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<a class="gmail-domain gmail-reader-domain" href="https://www.middleeasteye.net/opinion/israel-lebanon-how-conflict-could-redefine-modern-warfare">middleeasteye.net</a>
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<h1 class="gmail-reader-title">How Israel-Lebanon conflict could redefine modern warfare</h1>
<div class="gmail-credits gmail-reader-credits">Omar Ashour</div>
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<div class="gmail-reader-estimated-time">August 14, 2024<br></div>
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<div class="gmail-moz-reader-content gmail-reader-show-element"><div id="gmail-readability-page-1" class="gmail-page"><div><p>With the recent spate of confirmed and <a href="https://apnews.com/article/israel-palestinians-gaza-war-mohammed-deif-9524d7d5c8f7321f4d8c931fde664556" target="_blank">alleged</a> assassinations and decapitation strikes in <a href="https://www.middleeasteye.net/news/lebanon-explosion-beirut-israel-claims-targeted-hezbollah-commander#:~:text=Lebanon%3A%20Explosion%20reported%20in%20Beirut%20as%20Israel%20claims%20it%20targeted%20Hezbollah%20commander,-Israel%20says%20it&text=Israel%27s%20military%20said%20it,Golan%20Heights%20over%20the%20weekend." target="_blank">Beirut</a>, <a href="https://www.middleeasteye.net/opinion/ismail-haniyeh-killing-netanyahu-only-goal-set-region-fire" target="_blank">Tehran</a> and Khan Younis, the likelihood of a third war between <a href="https://www.middleeasteye.net/countries/israel" target="_blank">Israel</a> and <a href="https://www.middleeasteye.net/topics/hezbollah" target="_blank">Hezbollah</a> has markedly increased.</p>
<p>Both adversaries are expected to extensively deploy <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=PABug067OtI" target="_blank">unmanned aerial vehicles</a> (UAVs), or drones, of various types in a war on their doorstep.</p>
<p>In April, I wrote an <a href="https://www.middleeasteye.net/opinion/gaza-war-hezbollah-israel-ready-full-scale-war-is" target="_blank">article</a> discussing Hezbollah’s military capabilities.</p>
<p>At that time, I harboured hopes for a "peace-by-terror" scenario,
wherein conventional deterrence would prevail and prevent or postpone
the outbreak of a full-scale war. Back then, Israel's posture along the <a href="https://www.middleeasteye.net/countries/lebanon" target="_blank">Lebanese</a> border was primarily <a href="https://www.timesofisrael.com/on-both-sides-of-gazas-border-the-idf-is-remaking-security-from-the-underground-up/" target="_blank">defensive</a>.</p>
<p>However, as forecast, this stance swiftly transitioned to an <a href="https://www.timesofisrael.com/liveblog_entry/idfs-new-mountains-brigade-drills-lebanon-invasion-in-first-exercise/" target="_blank">offensive</a> one.</p>
<p>This offensive posture has been reinforced by the <a href="https://www.timesofisrael.com/visiting-north-idf-chief-says-war-in-lebanon-becoming-much-more-likely/" target="_blank">redeployment</a> of units from <a href="https://www.middleeasteye.net/topics/israel-war-gaza" target="_blank">Gaza</a>, including <a href="https://www.i24news.tv/en/news/israel/defense/artc-idf-conducts-lebanon-combat-simulations-as-tensions-grow-in-north" target="_blank">brigades</a>
from the 36th Regular Division of the Northern Command. This is the
same division that previously bisected Gaza into northern and southern
parts, fighting its way to the Mediterranean to establish the <a href="https://www.newarab.com/news/what-israels-netzarim-corridor-splitting-gaza-two" target="_blank">Netzarim corridor</a>.</p>
<p>Additionally, <a href="https://www.i24news.tv/en/news/israel-at-war/artc-israeli-military-conducts-war-exercise-to-prepare-for-northern-war" target="_blank">brigades</a>
from the elite 98th Paratroopers Division (regulars) and the 146th
Reserve Division have been redeployed or newly positioned in the north.</p>
<p>The current combat grouping of three divisions - 12 brigades - is
roughly twice the size of Israel’s invading force in July 2006.</p>
<h3>Spying on the spies</h3>
<p>At the time of writing, only some of the assault brigades of these
divisions were reported to be in their positions. Nonetheless, to avoid
the debacles of the 2006 war and to successfully push Hezbollah’s
tenacious units over the Litani river towards the north, the Israeli
army will require substantial additional manpower.</p>
<p>To effectively undermine the Israeli military's operational
objectives, Hezbollah is likely to intensify drone warfare and employ
several types of UAVs - including fixed-wing, multi-rotor, loitering
munitions and first-person-view - as a force multiplier against superior
Israeli forces.</p><p>How may Hezbollah employ drones during a potential third war? Well, here is an analytical review.</p>
<p>In July 2006, Hezbollah managed to intercept and decrypt the video
feeds and communications of Israeli drones by employing a combination of
electronic warfare techniques, signals intelligence and ground-based
interceptions.</p>
<p>This infiltration allowed them to gain real-time intelligence on the
Israeli army’s operational plans and units’ movements in southern
Lebanon.</p>
<blockquote>
<p>Hezbollah's fighters mined and booby-trapped some of the targeted
locations, and the organisation's 'tank-killing' teams were ready</p>
</blockquote>
<p>Hezbollah did not disrupt the feeds. Instead, its units spied on the
“flying spies” - the Israeli army’s surveillance drones. Identifying the
targeted locations, Hezbollah’s combat units prepared ambushes for the
Israeli army’s assault units.</p>
<p>Hezbollah’s fighters mined and booby-trapped some of the targeted
locations, and the organisation’s “tank-killing” teams were ready with
both anti-tank guided missiles and unguided rockets.</p>
<p>All these preparations were based on real-time movement seen in the
drone feeds. Moreover, Hezbollah repositioned its forces to better
withstand Israeli attacks and pre-registered/pre-arranged their indirect
fires, such as rocket artillery and mortars, for greater precision by
knowing the locations and movements of the Israeli army units.</p>
<p>Overall, in 2006, Hezbollah executed a textbook counter-drone operation that bled the Israeli army in deadly ambushes.</p>
<h3>Ground-based lethality</h3>
<p>Hezbollah is not the <a href="https://www.csis.org/analysis/lessons-2006-israeli-hezbollah-war" target="_blank">same 2006 force</a>.
The organisation’s current military capabilities are superior to the
vast majority of non-state forces, and to several small-states’ ground
forces.</p>
<p>Ground forces still dominate Hezbollah’s military capabilities. They
include various types of infantry, special forces, armour, artillery and
ground-based air defences.</p>
<p>Hezbollah’s ground-based lethality was exhibited by its anti-armour infantry teams in 2006.</p>
<div>
<p><a href="https://www.middleeasteye.net/opinion/gaza-war-hezbollah-israel-ready-full-scale-war-is" target="_blank"><img src="https://www.middleeasteye.net/sites/default/files/styles/read_more/public/images-story/Smoke%20billows%20during%20Israeli%20bombardment%20on%20the%20village%20of%20Kfarkila%20in%20southern%20Lebanon%20near%20the%20border%20with%20Israel%20on%20March%2026%2C%202024%2C-afp.jpg.webp?itok=Tl5UgRsH" width="400" height="250" alt="" class="gmail-moz-reader-block-img"></a></p><p>War on Gaza: Is Hezbollah ready for full-scale war with Israel?</p>
<p><br>
</p></div>
<p>These teams have caused the highest percentage of Israeli military
fatalities in Lebanon (over 28 percent by my estimates), compared with
other units and branches, including rocket- and mortar-artillery,
improvised explosive devices, sniping; and even compared with Israeli
friendly fire, which resulted in about 12 percent of the Israeli army’s
fatalities.</p>
<p>The organisation is also capable in the electronic, cyber and intelligence/information domains, and less so in the sea domain. </p>
<p>The capabilities in the air domain of operations have been steadily,
but unconventionally, advancing. In 2006, indirect fire from rockets and
missiles resulted in more civilian losses in Israel than military
losses in Lebanon, due to inaccuracy and other reasons.</p>
<p>In 2024, the level of precision (as well as ranges and payloads) has
significantly changed. That is due - in part - to Hezbollah’s unmanned
air force.</p>
<p>Although Hezbollah had a history of basic UAV employment even before
the 2006 war, the organisation has demonstrated a relatively new
capability in 2024: it can “see” deep into Israel.</p>
<p>“Seeing” in military terminology translates to “intelligence,
surveillance and reconnaissance” (ISR). Hezbollah successfully executed
multiple <a href="https://www.timesofisrael.com/waiting-for-the-rockets-at-the-opening-of-a-regional-conflict/" target="_blank">air-domain breaches</a>,
where military-grade UAVs have penetrated deep into Israeli airspace to
gather intelligence and perform surveillance and reconnaissance
operations.</p>
<h3>Remote capability</h3>
<p>Targeted locations were not just soft ones. They included the well-defended <a href="https://www.timesofisrael.com/hezbollah-publishes-drone-footage-of-ramat-david-airbase-in-north/" target="_blank">Ramat David Airbase</a> and an Israeli naval base in Haifa, as well as several warships and infrastructure of the navy’s submarine unit, <a href="https://www.timesofisrael.com/in-open-threat-hezbollah-publishes-drone-footage-of-sites-in-northern-israel/" target="_blank">Shayetet 7</a>.</p>
<p>The operations demonstrated Hezbollah’s remote capability to conduct
surveillance over Israeli air force and naval bases, as well as urban
centres.</p>
<div>
<p><img src="https://www.middleeasteye.net/sites/default/files/Rockets-Lebanon-Israel-Iron-Dome-Galilee-August-2024-Jalaa-MAREY-AFP_0.jpg" width="408" height="272" alt="Rockets fired from southern Lebanon are intercepted by Israel's Iron Dome air defence system over the Upper Galilee region in northern Israel, on 4 August 2024 (Jalaa Marey/AFP)" class="gmail-moz-reader-block-img" style="margin-right: 25px;"></p>
Rockets fired from southern Lebanon are intercepted by
Israel's Iron Dome air defence system over the Upper Galilee region in
northern Israel, on 4 August 2024 (Jalaa Marey/AFP)<span><img src="cid:ii_lzuh7y7z3" alt="image.gif" width="15" height="15"></span></div>
<p>If, or when, war breaks out, these ISR UAVs will likely transmit
their targets’ location coordinates to rocket-artillery batteries,
missile units, combat UAVs and/or loitering munitions (one-way or
“suicide” drones) for precision strikes.</p>
<p>In a way, this mimics what <a href="https://www.middleeasteye.net/countries/russia" target="_blank">Russia’s</a> Orlan-10 ISR UAVs and Lancet loitering munitions are doing in <a href="https://www.middleeasteye.net/topics/russia-ukraine-war" target="_blank">Ukraine</a>. The coordination between Russia’s ISR and combat UAVs and missile units might have resulted in <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/russian-iskanders-destroy-two-patriot-launchers-ukraine-russian-agencies-report-2024-07-07/" target="_blank">defeating and destroying</a>
two Patriot launchers - two components of one of the world’s most
capable and most expensive air-defence systems - by Russian occupation
forces in Ukraine.</p>
<blockquote>
<p>In an ironic way, Hezbollah might be following an old Anglo-American
military adage: 'If it can be seen, it can be hit. If it can be hit, it
can be killed'</p>
</blockquote>
<p>In an ironic way, Hezbollah might be following an old Anglo-American
military adage: “If it can be seen, it can be hit. If it can be hit, it
can be killed.” Hezbollah’s problem of blind rocket artillery and
inaccurate indirect fires is fading away, partly due to UAVs.</p>
<p>The remote capabilities are not limited to ISR, though.</p>
<p>The organisation conducted remote strikes deep into Israel, most recently in <a href="https://www.timesofisrael.com/two-idf-soldiers-moderately-wounded-in-hezbollah-drone-attack-on-north/" target="_blank">August 2024</a>.
Multiple drones were able to penetrate northern Israel, resulting in
the wounding of Israeli soldiers and civilians. The attacks underlined
the dual-use nature of Hezbollah's drone fleet for both surveillance and
strike operations.</p>
<p>Generally, the impacts of UAVs on warfare are still vehemently
debated among military and security experts. Still, for Hezbollah and
the Israeli army alike, drones will exert significant tactical and
likely operational impacts in the anticipated conflict.</p>
<p>So far, UAVs - regardless of their types - are not a strategic
category of weapon systems; it is very unlikely that they will decide
the outcome of the war.</p>
<h3>Remarkable advancement</h3>
<p>Even on the operational level of war, Hezbollah faces challenges in
developing, structuring and employing its unmanned air force.</p>
<p>Currently, the organisation cannot field and sustain the large UAV
swarms necessary to achieve air superiority below 3,000 feet, and
therefore deliver substantial air attacks.</p>
<p>With UAV swarms, Hezbollah would grapple with the issues of
destructive frequency interference, electronic warfare fratricide and
Israel’s advanced electronic attacks.</p>
<div>
<p><a href="https://www.middleeasteye.net/opinion/israel-lebanon-conflict-hezbollah-formidable-foe" target="_blank"><img src="https://www.middleeasteye.net/sites/default/files/styles/read_more/public/images-story/Supporters%20of%20the%20Lebanese%20Shiite%20movement%20Hezbollah%20wave%20flags%20as%20they%20watch%20a%20televised%20speech%20by%20its%20leader%20Hassan%20Nasrallah%20%28unseen%29%20in%20the%20Lebanese%20capital%20Beirut%27s%20southern%20suburbs%20on%20November%203%2C%202023-afp.jpg.webp?itok=0qXW_HGE" width="400" height="250" alt="" class="gmail-moz-reader-block-img"></a></p><p>Israel-Lebanon conflict: Hezbollah will be a formidable foe if war escalates</p>
<p><br>
</p></div>
<p>Without UAV swarms and their advantages, Hezbollah’s combat
effectiveness and lethality levels in the air domain may remain limited,
especially when compared with its anti-tank infantry teams or even its
unguided rocket artillery.</p>
<p>This holds true even with the deployment of military-grade loitering munitions when operating solo or in small numbers.</p>
<p>Nevertheless, Hezbollah’s UAV capabilities are evolving. Solutions to
the current challenges are a matter of will, skill and time.</p>
<p>Presently, UAVs have already provided Hezbollah with unprecedented
stealthy reconnaissance capabilities over Israel and enhanced
intermittent precision targeting. This represents a remarkable
advancement, once deemed an impossibility just a couple of decades ago.</p>
<p>The evolution of drone warfare in this conflict and beyond is far
from over. As Hezbollah continues to refine and expand its UAV arsenal,
these drones could become a force to reckon with in the air domain.</p>
<p>Hence, this unfolding war story may be poised to redefine air-ground battles in modern warfare.</p>
<p><i>The views expressed in this article belong to the author and do not necessarily reflect the editorial policy of Middle East Eye.</i></p>
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