the captives, however, 
Israelhadtocarpet-bombthecampitself, resultinginthe 
killingofmorethan270Palestiniancivilians.^61 One of the commandos 
involved in the operation was also 
killed.Despitethehype,theactualmechanicsoftheoperationconfirmedthatIsraelnowhasonlyonestrategy 
for victory in Gaza:a recurrent and daily recourse to massacres.^62

Israeli-nessisnowbeingredefined,andthisishappening in ways that tacitly 
acknowledge Palestinian perspectives.For us, who have endured and 
continue to endure the horrors of Zionism and its systematic policies of 
exclusion,murder, ethnic 
cleansing,humiliation,revulsionandvariousformsoferasure,Zionismhasalways 
beenaformofhorror, anongoingnightmareorNakba. An emphatically 
/horrifying /conception of Israeli-ness is 
nowalsobeingredefinedforbothIsraelisandtheirsup- porters.This new or 
emerging regime of the sublime, 
unfoldingthroughextensivefirepowerandtheremoval ofbattlefromwar, 
conductedviaheavilyarmouredmachinery and aimed at rendering Gaza 
mute,represents a continuation of Israel’s longstanding policy of ethnic 
cleansing– but it now does away with attempts to operationalise 
aesthetics in ways that might inspire wonder orexaltation. 
Itconsequentlyfailstoinspirenarratives ofheroismandcreativity. 
Israelisnowconfinedto theanti-heroics of pure elimination and genocide. 
This shift isalreadyhavingadramaticimpactonIsrael’sabilityto elicit 
political legitimation and support for its colonial enterprise.

Itisimportanttoreiteratethat,althoughitsreliance on pure horror has 
recently become more emphatic,Israel’s self-cultivated image of military 
excellence has always coexisted with its recourse to massacres,ethnic 
cleansing and other forms of brute force.Israel’s creation was enabled 
by the material effect of such massacres, more than by a performative 
display of awe-inspiring operations. However much the symbolic 
cultivation of Israeli-ness might centre itself on the sublime assertion 
ofpower, inrealitythemassacresandsystematicethnic cleansing were the 
primary means of its creation. The long history of the bloody killing of 
Palestinians predatestheNakba,itintensifiedduringtheNakba,andit 
hascontinuedallthroughthesubsequentconfrontation with Israeli settler 
colonialism. This history is punctuatedby the KufrQasem Massacre,the 
Qibya massacre, the infamous Sabra and Shatila massacre in Lebanon and 
numerousotheratrocities.^63 Thoughtheseepisodesare or should be 
well-known, and played an essential role in 
theassertionofIsraelidominanceandcontrol,withinIsrael itself they were 
also kept largely hidden from public scrutiny.

By contrast, the current and overt display of Israeli military horror in 
Gaza serves as a deterrent not only to Gaza but also to Lebanon and the 
broader region. Israeli propaganda on social media juxtaposes images 
of‘Beirut Before’ with suggestions of a ‘Beirut After’, evoking the 
spectre of a devastated city in the event of a large-scale war. 
ThisShock/without/Aweparadigmcontinuestoserve Israel, as it flirts with 
dangerous fascist ideologies and takes a festive and unapologetic 
pleasure in its power to punish, kill, maim and destroy.

Today, Israel’s hope is not that the world will soon forget this current 
phase of the conflict.Nor does Israel 
seektoencouragetheworldtorecogniseitselfinits carefully cultivated image 
as a lone liberal democracy holding back a sea ofArab and Muslim 
barbarians. In- stead,itnowhopesthattheworldwillsooncatchupwith 
itsstarkmonstrosity, andcementitscollusioninallthe horrors that ‘total 
victory’ might require.


/Abdaljawad////Omar////is////a////part-time////Lecturer////in////the////Philosophy 
//and Cultural Studies Department at Birzeit University and has 
contributed to a number of different outlets, including /Mondoweiss /and 
/Electronic Intifada/.///


    Notes

*1.*Saleh Abdel Jawad argues in his review of Bassem Sharif’s book on 
Wadie Haddad, the Arab Nationalist 
leaderassassinatedbyMossadin1978,thatIsraelisuccesses in extraction 
operations were largely due to the 
hijackers’ordersnottoharmpassengersandtheireth- ical commitments, which 
enabled Israel to stage these spectacular triumphs without risking much 
resistance from the hijackers themselves.See Saleh Abdeljawad, 
‘AbuSharifonWadieHaddad:TowardsaCriticalReview 
ofExternalOperations’,/Al-Akhbar/,2014,https://www.al- 
<https://www.al-akhbar.com/Opinion/2648>akhbar.com/Opinion/2648 
<https://www.al-akhbar.com/Opinion/2648>.

*2.*Alargecorpusofmainstreambooks,alongsidemany dramatised takes on 
Israeli militarism, such as /Fauda /onNetflix, 
attesttothisself-cultivatedimageofanem- 
battledliberalstatefacingmonstrousenemies.Seefor 
instance:MichaelBar-ZoharandNissimMishal,/Mossad: The Greatest Missions 
of the Israeli Secret Service /(New York: 
Ecco,2012);RonenBergman,/RiseandKillFirst://TheSecret History of 
Israel’s Targeted Assassinations /(NewYork:Ran- domHouse,2018); 
YaakovKatzandAmirBohbot,/The 
WeaponWizards:HowIsraelBecameaHigh-TechMilitary Superpower/(NewYork:St. 
Martin’sPress,2017);Yossi MelmanandDanRaviv, 
/Spies////Against////Armageddon:////Inside 
//Israel’s////Secret////Wars///(NewYork:LevantBooks,2012).

*3.*For an overview of the cultural and intellectual 
responsestothisdefeatintheArabWorld,seeElizabeth 
SuzanneKassab,/ContemporaryArabThought://CulturalCritiqueinComparativePerspective/(NewYork: 
ColumbiaUniversityPress,2009),48–115.

*4.*Cf.JensBjeringetal.,eds.,/War////and////Aesthetics:////Art,////Tech//nology,////and////the////Futures////of////Warfare///(Cambridge,MA:MIT 
Press,2024).

*5.*Walter Benjamin, ‘Theories of German Fascism:On 
theCollectionofEssays/WarandWarrior/,EditedbyErnst 
Jünger’,/NewGermanCritique/17(1979),122.

*6.*Benjaminpointsouthowthetechnologiesandmaterialsofwarfare,particularlygaswarfare,makethedesire 
forwaranemptygesture.Thisisbecauseiteliminates 
the‘outdatedsymbolsofheroism’thatJüngerandothers 
celebrate(Benjamin,‘TheoriesofGermanFascism’,121).

*7.*Benjamin,‘TheoriesofGermanFascism’,127–8.

*8.*Barbee-Sue Rodman, ‘War and Aesthetic Sensibility: 
AnEssayinCulturalHistory’,/Soundings:An 
InterdisciplinaryJournal/51:3(1968),308.

*9.*J. GlennGray, 
/The////Warriors:////Reflections////on////Men////in////Battle 
/[1959](Lincoln:BisonBooks,1970),36.//

*10.*Gray,/TheWarriors/,36.

*11.*Gray,/TheWarriors/,36.

*12.*Gray,/TheWarriors/,xii.

*13.*Quoted in Joshua Leifer, ‘What Amos Oz Couldn’t See’, /Dissent 
Magazine /(Spring 2019), https://www. 
<https://www.dissentmagazine.org/article/what-amos-oz-couldnt-see/>dissentmagazine.org/article/what-amos-oz-couldnt-see/ 
<https://www.dissentmagazine.org/article/what-amos-oz-couldnt-see/>.

*14.*TomSegev,/1967:Israel,theWar,andtheYearthatTrans- 
//formed////the////Middle////East,///trans.JessicaCohen(NewYork: 
MetropolitanBooks,2007),247.

*15.*Segev,/1967/,15.

*16.*Segev,/1967/,676.

*17.*Amnesty International, ‘Israel/OPT: 10 Things You 
NeedtoKnowAboutAnnexation’, 2July2020, https: 
<https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2020/07/israelopt-10-things-you-need-to-know-about-annexation/>

//www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2020/07/israelopt-10- 
<https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2020/07/israelopt-10-things-you-need-to-know-about-annexation/>things-you-need-to-know-about-annexation/ 
<https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2020/07/israelopt-10-things-you-need-to-know-about-annexation/>.

*18.*Mu’inal-TaherandTabghwa-Zaytoun,‘Hikayatwa- 
SuwarminZamanMuqawim[TobaccoandOlives:Stor- 
iesandPicturesfromaTimeofResistance]’(Doha:Arab Centre for Research and 
Policy Studies, 2017), 19.

*19.*RosemarySayigh,/Palestinians:////From////Peasants////to////Re//volutionaries/(London:ZedBooks,1979).

*20.*DaliaGavrieli-Nuri,‘Saying“War’,’Thinking“Victory”– The Mythmaking 
Surrounding Israel’s 1967 Victory’, /Israel //Studies /15:1(2010),96.

*21.*Foradiscussiononwar,theexcessiveandtherelation- 
shiptothesublime,seeVivienneJabri,‘ShockandAwe: 
PowerandtheResistanceofArt’,/Millennium /34:3(2006), 821–4.

*22.*Jean-FrançoisLyotard,/ThePostmodernCondition:////ARe- 
//port////on////Knowledge///(Minneapolis:UniversityofMinnesota 
Press,1984),77.

*23.*Edmund Burke, /A Philosophical Enquiry into the Origin 
//of////Our////Ideas////of////the////Sublime////and////Beautiful///[1757](Oxford: 
OxfordUniversityPress,1990).

*24.*For Kant this confrontation with the suprasensible 
producespain,itinstigatesaprocesswithinthefacultyof 
mind.SeeImmanuelKant,/CritiqueofJudgement/,trans.J.

H.Bernard(NewYork:MacMillan,1951),84.

*25.*Roland Barthes writes about how myths transform historyintonature, 
andtherebyextracteventsfromtheir 
historicalcontext.SeeinparticularRolandBarthes,/Myth- ologies/,trans. 
AnnetteLavers(NewYork: Farrar,Straus andGiroux,1972),142–5.

*26.*FormoreonIsraelimilitarismandthefearofpeace, see Uri Ben-Eliezer, 
/War over Peace://One Hundred Years of Israel’sMilitaristicNationalism/, 
trans.ShaulVardi(Oakland: University of California Press, 2019).

*27.*ForadetailedexplorationofNietzscheandZionism 
andtheinfluenceofNietzscheonearlyZionistthinking, 
centringnotionssuchasself-overcoming,mastery, long- 
ingforanauthenticselfandsublimemissions,seeJacob 
Golomb,/NietzscheandZion/(Ithaca,NY:CornellUniversity Press,1997).

*28.*Ze’evJabotinsky,‘TheEthicsoftheIronWall’,/Razsviet/, 11 November 
1923, https://en.jabotinsky.org/archive/ 
<https://en.jabotinsky.org/archive/search-archive/item/?itemId=114767>search-archive/item/?itemId=114767 
<https://en.jabotinsky.org/archive/search-archive/item/?itemId=114767>.

*29.*TalalAsad,‘ReflectionsontheIsraeli-Palestinian Conflict’, 
/Humanity////Journal/, 21March2024,https: 
<https://humanityjournal.org/blog/reflections-on-the-israeli-palestinian-conflict/>

//humanityjournal.org/blog/reflections-on-the-israeli- 
<https://humanityjournal.org/blog/reflections-on-the-israeli-palestinian-conflict/>palestinian-conflict/ 
<https://humanityjournal.org/blog/reflections-on-the-israeli-palestinian-conflict/>.

*30.*WalidDaqqa,‘Sihral-Wa’iawI’adatTa’rifal-Ta’dhib 
[SearingConsciousnessorRedefiningTorture]’ (Beirut: 
CentreforStudiesandArabScientificPublishers,with Al-Jazeera,2010),27–33.

*31.*Daqqa,‘Sihral-Wa’iawI’adatTa’rifal-Ta’dhib.’

*32.*PaulVirilio,/War////and////Cinema:////The////Logistics////of////Perception/, 
trans. PatrickCamiller(London: Verso,1989),10.

*33.*Virilio,/War////and////Cinema/,13.

*34.*Virilio,/War////and////Cinema/,13.

*35.*HarlanK.UllmanandJamesP.Wade,/Shock and////Awe: 
//AchievingRapidDominance/(Washington,DC:National Defense University, 
1996), http://www.dodccrp.org/files/ 
<http://www.dodccrp.org/files/Ullman_Shock.pdf>Ullman_Shock.pdf 
<http://www.dodccrp.org/files/Ullman_Shock.pdf>.

*36.*SeeforinstanceNadiaAbuEl-Haj,/CombatTrauma: Imaginaries of War and 
Citizenship in Post-9/11 America /(London: Verso,2022).

*37.*For a critical take on Shock and Awe and its 
relationshiptotheVietnamWar,seeH.R.McMaster,‘This FamiliarBattleground’, 
/WorldAffairs/, 9October2009, 
https://www.hoover.org/research/familiar-battleground 
<https://www.hoover.org/research/familiar-battleground>.

*38.*UllmanandWade,/Shock////and////Awe/.

*39.*LucianStaiano-Daniels,‘TasteandtheClaimsofWar: The Kantian Sublime 
and the Function of War in Pub- 
licAestheticJudgement’,/HistoryofEuropeanIdeas/49:5 (2022),824.

*40.*Martin Heidegger, ‘The Question Concerning Tech- nology’, in 
/The//QuestionConcerningTechnologyandOther 
Essays/,trans.WilliamLovitt(NewYork: Harper&Row, 
1977),3–35.ForHeidegger,theessenceoftechnologyis 
nottechnological;rather, itliesintechnologyasamodeof 
revelationwhichhecalls‘enframing’[/Gestell/].Enframing ‘is the gathering 
together that belongs to that setting- 
uponwhichsetsuponmanandputshiminpositiontore- 
vealthereal,inthemodeofordering,asstanding-reserve’

(24).Byenhancingthemilitaryanditsperceptivecapacitiesthroughtheemploymentofawiderangeofcomplex 
tools – sensors, radars, satellites, algorithmic deductions, artificial 
intelligence, cyber capabilities, representational 
media,aerialsurveillance,amongothers– 
boththoseoperatingthemilitarysystemandthosetargetedbyitare 
reducedtomeredatapointsinawebofcalculations.They 
nowcometobeseenasresourcestobeeitherusedor 
annihilated.Enframingalsoconcealswhatitrevealsinthe 
contextofmoderntechnology. AsHeideggerputsit,en- 
framing‘doesnotsimplyendangermaninhisrelationship 
tohimselfandtoeverythingthatis.’ Inaddition,theen- 
framedresourcesorinventoryoftoolsatman’sdisposal 
‘nolongerevenlettheirownfundamentalcharacteristic appear, namely, 
thisrevealingassuch’ (27).Insteadof 
disclosingthetruthofbeing,moderntechnologydistorts 
it.Thishasdeepimplicationsfortheimpactoftechnology 
inwarfare,andforthewaysthebattlefieldcomestobe ordered, including human 
and non-human actants and targets.

*41.*JeanBaudrillard,/TheGulfWarDidNotTakePlace/, trans.Paul Patton 
(Bloomington: Indiana University Press,1991).

*42.*A series of articles were published by the Israeli 
magazine/+972/thatdiscussthegenerativetargeting 
powerofAIanditsuseinthewarinGaza.Seeinparticular Yuval Abraham, “‘A Mass 
Assassination Factory”: InsideIsrael’sCalculatedBombingofGaza’,/+972 
Magazine/,30November2023,https://www.972mag.com/ 
<https://www.972mag.com/mass-assassination-factory-israel-calculated-bombing-gaza/>mass-assassination-factory-israel-calculated-bombing-gaza/ 
<https://www.972mag.com/mass-assassination-factory-israel-calculated-bombing-gaza/>; 
YuvalAbraham,“‘Lavender”: TheAIMachineDirecting 
Israel’sBombingSpreeinGaza’,/+972Magazine/,3April 2024, 
https://www.972mag.com/lavender-ai-israeli-army- 
<https://www.972mag.com/lavender-ai-israeli-army-gaza/>gaza/ 
<https://www.972mag.com/lavender-ai-israeli-army-gaza/>.

*43.*AlthoughIsraelisocietyspeaksofanexistentialanxi- ety, 
thisgenerallyremainsaproductiveconfessionofvul- 
nerabilityinthefaceofpossibledemise.Thisformofpub- 
licacknowledgementofprecarityhidesadeepersense 
ofsecuritythatisparadoxicallyproducedbyspeakingof 
vulnerabilities.Alargeliteratureexistsonexistentialanxi- 
etyofIsraelisociety– seeforinstanceGadYair, ‘Israeli Existential 
Anxiety:Cultural Trauma and the Constitution of National Character’, 
/Social Identities /20:4–5 (2014), 346–62;GiladHirschberger, 
TomPyszczynskiandTsachi Ein-Dor, ‘AnEver-DyingPeople: 
TheExistentialUnderpinnings of Israelis’ Perceptions of War and 
Conflict’, /Les Cahiers Internationaux de Psychologie Sociale /87:3 
(2010), 443–57.

*44.*TheDADOCentreforInterdisciplinaryMilitaryStud- 
ieswasestablishedin2007asareconfigurationofthe older Operational Theory 
Research Institute (OTRI), 
whichwasdirectedbyShimonNaveh.Thischangeoccurredasaresultofthe2006LebanonWar, 
duringwhich Israel’s military faced significant criticism for its 
failures ingroundmanoeuvresinSouthLebanon.TheWinograd 
Commission,setuptoinvestigatethesefailures,placed 
someoftheresponsibilityonthelanguageandoperative 
conceptsdevelopedbyOTRIandtheworkofNavehand histeam. 
DADOthusemergedasanupdatedversionof 
theInstitute,oneintendedtoretainwhatwasvaluable 
inOTRI’sworkwhilelearningfromitsexcessesandmistakes.

*45.*Naveh’s1997book,/In////Pursuit////of////Military////Excellence:////The 
//Evolution of Operational Theory/, is replete with various 
examplesofsystemsanalysisandhistoricalexperiencesof 
operationalart,includingtheNapoleonicWars,Blitzkrieg 
andthe1967war,amongothers.Heprovidesanalyses of these operations by 
approaching them through 
systemsanalysis,emphasisingthecapacitytointegratevariouscomponentsintoasingleoperationthatsuccessfully 
achievesitsmilitaryobjectives.Thebookalsoincludes 
analysesofhowtheseoperationscaninduceasystems shock in the enemy forces.

*46.*When Aviv Kochavi came to lead Israel’s military in 
2019,heredrewitsconceptualapparatusaroundthepur- 
suitofdecisivevictory.SeeYaakovLappin,‘TheIDF’sMo- 
mentumPlanAimstoCreateaNewTypeofWarMachine’, 
/BESACenterPerspectivesPaper/,no.1,497,22March2020, 
https://besacenter.org/idf-momentum-plan/ 
<https://besacenter.org/idf-momentum-plan/>.

*47.*SergioCatignani,/Israeli////Counter-Insurgency////and//theIntifadas:DilemmasofaConventionalArmy/(London:Routledge,2008).//

*48.*EyalWeizman,/HollowLand://Israel’sArchitectureofOccupation/(London: 
VersoBooks,2012),187–219.

*49.*ŁukaszPrzybyło,‘SystemicOperationalDesign– a Study in Failed 
Concept’, /Security and Defence Quarterly /42:2(2023),35–54.

*50.*ForacriticalreadingonthePalestinianAuthorityin 
thewakeoftheSecondIntifada,seeDanaElKurd,/Po- 
larizedandDemobilized:LegaciesofAuthoritarianismin Palestine/(London: 
HurstPublishers,2019).

*51.*See in particular Eyal Weizman, ‘Walking through Walls:Soldiers as 
Architects in the Israeli–Palestinian Conflict’, /Radical 
Philosophy///136 (March 2006), https:// 
<https://www.radicalphilosophy.com/article/walking-through-walls>www.radicalphilosophy.com/article/walking-through-walls 
<https://www.radicalphilosophy.com/article/walking-through-walls>.

*52.*Foranearlydiscussionofairpoweranditsefficacyand 
possibilities,seeGiulioDouhet,/The////Command////of////the////Air/, 
trans.DinoFerrari(NewYork;Coward-McMann,1942).

*53.*ShimonNaveh,/In////Pursuit////of////Military////Excellence:////The 
//EvolutionofOperationalTheory /(London:Routledge, 1997).

*54.*ColonelEranOrtal,‘We’reConfused,Too: 
AHistoricalPerspectiveforDiscussionof“LandAhead’,”/Military 
Review/(March-April2019),https://www.armyupress.army. 
<https://www.armyupress.army.mil/Journals/Military-Review/English-Edition-Archives/Mar-Apr-2019/82-Confused/>mil/Journals/Military-Review/English-Edition-Archives/Mar- 
<https://www.armyupress.army.mil/Journals/Military-Review/English-Edition-Archives/Mar-Apr-2019/82-Confused/>Apr-2019/82-Confused/ 
<https://www.armyupress.army.mil/Journals/Military-Review/English-Edition-Archives/Mar-Apr-2019/82-Confused/>.

*55.*Aviv Kochavi and Eran Ortal, ‘Ma’asei 
Aman:PermanentChangeinaChangingReality’,DADOCenter,2July2014,https://www.idf.il/en/mini-sites/dado- 
<http://www.idf.il/en/mini-sites/dado->center/vol-2-change-and-transformation/ma-asei- 
aman/.

*56.*MajorGeneralAvivKochavi,‘ToBeaMilitaryLeader: Major General 
Kochavi’, Dado Center, Israel Defense Forces (22 June 2022), 
https://www.idf.il/en/mini-sites/ 
<https://www.idf.il/en/mini-sites/dado-center/research/to-be-a-military-leader-major-general-kochavi/>dado-center/research/to-be-a-military-leader-major-general- 
<https://www.idf.il/en/mini-sites/dado-center/research/to-be-a-military-leader-major-general-kochavi/>kochavi/ 
<https://www.idf.il/en/mini-sites/dado-center/research/to-be-a-military-leader-major-general-kochavi/>.

*57.*David M. Halbfinger, ‘A Press Corps Deceived, and the Gaza Invasion 
That Wasn’t’, /New York Times/, 
14May2021,https://www.nytimes.com/2021/05/14/world/ 
<https://www.nytimes.com/2021/05/14/world/middleeast/israel-gaza-disinformation.html>middleeast/israel-gaza-disinformation.html 
<https://www.nytimes.com/2021/05/14/world/middleeast/israel-gaza-disinformation.html>.

*58.*Kochavi,‘ToBeaMilitaryLeader.’

*59.*The metaphoric reference to matrix capability is 
meanttohighlighttherepresentationalmediaavailable 
forIsraelicommanders.Thematrixisdesignedtointeg- 
ratevastamountsofintelligence,imageryandotherin- formation, displaying 
this consolidated data on one or 
multiplescreensforcommandersandoperationalleaders. This integration 
allows for real-time situational aware- ness and informed 
decision-making, and is presumed to enhance operational effectiveness on 
the battlefield. See Ron Leshem, ‘IDF Possesses Matrix-like Capabilit- 
ies,Ex-IsraeliArmyChiefSays’, /Ynetnews/, 30June2023, 
https://www.ynetnews.com/magazine/article/ry0uzlhu3 
<https://www.ynetnews.com/magazine/article/ry0uzlhu3>.

*60.*AlJazeerastaff,‘Nuseirat:AnatomyofIsrael’sMassacre in Gaza’, /Al 
Jazeera/, 11 June 2024, https://www. 
<https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2024/6/11/nuseirat-anatomy-of-israels-massacre-in-gaza>aljazeera.com/news/2024/6/11/nuseirat-anatomy-of-israels- 
<https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2024/6/11/nuseirat-anatomy-of-israels-massacre-in-gaza>massacre-in-gaza 
<https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2024/6/11/nuseirat-anatomy-of-israels-massacre-in-gaza>.

*61.*AlJazeerastaff,‘Nuseirat.’

*62.*Shrouq Aila, ‘Nuseirat Massacre:Inside Israel’s Failed Hostage 
Rescue in Gaza’, /The Intercept/, 10 June2024, 
https://theintercept.com/2024/06/10/nuseirat- 
<https://theintercept.com/2024/06/10/nuseirat-massacre-israel-hostage-rescue-gaza/>massacre-israel-hostage-rescue-gaza/ 
<https://theintercept.com/2024/06/10/nuseirat-massacre-israel-hostage-rescue-gaza/>.

*63.*Much is made of Israeli protests against the 1982 Sabra Shatila 
Massacres. A confluence of factors 
encouragedtheseproteststoemergeinIsraelatthetime,includingconcernsthatIsraelmightgetboggeddowninanun- 
necessarywarinLebanon,Morefundamentally, 
themassacresdrewparticularcondemnationbecausetheywere 
committedbyalliesoftheIsraelimilitary, thePhalange, rather than by the 
military itself.

-------------- next part --------------
An HTML attachment was scrubbed...
URL: <http://freedomarchives.org/pipermail/news_freedomarchives.org/attachments/20240907/9ac1325d/attachment-0001.htm>
-------------- next part --------------
A non-text attachment was scrubbed...
Name: kwsWlXbeIzi0W0YG.jpg
Type: image/jpeg
Size: 127507 bytes
Desc: not available
URL: <http://freedomarchives.org/pipermail/news_freedomarchives.org/attachments/20240907/9ac1325d/attachment-0001.jpg>