[News] Revolution, Counter Revolution, and the Economic War in Venezuela
Anti-Imperialist News
news at freedomarchives.org
Tue Jan 27 12:29:09 EST 2015
Revolution, Counter Revolution, and the Economic War in Venezuela: Part I
By William Camacaro and Frederick B. Mills, January 27th 2015
http://venezuelanalysis.com/analysis/11170
*Introduction: A Decisive Battle is at Hand*
In a speech outside the Miraflores palace on January 17, 2015, upon his
return from a twelve day trip abroad, President of the Bolivarian
Republic of Venezuela Nicolas Maduro Moros addressed an expectant crowd
of well wishers. Seizing the moment in the midst of an economic crisis
and an intense opposition campaign against his administration, Maduro
spoke with a renewed sense of confidence and determination: “This
economic battle is decisive. We have the resources, the organized people
[/pueblo organizado/], the historic project, the only one that exists in
Venezuela. We have the force, moral and spiritual. We have the historic
purpose. I am calling for meeting the challenge of the rebirth of the
economy of the country.” Just days earlier, perennial presidential
candidate of the opposition coalition (Democratic Unity Roundtable, MUD)
and leader of the right wing Justice First party, Henrique Capriles
Radonski <http://venezuelanalysis.com/news/11162>, argued that the
combination of falling oil prices and scarcity of basic consumer goods,
constituted “a perfect storm for changing the government.” As rumors of
an imminent coup against Maduro spread and predictions of economic
collapse appear in the some of the corporate international press
<http://www.forbes.com/sites/christopherhelman/2014/02/20/cheap-gasoline-why-venezuela-is-doomed-to-collapse/>,
the broad spectrum of Chavismo is circling the wagons around the
revolutionary project.
Venezuela is not alone, as over the past year there have been
expressions of solidarity with the Maduro administration from the Union
of South American Nations (UNASUR), the Bolivarian Alliance for the
Peoples of Our America(ALBA), the G77 plus China, and the Non-Aligned
Movement as well as from progressive forces from around the world. At
the height of the /guarimbas /(violent demonstrations) during the first
quarter of 2014, the majority position of the Organization of American
States (OAS) too came down on the side of the constitutional order. The
late President Hugo Chávez and now Maduro have played leadership roles
in the regional associations of Latin American independence and
integration; for this reason social movements, Afro-descendant and
indigenous peoples, and peasants and workers throughout region are among
the stakeholders in Venezuela’s revolutionary project.
A great deal hangs in the balance with regard to the feasibility of
advancing a democratic socialist project while under the continuous
attack of a U.S. backed opposition, elements of which are bent on
restoring the neoliberal regime. One gets the sense that a decisive
battle is underway for the political future of Venezuela and indeed, for
the cause of sovereignty throughout the region. For all of these reasons
Maduro’s annual address to the nation (/Memoria y Cuenta/) on January
21, 2015 held special weight as Venezuelans and international observers
heard the government’s vision for the way forward.
Last Wednesday, President Maduro gave his annual address before the
national assembly and the country (/Memoria y Cuenta/), in his role as
head of state during the year 2014. He made his way, walking along the
streets towards the National Assembly amid the enthusiastic greetings
and embraces of a great multitude of followers. Addressing the nation,
he said: “In the year 2015 we will implement a special plan of
protection for Venezuelan families through the Great Mission of the
Households of the Country, having as our objective to protect, through
holistic policies, the attention given to children, and to increase
pensions for families and in particular for Venezuelan women.” The
government of Venezuela understands that in the face of the difficult
economic situation it has to fortify, not retrench, the social programs
that benefit the most needy. The Maduro administration is committed to
maintaining the Grand Housing Mission that up to now has built 673,416
housing units and it has approved the resources to build 400,000 more
housing units this coming year. It has also promised to increase the
number of scholarships and pensions as well as increase the minimum wage
by 15 percent and preserve the Food Mission. “This is a holistic
strategy: protect the family, the households of the country, our young
students; advance our powerful Housing Mission of Venezuela which also
will generate a great amount of economic development; advance the
powerful Great Mission New Barrio--Tri-Color (housing renovation
project); to continue the social development of our country,” emphasized
Maduro. At the same time, Maduro ordered the immediate inspection of all
of the food distribution networks of the country and threatened to bring
the full weight of the law against those who continue the economic
sabotage. At this writing (January 22) the Minister of Commerce, Isabel
Delgado
<http://www.ultimasnoticias.com.ve/noticias/actualidad/economia/gobierno-se-reunira-con-las-cien-distribuidoras-ma.aspx>
announced that the government is meeting with 100 of the country’s
largest producers and distributors at the Miraflores Palace to discuss
distribution issues in the coming days.
This essay will offer a briefing on the current political standoff in
Caracas and argue that only an effective counter offensive by the
government, with the support of the popular sectors, can push back the
opposition economic coup underway in Venezuela and start the country
down the arduous road to economic recovery. By distinguishing the
anatomy of the coup in Chile in September of 1973 from the short lived
coup in Venezuela in April of 2002 and by reviewing the use of food as a
political weapon during the oil strike in Venezuela from December 2002
to March 2003, we aim at interpreting the dialectic at work in the
present confrontation between revolution and counter revolution in this
South American nation.
1.
*Overview of the Current Political Climate in Venezuela*
Both the opposition coalitionMUD
<http://www.lanacion.com.ve/politica/mud-hara-anuncios-este-viernes-23-en-una-convencion-nacional/>
on the one hand, and the United Socialist Party of Venezuela
<http://www.eluniversal.com/nacional-y-politica/150120/venezuelan-pro-government-march-on-january-23>
and allied parties on the other, are now preparing to mobilize their
constituents for demonstrations during the third week of January,
marking the anniversary of the overthrow of the dictatorship of Marcos
Pérez Jiménez on January 23, 1958. While it appears that the MUD has
moved its march to the 24th, the Venezuelan newspaper /El Universal/
<http://www.eluniversal.com/nacional-y-politica/150121/estudiantes-de-anzoategui-anunciaron-concentracion-pacifica-para-el-23>
has confirmed a number of anti-government student demonstrations are
planned in Sucre, Mérida, Zulia, Guayana, Táchira, Carabobo, and Miranda
on the 23rd. The 23rd of January has cultural significance because it
marks a break in Venezuelan history, when a dictatorship gave way to a
power sharing arrangement between the major political parties (AD,
COPEI, URD) called the pact of Punto Fijo or /puntofijismo/. This
representative democracy (also referred to as the Fourth Republic)
advanced the interests of transnational capital and the ruling class of
Venezuela. It was characterized by routine rampant corruption and the
prevalence of poverty for more than half the population.
At this writing, theUnited Socialist Party of Venezuela (PSUV)
<http://www.google.com/url?q=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.psuv.org.ve%2F&sa=D&sntz=1&usg=AFQjCNHX55MMdt2Je6JRjlBOzyMfzLVf-g>has
called for a “march of the undefeated” in west Caracas, “in honor of
those who were assassinated and persecuted by the fascist right during
the governments of the fourth republic.” The MUD
<http://globovision.com/mud-convoca-marcha-de-las-ollas-vacias/> has
called on its followers to participate in an anti-government
demonstration in Caracas on the 24th of January which it designates as
“the march of the empty pots, against hunger and for change.” The MUD
action is also a protest against “scarcity, the lines, the insecurity,
and the repression.” It appears that the MUD will transmit a message “to
the nation” on the 23rd with a proposal for change. The 23rd and 24th of
January are therefore set to be days of struggle for the hearts and
minds of Venezuelan constituent power.
/1.2 The Psychological War/
In addition to an economic war, some political analysts suggest that
there is also psychological warfare being perpetrated by the opposition
press and rumor mill. Oscar Schémel
<http://www.hinterlaces.com/analisis/hinterlaces/schemel-67-cree-que-un-estallido-social-empeoraria-la-situacion>,
President of Venezuelan polling firm and think tank /Hinterlaces/ argues
that the psychological campaign is aimed at the neurotization of the
public:
One of the variables on which these campaigns are based is the
exacerbation of the problems, the exaggeration of the problems, mediated
by a campaign of rumors to generate a climate of anxiety. After just a
week on the queues, people were buying candles, in addition to food,
because they heard that a coup was coming, because there was going going
to be a magnicide, because there was going to be generalized looting,
because there was going to be a social explosion. This generates anxiety
and this anxiety does not disappear but accumulates.
Although, observes Schémel, this sort of strategy has worked at bringing
about a social explosion in other countries, it will not work in
Venezuela: “This accumulation of anxiety in Venezuela does not generate
a neurotic response because Venezuelans think that chaos or violent,
irrational, unconstitutional exits can make the situation worse.”
Instances of the sort of rumor mongering observed by Schémel can be
found in the opposition press. For example, /El Nacional/ published an
opinion piece by journalist Marianella Salazar
<http://www.el-nacional.com/opinion/Llegamos-llegadero_0_555544619.html>
which lays out the details of an alleged military conspiracy to force
Maduro to resign and seek asylum in Cuba where Raul Castro has already
allegedly agreed to receive him! Here is how Salazar speculates that the
plot might then unfold: “on the agenda for the transition has emerged
the name of General Raúl Baduel. Although he is in the military prison
of Ramo Verde, he has /auctóritas /in the heart of the Bolivarian Armed
Forces and they consider him a conciliator without intentions of
installing a military dictatorship.” Among the outcomes of such a coup
is that Venezuela could then “leave the China Fund and go to the
International Monetary Fund.” The author also imagines that should
General Baduel take the helm of the executive branch of government he
would “avoid the Caracazo.” Perhaps this is supposed to give readers
comfort. The /Caracazo/ refers to an uprising originating in the poorer
sections of Caracas in February 1989 in response to an IMF “structural
adjustment package” imposed by then President Carlos Andrés Pérez. Pérez
responded by declaring a state of emergency and between 300 and 3000
Venezuelans were killed by the security forces. /Yet a return to the IMF
is just what Salazar has in mind! /
/1.3 Polarization versus Accommodation /
These sorts of economic and psychological opposition campaigns are not
new to Venezuelan politics. Since Hugo Chávez was elected President in
1998 the counter revolution has been relentless in its quest to bring
about regime change, with hard liners willing to deploy terrorist
attacks and sabotage. Each onslaught by the ultra right has been
deterred by the civic military alliance that has continued to back the
constitutional order to this day. But is this time different? Are we
witnessing the eve of another break in history, one that will restore a
rehabilitated version of the neo-liberal regime of the fourth republic?
Or will the Bolivarian cause weather yet another political and economic
storm?
The last fifteen years show that Chavismo does not strengthen its
position by negotiating with the right but by confronting it. After the
April 2002 coup Chávez resorted to conciliation and compromise to no
avail. Something similar has happened during the Maduro administration.
After narrowly winning the presidential election in April of 2013, the
opposition presidential candidate refused to concede the electoral
victory to Nicolas Maduro and urged his followers to “drain the
outrage.” The opposition waged an unsuccessful international campaign to
delegitimize the outcome of the presidential election and an estimated
eleven Chavistas were killed by anti-government extremists. Yet Maduro
called for dialog with the opposition, and UNASUR as well as the Vatican
helped to mediate the discussions. Maduro took some heat from the left
for these talks and the shortages and price gouging only continued.
Later in the year (2013), Maduro launched an offensive to enforce price
controls and anti-hoarding laws. While evoking the antipathy of big
business, such measures may partly account for a recovery in the
electoral base of Chavismo in time for the municipal elections in
December that year. The PSUV and their allies won about three quarters
of the municipalities <http://venezuelanalysis.com/news/10227> in the
December 2013 municipal elections
<http://www.coha.org/the-municipal-elections-in-venezuela-as-a-plebiscite-on-chavismo/>.
In what opposition leader Capriles had vowed would be a plebiscite on
Chavismo, the PSUV and its allies together also won the popular vote by
a margin of about 6.5 percent. Of course, a year later things are
different: the economy is in recession and despite intensified
government efforts to curtail contraband, speculation, and hoarding
<http://www.coha.org/venezuela-achieves-progress-in-its-battle-against-contraband/>,
the shortages have persisted.
A poll released in October 2014 by Venezuelan Institute of Data Analysis
(IVAD)
<http://www.eluniversal.com/nacional-y-politica/141213/drive-for-constituent-assembly-the-best-option-in-store>
shows an erosion in the public approval rating of President Maduro
though the think tank and polling firm Hinterlaces
<http://www.hinterlaces.com/analisis/politica/oscar-schemel-describe-los-principales-factores-politicos-de-2015>
maintains that the opposition is in no better shape with regard to
public confidence. In terms of the mood of the electorate, Venezuelan
journalist Eleazar Díaz Range
<http://www.correodelorinoco.gob.ve/nacionales/desabastecimiento-colas-y-escasez-pueden-incidir-conducta-venezolano-cara-a-elecciones-parlamentarias/>l
<http://www.correodelorinoco.gob.ve/nacionales/desabastecimiento-colas-y-escasez-pueden-incidir-conducta-venezolano-cara-a-elecciones-parlamentarias/>
argues that the shortages could provoke apathy among voters and
therefore influence the outcome of the upcoming parliamentary elections.
He urges that Maduro needs more effective “political communication and
to execute what he promises.”
To be sure, there are indeed signs of some dissatisfaction with the
government response to the shortages even in the popular barrios. But
this does not necessarily translate into widespread disaffection. Those
who are prepared to write the obituary on Chavismo will probably join
their like-minded predecessors of the last fifteen years in
underestimating the driving force behind the Bolivarian revolution: the
millions of formerly excluded constituents, now protagonists in a
politics of liberation, who will not easily succumb to military,
economic, or parliamentary coups, the success of which they reasonably
suspect would once again relegate them to the margins of social and
economic life.
*2. Historical Precedents*
/2.1 Venezuela Compared to Chile in 1973/
The situation on the ground today in Venezuela, in particular the
shortages of basic goods, is in some respects analogous to the the
conditions leading up to the 1973 coup against the democratically
elected socialist government of Salvador Allende in Chile. A major
tactic of the right-wing Chilean opposition and the Nixon administration
was to "make the economy scream" by provoking food shortages, a truckers
strike, and mayhem in the streets. Researcher Peter Kornbluh, in /The
Pinochet File: A Declassified Dossier on Atrocity and Accountability/,
summarizes declassified cables that indicate in the days preceding the
overthrow of Allende a terrorist paramilitary group and a “large
segment” of the business community were “undertaking actions to increase
discontent and incidents of violence...in order to create an atmosphere
in Chile which would be propitious for a military coup” (2003, p 91).
A similar game plan was played out, albeit unsuccessfully, during the
short lived coup against Chávez in April 2002. In the months leading up
to the coup there was a fall in oil prices, an economic slowdown,
growing resentment within the PDVSA management over government
interventions, and some erosion in Chávez’s approval ratings. A general
strike called by the anti-government Federation of Venezuelan Workers
(CTV) and the Venezuelan Federation of Chambers of Commerce
(fedecámaras) on December 10, 2002 met with what Wilpert calls “moderate
success” (2007, p. 23). The fedecámaras--Media--Military coup went into
action on April 11 and by the afternoon of April 12 the most extreme
elements within the golpista camp exhibited their brand of democracy.
Political analyst Fernando Coronil describes the scene inside Miraflores
Palace that day:
Pedro Carmona [then head of fedecámaras] proclaimed himself provisional
president in the name of the law of Chávez’s constitution. Immediately
afterwards he named some members of his cabinet, summarily dismissed the
National Assembly, the state governors, and municipal leaders (all of
them democratically elected), disbanded the Supreme Court, and fired the
Attorney General and the People’s Defender. (2011, p. 49)
No sooner had this regime been sworn-in amidst a great deal of
celebration and fanfare by the golpistas than the coup began to unravel.
The situation on the ground today in Venezuela, especially the shortages
of basic goods, is reminiscent of the U.S.--backed coup that toppled the
democratically elected government of Salvador Allende. That coup
succeeded and Chile was subjected to a decade and a half of brutal rule
by the Pinochet dictatorship. By contrast, the short-lived coup of April
2002 against Chávez, once again supported by a U.S.--backed opposition,
was derailed by an enormous show of popular power and by the loyalty of
a majority of army and security forces. This reversal of a military coup
was unprecedented in Latin America and it came as a great surprise to
the Venezuelan golpistas. Since that time a persistent slogan of
Chavismo has been that “for every April 11 there will be an April 13.”
On January 17, 2015, Maduro urged
<http://www.noticias24.com/venezuela/noticia/270821/presidente-maduro-llamo-a-la-union-del-pueblo-para-obtener-victoria-ante-la-guerra-economica/>:
“In the face of this 11th of April in process, in the arena of economic
sabotage, we need to wage an economic 13th of April….”
/2.2 The Oil Strike of December 2002 to March 2003/
The short lived 2002 coup against Chávez removed the military option
from the arsenal of the counter revolution. Just months later, the same
opposition groups launched an attempt at an economic coup against the
Bolivarian government. Chávez had issued 49 laws by decree, a temporary
power (the enabling law) granted by the National Assembly. Some of these
laws, in particular those relating to land reform and oil industry
policy, did not sit well with landowners and PDVSA. With the possibility
of privatizing the state owned oil industry foreclosed by the 1999
Constitution, Chávez sought to ensure that a substantial part of oil
revenue would be directed towards social investment (referred to often
as by Bolivarians as “paying the social debt”), but he was up against an
entrenched group of oil executives that coveted their independence.
PDVSA management argued that Chávez was seeking to politicize PDVSA and
undermine what it took to be a “meritocracy”. According to Gregory
Wilpert’s history of the period, the company was unwilling “to go along
with the government’s plans to increase taxes on the oil industry, to
reduce costs, to increase transparency in its international operations,
and to appoint a pro-Chávez board of directors.” Wilpert observes that
this conflict came to a head during the April 2002 coup attempt “when
PDVSA managers actively supported the coup by shutting down one of
Venezuela’s main refineries during that crisis…” (p. 95). After a brief
period of what Wilpert calls a “retreat” by Chávez in the aftermath of
the coup, the opposition called for a “general strike” which led to “a
combination of management lockout (of the oil industry), administrative
and professional employee strike, and general sabotage of the oil
industry” (25). It is important to note that in addition to placing a
stranglehold on the country’s main source of export revenue, there were
“food and gas shortages throughout Venezuela, mostly because many
distribution centers were closed down” (25). In a move that brought most
harm to the poor and working class, gasoline and food were being used as
a political weapon against the Bolivarian project.
Richard Gott’s history of the Bolivarian revolution draws attention to
the impact of deliberate food shortages during the oil strike: “The mass
of the population bore the food shortages with equanimity. They
tolerated the electricity blackouts, the oil scarcity, and the transport
failures” (2011, p. 251). Historian Bart Jones (2007) also describes the
scene and Chávez’s decisive actions at the time:
The situation was desperate. Gasoline supplies were dwindling, and
service stations were closed. So Chávez did something else previously
unthinkable in a nation with some of the world’s largest oil reserves –
he imported gasoline. He contacted Brazil, Trinidad and Tobago, Mexico,
Russia and other countries to ask them to send what they could. When
basic foods grew scarce, he cobbled together another informal supply
network, persuading Colombia The Dominican Republic, and others to send
rice, flour, milk, meat and other products. (p. 378)
After weeks of an industry lockout and acts of sabotage against PDVSA
infrastructure Chávez went on the offensive, using troops to stop the
hoarding of food and to keep schools and banks open (254). The
opposition attempt to cripple the oil industry did not sit well with the
military, who were called in to secure the facilities. The management of
PDVSA was replaced and an overall 18,000 (almost half the workforce)
lost their jobs.
The oil lockout and the subsequent government takeover of the management
of PDVSA struck a great blow against the economic power of the
oligarchy. As George Ciccariello-Maher points out in /We Created
Chávez/, /A People’s History of the Venezuelan Revolution/:
If the reversed coup marked the /political/ destruction of the
anti-Chávez opposition, then the defeat of the oil lockout effectively
crushed the opposition’s /economic /power, wresting the national oil
company PDVSA--often referred to as a ‘state within a state’ as a result
of its /de facto/ autonomy--from their greedy hands to be put instead
into the service of the Revolution. (2013, p. 181)
Ciccariello-Maher also documents, through interviews with activists who
resisted the oil strike, that pro-Chavista workers played a role in
taking back control of the oil installations from striking managers and
workers (p. 182). Another account by a PDVSA insider, former PDVSA
president (2004 - 2014) and currently Venezuela’s ambassador the the
United Nations, Rafael Ramírez, supports this view:
In the petroleum industry something very interesting happened. Being a
vertical organization the workers knew who had given the instruction to
bring the industry to a hault. So just as on April 13, the patriotic
soldiers and officials rebelled against the senior military officials.
The patriotic workers and managers rejected the indications of their
bosses who were committed to sabotage. The petroleum meritocracy was
very arrogant and demeaning towards the people [/pueblo/]. (German
Sanchez, 2012, p. 283)
It is important to note that popular power ensured the return of the
democratically elected government of Chávez to power in 2002 and
defended the government again during the oil strike in 2002-2003. These
events occurred prior to the implementation of the social missions later
in 2003. These are the social programs that have done so much to reduce
economic inequality in the country, alleviate poverty and increase
access to education, healthcare, and housing for millions of formerly
excluded Venezuelans. It appears that the popular sectors had cast their
lot, despite the trappings of economic and psychological warfare, for
staying the Bolivarian course rather than opting for a restoration of
the neoliberal regime.
The damage wrought by an attempt at an economic coup by crippling the
oil industry was devastating. According to Jones (2007) “Production
plummeted to as little as 150,000 barrels a day, compared with normal
output of 3 million a day. Exports typically averaging 2.5 million
barrels a day dropped to next to nothing” (p. 379). Furthermore, Jones
writes that “the economy nearly collapsed, contracting by 27 percent in
the first fourth months of 2003” (p. 386).Jones puts the total cost to
the oil industry of the lockout at $13.3 billion USD (2007, p. 386).
Economist Alfredo Serrano Mancilla indicates that by the end of the
strike unemployment shot up to 20.7 percent and about 700,000 jobs were
lost. Many small and medium size businesses went bust because they
depended for their supplies on businesses under the umbrella of the
opposition Fedecámaras. Poverty reduction that had been underway since
1998 suffered a reversal that could not be effectively remedied until
the implementation of the missions established in the aftermath of the
oil strike in 2003 (pp. 308-310).
After the oil strike, the opposition regrouped and within months Chávez
faced a recall referendum in which he won a resounding victory. On
August 15, 2004, 5,800,600 (59.25 percent) voted for Chávez and
3,989,000 (40.74 percent) voted for recall. So in just a three year
period, the Bolivarian revolution faced down a military coup, an
economic coup and constitutional referendum by an opposition that sought
regime change even this meant resorting to extra constitutional means.
As a result, argues Ciccariello-Maher, the revolution only became more
radicalized and determined.
Part II
By William Camacaro and Frederick B. Mills, January 27th 2015
http://venezuelanalysis.com/analysis/11171
*3. The Economic Model Must Change*
Today there is universal agreement among both the broad spectrum of
Chavismo and the various factions of the opposition: Venezuela is facing
an economic crisis, perhaps even an emergency, that requires urgent
“rectificación”. While high inflation, a broken currency exchange
system, and falling oil prices have indeed been urgent issues, the
scarcity of basic goods reached crisis proportions in the days preceding
and during Maduro’s trip abroad and still stands in need of a
sustainable remedy. The government and the opposition approach these
problems from radically different perspectives and propose dialectically
opposed solutions. Something has to give, and give soon.
/3.1 The MUD--Fedecámaras Position/
The opposition MUD--Fedecámaras position is that the current economic
crisis can be resolved by free market oriented reform. Fedecámaras has
called on the government to respect private property rights, repeal the
Law of Just Prices
<http://globovision.com/fedecamaras-zulia-pide-eliminar-la-ley-de-precios-justos/>,
deregulate the economy, correct the “excesses” of Labor Law, and
establish one floating exchange rate. The director of the Chamber of
Commerce of Caracas, Victor Maldonado
<http://www.fedecamaras.org.ve/detalle.php?id=2726>, maintains that “If
we begin to make these corrections today in the economy in the medium
term one will see the results.” Fedecámaras representatives also blame
some of the scarcity of consumer products on a lack of sufficient
/divisas/ (dollars)
<http://noticiaaldia.com/2013/01/desabastecimiento-es-por-falta-de-divisas-fedecamaras/>
available at preferential exchange rates for the import sector.
For Capriles Radonski
<http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2015-01-14/capriles-calls-for-united-venezuela-opposition-as-crisis-deepens.html>,
Venezuela is facing a state of emergency on account of a failed economic
model and therefore the game is up for the Bolivarian project. On
January 14 he called for a divided opposition to unite in the common
cause of a “constitutional” change of government. His call appears to
have gotten some traction. On January 18, Jesús Torrealba
<http://www.lanacion.com.ve/politica/mud-hara-anuncios-este-viernes-23-en-una-convencion-nacional/>,
executive secretary of the right wing MUD, announced that the various
factions within the MUD have united: “This (situation) is grave and for
this María Corina [Machado], [Leopoldo] López and [Henrique] Capriles
are in agreement.” Torrealba also said that on the 23rd of January the
opposition will march and go “where the /pueblo/ are, where there is
urban and rural poverty, we recall that 54% of the population live in
the barrios.” [As we noted above, the MUD demonstration appears to have
been changed to January 24.]
/3.2 The Government Position/
The government position is that basic commodity shortages are being
caused by elements of the private sector that control the importation,
production and distribution of food and other products and criminal
speculators and smugglers who are sometimes allied with this sector.
These actors are allegedly responsible or complicit in the illegal
stockpiling of products in warehouses aimed at bringing about artificial
shortages. There is empirical evidence for such claims. Thousands of
tons of products, including subsidized items, have been diverted from
the marketplace for sale in Colombia in 2014. Warehouses full of goods
that ought to be on store shelves are frequently discovered by the
authorities. Subsidized food items are often purchased by speculators
for resale at higher prices in the domestic market. Some importers have
been buying products at the subsidized currency exchange rate but then
selling those products as though they were purchased at the much higher
parallel rate. Fictitious “importers” are also blamed for massive
amounts of currency fraud by obtaining /divisas/ (dollars)at the
preferential exchange rate under pretext of importing priority goods and
then selling those dollars on the parallel market or holding on to them
in expectation of further devaluation of the bolivar, a practice that
suggests the corruption of some public servants as well.What are we to
make of these observations about scarcity?
To be sure, the government has made its share of mistakes in managing
the economy and Maduro has made it clear in his address to the nation
(/Memoria y Cuent/a) on January 21 that some changes to economic policy,
and in particular the currency exchange system, will now be implemented
as part of an Economic Recovery Plan
<http://venezuelanalysis.com/news/11122>. There is empirical evidence,
however, reported with some frequency in Venezuelan newspapers and by
Venezuela Analysis <http://venezuelanalysis.com/news/11158>, that while
some of the hoarding, reselling, and speculation is likely being
perpetrated by opportunists, there is also collusion by the private
sector. So there is /an economic war underway in Venezuela aimed at
producing leverage through scarcity to scale back government price
controls and labor protections and cause disaffection with the
government./ As the President of Fedecámara, Jorge Roig remarked, during
a recent interview
<http://www.correodelorinoco.gob.ve/nacionales/jorge-roig-confiesa-colas-duraran-hasta-que-gobierno-siga-atacando-a-empresa-privada/>
with journalist Vladimir Villegas: “how long will the lines last? As
long as the government continues to attack private enterprise.”
For Maduro, the game is up for the economic coup being waged by the
political opposition and its allied collaborators in the private sector.
He has delivered an ultimatum to food distributors to cooperate with
efforts to overcome food shortages and in his January 21, 2015 address
to the nation (/Memoria y Cuenta/) vowed to immediately launch an all
out effort to bring the diversion of commodities from the marketplace
under control. This means that the government will more aggressively
enforce laws against hoarding, continue to intercept contraband, and
move to alleviate panic buying. There is growing pressure on the Maduro
administration to also increase prosecutions of those committing
currency fraud, including collaborators in the state bureaucracy, and to
allow an independent audit of the currency exchange transactions. The
state, backed by workers, is also expected to continue to support the
resumption of production in plants abandoned by the owners.
/3.3 The Economic Model Debate/
Opposition leader Capriles is certainly correct that the current
economic model is not sustainable, but what is that model? While there
has been a great deal of state intervention in the economy and
significant social investment through the missions under Chavismo,
Venezuela is still largely a capitalist country, and food imports and
distribution, despite the growing number of cooperatives and socialist
or mixed run enterprises, is still mostly in private hands. /So the
debate is not over whether the economic model has to be changed, all are
agreed, but in what direction: should there be more or less social
control over the means or terms of the production and distribution of
goods and services?/
As Venezuelan philosopher Carlos Lanz points out, the problem of
scarcity and price gouging is not an aberration but a symptom of what he
has called “the model of speculative accumulation” being imposed by the
major food distributors and importers, a model that drives the economic
war and is the major cause of scarcity in this South American country
today (Email communication, 01-19-2015). The so called “economic war” is
not just something being waged by elements of the private sector. It is
at least in part an expression of the contradiction between the interest
of capital in maximizing profits and the interest of labor in a more
equitable distribution of socially produced wealth and of the income
generated by the nation’s natural resources. In this light, one can
interpret management induced production slowdowns and hoarding as a form
of leverage to obtain concessions from the state on the repeal of price
controls and to rein in some of the legal guarantees that favor labor
over private interests. Maduro has taken a firm stand on the answer to
this question in his speech to the nation on January 17 and again on
January 21, 2015: “It is necessary to further advance the model, not to
change it.”
*4. The Balance of Forces *
The announcement by the MUD of a march that would enter the Chavista
strongholds in Caracas on January 23 (a march that we indicated might
not take place) drew a quick response from the mayor of Caracas,Jorge
Rodríguez <http://www.antv.gob.ve/m9/ns_noticias_antv.asp?id=58422>: the
MUD does not have permission to realize any sort of gathering in the
municipality of Libertador this 23rd of January. “We will not permit
demonstrations of a violent nature in the municipality of Libertador.
How does one believe the opposition, that they are going to develop a
peaceful demonstration if up until now they have not done this…. It is
inadmissible, we have the obligation to protect the physical integrity
of the inhabitants and the property” he emphasized. Rodríguez also
indicated that the security forces are prepared for whatever irregular
situation that might be posed by the opposition. “We have to assume as
though it were an equation, that the opposition will behave in a violent
manner.”
Historic memory probably plays some role in Rodríguez’s decision to deny
permission to the opposition march to enter his municipality. On the 9th
of April 2002, fedecámaras, together with the CTV called for a general
strike to force the resignation of then President Chávez. The march
calling for the general strike congregated on the 11 of April 2002 at
the main headquarters of the PDVSA. From there the then president of of
the CTV said in an impassioned manner: “I do not rule out the
possibility that this crowd, this human river, marches to Miraflores to
expel the traitor of the Venezuelan people” (see Jones, 2007, p. 319).
They marched up to the areas near to the Miraflores palace with the
permission of the then mayor of Caracas, Alfredo Peña who was part of
the opposition. In hindsight, this march arguably had as its objective
the creation of chaos, assassination, and eventually the justification
of a /coup d'état/. On the heels of a violent attempt at extra
constitutional regime change earlier last year, and amid rumors of an
imminent coup, the municipality of Libertador has decided not to lend
itself at this time to the contingencies of an opposition march that may
harbor, however unintentional, similar golpista elements.
Both the Maduro administration and the MUD now seek to augment their
respective bases of support especially among the undecided and
disaffected voters who will determine the outcome of the upcoming
parliamentary elections. The opposition has suffered divisions over the
past year between the more moderate forces open to dialog with the
government and committed to liberal democratic procedures, and the
hardliners who want to defeat the Bolivarian cause even if it takes
extra constitutional means. The MUD defeat at the polls in the nominal
“plebiscite” municipal elections of December 2013 led to the resignation
of the executive secretary of the MUD and a leadership vacuum. Just
months later national polls indicated that the large majority of
Venezuelans (88 percent
<http://www.hinterlaces.com/analisis/politica/67-muestra-opinion-desfavorable-del-gobierno-de-eeuu>)
rejected the violence at the barricades. After these setbacks, it
appears that the major players within the opposition, at least according
to the new MUD executive secretary Jesús Torrealba, have regrouped and
now seek to win seats in the upcoming parliamentary elections as part of
an effort to bring about a change of government.Capriles has recognized,
perhaps more than his colleagues in the MUD, the importance of winning
over at least some of the traditionally pro-government electorate in
order to garner enough votes to retake the legislative and executive
helm of the liberal democratic state. One of the slogans that the MUD is
presently using in this regard: “Chavista Comrades, Unite With Us.”
The Maduro administration, in the midst of an economic crisis
exacerbated by plummeting oil prices, has been taking heat from both a
determined opposition and Chavista dissidents who think he has been
moving too slowly in advancing the transition to socialism
<http://www.coha.org/chavistas-deliberate-on-the-way-forward/> according
to the Plan de la Patria (2013 - 2019)
<http://www.nicolasmaduro.org.ve/programa-patria-venezuela-2013-2019/>.
Independent community media and a number of leading Chavista public
intellectuals such as Luis Britto García, José Vicente Rangel, and
Gonzalo Gómez have articulated an analysis that is not persuaded the
government is principally responsible for the scarcity of basic goods,
on the contrary, they express no doubt that there is an economic war
being waged against the government. But as the keen observer and analyst
of Venezuelan public opinion, President of Hinterlaces, Oscar Schémel
points out, the government still has to communicate a stronger case,
through deeds, that it can effectively deal with the economic crisis. If
it can achieve this objective promptly, the government can shore up its
electoral base in time for the parliamentary elections.
Another important factor in considering the current balance of forces is
the /civic military unity /built by the late Hugo Chávez. This alliance
was instrumental in reversing the coup of April 2002 and it ended the
oil lockout and economic war of 2002-2003. This unity was demonstrated
once again during the first quarter of 2014 when the /guarimbas /failed
to gain a foothold in the popular barrios. These events indicate that
without the support of the popular sectors the military is highly
unlikely to intervene on behalf of imperial and oligarchic interests.
Perhaps most important to shoring up the government’s immediate fiscal
position was the recent CELAC--China conference in Beijing and President
Maduro’s twelve day international trip. Maduro has secured agreements
with China (about 20 billion dollars in investments
<http://venezuelanalysis.com/news/11143>) and other countries that have
given some needed oxygen to Venezuela’s federal budget. Although Maduro
did not bring home an OPEC agreement, the trip at least set the stage
for a meeting next week in Caracas of technical teams from OPEC
countries
<http://www.telesurtv.net/news/Comisiones-tecnicas-de-paises-petroleros-se-reuniran-en-Caracas-20150118-0001.html>with
the goal of reaching “global consensus on petroleum prices.” At a time
when the U.S. is imposing unilateral sanctions on Venezuela, Maduro’s
trip has also fortified his relationships with a number of nations and
raised the profile of Caracas on the world stage. Moreover, Venezuela
has the strong support of allies not only in Latin America
<http://www.counterpunch.org/2015/01/02/approchement-between-the-united-states-and-cuba-and-sanctions-against-venezuela/>,
but among the Non-aligned Movement countries as well.
While the images of long lines and empty store shelves are played over
and over again in the international corporate media, there are other
scenes that show another side to Venezuelan political reality. As the
Worker-President Nicolas Maduro drove a bus through the streets of
Caracas on January 17, upon his return from a twelve day trip abroad
<http://www.correodelorinoco.gob.ve/foto-dia/asi-recibio-pueblo-al-presidente-maduro-fotos/>,
he was greeted by well wishers at ten different points in the city. And
as he walked to the National Assembly Building on the way to deliver his
address to the nation on January 21, the streets were lined with
cheering well wishers. There is indeed growing public resentment over
the shortages and long queues as there was in 2002 and again in 2003.
Nevertheless, in those cases popular power, at the critical hour,
remained firmly on the side of the Bolivarian cause, despite the
hardships caused by scarcity. The MUD is trying to capitalize on “the
perfect storm” by whittling away at Chavista support for Maduro in the
popular barrios, but this will be an uphill battle so long as the
opposition retains the stain of the intensely unpopular April 2002 coup.
As a number of political commentators have urged, it is most important
now for Maduro to follow up on his announcements of remedies and reforms
with more details and effective action if Chavistas are to achieve an
electoral edge in the coming parliamentary elections. If the last
fifteen years of the Bolivarian revolution are any indication of the
future, then once again, just as during the coup of 2002 and the
subsequent oil strike, the organized expressions of popular power will
probably be decisive in determining the outcome of the present economic
and political crossroad.
Note: Translations by the authors are unofficial.
See: Revolution, Counter Revolution, and the Economic War in Venezuela:
Part I <http://venezuelanalysis.com/analysis/11170>
*References to Books:*
Ciccariello-Maher, G. (2013). /We Created Chávez: A People’s History of
the Venezuelan Revolution./ Durham: Duke University Press.
Coronil, F. (2011). “State Reflections: The 2002 Coup against Hugo
Chávez.” In Thomas Ponniah and Jonathan Eastwood, Eds. /The Revolution
in Venezuela: Social and Political Change Under Chávez/. Cambridge, MA:
Harvard University Press.
Gott, R. (2011). /Hugo Chávez and the Bolivarian Revolution/. New York:
Verso.
Jones, B. (2007). !HUGO! /The Hugo Chávez story From Mud Hut to
Perpetual Revolution/. Hanover New Hampshire: Steerforth Press.
Kornbluh, P. (2003). /The Pinochet File: A Declassified Dossier on
Atrocity and Accountability/. New York: The New Press.
Mancilla, A. S. (2014). /El Pensamiento Económico de Hugo Chávez/.
Spain: El Viejo Topo.
Sanchez, G.(2012). /LA NUBE NEGRA: Golpe Petrolero en Venezuela/. CA:
Vadell Hermanos Editores.
Wilpert, G. (2007). /Changing Venezuela by Taking Power: The History and
Policies of the Chávez Government/. New York: Verso.
--
Freedom Archives 522 Valencia Street San Francisco, CA 94110 415
863.9977 www.freedomarchives.org
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