[News] Vietnam Will Win: Military Realities

[Anti-Imperialist News]

https://www.counterpunch.org/2018/02/21/vietnam-will-win-military-realities/ 



  Vietnam Will Win: Military Realities

by Wilfred Burchett 
<https://www.counterpunch.org/author/wilfred-burchett/> - February 21, 2018
------------------------------------------------------------------------

By the turn of the year 1967-68, it was clear that things had developed 
just as the NLF leadership had foreseen. And they continued to do so 
throughout 1968. At the end of January, on the eve of the Têt offensive, 
and with almost 500,000 U.S. troops in South Vietnam, the U.S.-Saigon 
command had fewer mobile forces at its disposal than during the 1965-66 
dry season when Westmoreland had about 200,000 U.S. troops under his 
command. Entire divisions were bogged down guarding bases, bridges and 
roads in a situation strongly reminiscent of the 800,000 strong French 
army in the latter phases of the Algerian war. Such a high proportion of 
French troops were locked up in their barbed-wire covered “mirador” 
fortresses guarding bases, bridges and stretches of roads and railways, 
that none were left for offensive operations.

The nearly 1,300,000-man army under Westmoreland had been pushed into 
the defensive, the initiative having passed into the hands of the NLF. 
Bases, garrisons, outposts were all encircled by NLF guerrillas, while 
NLF main force units launched operation after operation, starting with 
the Loc Ninh and Dak To battles in October-November 1967, and then 
others that prepared the ground for the Têt offensive.

During the two-and-a-half years since the first U.S. Marine units had 
landed at Da Nang, the NLF guerrilla and regional forces had increased 
in numbers and improved their equipment. These forces concentrated on 
thwarting the American dry-season offensives. Most important, they drew 
nooses around all U.S. bases, nibbling away at the perimeters, attacking 
with commando raids inside the bases or by rocket and mortar attacks 
from their perimeter positions. Because of frequent ambushes on the 
roads and the impossibility of moving all U.S. supplies by air, hundreds 
of thousands of American troops were employed solely in trying to 
protect bases and bridges and to open roads or keep them open. The 
constant danger hanging over these bases can be judged from a Reuters 
report of January 12, 1968[1] <#_edn1> from Saigon stating that 872 U.S. 
planes and 777 helicopters had been lost in south Vietnam due to “non 
hostile action.” These are official figures which, the U.S. spokesman 
explained “include planes and helicopters destroyed on the ground in 
Communist attacks.” The same dispatch stated that “according to an 
official report the Communists have downed 222 planes and 465 
helicopters” in south Vietnam. These are extraordinary figures for a 
fighting force that has neither planes nor antiaircraft artillery. NLF 
figures are much higher. They claim 1,800 planes and helicopters downed 
or destroyed on the ground during the latter half of 1967 alone. The NLF 
claims are supported by the fact that there had been a marked falling 
off in U.S. air activity in south Vietnam, especially in air response to 
the innumerable NLF small and medium-sized actions launched during the 
1967 summer-autumn campaigns. Air power in Vietnam has not increased 
proportionately to the increase in ground troops, probably due to a 
shortage of pilots. In other words, about the same amount of air power 
that supported some 250,000 U.S. troops in 1965-66 had to suffice for 
twice as many three years later.

While the regional and guerrilla forces attended to U.S. bases and 
outposts, the NLF regular forces continued their buildup and training 
exercises for the major offensive operations they were to launch in the 
1967-68 dry season. By then a curious situation had developed, one that 
the Pentagon computers could never have foreseen. The fantastic weight 
and array of military technique which had so mesmerized many observers 
in the first few months of U.S. intervention was mostly immobilized in 
bases encircled by guerrillas. U.S. forces were shelled in their bases 
at night, ambushed if they moved too far and too fast by day, and they 
were rarely brought to bear effectively on an adversary who was 
everywhere and nowhere at the same time. If one critically analyzed the 
facts, it was a fair assumption that from the beginning of the 1967-68 
dry season, no U.S. commander could ever again launch such large-scale 
operations as “Junction City” of the 1966-67 dry season in which some 
45,000 troops and almost 1,000 tanks and armored vehicles were employed. 
The contrary to what General Westmoreland had predicted had happened. 
The NLF had acquired the ability to launch huge-scale operations, while 
the U.S. Command had lost that capacity.

When the NLF opened the 1967-68 dry season offensive at Loc Ninh on 
October 28 and Dak To on November 4, 1967, Westmoreland had only two 
brigades of mobile reserves at his disposal: the 101st and 173rd 
Airborne Brigades. Taken completely by surprise at Loc Ninh, he had to 
halt preparations for operations in the coastal provinces and north of 
Saigon and withdraw elements of the U.S. 1st and 25th Divisions to rush 
to the battle front. At Dak To, when elements of the U.S. 1st Cavalry 
(Airmobile) and 4th Infantry Divisions – also withdrawn from other 
intended assignments – proved incapable of making any progress, he 
committed the 173rd Airborne Brigade, half his mobile reserves. Two of 
the brigade’s three battalions were decimated at Dak To; the third was 
saved because it was behind guarding brigade headquarters. Only the 
101st Brigade was left and it was up in the 1st Corps area to help 
rescue the Marines. The 1st and 25th Divisions, normally available to 
protect Saigon, had been badly mauled and as a panic measure the two 
remaining brigades of the 101st Airborne Division-earmarked for the 
defense of the United States itself – were airlifted from the United 
States to the Bien Hoa base, 12.5 miles north of Saigon. The defenses of 
both Bien Hoa and Saigon had been seriously weakened by the losses 
inflicted on the 1st and 25th Divisions and the removal of other units 
far north to the 1st Corps area.

Westmoreland “first operated in divisions, then regiments, then 
battalions, companies and finally in platoons garrisoned in thousands of 
strong points and posts, dispersed over the four corners of the theater 
of operations. He was thus confronted with this contradiction: if he did 
not disperse his troops it was impossible to occupy the territory 
invaded; but in dispersing them he got himself into difficulties. His 
scattered units became easy prey for our troops, his mobile forces were 
continually reduced and the shortage of effectives became more 
marked…”[2] <#_edn2> This was how General Vo Nguyen Giap, the victor of 
Dien Bien Phu, described the situation of the French Expeditionary 
Forces on the eve of that historic battle. It is a description that 
closely paralleled the situation of U.S. forces in Vietnam at the 
beginning of the 1967-68 dry season. But Westmoreland seemed unaware of 
that fact. Brigades and even battalion-sized elements of certain 
divisions were trying to hold positions separated by more than a hundred 
miles. Smaller units were dispersed in scattered, often isolated 
outposts, picked off one after another, or as at Loc Ninh and Dak To, 
attacks against these outposts were used by the NLF as bait to attract 
more important U S. units into an area favorable for NLF forces.

A Reuters dispatch from Da Nang on January 9, 1968, described some of 
the difficulties resulting from the dispersion of U.S. forces:[3] <#_edn3>

    “The Vietcong were reported by U.S. military sources today to have
    launched a concentrated campaign against 1,000 American Marines
    scattered in small outposts throughout the northern five provinces
    of South Vietnam…

    “Sources here said the 79 village compounds – each manned by an
    average of 12 Marines – had apparently become a prime target of the
    Vietcong… The units have reinforced their barbed wire and minefield
    defense following a series of attacks since the start of the year
    that one U.S. spokesman described as ‘the toughest test for the
    pacification program since it started w 1965.’

    “In eight days the Vietcong supported by North Vietnamese soldiers
    launched 62 attacks on the compounds, killing 27 Marines and
    wounding another 52…”

Three days later, another Reuters account indicated that U.S. forces on 
large bases were equally vulnerable to attack:

    “Six thousand crack South Korean Marines will help defend the key
    U.S. base at Da Nang… The South Koreans in a previously secret move
    have moved to a new headquarters at Hoi An, 20 miles south of Da
    Nang, which is the headquarters for 75,000 U.S. Marines. Da Nang is
    also a major base for giant U.S. transports and a take-off point for
    raids against North Vietnam. It has come under costly rocket attacks
    launched by North Vietnamese and Vietcong regulars from hills
    overlooking the coastal base…”[4] <#_edn4>

At first it had been pretended that the Marines themselves arrived only 
to protect this base. Then South Vietnamese troops took over the defense 
as Marines were used for combat operations. The frequency with which NLF 
units penetrated the perimeters caused the Americans to suspect 
collusion between the NLF and the Saigon troops, so the latter were 
withdrawn and the Marines took over their own defense. But when the 
bitter fighting started around the 17th parallel as a result of 
Westmoreland’s blunders, the Marines found that they did not have enough 
troops to carry out defensive holding operations plus their 
“pacification” program and to guard their own bases in addition. Every 
time they called on reserve units from the bases at Chu Lai and Da Nang 
to try to rescue some encircled company, NLF guerrillas struck within 
the reduced defense perimeters of the bases. A regiment of Saigon troops 
was again sent to help guard them but they settled down to a happy “no 
see, no hear, no act” sort of arrangement with local NLF forces.

A brigade of the U.S. 1st Cavalry (Airmobile) Division was withdrawn 
from its base in the Central Highlands and rushed up to the rescue. The 
196th Light Independent Brigade, originally earmarked for setting itself 
up in the Tay Ninh forest, some 50 miles north of Saigon, was sent to 
establish its base at Chu Lai instead. The 101st Airborne Brigade which 
normally operates in the Saigon border area was also sent north. Even 
the newly constituted 198th Light Independent Brigade was sent to try to 
protect the An Hao air base, three miles north of Chu Lai. (Soon after 
it arrived the base was attacked – on the night of October 30-31, 1967 – 
with the result that 50 out of 70 planes and helicopters were put out of 
action.) On January 10, 1968, NLF units wiped out the headquarters unit 
of the 196th Brigade at Que Son, 24 miles south of Quang Nam.

By early 1968, the disastrous situation for the Marines could no longer 
be concealed and it was no accident that two retired marine generals 
(former Marine Corps Commandant General David Shoup and Brigadier 
General Samuel Griffith) were calling for a military withdrawal from 
Vietnam. Three years after their first contingent landed, the Marines 
were bogged down in positional warfare, something for which they were 
never intended, unable to protect their own bases, reduced to the 
humiliation of calling on the US. Army for help and on the South Koreans 
to protect their bases.

This was a far cry from the days of “ink blot” strategy. The Marines had 
never been really able to secure the highway linking their two major 
bases. In three years, the best they could do was send heavily protected 
convoys over the Chu Lai-Da Nang road in daylight only.

On September 9, 1967, at Hoi An, the region that South Korean troops 
took over in mid-January of 1968, there was a series of accidents which 
was unreported in the Saigon communiqués. On the first three days of 
September, nearly 67 Saigon troops, including regulars, militiamen and 
Civil Guards, deserted in the Hoi An area, many of them coming over to 
the NLF. On September 4, in Hoi An Town itself, elements of the Saigon 
51st Regiment mutinied and killed a number of their officers who were 
insisting on their voting the Thieu-Ky ticket in the presidential 
elections, and on the 9th, troops of one of the U.S.-Saigon mixed units 
at the Co Dinh base, three miles west of Hoi An, killed their Saigon 
officers and 13 Americans in the unit, razed the base and crazed over to 
the NLF, bringing all their weapons with them. One could predict that 
similar incidents would increase in number, with large-scale units of 
the Saigon army crossing over to the NLF side the latter’s offensives 
continued to grow w scope and violence , and contradictions between the 
U.S. and Saigon forces deepened. This is precisely what happened after 
the NLF launched its Têt offensive, during the first week of which some 
200,000 Saigon troops deserted. In 11 provinces alone, 169 posts were 
abandoned, mainly by regional troops who crossed over to the NLF, 
bringing their arms with them. Whole battalions, including one tank 
battalion complete with its tanks, changed sides; other units simply 
disintegrated, troops going back to their native villages. Saigon police 
and troops ordered into action against an NLF commando group which had 
attacked and occupied part of the U.S. Embassy in Saigon refused, simply 
turning their backs on the fighting.

The NLF’s Lunar New Year offensive started the disintegration of the 
Saigon army, more troops deserting in one week than in the whole of the 
previous year.

One after another, the various roles assigned to the Saigon army by the 
Pentagon had failed. “Special War,” with the South Vietnamese troops 
financed, armed, trained and finally officered by the Americans, was 
dealt a mortal blow at Binh Gia,[5] <#_edn5> as related earlier. In the 
first phases after the engagement of U.S. combat units in “limited war,” 
the Saigon army was to fight side by side with U.S. forces, divisions 
alongside divisions, regiments alongside regiments and battalions 
alongside battalions, under U.S. overall command. This also failed, the 
Americans claimed, because Saigon units had a habit of slipping away 
from the flanks they were supposed to be guarding or of simply refusing 
to advance. The Saigon troops claim this failed because they were always 
given the dirtiest and most dangerous jobs. (A best seller in Saigon in 
late 1967 was a book that described how U.S. troops abandoned Saigon 
units in the Plei Me-Ia Drang Valley battle of October-November 1965.)

In numerous sweep operations, U.S. troops often moved straight ahead in 
columns while platoons of Saigon Rangers were dropped in “flea-hopping” 
operations into clearings to the right and left of the main thrust like 
hunting dogs to “start up” the quarry. If there was any “quarry,” U.S. 
troops were supposed to try to encircle the area while air and artillery 
strikes were called in, the Ranger platoons having a better than even 
chance of getting their share of the bombs and shells, as the NLF forces 
always have shelters at their disposal. After the first few of these 
operations, the Rangers tended to move only a few yards into the jungle 
and signal back “no contact,” then squat on their haunches for the 
helicopters to pick them up for the next clearing. On countless 
occasions, NLF cadres told me, the scouting units clearly saw “Vietcong” 
positions but never reported back.

Saigon troops were then assigned independent operations and the U.S. 
press was full of reproaches that they were not “combative” enough, 
refusing to advance if they encountered hostile fire. In early 1967, it 
was announced that the Saigon army would be mainly withdrawn from 
operations and retrained for “pacification” duties, which mainly meant 
they were to “pacify” areas from which U.S. combat units were supposed 
to clear out the NLF.

There were, however, insurmountable flaws in this plan. Areas “cleared” 
by U.S. troops were found to be more violently “Vietcong” than before 
American operations had been conducted in them. A standard joke among 
U.S. troops is: “If there were no VC when we came here, by God there 
will be thousands when we leave.” And the definition of Americans that a 
“Vietcong is a dead Vietnamese” has been changed by the murderous South 
Korean troops into the slogan that as far as they are concerned a 
“Vietcong is any live Vietnamese” – to be slaughtered.

“Pacification” following U.S.-South Korean type “sweeps” became as 
dangerous a business as combat operations. Career officers in the Saigon 
army felt humiliated by this secondary role and many of the officers and 
conscripts were sickened by the massacres and tortures inflicted on 
their compatriots, often on their own relatives, by the invaders. 
“Pacification” in many areas turned into a sort of unofficial 
“fraternization” exercise. This was particularly so in the 1st Corps 
area, that is, the five northern provinces leading up to the 17th 
parallel, and the 4th Corps area in the Mekong Delta.

It was apparent during McNamara’s ninth visit to Saigon in the summer of 
1967 that Westmoreland was short of mobile reserves, so the Defense 
Secretary partly reversed the decisions taken earlier in the year and 
demanded that Saigon troops play a more “active” role in combat 
operations. In order to overcome “lack of combativity,” the idea of 
integrated units was to be tried, Saigon forces integrated with 
similar-sized U.S. units in the proportion of one or two in favor of the 
Americans. (It appears that on patrols and in combat, U.S. troops feel 
nervous if they have anything less than the two-to-one ratio.) But the 
integrated unit did not work either, as the incident at Hoi An, one of 
several such, demonstrated. As far as the Saigon army was concerned, it 
was “America’s war, let the Americans do the fighting and dying.” 
Moreover, by the end of 1967, with the NLF dry season offensive in full 
swing, it was clear to the officers and men of the Saigon army that it 
was a war the United States was losing. Who, even among those who a year 
or two previously had been the most ardent U.S. supporters of the war, 
wanted to be identified, until too late, with the losing side? A handful 
of top collaborators may later pull out when the United States 
withdraws. A certain number of top-level collaborators with the United 
States were quietly selling their extra cars and villas by the beginning 
of 1968, transferring their money abroad. But the vast majority of those 
who have served the Americans will have to remain in Vietnam where 
everything connected with the United States is coming to be hated and 
despised. By the turn of the year many officers and officials at various 
levels were beginning to make dispositions accordingly, including open 
hostility to U.S. officials and secret contacts with the NLF. /New/ 
/York Times /correspondent R. W. Apple reported from Saigon on January 
1, 1968, that: “American officials at almost all levels both in Saigon 
and in the provinces are reported to be under increasing pressure from 
Washington to produce convincing evidence of progress in the next few 
months… The latest campaign for results appears to differ from some of 
those in the past in that it is directed more toward the Vietnamese, 
military and civilians, than the Americans.

“A well-informed Saigon source said that recent cables from the State 
Department and Pentagon have been full of instructions like these: ‘Get 
the South Vietnamese Army moving. Not only the regulars but the militia 
and national guardsmen. And get the idea across to the American public 
that they are fighting well… Do something – anything –about government 
corruption… Get President Nguyen Van Thieu to demonstrate his commitment 
to the war as well as his determination to demand sacrifices from the 
public…’ Whether the pressure will result in action by the Vietnamese is 
problematical.”

Apple continues: “Already the efforts by Ambassador Ellsworth Bunker to 
prod President Thieu into action on several fronts have produced 
anti-American speeches in the legislature and editorial attacks in the 
newspapers…”

“Such  pressures, especially on the Saigon military, to accept higher 
casualties to suit President Johnson’s electioneering needs of that 
period, obviously could only deepen the conflicts between Saigon army 
units and their own local commands and between the local commanders and 
the U.S.-Saigon high command. One concrete result of U.S. pressures was 
the removal in mid-January 1968 of General Phan Trong Chinh, commander 
of the Saigon 25th Division, who had long been an outspoken critic of 
American interference in Saigon army affairs. Chinh’s division had 
virtually retired from the war for more than a year, and Westmoreland 
had been trying to get the general dismissed for nearly two years. 
Commenting on Chinh’s retirement “on sick leave,” William Tuohy of the 
/Los Angeles Times/[6] <#_edn6> wrote that “After years of expecting the 
‘soft’ approach from American advisers, many Vietnamese generals are not 
now taking kindly to the current ‘hard’ approach by the U.S. advisory 
effort… The irony is that despite Chinh’s well-known deficiencies as a 
commander, some Vietnamese admire him for what they consider his 
standing up to the Americans. Anti-Americanism is on the upswing in 
Vietnam…” concludes Tuohy, a veteran Saigon correspondent.

Earlier, Westmoreland had succeeded in removing General Dang Van Quang, 
the Saigon commander of the 4th zone (the Mekong Delta) because the 
Americans had long considered him “too passive.” The ouster of General 
Quang was to be the prelude to the Americans moving into the Delta, 
something which General Quang most strenuously opposed, as indeed he 
opposed any intensification of the war in the 4th zone, where his units 
in most areas had established “fraternal” relations with those of the 
NLF. As things turned out, because of the situation around the 17th 
parallel, the U.S. forces gradually being encircled in what was to have 
been their main forward base at Khe Sanh, the U.S. units earmarked for 
the Delta were rushed north. But the ouster of General Quang at U.S. 
insistence deepened resentment within the Saigon military hierarchy.[7] 
<#_edn7>

One of the most extraordinary aspects of official U.S. reports on 
casualties, desertions and other factors claimed to be indicative of a 
weakening of the NLF forces, is that they are completely contradicted by 
other figures given on total NLF effectives. For example, a December 23, 
1967, dispatch from Washington of the /New York Times /states:

“Government officials say privately that they now estimate enemy 
military and political manpower in South Vietnam at 418,000 to 483,000 – 
much higher than the figure of less than 300,000 reported in 1966. 
During his latest visit to Washington, General William C. Westmoreland, 
the American commander in Saigon, reported ‘remarkable progress.’ He 
presented charts showing a decline in enemy armed strength from 285,000 
in late 1966 to 242,000…

“For one thing, officials say that new intelligence shows that a year 
ago they were grossly underestimating enemy strength, especially the 
Vietcong political apparatus and low-level militia forces… Essentially, 
administration specialists now conclude that the enemy organization is – 
and has long been – numerically much more formidable than Washington had 
reckoned…”

While Westmoreland says 242,000, to justify his “body count” statistics 
and paper victories, Washington inclines to 483,000 NLF effectives. My 
estimate is a much higher figure, which would include those “low-level 
militia forces” and such units of the NLF regular forces as Westmoreland 
overlooked until they suddenly appeared at Loc Ninh and Dak To. It is 
useless to make a distinction between “military and political manpower,” 
as the /New/ /York Times /story suggests. Every political cadre carries 
a gun, and every educational, medical, cultural or economic cadre does 
also. So does virtually every able-bodied man and woman throughout the 
liberated areas.

There has also been a steady change in quality as well as quantity in 
the relation between NLF and U.S.-Saigon forces. A key factor in 
comparing the combat quality of NLF and U.S. troops is that the latter 
are usually green troops sent out after a few months of training to 
serve one year in a type of warfare which is the most exacting in its 
demands on experience, knowledge of the terrain, adaptation to climate, 
ability to react to surprise situations – and virtually every contact 
with NLF forces is under such conditions. “Rotation” does not apply to 
the NLF troops, who year by year add to their combat experience, 
analyzing the results of every encounter and taking weeks or months off 
as units to sum up the experiences of a whole year’s activities. Thus 
each individual fighter and combat unit as a whole, accumulates a wealth 
of battlefield experience for which there is no substitute. 
Inexperienced U.S. troops are exposed to formidable veterans of jungle 
warfare and a people’s war of an intensity and scope the world has never 
before known.

Furthermore, there has been a steady deterioration in the quality of 
U.S. troops for easily understandable reasons. The first units to come 
were elite divisions of professional soldiers, many of them veterans of 
the Korean war and all of them highly trained in jungle warfare. The 1st 
and 3rd Marine Divisions, the 1st and 25th Infantry Divisions, and the 
1st Cavalry (Airmobile) Division were the best units the United States 
had for a Vietnamese-type war. The 4th and 9th Divisions that came later 
were of inferior quality, as were also the 196th and 198th Light 
Infantry Brigades. But under the “rotation” system, veterans of even the 
elite divisions were replaced after a year, only an insignificant 
proportion volunteering for a second tour of duty. Another weakness is 
that the Pentagon has still not been able to decide on the type of unit 
it really needs in South Vietnam, much less develop such a unit.

When the 1st Cavalry (Airmobile) Division was sent out with its 434 
helicopters, American military experts went into ecstasies over this 
supposedly “perfect instrument” for jungle warfare. But the results were 
meager, to say the least. It turned out to be an unwieldy instrument, 
the complete dependence on helicopters being found to have its 
disadvantages. Dumping troops down into an entirely hostile environment, 
with no friendly rear or flanks for maneuvering and no road for 
retreating when landing fields came under furious fire, often proved 
extremely costly in men and helicopters, especially in comparison with 
results achieved. By the end of 1967, the famous Airmobile Division was 
not very mobile. Elements were bogged down near the 17th parallel, 
others in guarding roads and bases and one unit was engaged in the Dak 
To battle. By mid-1968, troops of the 1st Aircavalry Division were 
burrowing for their lives deep underground at Khe Sanh, trying to put as 
much earth as possible between themselves and exploding NLF rockets and 
mortar shells. The 1st Aircavalry was no longer a specialist unit, at 
least it was no longer able to exploit its specialty. Another type of 
U.S. formation took the field, especially tailored for the war in South 
Vietnam.

“The light infantry brigade is the thing now in South Vietnam,” the 
/Christian Science Monitor /reported on September 29, 1966, hailing the 
arrival of the 196th Light Infantry Brigade, the prototype of this new 
weapon. “It’s only one-fourth the size of a big American division – 
3,000 to 4,000 men. Helicopter companies work closely with it when needed.

“The U.S. Army is fast learning its lessons from the anti-guerrilla war 
in Asia. The cry is for fighting units that are smaller and lighter in 
size and equipment…

“The now famous 1st Cavalry (Airmobile) Division with its own 434 
‘copters is not being duplicated – not now anyhow. Instead the Army is 
creating a new team – light brigades matched with helicopter companies. 
They are expected to do smaller anti guerrilla jobs faster than a big 
cumbersome division of 16,000 men. One such streamlined light brigade is 
the 196th, now in South Vietnam… Two other infantry brigades are shaping 
up for combat, the 198th at Fort Banning, the 11th Brigade at Hawaii…”

It is interesting to note that when the military experts went into 
raptures over the 1st Cavalry (Airmobile) Division with its super 
mobility and firepower, they claimed that such big and powerful units 
would force the NLF to abandon large-scale units and revert to smaller 
formations. Actually it was the Pentagon which decided to go back to 
smaller units. Less than two months after the ecstasies over the 196th, 
however, Ward Just, the Saigon correspondent of the /Washington Post, 
/quoted a “senior American field commander” as saying: “The 196th Light 
Brigade has gone back to the drawing boards…”[8] <#_edn8> Between the 
writing of these two contradictory reports, the 196th had its baptism of 
fire in “Operation Attleboro” in which it was to be the star performer. 
The aim was to clear out an NLF base area in the forests of Tay Ninh, 
where the 196th was to establish its own base and “protect” a massive 
“pacification” operation by the Saigon troops. In fact, two of the 
196th’s three battalions were wiped out and the third, left behind to 
guard the brigade command post, was also badly hit when the command post 
itself was attacked. The unit commander, Brigadier General Edward de 
Saussure, was relieved of his command during the battle and reproached 
for having handled his units badly. The brigade was withdrawn from the 
area and combat activity to be completely reorganized. Operation 
“Junction City,” launched in the same area a couple of months later with 
twice as many men, fared no better, the operational commander also being 
relieved of his command. The base areas in Tay Ninh remain firmly in the 
hands of the NLF. The 196th later turned up in the 1st Corps area, where 
its headquarters unit was wiped out on January 10, 1968. The 198th has 
since flown out to the same area and failed in its first mission to 
protect the An Hao air base. As noted above, the 11th was flown out from 
Hawaii as part of the emergency measure after the 173rd Airborne Brigade 
was put out of action and had not been involved in combat at the time of 
writing. But there have been no further claims that the “light brigade” 
was a war-winning weapon in South Vietnam.

The above is a description of “things as they were” in South Vietnam at 
the beginning of 1968, a state of affairs which could have been verified 
by anyone taking the trouble to look at facts instead of the communiqués 
of the U.S.-Saigon command. The shock of the Têt offensive on American 
opinion was simply that of a reality which had long been successfully 
obscured by the optimistic reports of General Westmoreland and top U.S. 
officials.

The relation of forces had continuously changed in favor of the NLF, the 
U.S. command had completely lost all operational initiative and the 
stage was gradually set for the devastating, nationwide offensive which 
the Pentagon later claimed had been expected, yet no steps had been 
taken to prepare for it. Whatever else it proved, one thing was clear. 
After a long uphill climb, the Liberation Armed Forces were over the top 
and starting to rush down the other side.

“… Our people’s revolutionary armies continued to intensify and extend 
guerrilla operations, continued the task of building up and training 
regular units. In battle, during the buildup of our forces, we developed 
from autonomous companies to mobile battalions, then from battalions to 
regiments and divisions. The first appearance of our regiments in 
battles near the frontier areas marked our first great victory, which 
only added to the enemy’s confusion . . .”[9] <#_edn9>

One could be excused for thinking that this was Nguyen Huu Tho 
describing the building up and appearance of the NLF main force units in 
the battles near the Laotian and Cambodian borders at the start of the 
1967-68 operational season. However, these words of Vo Nguyen Giap are 
from his account of the development of the Vietnam People’s Army during 
the later stages of the resistance war against France. But it was also 
the situation on the eve of the historic Têt offensive and the second 
great offensive launched in the first days of May, 1968. It was the 
situation which led to the greatest military defeat the U.S. Command had 
suffered in South Vietnam until that time – the abandonment of the Khe 
Sanh base in late June,1968, an event of great ill omen for the whole 
U.S. military posture in South Vietnam.

“U.S. Resolved To Hold Khe Sank At All Costs,” read a headline in the 
/Internationale Herald Tribune /of February 9, 1968. Later it was 
learned that President Johnson had extracted written pledges from the 
generals responsible that Khe Sanh “could and would be held.” But less 
than five months later, U.S. troops started pulling out of Khe Sanh. On 
June 28 the same newspaper reported a U.S. military spokesman in Saigon 
as saying that “the move was prompted by a reported large increase in 
Communist forces in the area…” Although the siege of Khe Sanh was given 
daily front-page headlines, its abandonment passed almost without 
comment in the American and Western press. But the abandonment 
(“deactivation” was the term employed by the U.S.-Saigon Command) marked 
a turning point in the war. It represented a strategic, tactical and 
operational defeat of decisive importance for the U.S. Command. The 
strategy of “search and destroy” on which all U.S. military planning in 
South Vietnam was based came to an end at Khe Sanh. It had been dealt a 
heavy blow during the Têt offensive and was virtually finished off 
during the second wave of NLF offensive in May. The /coup de grâce /was 
delivered at Khe Sanh despite the written pledges.

Even more serious from a U.S. viewpoint, the abandonment of Khe Sanh – 
vitally important, the American generals had always maintained, to 
control supply and infiltration routes along the western sector of the 
demilitarized zone and the frontier areas with Laos – also meant a very 
serious first defeat for the new passive, defensive strategy. During the 
171 days of the siege of Khe Sanh, the role of this base was 
transformed. Like Dien Bien Phu, it was originally intended as an 
operational base, deep in the NLF rear, from which U.S. troops would 
strike out in their famous “search and destroy” operations, or “find, 
fix, fight and destroy the enemy,” as Westmoreland often expressed it. 
Also like Dien Bien Phu, because of encirclement and harassing 
operations, Khe Sanh gradually had to be transformed into a passive 
defense bastion with deep underground bunkers and connecting trenches, 
positions from which the troops rarely dared move out.

Khe Sanh in its later stages was defended by some 40,000 troops 
stretched out along 25 miles of Highway No. 9, leading from the main 
supply base at Cua Viet on the coast to the Khe Sanh complex, with minor 
fortresses every couple of miles along the road to protect the supply 
convoys. The base and the airstrip, on which it often had to depend for 
supplies, were under constant artillery fire. In spite of the fantastic 
firepower at their disposal, including several B-52 raids per day, the 
Americans were never able to silence this artillery. The equivalent of 
one-sixth of the bombs used during the three years of the Korean war was 
dropped around Khe Sanh alone, yet the NLF artillery kept firing.

But to understand the deeper reasons for the abandonment of this 
much-publicized base, one must comprehend the significance of the NLF 
second-wave offensive in early May of this year. This time the Americans 
were not taken by surprise as at the Têt offensive. Although the exact 
timing was a surprise, the U.S. Command knew it was coming and had taken 
appropriate defense measures. For instance, they concentrated some 100 
American and Saigon army battalions in and around Saigon. These included 
all the “elite” battalions of the Saigon army – that is, specially 
trained, equipped and paid marines, rangers and parachutists. In spite 
of official American claims that the May offensive was much “weaker” 
than that of Têt, a far heavier blow was dealt.

The “elite” battalions were torn to pieces, effectives in the various 
units being reduced by 50 to 70%, according to an NLF spokesman who had 
access to precise statistics from adversary as well as NLF sources. 
Replacements sent from the training camps were raw recruits who had been 
in training for a week or less, and had neither stomach nor aptitude for 
battle. The quality and morale of the “elite” units was drastically reduced.

The Têt offensive had brought NLF military strength to within easy range 
of the main U.S. bases and storage depots. This was fully exploited 
during the May offensive when the destruction of military equipment, 
especially tanks and vehicles, was tremendous. In a single two day 
battle at Trang Bang near Saigon, for example, 150 tanks were destroyed. 
Parenthetically, it is worth noting that the NLF units consider coming 
to grips with U.S. tanks as “child’s play” because children who know all 
the jungle and rice field paths suitable for tanks sometimes take part 
in their destruction. One can also say that every U.S. bombing raid and 
artillery bombardment dooms a few more tanks to destruction, since most 
of them are blown up by electrically detonated mines made from 
unexploded U.S. bombs and shell.

The fact that the NLF in its May offensive, despite the massive security 
measures, could still penetrate the main cities even more effectively 
than at Têt and that U.S.-Saigon forces ended up much weaker than 
before, forced another “agonizing reappraisal” of U.S. strategy. An army 
is as strong as the mobile reserves which represent its striking force, 
and losses during the May offensive cut deeply into their mobile 
reserves. There were no longer mobile reserves for “search and destroy” 
operations. Even after the Têt offensive, there were no longer garrison 
troops to put “pacification” teams back into the countryside and protect 
them. There was desperate urgency to protect the rear bases and the 
towns. Such a “luxury” as the Khe Sanh forward base could no longer be 
afforded, especially as it, the posts protecting the supply route, and 
the supply route itself and main supply base were subject to continuous 
harassing attacks with a major offensive in sight against Khe Sanh 
itself.[10] <#_edn10>

What an AP dispatch of July 16 described as a “medieval strategy of 
pulling back to defend the approaches to the cities” was adopted, in 
spite of “the Allies’ enormous firepower, the mobility of their 
helicopters, their numerical superiority and electronic computers.” In 
effect, this was a strategy of retreat, of passive defense. The endless 
series of nervous warnings, from President Johnson on down, of some 
“imminent” new “Vietcong” offensive, best symbolizes the degeneration of 
the American military position.

This was also symbolized on the ground at Khe Sanh. Marine troops, whose 
specialty is swift beach landings to secure bridgeheads for army troops, 
were trapped in positional warfare in the jungle covered mountains in 
and around that forward base. The much-vaunted sky warriors of the 1st 
Air Cavalry Division were burrowing underground like rats, hardly ever 
daring to surface, let alone take to the skies. It was obviously easier 
for the NLF to deal with the Marines at Khe Sanh rather than at their 
base at Da Nang and to deal with the Aircav troops there also rather 
than at the latter’s well-protected lair at An Khe. It was also possible 
to develop people’s war against all the 40,000 troops engaged in the Khe 
Sanh operation. While regular forces maintained their ceaseless pounding 
of Khe Sanh and its satellite posts, the guerrillas and regional troops 
carried out night attacks against posts guarding the supply route, day 
and nighttime ambushes against the supply convoys and night raids into 
the Cua Viet supply base.

The written pledges to defend Khe Sank given President Johnson by his 
top generals should be posted on the wall. They symbolize the writing on 
the wall for U.S. military power in South Vietnam, the shape of things 
to come. For if the Americans can be forced out of such a highly 
fortified position, despite all the troops at their disposal, they can 
be forced out of all other bases in due time. The withdrawal from Khe 
Sanh meant that other advance posts became immediately untenable. Thus 
without any publicity, Kham Duc, another key post to the south of Khe 
Sanh near the Laotian border, and other satellite posts in the area were 
evacuated, as well as most of those along Highway No. 9 between Khe Sanh 
and Cua Viet.

If readers are astounded that such things are possible given the vast 
military machine the Americans have assembled in South Vietnam, then one 
must recall that it was the loss of 16,000 troops at Dien Bien Phu, 
numerically a tiny proportion of the several hundred thousand strong 
Expeditionary Corps, that forced the French government to see that the 
game was up. Dien Bien Phu was, for the French, the sign that their 
elite troops with maximum support could be defeated; their next best 
units were bottled up in the Red River delta and all would have been 
lost when the Vietminh concentrated their attention there. A game of 
chess is usually lost although the loser still has plenty of pawns on 
the board. Similarly military defeat is possible although plenty of 
troops still remain in the field. And defeat, military defeat in the 
most classical sense of the term, stares the Americans in the face today 
in South Vietnam.

Seven years ago, American advisers were helping the Ngo Dinh Diem 
dictatorship to try to lock up all South Vietnamese peasants in some 
16,000 “strategic hamlets” behind barbed-wire fortifications, and to 
seal off the frontiers with North Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia by “white 
zones” cleared of all their vegetation by defoliant chemicals. Today it 
is the Americans themselves who are sealing themselves off behind 
barbed-wire fortifications in the cities, their commanders uttering 
warnings that the next “Vietcong” offensive win come this week, next 
week, next month… From the outside, they are surrounded by the peasants 
who should have been locked up in those 16,000 “strategic hamlets.” From 
the inside, behind their backs, they are threatened by the urban 
workers, intellectuals and even part of the bourgeoisie outraged by the 
American occupation. What a humiliation this is for the mightiest of the 
Western imperialists!

American public opinion has been drugged with “we are winning” fantasies 
inspired by false propaganda such as the myth of “body count” of 
“Vietcong” losses. This myth was set in true perspective in the July 
1968 issue of /Army/ magazine by an intelligence officer on General 
Westmoreland’s staff, Lt. Col. R. McMahon, who wrote:

“Some U.S. combat units really count bodies. Others probably never do 
but under pressure from higher up, report whatever ‘body count’ would be 
expected… Apart from the impression we are creating worldwide, that we 
are ghouls obsessed with the gruesome stacking and counting of cadavers, 
there is a very real danger of falling victim to our own inflated 
statistics.”

*Notes.*

[1] <#_ednref1> /International Herald Tribune/ (Paris), Jan. 13, 1968.

[2] <#_ednref2> Translated from /Guerre du Peuple, Armée du Peuple/, 
Foreign Languages Publishing House, Hanoi, 1961, page 175.

[3] <#_ednref3> /International Herald Tribune/ (Paris), January 10, 1968

[4] <#_ednref4> Same dispatch from Saigon of Jan. 12, 1968, cited 
previously.

[5] <#_ednref5> See Chapter one.

[6] <#_ednref6> /International Herald Tribune/ (Paris), Jan. 13-14, 1968.

[7] <#_ednref7> It was General Creighton Abrams’ promise to President 
Johnson that he could build up a strong, effective South Vietnamese 
Army, which could gradually take over the major share of combat 
operations from U.S. troops, that clinched his appointment as 
Westmoreland’s successor. But even by the time he had taken over, 
resentment against Americans’ contempt for the ARVN (Army of the 
Republic of Vietnam) was so great, the rise of nationalist feeling so 
marked, and internal rivalries within the ARVN hierarchy so deep-rooted, 
that Abrams’ promises looked like a bad joke.

[8] <#_ednref8> /International Herald Tribune/ (Paris), Nov. 21, 1966.

[9] <#_ednref9> Translated from /Guerre du Peuple, Armée du Peuple/, 
page 176.

[10] <#_ednref10> In fact, Khe Sanh could have been taken whenever the 
NLF high command wanted. They preferred to keep it as a “running sore,” 
sapping U.S. strength.

*NEXT: Chapter 8 – The Work of Persuasion*

-- 
Freedom Archives 522 Valencia Street San Francisco, CA 94110 415 
863.9977 https://freedomarchives.org/
-------------- next part --------------
An HTML attachment was scrubbed...
URL: <http://freedomarchives.org/pipermail/news_freedomarchives.org/attachments/20180221/e7fd5892/attachment.htm>