[News] How Israel-Lebanon conflict could redefine modern warfare

[Anti-Imperialist News]

middleeasteye.net
<https://www.middleeasteye.net/opinion/israel-lebanon-how-conflict-could-redefine-modern-warfare>
How Israel-Lebanon conflict could redefine modern warfare
Omar Ashour
August 14, 2024
------------------------------

With the recent spate of confirmed and alleged
<https://apnews.com/article/israel-palestinians-gaza-war-mohammed-deif-9524d7d5c8f7321f4d8c931fde664556>
assassinations and decapitation strikes in Beirut
<https://www.middleeasteye.net/news/lebanon-explosion-beirut-israel-claims-targeted-hezbollah-commander#:~:text=Lebanon%3A%20Explosion%20reported%20in%20Beirut%20as%20Israel%20claims%20it%20targeted%20Hezbollah%20commander,-Israel%20says%20it&text=Israel%27s%20military%20said%20it,Golan%20Heights%20over%20the%20weekend.>,
Tehran
<https://www.middleeasteye.net/opinion/ismail-haniyeh-killing-netanyahu-only-goal-set-region-fire>
and
Khan Younis, the likelihood of a third war between Israel
<https://www.middleeasteye.net/countries/israel> and Hezbollah
<https://www.middleeasteye.net/topics/hezbollah> has markedly increased.

Both adversaries are expected to extensively deploy unmanned aerial vehicles
<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=PABug067OtI> (UAVs), or drones, of various
types in a war on their doorstep.

In April, I wrote an article
<https://www.middleeasteye.net/opinion/gaza-war-hezbollah-israel-ready-full-scale-war-is>
discussing Hezbollah’s military capabilities.

At that time, I harboured hopes for a "peace-by-terror" scenario, wherein
conventional deterrence would prevail and prevent or postpone the outbreak
of a full-scale war. Back then, Israel's posture along the Lebanese
<https://www.middleeasteye.net/countries/lebanon> border was primarily
defensive
<https://www.timesofisrael.com/on-both-sides-of-gazas-border-the-idf-is-remaking-security-from-the-underground-up/>
.

However, as forecast, this stance swiftly transitioned to an offensive
<https://www.timesofisrael.com/liveblog_entry/idfs-new-mountains-brigade-drills-lebanon-invasion-in-first-exercise/>
one.

This offensive posture has been reinforced by the redeployment
<https://www.timesofisrael.com/visiting-north-idf-chief-says-war-in-lebanon-becoming-much-more-likely/>
of units from Gaza <https://www.middleeasteye.net/topics/israel-war-gaza>,
including brigades
<https://www.i24news.tv/en/news/israel/defense/artc-idf-conducts-lebanon-combat-simulations-as-tensions-grow-in-north>
from the 36th Regular Division of the Northern Command. This is the same
division that previously bisected Gaza into northern and southern parts,
fighting its way to the Mediterranean to establish the Netzarim corridor
<https://www.newarab.com/news/what-israels-netzarim-corridor-splitting-gaza-two>
.

Additionally, brigades
<https://www.i24news.tv/en/news/israel-at-war/artc-israeli-military-conducts-war-exercise-to-prepare-for-northern-war>
from the elite 98th Paratroopers Division (regulars) and the 146th Reserve
Division have been redeployed or newly positioned in the north.

The current combat grouping of three divisions - 12 brigades - is roughly
twice the size of Israel’s invading force in July 2006.
Spying on the spies

At the time of writing, only some of the assault brigades of these
divisions were reported to be in their positions. Nonetheless, to avoid the
debacles of the 2006 war and to successfully push Hezbollah’s tenacious
units over the Litani river towards the north, the Israeli army will
require substantial additional manpower.

To effectively undermine the Israeli military's operational objectives,
Hezbollah is likely to intensify drone warfare and employ several types of
UAVs - including fixed-wing, multi-rotor, loitering munitions and
first-person-view - as a force multiplier against superior Israeli forces.

How may Hezbollah employ drones during a potential third war? Well, here is
an analytical review.

In July 2006, Hezbollah managed to intercept and decrypt the video feeds
and communications of Israeli drones by employing a combination of
electronic warfare techniques, signals intelligence and ground-based
interceptions.

This infiltration allowed them to gain real-time intelligence on the
Israeli army’s operational plans and units’ movements in southern Lebanon.

Hezbollah's fighters mined and booby-trapped some of the targeted
locations, and the organisation's 'tank-killing' teams were ready

Hezbollah did not disrupt the feeds. Instead, its units spied on the
“flying spies” - the Israeli army’s surveillance drones. Identifying the
targeted locations, Hezbollah’s combat units prepared ambushes for the
Israeli army’s assault units.

Hezbollah’s fighters mined and booby-trapped some of the targeted
locations, and the organisation’s “tank-killing” teams were ready with both
anti-tank guided missiles and unguided rockets.

All these preparations were based on real-time movement seen in the drone
feeds. Moreover, Hezbollah repositioned its forces to better withstand
Israeli attacks and pre-registered/pre-arranged their indirect fires, such
as rocket artillery and mortars, for greater precision by knowing the
locations and movements of the Israeli army units.

Overall, in 2006, Hezbollah executed a textbook counter-drone operation
that bled the Israeli army in deadly ambushes.
Ground-based lethality

Hezbollah is not the same 2006 force
<https://www.csis.org/analysis/lessons-2006-israeli-hezbollah-war>. The
organisation’s current military capabilities are superior to the vast
majority of non-state forces, and to several small-states’ ground forces.

Ground forces still dominate Hezbollah’s military capabilities. They
include various types of infantry, special forces, armour, artillery and
ground-based air defences.

Hezbollah’s ground-based lethality was exhibited by its anti-armour
infantry teams in 2006.

<https://www.middleeasteye.net/opinion/gaza-war-hezbollah-israel-ready-full-scale-war-is>

War on Gaza: Is Hezbollah ready for full-scale war with Israel?


These teams have caused the highest percentage of Israeli military
fatalities in Lebanon (over 28 percent by my estimates), compared with
other units and branches, including rocket- and mortar-artillery,
improvised explosive devices, sniping; and even compared with Israeli
friendly fire, which resulted in about 12 percent of the Israeli army’s
fatalities.

The organisation is also capable in the electronic, cyber and
intelligence/information domains, and less so in the sea domain.

The capabilities in the air domain of operations have been steadily, but
unconventionally, advancing. In 2006, indirect fire from rockets and
missiles resulted in more civilian losses in Israel than military losses in
Lebanon, due to inaccuracy and other reasons.

In 2024, the level of precision (as well as ranges and payloads) has
significantly changed. That is due - in part - to Hezbollah’s unmanned air
force.

Although Hezbollah had a history of basic UAV employment even before the
2006 war, the organisation has demonstrated a relatively new capability in
2024: it can “see” deep into Israel.

“Seeing” in military terminology translates to “intelligence, surveillance
and reconnaissance” (ISR). Hezbollah successfully executed multiple air-domain
breaches
<https://www.timesofisrael.com/waiting-for-the-rockets-at-the-opening-of-a-regional-conflict/>,
where military-grade UAVs have penetrated deep into Israeli airspace to
gather intelligence and perform surveillance and reconnaissance operations.
Remote capability

Targeted locations were not just soft ones. They included the
well-defended Ramat
David Airbase
<https://www.timesofisrael.com/hezbollah-publishes-drone-footage-of-ramat-david-airbase-in-north/>
and an Israeli naval base in Haifa, as well as several warships and
infrastructure of the navy’s submarine unit, Shayetet 7
<https://www.timesofisrael.com/in-open-threat-hezbollah-publishes-drone-footage-of-sites-in-northern-israel/>
.

The operations demonstrated Hezbollah’s remote capability to conduct
surveillance over Israeli air force and naval bases, as well as urban
centres.

[image: Rockets fired from southern Lebanon are intercepted by Israel's
Iron Dome air defence system over the Upper Galilee region in northern
Israel, on 4 August 2024 (Jalaa Marey/AFP)]
Rockets fired from southern Lebanon are intercepted by Israel's Iron Dome
air defence system over the Upper Galilee region in northern Israel, on 4
August 2024 (Jalaa Marey/AFP)[image: image.gif]

If, or when, war breaks out, these ISR UAVs will likely transmit their
targets’ location coordinates to rocket-artillery batteries, missile units,
combat UAVs and/or loitering munitions (one-way or “suicide” drones) for
precision strikes.

In a way, this mimics what Russia’s
<https://www.middleeasteye.net/countries/russia> Orlan-10 ISR UAVs and
Lancet loitering munitions are doing in Ukraine
<https://www.middleeasteye.net/topics/russia-ukraine-war>. The coordination
between Russia’s ISR and combat UAVs and missile units might have resulted
in defeating and destroying
<https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/russian-iskanders-destroy-two-patriot-launchers-ukraine-russian-agencies-report-2024-07-07/>
two Patriot launchers - two components of one of the world’s most capable
and most expensive air-defence systems - by Russian occupation forces in
Ukraine.

In an ironic way, Hezbollah might be following an old Anglo-American
military adage: 'If it can be seen, it can be hit. If it can be hit, it can
be killed'

In an ironic way, Hezbollah might be following an old Anglo-American
military adage: “If it can be seen, it can be hit. If it can be hit, it can
be killed.” Hezbollah’s problem of blind rocket artillery and inaccurate
indirect fires is fading away, partly due to UAVs.

The remote capabilities are not limited to ISR, though.

The organisation conducted remote strikes deep into Israel, most recently
in August 2024
<https://www.timesofisrael.com/two-idf-soldiers-moderately-wounded-in-hezbollah-drone-attack-on-north/>.
Multiple drones were able to penetrate northern Israel, resulting in the
wounding of Israeli soldiers and civilians. The attacks underlined the
dual-use nature of Hezbollah's drone fleet for both surveillance and strike
operations.

Generally, the impacts of UAVs on warfare are still vehemently debated
among military and security experts. Still, for Hezbollah and the Israeli
army alike, drones will exert significant tactical and likely operational
impacts in the anticipated conflict.

So far, UAVs - regardless of their types - are not a strategic category of
weapon systems; it is very unlikely that they will decide the outcome of
the war.
Remarkable advancement

Even on the operational level of war, Hezbollah faces challenges in
developing, structuring and employing its unmanned air force.

Currently, the organisation cannot field and sustain the large UAV swarms
necessary to achieve air superiority below 3,000 feet, and therefore
deliver substantial air attacks.

With UAV swarms, Hezbollah would grapple with the issues of destructive
frequency interference, electronic warfare fratricide and Israel’s advanced
electronic attacks.

<https://www.middleeasteye.net/opinion/israel-lebanon-conflict-hezbollah-formidable-foe>

Israel-Lebanon conflict: Hezbollah will be a formidable foe if war escalates


Without UAV swarms and their advantages, Hezbollah’s combat effectiveness
and lethality levels in the air domain may remain limited, especially when
compared with its anti-tank infantry teams or even its unguided rocket
artillery.

This holds true even with the deployment of military-grade loitering
munitions when operating solo or in small numbers.

Nevertheless, Hezbollah’s UAV capabilities are evolving. Solutions to the
current challenges are a matter of will, skill and time.

Presently, UAVs have already provided Hezbollah with unprecedented stealthy
reconnaissance capabilities over Israel and enhanced intermittent precision
targeting. This represents a remarkable advancement, once deemed an
impossibility just a couple of decades ago.

The evolution of drone warfare in this conflict and beyond is far from
over. As Hezbollah continues to refine and expand its UAV arsenal, these
drones could become a force to reckon with in the air domain.

Hence, this unfolding war story may be poised to redefine air-ground
battles in modern warfare.

*The views expressed in this article belong to the author and do not
necessarily reflect the editorial policy of Middle East Eye.*
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