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<h1 id="reader-title">Standoff in Venezuela<br>
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<div id="reader-credits" class="credits">By Steve Ellner &
Federico Fuentes – May 22nd 2017</div>
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<p><strong>When it comes to the current turmoil in
Venezuela, the media have been unanimous in their
version of events: the Maduro regime is on its last
legs due to the overwhelming opposition it faces from
the people, including among the poorest sectors that
previously supported the government, and therefore its
only recourse for survival is violent repression. How
accurate is this media narrative?</strong> </p>
<p>It’s hardly a far-gone conclusion. </p>
<p>There is no better indication of the deceptiveness of
the mainstream media’s narrative than the spatial nature
of the anti-government protests in early 2014 known as
the “guarimba” and again this year. </p>
<p>The protests are centred in the middle and upper class
areas whose mayors belong to the opposition. The
strategy behind the protests is for the mass civil
disobedience, confrontation with security forces and
widespread destruction of public property to spread to
the poorer areas.</p>
<p>Certainly, the popular sectors have a long tradition of
street protests, particularly over deficient public
services. But the popular sectors have remained largely
passive, although with more exceptions now than in 2014.
Obviously the opposition is banking on greater active
popular support than in 2015. </p>
<p>Along similar lines, the Chavista United Socialist
Party of Venezuela (PSUV) has been more damaged by
electoral abstention among disenchanted Chavistas than
those who end up voting for the opposition. Such
electoral behaviour is what explains the Chavista defeat
in the December 2014 elections for the National
Assembly. </p>
<p>But the Chavista leaders still have an impressive
degree of mobilisation capacity, as was demonstrated in
two recent marches, one on Venezuelan Independence Day
on April 19, and the other on May 1. </p>
<p>The nation’s precarious economic situation as well as
the complete political turnaround in the hemisphere
strengthens the opposition’s hand. Whereas in past
political crises, such as the coup attempt in 2002 and
the general strike of 2002-2003, the Chavez government
was able to count on backing from other Latin American
nations including in some cases non-leftist ones.</p>
<p>Now Venezuela’s neighbouring governments, in spite of
their considerable unpopularity and internal discontent,
have explicitly taken up the cause of the Venezuelan
opposition.</p>
<p>But at this point I would describe the political
situation in Venezuela as a standoff, a far cry from
saying that the government is on its last legs. Of
course, given the political volatility over the recent
past, predictions have to be at best tentative. </p>
<p>In an ultimate sense, the popular sectors have the last
word. If they were to join the protests, then the
statement that the Maduro government is, as you say, on
its last legs, would be accurate. The situation would
then be similar to that of the Soviet Union in 1991 when
the miners began to march against the government, thus
signalling the collapse of the regime.</p>
<p><strong>Even some former supporters of the government
today speak of an authoritarian turn on the part of
Maduro. Is there any truth to this accusation?</strong></p>
<p>To answer your question it has to be pointed out that
Venezuela is not in a normal situation, with what
political scientists call a “loyal opposition” that
recognises the government’s legitimacy and plays by the
rules of the game. Thus to talk about government actions
without placing them in context – as the corporate media
is prone to do – is misleading. </p>
<p>The opposition leaders of today are, for the most part,
the same ones involved in the coup and general strike of
2002-2003, the same ones who refused to recognise the
legitimacy of the electoral processes in 2004 and 2005
and consistently questioned the legitimacy of the
National Electoral Council except in those cases in
which the government was defeated.</p>
<p>They are also the same ones who refused to recognise
Maduro’s triumph in the presidential election of 2013,
resulting in about a dozen deaths, and then promoted the
four months of protests in 2014 involving civil
disobedience on a massive scale along with considerable
violence, resulting in 43 deaths including six members
of the national guard.</p>
<p>The current period commences with the opposition’s
triumph in the National Assembly elections of 2015 when
the president of that body, Henry Ramos Allup,
immediately announced that regime change would be
achieved within six months; subsequently the National
Assembly turned down the executive’s budgetary
allocations. All along the opposition has rejected the
government’s call for a national dialogue, demanding
concessions as a precondition for negotiations. The
protests that have occurred in the last month are a
repeat of the guarimba of 2014. Opposition leaders
completely evade the issue of violence, other than
declaring that they are opposed to it in an abstract
sense. </p>
<p>Practically every day they call marches in the affluent
eastern part of Caracas that attempt to reach the
downtown area where the presidential palace is located.
Government spokespeople have stated numerous times that
downtown Caracas is off limits for the opposition
marches; security forces commonly employ tear gas to
prevent passage.</p>
<p>The reason for the government’s refusal is obvious.
With a massive number of opposition people in the
downtown area for an indefinite period of time, massive
civil disobedience, the surrounding of the presidential
palace and violence would all ensue, along with
uncontrollable chaos. </p>
<p>The confrontations would be aggravated by the coverage
of the international media, which has always spun their
reports to favour the opposition. The fact that every
day for the last several weeks the main leaders of the
opposition have called for marches to reach downtown
Caracas, even though they know full well that
confrontations will occur, would suggest that their
strategy for gaining power envisions street disruptions
and combat.</p>
<p>The spatial nature of the protests is key. You may say
that the government is justified in avoiding the
protests from reaching the centre of Caracas. But the
question may be asked, would the Chavistas tolerate
peaceful marches originating from the affluent eastern
half of the city marching though Chavista strongholds in
the popular sectors? </p>
<p>The question is clouded by the fact that the opposition
marches almost invariably involve civil disobedience and
violence. </p>
<p><strong>Would you say that both the Chavistas and the
opposition are assuming intransigent positions?</strong></p>
<p>Both sides are playing hard ball, but a description of
the political setting is indispensible in order to
appreciate what is at stake. The fact is that the
democratic nature of some of the government’s decisions
is questionable, two in particular. </p>
<p>A month ago, ex-presidential candidate (on two
occasions), and governor of the state of Miranda,
Henrique Capriles was stripped of his right to
participate in elections due to charges of corruption.</p>
<p>In the second place, the gubernatorial and municipal
elections [sic]* which were slated for December 2016
have been delayed on grounds that other proposed
electoral processes have pushed them into the future.
Although Maduro has indicated that his party is ready to
participate in those elections, a date has still not
been set. If elections were held today, the Chavistas
would very possibly suffer losses. </p>
<p>The hardliners in the Chavista movement headed by
National Assembly deputy Diosdado Cabello are obviously
calling the shots and they support an aggressive line
toward the opposition. The most visible voice for the
“soft-line” is former vice-president Jose Vicente
Rangel, who favours gestures that would encourage
negotiations and buttress those in the opposition who
reject street confrontation. </p>
<p>Likewise, the radicals in the opposition are firmly in
control. They have made clear that once in power, they
would jail the Chavista leaders on grounds of corruption
and violation of human rights. Their call for “No to
Impunity” is a coded slogan. It means in effect a witch
hunt against the Chavista movement and repression that
would pave the way for the imposition of unpopular
neoliberal policies.</p>
<p>Indeed, neoliberalism characterised Capriles’ platform
in the two presidential elections of 2012 and 2013.
There is a definite relationship between the radical
tactics and intolerance displayed by the opposition, on
the one hand, and the neoliberal program which would be
imposed should the opposition return to power, on the
other hand.</p>
<p>To sum up, the narrative that calls the Maduro
government “authoritarian” is a blatant
misrepresentation of what is happening. On the other
hand, the Chavista leaders have on occasion distanced
themselves from democratic principles. Their actions,
however, need to be contextualised. </p>
<p><strong>What has been the impact of interference by the
US government and the Organization of American States,
along with the changing attitude of certain
governments in the region?</strong> </p>
<p>The foreign actors you refer to have failed to place
themselves above Venezuela’s internal politics in order
to promote a peaceful resolution to a conflict that
could well degenerate into civil war. The statements
issued by the White House as well as Luis Almagro, the
OAS’ secretary general, coincide in their entirety with
the opposition’s narrative and demands.</p>
<p>Rather than taking sides in Venezuela’s internal
conflict, the OAS should have called for a national
dialogue and named a nonpartisan committee to
investigate disputed events. The decision of the Maduro
government to withdraw from the OAS was a reaction to
the organisation’s partisanship, which has served only
to exacerbate the political polarization.</p>
<p>The OAS and other international actors reinforce the
Venezuelan opposition’s narrative that conflates
pressing economic problems and the alleged
authoritarianism of the Maduro government. This line
inadvertently strengthens the hand of the hardliners
within the opposition. </p>
<p>The only way to justify regime change by non-electoral
means and the intervention of foreign actors, such as
the OAS, is to attempt to demonstrate that the nation is
headed toward a dictatorship and systematically violates
human rights. </p>
<p>But the moderates within the opposition – although at
this point they have no visible national leader – favour
emphasising economic issues in order to reach out to the
popular sectors of the population, attract some of the
disenchanted Chavistas, and at the same time accept
dialogue with government representatives. The moderates
therefore place an accent mark on economic issues more
than political ones. </p>
<p>In this sense, the intromission of foreign actors who
question the Venezuelan government’s democratic
credentials only serves to bolster the position of the
radicals in the opposition and to further polarise the
nation.</p>
<p><strong>In terms of the current economic problems: how
serious are the shortages?</strong></p>
<p>The problem of shortages of basic products is
undeniable, even while media outlets like the <em>Wall
Street Journal</em> claim that the nation is on the
verge of mass starvation. Hunger is a scourge that
afflicts the lower strata in other, if not all, Latin
American nations. But the key index from social and
political viewpoints is the contrast with standards in
Venezuela in previous years. The deterioration has
certainly been sharp with regard to the period prior to
the sharp decline in oil prices in mid-2015.</p>
<p><strong>What do you foresee happening in the immediate
future? Is the Maduro government doomed? What do you
think of the proposed Constituent Assembly?</strong></p>
<p>Maduro’s proposal for a constituent assembly is a mixed
bag with regard to the possibility of achieving greater
stability. </p>
<p>On the one hand it is an initiative – something new –
that is designed to break the deadlock the nation finds
itself stuck in. A favourable scenario would be that the
Chavistas are able to activate their base as well as
that of social movements and achieve an important degree
of electoral participation.</p>
<p>Furthermore, in the best-case scenario, constituent
assembly delegates would formulate viable proposals to
deal with pressing issues, such as corruption, and the
Chavistas in power would demonstrate genuine receptivity
to them. In short, a constituent assembly based on
bottom-up participation could be a game changer.</p>
<p>In the case of the alternative scenario, the
constituent assembly proposal will be viewed as a ploy
to buy time and sidetrack the electoral process.</p>
<p><em>* Venezuelanaysis Editor's note: here Professor
Ellner appears to make an error in suggesting that
municipal elections were postponed last year, when in
fact these elections are scheduled for 2017. </em></p>
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