[News] Standoff in Venezuela
Anti-Imperialist News
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Tue May 23 18:23:59 EDT 2017
https://venezuelanalysis.com/analysis/13143
Standoff in Venezuela
By Steve Ellner & Federico Fuentes – May 22nd 2017
------------------------------------------------------------------------
*When it comes to the current turmoil in Venezuela, the media have been
unanimous in their version of events: the Maduro regime is on its last
legs due to the overwhelming opposition it faces from the people,
including among the poorest sectors that previously supported the
government, and therefore its only recourse for survival is violent
repression. How accurate is this media narrative?*
It’s hardly a far-gone conclusion.
There is no better indication of the deceptiveness of the mainstream
media’s narrative than the spatial nature of the anti-government
protests in early 2014 known as the “guarimba” and again this year.
The protests are centred in the middle and upper class areas whose
mayors belong to the opposition. The strategy behind the protests is for
the mass civil disobedience, confrontation with security forces and
widespread destruction of public property to spread to the poorer areas.
Certainly, the popular sectors have a long tradition of street protests,
particularly over deficient public services. But the popular sectors
have remained largely passive, although with more exceptions now than in
2014. Obviously the opposition is banking on greater active popular
support than in 2015.
Along similar lines, the Chavista United Socialist Party of Venezuela
(PSUV) has been more damaged by electoral abstention among disenchanted
Chavistas than those who end up voting for the opposition. Such
electoral behaviour is what explains the Chavista defeat in the December
2014 elections for the National Assembly.
But the Chavista leaders still have an impressive degree of mobilisation
capacity, as was demonstrated in two recent marches, one on Venezuelan
Independence Day on April 19, and the other on May 1.
The nation’s precarious economic situation as well as the complete
political turnaround in the hemisphere strengthens the opposition’s
hand. Whereas in past political crises, such as the coup attempt in 2002
and the general strike of 2002-2003, the Chavez government was able to
count on backing from other Latin American nations including in some
cases non-leftist ones.
Now Venezuela’s neighbouring governments, in spite of their considerable
unpopularity and internal discontent, have explicitly taken up the cause
of the Venezuelan opposition.
But at this point I would describe the political situation in Venezuela
as a standoff, a far cry from saying that the government is on its last
legs. Of course, given the political volatility over the recent past,
predictions have to be at best tentative.
In an ultimate sense, the popular sectors have the last word. If they
were to join the protests, then the statement that the Maduro government
is, as you say, on its last legs, would be accurate. The situation would
then be similar to that of the Soviet Union in 1991 when the miners
began to march against the government, thus signalling the collapse of
the regime.
*Even some former supporters of the government today speak of an
authoritarian turn on the part of Maduro. Is there any truth to this
accusation?*
To answer your question it has to be pointed out that Venezuela is not
in a normal situation, with what political scientists call a “loyal
opposition” that recognises the government’s legitimacy and plays by the
rules of the game. Thus to talk about government actions without placing
them in context – as the corporate media is prone to do – is misleading.
The opposition leaders of today are, for the most part, the same ones
involved in the coup and general strike of 2002-2003, the same ones who
refused to recognise the legitimacy of the electoral processes in 2004
and 2005 and consistently questioned the legitimacy of the National
Electoral Council except in those cases in which the government was
defeated.
They are also the same ones who refused to recognise Maduro’s triumph in
the presidential election of 2013, resulting in about a dozen deaths,
and then promoted the four months of protests in 2014 involving civil
disobedience on a massive scale along with considerable violence,
resulting in 43 deaths including six members of the national guard.
The current period commences with the opposition’s triumph in the
National Assembly elections of 2015 when the president of that body,
Henry Ramos Allup, immediately announced that regime change would be
achieved within six months; subsequently the National Assembly turned
down the executive’s budgetary allocations. All along the opposition has
rejected the government’s call for a national dialogue, demanding
concessions as a precondition for negotiations. The protests that have
occurred in the last month are a repeat of the guarimba of 2014.
Opposition leaders completely evade the issue of violence, other than
declaring that they are opposed to it in an abstract sense.
Practically every day they call marches in the affluent eastern part of
Caracas that attempt to reach the downtown area where the presidential
palace is located. Government spokespeople have stated numerous times
that downtown Caracas is off limits for the opposition marches; security
forces commonly employ tear gas to prevent passage.
The reason for the government’s refusal is obvious. With a massive
number of opposition people in the downtown area for an indefinite
period of time, massive civil disobedience, the surrounding of the
presidential palace and violence would all ensue, along with
uncontrollable chaos.
The confrontations would be aggravated by the coverage of the
international media, which has always spun their reports to favour the
opposition. The fact that every day for the last several weeks the main
leaders of the opposition have called for marches to reach downtown
Caracas, even though they know full well that confrontations will occur,
would suggest that their strategy for gaining power envisions street
disruptions and combat.
The spatial nature of the protests is key. You may say that the
government is justified in avoiding the protests from reaching the
centre of Caracas. But the question may be asked, would the Chavistas
tolerate peaceful marches originating from the affluent eastern half of
the city marching though Chavista strongholds in the popular sectors?
The question is clouded by the fact that the opposition marches almost
invariably involve civil disobedience and violence.
*Would you say that both the Chavistas and the opposition are assuming
intransigent positions?*
Both sides are playing hard ball, but a description of the political
setting is indispensible in order to appreciate what is at stake. The
fact is that the democratic nature of some of the government’s decisions
is questionable, two in particular.
A month ago, ex-presidential candidate (on two occasions), and governor
of the state of Miranda, Henrique Capriles was stripped of his right to
participate in elections due to charges of corruption.
In the second place, the gubernatorial and municipal elections [sic]*
which were slated for December 2016 have been delayed on grounds that
other proposed electoral processes have pushed them into the future.
Although Maduro has indicated that his party is ready to participate in
those elections, a date has still not been set. If elections were held
today, the Chavistas would very possibly suffer losses.
The hardliners in the Chavista movement headed by National Assembly
deputy Diosdado Cabello are obviously calling the shots and they support
an aggressive line toward the opposition. The most visible voice for the
“soft-line” is former vice-president Jose Vicente Rangel, who favours
gestures that would encourage negotiations and buttress those in the
opposition who reject street confrontation.
Likewise, the radicals in the opposition are firmly in control. They
have made clear that once in power, they would jail the Chavista leaders
on grounds of corruption and violation of human rights. Their call for
“No to Impunity” is a coded slogan. It means in effect a witch hunt
against the Chavista movement and repression that would pave the way for
the imposition of unpopular neoliberal policies.
Indeed, neoliberalism characterised Capriles’ platform in the two
presidential elections of 2012 and 2013. There is a definite
relationship between the radical tactics and intolerance displayed by
the opposition, on the one hand, and the neoliberal program which would
be imposed should the opposition return to power, on the other hand.
To sum up, the narrative that calls the Maduro government
“authoritarian” is a blatant misrepresentation of what is happening. On
the other hand, the Chavista leaders have on occasion distanced
themselves from democratic principles. Their actions, however, need to
be contextualised.
*What has been the impact of interference by the US government and the
Organization of American States, along with the changing attitude of
certain governments in the region?*
The foreign actors you refer to have failed to place themselves above
Venezuela’s internal politics in order to promote a peaceful resolution
to a conflict that could well degenerate into civil war. The statements
issued by the White House as well as Luis Almagro, the OAS’ secretary
general, coincide in their entirety with the opposition’s narrative and
demands.
Rather than taking sides in Venezuela’s internal conflict, the OAS
should have called for a national dialogue and named a nonpartisan
committee to investigate disputed events. The decision of the Maduro
government to withdraw from the OAS was a reaction to the organisation’s
partisanship, which has served only to exacerbate the political
polarization.
The OAS and other international actors reinforce the Venezuelan
opposition’s narrative that conflates pressing economic problems and the
alleged authoritarianism of the Maduro government. This line
inadvertently strengthens the hand of the hardliners within the opposition.
The only way to justify regime change by non-electoral means and the
intervention of foreign actors, such as the OAS, is to attempt to
demonstrate that the nation is headed toward a dictatorship and
systematically violates human rights.
But the moderates within the opposition – although at this point they
have no visible national leader – favour emphasising economic issues in
order to reach out to the popular sectors of the population, attract
some of the disenchanted Chavistas, and at the same time accept dialogue
with government representatives. The moderates therefore place an accent
mark on economic issues more than political ones.
In this sense, the intromission of foreign actors who question the
Venezuelan government’s democratic credentials only serves to bolster
the position of the radicals in the opposition and to further polarise
the nation.
*In terms of the current economic problems: how serious are the shortages?*
The problem of shortages of basic products is undeniable, even while
media outlets like the /Wall Street Journal/ claim that the nation is on
the verge of mass starvation. Hunger is a scourge that afflicts the
lower strata in other, if not all, Latin American nations. But the key
index from social and political viewpoints is the contrast with
standards in Venezuela in previous years. The deterioration has
certainly been sharp with regard to the period prior to the sharp
decline in oil prices in mid-2015.
*What do you foresee happening in the immediate future? Is the Maduro
government doomed? What do you think of the proposed Constituent Assembly?*
Maduro’s proposal for a constituent assembly is a mixed bag with regard
to the possibility of achieving greater stability.
On the one hand it is an initiative – something new – that is designed
to break the deadlock the nation finds itself stuck in. A favourable
scenario would be that the Chavistas are able to activate their base as
well as that of social movements and achieve an important degree of
electoral participation.
Furthermore, in the best-case scenario, constituent assembly delegates
would formulate viable proposals to deal with pressing issues, such as
corruption, and the Chavistas in power would demonstrate genuine
receptivity to them. In short, a constituent assembly based on bottom-up
participation could be a game changer.
In the case of the alternative scenario, the constituent assembly
proposal will be viewed as a ploy to buy time and sidetrack the
electoral process.
/* Venezuelanaysis Editor's note: here Professor Ellner appears to make
an error in suggesting that municipal elections were postponed last
year, when in fact these elections are scheduled for 2017. /
--
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