[News] Palestinian Youth Revolt: Any Role for Political Parties?
news at freedomarchives.org
Fri Nov 27 12:59:23 EST 2015
Palestinian Youth Revolt: Any Role for Political Parties?
by Jamal Juma' <https://al-shabaka.org/en/author/JamalJuma/>, Jamil
Hilal <https://al-shabaka.org/en/author/JamilH/>, Nijmeh Ali
<https://al-shabaka.org/en/author/nijmehali/>, Khalil Shaheen
<https://al-shabaka.org/en/author/khalil-shaheen/>, Jaber Suleiman
<https://al-shabaka.org/en/author/JaberS/>, Mjriam Abu Samra
<https://al-shabaka.org/en/author/mjriamabusamra/>, Belal Shobaki
<https://al-shabaka.org/en/author/belalshobaki/>, Alaa Tartir
<https://al-shabaka.org/en/author/alaat/> on November 23, 2015
The absence of authentic Palestinian national leadership is particularly
acute at this time of crisis. The current youth uprising against
Israel’s prolonged military occupation and denial of human rights in the
occupied Palestinian territory (OPT) and within Israel is generally
acknowledged to be largely leaderless. What role is there for political
parties to contribute to the youth uprising given that they remain
entrenched in the Palestinian body politic despite their splits and
weaknesses? Assuming that Fatah-Hamas reconciliation remains stalled,
what can other political parties and forces do to provide a framework
for national leadership, whether within or outside the Palestine
Liberation Organization (PLO)? What other avenues could provide a space
for national – or local - leadership to emerge at such times of crisis,
There are some common strands in the Al-Shabaka policy analysts’
diagnosis of the situation, but their ideas for future action divide
into two broad clusters: Those who suggest alternatives beyond the
current political set-up and those who look for ways to make the current
structure work. Jamal Juma’
<https://al-shabaka.org/en/author/JamalJuma/> calls for serious
investment in rebuilding the political space in order to support the
uprising, including strengthened homeland-Diaspora ties. Jamil Hilal
<https://al-shabaka.org/en/author/JamilH/> argues that one way forward
is by building on and linking local, democratically constituted
committees as the basis for a revived national movement. Nijmeh Ali
<https://al-shabaka.org/en/author/nijmehali/> does not see a new
alternative framework but rather calls for a change of behaviors within
the existing system. Khalil Shaheen
<https://al-shabaka.org/en/author/khalil-shaheen/> also believes there
is still room in this transitional phase for the traditional party
system - as compromised as it is.
Jaber Suleiman <https://al-shabaka.org/en/author/JaberS/> points out
that the youth wave of anger is as much against the PA, but that there
is no option but to find ways to collaborate in order to sustain the
momentum. Mjiriam Abu Samra
<https://al-shabaka.org/en/author/mjriamabusamra/> concludes that it is
the youth themselves who will ultimately radically reform Palestinian
politics. Belal Shobaki <https://al-shabaka.org/en/author/belalshobaki/>
notes that the fact that the Popular Front for the Liberation of
Palestine and Islamic Jihad can still bring out the numbers could serve
as a way to harness traditional parties to the new wave. Alaa Tartir
<https://al-shabaka.org/en/author/alaat/> argues that confrontation at
all levels and different spheres needs to become a way of life until
freedom is realized.
Jamal Juma’: Vision, Clear Objectives, Multi-Level Relationships
For nearly two months, Palestinians have waited for the political
parties to shoulder their role in leading and guiding the uprising.
Clearly, they are neither able nor willing to do so. There are several
reasons for their inaction. For one thing, party leaders are reluctant
to pay the price of leading and framing popular resistance, whether this
price is extracted by the Israeli occupation authorities in the form of
arrests, prosecution and targeting of organizations - especially as the
parties operate openly and their organizational structures are weak. Nor
do they want to lose the privileges they enjoy as members of the PLO,
both in terms of financial benefits and political status.
Moreover, the various parties cannot act without the consent of the
Palestinian Authority (PA) security apparatus and that of its leading
faction, Fatah: They are currently too weak to change the status quo.
President Mahmoud Abbas, who holds all the power, believes that the
uprising accomplished its mission by refocusing attention on the
Palestinian cause and stimulating the international community and is
betting on new initiatives to resume the negotiations with Israel.
Indeed, Abbas has announced in unequivocal terms that he does not want
Given the weakness of their current composition and organizational
structures, these parties cannot provide a political, organizational and
economic framework capable of leading a long-term uprising that would
drain the Israeli occupation’s resources and energies. A successful
uprising would require a comprehensive vision to achieve clear and
attainable objectives by mobilizing local, regional and international
opportunities and relationships.
As for the Islamic forces, Hamas and Islamic Jihad, they have also taken
the same position of inaction. They too do not want to pay the price and
give Israel an opportunity to launch an offensive against the Gaza
Strip. They also fear that the uprising could be exploited to improve
the terms of negotiations for the Palestine Liberation Organization
(PLO) and PA.
There are several factors in favor of creating a space for a new
national or local leadership. Even if it subsides, the current uprising
has raised the question the current leadership's eligibility and has
legitimized the search for alternatives. It has also united the
Palestinian people inside the Green Line, the West Bank, Jerusalem and
Gaza. Ironically, the political forces are the ones who remain divided.
The Palestinians in the Diaspora have also acted albeit in a limited
way, and have helped to organize demonstrations. The actions on the
ground are seeding an emerging leadership that can be nurtured, although
it is scattered and localized.
On the negative side, however, it is clear that the PA will not allow a
new leadership to emerge, and will spare no effort to thwart it, even if
this requires coordination with the Israeli occupation – with which it
is coordinating anyway. In addition, the existing grassroots movements
are weak, while intellectuals play a weak role in Palestinian political
life and are unable to support popular forces. As for the Palestinian
diaspora, it has little influence on decision-making.
The challenge is to build on the positive factors and minimize the
negative ones: Note that any serious movement to create an alternative
leadership would have to work below the radar to some extent.
To begin with, it is important to provide a space safe from political
domination, a space in which it would be possible to support those
popular forces that have a political vision and capacity to mobilize,
such as trade unions, farmers’ organizations, women’s federations, and
of course youth groups, so that they can work alongside the uprising.
It is also important to tap the potential of the Palestinian Diaspora,
especially among the youth, and to organize working groups that could
communicate and coordinate with enlightened national figures who believe
in the important role the Diaspora has to play in both Palestinian
decision-making and in supporting the resistance of the Palestinian people.
Indeed, it is vital to invest in meaningful coordination between the
homeland and the Diaspora. We must rebuild the trust between us and
revive our self-confidence and confidence in our ability to affect
change. In the final analysis, we must have absolute faith in our people
and in their ability to sacrifice and advance and we must believe,
beyond any doubt, that we will prevail.
Jamil Hilal: Democratic Communities, Networked New Leadership
Democratic and progressive political parties have historically provided
leadership in the struggle for freedom from oppression, especially from
settler-colonial pillage and terror. Unfortunately this has not happened
here since the first Intifada in the late1980s. Not only have political
parties and movements failed to embrace their responsibility, they have
also acted in ways that have fragmented the Palestinian national
liberation movement. Instead, the parties should have critically
reviewed past progress and failings so as to rebuild a movement more
attuned to new national, regional and international conditions. In
short, political parties are in no position to provide a unified
leadership and a coherent strategy to the present youth struggle against
the colonial oppressors and to the youth’s bleak future.
As for reconciliation between Fatah and Hamas, all indications are that
it is not forthcoming soon. The other political parties have played the
role of a mediator instead of forming an alternative leadership with a
program to address the intensified fragmentation, colonization and
subjugation imposed on Palestinians. No historic bloc has been formed to
pressure the two main opposed movements (Fatah and Hamas) to come to
their senses, or, failing which, to take the responsibility of providing
a new vision and leadership. The majority of the Palestinian people are
disillusioned and frustrated by the continued bickering and performance
of Fatah and Hamas while more land is colonized and homes destroyed,
Palestinians arbitrarily arrested, Jerusalem Israel-ized, Gazans
subjected to a slow genocide, the 1948 Palestinians suffering
discrimination and segregation, and refugees condemned to exile. Now
unarmed youth are being assassinated in cold blood by the Israeli army
and settlers while security co-ordination is shamelessly maintained.
The answer may be for each Palestinian community to establish its
alternative democratic leadership and to think collectively regarding
how to construct a new national movement while preserving the assets
that the Palestinian struggle built in previous decades. This will not
be easy, but the 1948 Palestinians seem to be on the right track and
their example should be studied and where possible followed.
Of course, this is not easily implemented. Yet there seems to be a need,
given the extremely vulnerable situation of most Palestinian
communities, to establish local committees in villages, refugee camps,
and town neighborhoods so that they can articulate their needs according
to the specifics of their situation, and then to form larger
associations. For example, in the West Bank, the question for a large
number of communities is how to defend themselves, their land and
property against the murderous attacks of the settlers; in the Gaza
Strip, how to contend with the pressing problems caused by Israel’s
siege and repeated deadly wars; and in Lebanon, how to empower popular
committees in the refugee camps so that they form a “unified framework”
to deal with the broader problems across camps. The role of such local
committees could expand as the situation demands, whether from
municipalities, village councils, local branches of political parties,
and local civil societies and institutions. The examples of the ongoing
struggles of Higher Follow Up Committee among the 1948 Palestinians and
the struggles of the Boycott, Divestment, and Sanctions (BDS) movement
are beacons for the rest of us.
But in the real world, people sit down and find concrete solutions to
the problems they face in a specific situation. Luckily, they do not
wait, for people like me to tell them what to do.
Nijmeh Ali: Change Must Come From Within the Parties
The Palestinian youth that have taken to the streets are initiating an
important phase in responding to the Israeli occupation and to
injustice, indicating the significant role the younger generations could
play replacing the current leadership.
However, the question remains: is the new generation capable of bringing
the uprising or wave of anger from the street into political or
diplomatic spheres? The problem lies in the failure to revolt against
the traditional Palestinian leaderships of Fatah, Hamas and the left:
This is what is needed in order to transform the spirit of revolution
into diplomatic and political results.
The Palestinian political parties are currently acting like parties
everywhere: They are weighing the political gains they can reap from
this wave of anger, such as resuming negotiations with Israel. They are
not acting like revolutionary parties fighting a battle for liberation,
and are out of line with the public mood. Thus, the parties are likely
to erect obstacles rather than to support the youth uprising or any
other action outside established institutional frameworks such as the
factions armed wings. Uncontrolled actions do not benefit political
parties because they cannot steer them.
The issue is not about creating a new space within or outside the PLO.
It is also about changing the political behavior of Palestinians as a
people affiliated with existing political bodies. It is imperative to
transcend the narrow partisan affiliations have entrenched the internal
Palestinian division and weakened the PLO. The popular wave of anger is
an open rebellion against such narrow affiliations and an expression of
the need to reinforce national as opposed to partisan attachments.
However, given this reality and the deepening partisan division, it
would have been more promising had the youth rebelled against the
current political leaderships and replaced them with younger leaders
with political energy, confidence and vigor.
Local leaders have never been isolated from their central leaderships:
Fatah and Hamas, for example, are mass political movements rather than
political parties in the traditional sense. Therefore, one does not
envisage a scenario in which an independent popular movement could
emerge, even though popular committees could be established as was the
case in the first Intifada. It is worth noting that the unified national
leadership of that Intifada was formed by political actors who espoused
common political goals and a vision centered on ending the occupation as
a fundamental step towards liberation.
In short, we need a Palestinian spring within the Palestinian parties
rather than alternative political frameworks that would reinforce the
division and the narrow partisanship. Without rebellion from the youth
within the Palestinian political parties, no uprising will effect real
political change. The sacrifices of the Palestinian people will go to
waste, increasing the frustration with their sense of helplessness. It
would be truly alarming if this frustration slowly kills the
Palestinians' faith in their power to become liberated.
Khalil Shaheen: Activism that Sidesteps Traditional Politics
The Palestinian political system is nearing its demise after forsaking
its identity as a national liberation movement by recognizing the
legitimacy of a racist settler colonial system in the Oslo Accords. The
current wave of anger is a rebellion against this relationship and the
ideology on which it was based. The wave is also an extension of forms
of expression and political action that have evolved outside the
traditional political and organizational system established in the
1960s, which itself has experienced a slow and terminal decline.
However, one must acknowledge the "coexistence" between the traditional
politics of the PLO, the PA and the Palestinian factions on the one hand
and the new forms of political action on the other due to the
transitional nature of the present stage. In particular, the traditional
national movement continues to have a political role despite its
inability to realize its historical goal of achieving the national
rights of the Palestinian people.
This realization should stimulate Palestinians to think strategically
about the repercussions of a failing ideology and set of practices and
what is needed to restore the Palestinian national project and a
national body capable of achieving its objectives.
In the past few years, some have taken the position that there is no
need to rebuild the national movement as a prerequisite to adopting
programs of action. Rather they believe that recruiting a broad range of
actors into participatory programs of action is the way to rebuild the
national movement. This approach focuses on creating a new path based on
uniting Palestinians in the homeland and the diaspora. The global BDS
movement, the right of return movement, and the popular resistance
committees against the Separation Wall are all expressions of new forms
of action outside the traditional framework of party political action.
Similarly, the current wave of anger is a new form of popular and
youth-based action. The traditional political party system failed to
predict the consequences of this action at a time of heightened division
and internal conflicts over power and influence. This wave may falter or
intensify but it is likely that it is one of a series of waves that will
continue to gain momentum until they become a tsunami expressing the
collective recognition of the Palestinian cause as one of national
liberation and the need to rebuild the national and institutional
structures capable of creating a new path for struggle.
The current wave of anger shows that there is a new generation
redefining the people's relationship with the Israeli occupation as one
based on conflict rather than "understanding". It is doing so by defying
the monopoly of politics within the Bantustans run by the PA, which
Israel’s occupation been transforming into an administrative, economic
and security agent within a system of colonial domination.
However, this does not mean the end of the political role of factions,
despite their state of internal division and lack of popular legitimacy.
The factions still govern the practice of politics and forms of armed
resistance, especially in the Gaza Strip. They dominate the PLO, PA,
trade unions, professional associations and student bodies.
The current signs for emerging new forms of political action and
struggle may seem similar to those witnessed in the late 1950s and early
1960s when a young generation used favorable Arab and international
conditions to set a new path for struggle that overthrew the pre-Nakba
and post-Nakba leadership in a relatively short time. That generation
developed political bodies and armed groups that derived their
legitimacy from the people, who proclaimed their allegiance to the new
leadership without elections.
However, the conditions today are different and key elements of this
process are still missing. There is still space for the traditional
actors to play a role. Yet it will not be possible to restore politics
as an organized activity with broad popular engagement unless the goals,
work methods and rules change. At some point, the traditional parties
must deal with the new forms of political activism that is redefining
the relationship with the colonizer.
This will require working with the younger generation to establish the
goals and demands of the current wave of anger rather than attempting to
monopolize or contain it. This could help to transform the traditional
parties’ forms of political action into a proactive struggle led by the
younger generation and hasten the evolution of a comprehensive uprising
capable of creating a new path in the struggle for liberation.
Jaber Suleiman: Overcoming a Paradox to Rebuild the Movement
The youth movement underway in Palestine raises several questions
regarding its motives, causes, and nature. Is it an expression of
despair and frustration or a rekindled national spirit? Is it triggered
by Palestinian division, the tattered state of the PA, the demise of the
Oslo process and the two-state solution, aggressive Israeli settlement
expansion, the desecration of holy places, or declining Arab interest in
and international neglect of the Palestinian cause? Will it evolve into
a popular uprising like the first intifada or will it remain an
expression of anger that will soon recede? What conditions need to be
met in order for this movement to evolve into an uprising guided by a
unified national leadership and national program? What role should the
PLO factions and the wider Palestinian leadership play to strengthen and
protect the uprising and develop a unified national leadership, given
the institutionalization of the Palestinian division? And how?
This unprecedented youth movement, which is led by Palestinians born
around the time of the signing of the Oslo Accords, is directed against
the occupation. Yet it also includes anger and protest against the PA
and its political performance, which is responsible for the current
state of the Palestinian cause in general and the conditions in the OPT
in particular. This is the paradox we face: How can the Palestinian
factions, within and outside the PLO, which helped to create the current
state of affairs contribute to developing the movement and creating a
unified leadership? In fact, the factions can neither be excluded nor
exempted from responsibility, especially given the lack of an
alternative national movement or a popular, non-factional bloc (a
historical bloc in Gramsci's sense) capable of formulating an
overarching national body inclusive of all Palestinians.
The importance of coordination between the political leadership and the
youth who are confronting the occupation on a daily basis cannot be
overstated. This does not mean that the factions are free to hijack and
exploit the movement to achieve other goals that are not in line with
fighting the occupation, ending the division and finding a way out of
the current Palestinian impasse, especially as the Palestinian people
continue to pay the price for the way in which the first Intifada was
exploited in order to sign the Oslo Accords.
There are urgent national tasks for all to undertake. The factions
should not overburden the youth movement or push it towards
militarization or achievement of quick results such as an immediate
ending of the occupation that they themselves have collectively failed
to realize. Consequently, there needs to be agreement on modest phased
and tactical goals. The factions should treat this wave as one step on
the long and thorny path of struggle, and must contribute to and support
it on this basis. The factions should listen to the younger generations
and include them in the field leadership and local committees that need
to be created.
The parties should focus on forming a unified political leadership that
represents all factions, even before ending the division, so as to
sustain the steadfastness of the Palestinian people and prepare for a
long battle with the occupation. This is indispensable for developing
the current youth movement into a popular uprising and extensive civil
disobedience along the lines of the strike of 1936, together with
diplomatic and legal battles against the Israeli occupation on the
international front. To achieve these efforts, the security coordination
with Israel must cease immediately, as an essential step towards
dismantling the administrative and legal structure of Oslo. The PA's
functions should be reconsidered, and the division between Hamas and
Fatah should be overcome so that the PLO can be rebuilt on an inclusive
The anti-occupation forces, which include civil society institutions,
grassroots organizations, trade unions, professional associations,
universities and the BDS campaign must engage more actively in the youth
movement. They need to use their international ties with solidarity
groups and anti-discrimination and anti-occupation movements around the
globe to support the youth and their drive to ending the occupation.
Mjiriam Abu Samra: Palestinian Youth Will One Day Redefine
In order to address the overarching issue of /why/ the historical
political parties have not been able to catalyze current youth
frustration so far we need to consider the way Palestinian politics have
been transformed, primarily the shift in the PLO political discourse and
strategy from a liberation struggle to state-building. This deprived the
struggle of its foundational principles and slowly undermined its
strategies: A neo-colonial normalization with the occupier replaced the
original anti-colonial framework that shaped the struggle. As a result,
the national movement was paralyzed in terms of its capacity for
The neo-colonial relationship between the colonizer and the colonized
isolated the Palestinian leadership from its popular constituencies and
the struggle stalled. The crisis between Hamas and Fatah is one
demonstration of the complex colonial condition imposed on Palestinians
and the inability of Palestinian parties to give priority to the will of
their people over the neoliberal interests. Although its most acute
manifestation is the Fatah-Hamas crisis, the neoliberal project ushered
in by Oslo has affected all Palestinian parties to varying degrees and
has made them unable to give expression to the popular will.
With this broader framework in mind, we are unlikely to see any
significant role for the historical parties in the current uprising -
unless they restore the anti-colonial political vision and discourse of
the Palestinian movement. However, such a radical shift could mean the
very extinction of the ruling class and the dismantling of the apparatus
of economic and political interests in the OPT. This is a risk that the
Palestinian leadership seems unwilling to take at the moment.
Indeed, any other effort to provide a solid and long-lasting leadership
to the spontaneous movements on the ground needs to reposition
liberation and justice at the core of the struggle. It is more likely
that Palestinian youth will eventually play a role in a radical
re-definition of Palestinian politics than that the historical parties
will make a genuine contribution to the current uprising.
In this regard, we should pay attention to the new efforts coming from
Palestinian youth in the Diaspora (/shatat/) and in historical
Palestine, who are providing a solid political framework to the current
uprising and, in general, to Palestinian discontent. It is too early to
assess the strategic potential of these initiatives, yet it is important
to highlight the radical discourse they are endorsing. It is also
important to recognize, above all, the strenuous effort to re-unify – if
only symbolically, for now – the political message of all constituencies
of Palestinian society: those under occupation in the West Bank and
Gaza, those in “48 Palestine” and those in the Diaspora. See, for
example, the transnational mobilization
<https://www.facebook.com/palyouthmobilization/> called by Palestinian
youth from all over the world on Nov 29, which the United Nations marks
as the international day of solidarity with the Palestinian people.
Such efforts are a new trajectory for Palestinian politics that aim to
unify Palestinian society around a shared vision of justice, liberation
and return. These nascent initiatives might provide a new space for the
emergence of a national leadership able to elaborate –and sustain – a
renovated strategy of resistance for the Palestinian struggle.
Belal Shobaki: Turn to the Political Parties Who Can Still Mobilize
The current popular movement makes it even more urgent for the political
parties to transcend partisan interests and contribute to the expansion
of civil and social activism. Fatah and Hamas have a golden opportunity
to move beyond their preoccupation with the institutional concerns of
managing the PA and to act in a way that befits their identity as
liberation movements under occupation. All factions should join ranks in
drafting a national agenda that transcends Oslo and the institutional
structure incapacitating the Palestinian struggle. They can use their
media machines to rebuild a political, economic and social culture that
nurtures the uprising rather than polarization and partisan
mobilization. This would entail a behavioral change in the Palestinians'
comfortable consumption habits, especially in the West Bank.
Fatah may find it difficult to take such actions, given that it
identifies with PA institutions. However, Fatah's loss will be much
greater if it fails to change. The general mood of the Palestinian
public, including Fatah's own constituency, differs completely from the
political leadership's belief that the current events are just a "wave
of anger" that can be controlled by the security agencies and exploited
to drive negotiations with Israel. The Palestinian factions' failure to
mobilize for an open confrontation with the occupation while the youth
uprising continues will doubtless generate field leaders who will be
more capable of directing the scene than those sitting in their offices.
This would lead to a widening gap between field forces free of
regulatory and partisan restrictions and government bureaucrats.
Such a movement should look beyond the Fatah and Hamas options. The
Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine and Islamic Jihad could
mobilize strong rallies and demonstrations against the occupation. Both
enjoy the respect of the Palestinian people and have more freedom than
Hamas, which has been the target of a double security campaign in the
West Bank by Israel and the PA. Both movements could work with other
factions to support open confrontation with the Israeli occupation and
lead a call for the formation of coordinating committees to manage the
uprising. These committees should later evolve into a joint leadership
that subsequently becomes an integral part of the PLO as part of a
program to reform the organization.
However, creating a new space is contingent on overcoming past
experience and specifically the experience of the Oslo formula for a
two-state solution. The actors currently monopolizing Palestinian
political institutions are the ones who still back this formula. If the
public turns the uprising into a rejection of Oslo, in addition to
confronting the occupation, either new leaders will emerge who will
pursue new options or the current leaders will feel compelled to change
their rhetoric and political behavior.
Alaa Tartir: The Politics of Confrontation
Who will protect and build on the Palestinian wave of anger currently
raging in the OPT, and how? The answer to this question should concern
us deeply: The continued sacrifices of the Palestinian people should not
be exploited by the traditional Palestinian political elite - yet again
- as a card in some new round of ill-fated negotiations. It must also
not become a way for the authorities to use simply to release the
The traditional Palestinian leadership’s protracted inability to realize
Palestinian aspirations has created an opportunity for non-traditional
leaders, including Palestinian civil society actors and opponents of the
PA. However, they have yet to make fully use of this opportunity. A
structural transformation of Palestinian leadership is needed. It will
need time, resources, and political determination as well as mass
mobilization at key moments. The forms of struggle and the political
objectives are among the key questions to be answered. The alternative
is taking shape, but it is still young like the youth in revolt. It is
important to address these questions quickly: Without the necessary
support and mechanisms to coordinate efforts and initiatives, the
movement will quickly die out.
Non-traditional Palestinian leaders should act now to pool their efforts
into creating a strategy for struggle that generates rather than
draining the wave’s potential and energies. It is a tall order, but it
is the only way to avoid another disappointment that increases the
existing frustration and disorientation. Moments of historic
transformation are never easy.
The way ahead will involve cycles of confrontation on many different
fronts. In other words, the confrontation should not be limited to
physical standoffs at military checkpoints but extend to the political,
economic, media, and other spheres. Indeed, confrontation in a situation
of colonization is the only way to change the balance of power
equations, challenge the facts on the ground and built a path to the future.
The current movements by the youth and by non-traditional leaders in
civil society embody the politics of confrontation: They use collective
action to challenge the authorities and their claims of representation.
However, we need to move from the current state of anger to a movement
that represents the Palestinian society as a whole, transforming it into
a society grounded in social movements and horizontal networks that
focus on political, economic, and social issues. This can be done by
building on existing social and other networks in order to promote
collective goals, working for liberation from colonization and defying
repressive authorities and elites. This can transform the current wave
of anger into a permanent state of confrontation with the colonizer as
well as a sustainable social movement that brings the colonized closer
to freedom and self-determination.
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