[News] The Third Insurrectionary Moment of the Venezuelan Right
Anti-Imperialist News
news at freedomarchives.org
Wed Feb 26 19:01:07 EST 2014
February Traumas: The Third Insurrectionary Moment of the Venezuelan Right
<http://venezuelanalysis.com/printmail/10411>http://venezuelanalysis.com/analysis/10411
<http://venezuelanalysis.com/print/10411>
By Jeffrey R. Webber and Susan Spronk - New Politics, February 26th 2014
"Today the counter-revolutionary Right is reactivating itself,"
according to long-time Venezuelan revolutionary Roland Denis, "taking
advantage of the profound deterioration that this slow revolutionary
process is suffering. Its reappearance and interlacing with 'democratic
civil society' is a clear signal to the popular movement that we either
convert this moment into a creative and reactivating crisis of the
collective revolutionary will, or we bid farewell to this beautiful and
traumatic history that we have built over the last 25 years."[1]
<http://newpol.org/content/february-traumas-third-insurrectionary-moment-venezuelan-right#_edn1>
For seasoned observers of Venezuelan politics, the events of the past
week are a disheartening repetition of opposition-led resistance efforts
that have yet again sought to undermine political stability in the
country. This is not the first time in recent history that the
opposition has resorted to "extra-parliamentary" tactics, including
violence, to push their political agenda. Nor is it the first time that
the mainstream media has provided generous airtime to opposition
demonstrations in Caracas, repeating the sob stories of upper class
Venezuelans "repressed" by the government because they cannot find
toilet paper on the store shelves, or in a more laughable episode,
ingredients to bake a cake.[2]
<http://newpol.org/content/february-traumas-third-insurrectionary-moment-venezuelan-right#_edn2>
As with most situations in which there has been a violent conflict over
who controls the reins of the state, it is /possible/ to find fault on
both sides. As a February 22^nd report by the Centre for Economic
Policy Research notes, "the political allegiances" of the victims of the
violence so far "and their causes of death are varied." Of the eight
deaths, two of the responsible assailants might be linked to the
government, including a SEBIM agent (the Venezuelan intelligence
service) who was not authorized to be at the protest. The head of SEBIM
was subsequently fired and there is a warrant out for arrest of the
agents who fired the shots.[3]
<http://newpol.org/content/february-traumas-third-insurrectionary-moment-venezuelan-right#_edn3>
Over the last few weeks, the functional role of the privately-owned
media viewable in Venezuela, such as the Colombian television station
NTN24 which also broadcasts in Colombia, and CNN en Español, based in
the US, has been to promote and consolidate a matrix of opinion and
interpretation around the recent events in Venezuela: "peaceful
protests" have been lined up against "excessive use of force by state
security apparatuses." This frame has found its echo in virtually all of
the presidential or prime ministerial statements on the recent conflicts
in Venezuela issued by Western imperialist states over the last number
of days.
For example, on February 21, 2014 US Secretary of State John Kerry
predictably called for an end to violence "on both sides," criticizing
the Venezuelan government for imprisoning "students and a key
opposition figure" as well as limiting "the freedoms of expression and
assembly necessary for legitimate political debate," such as revoking
the credentials of CNN en Español reporters. [4]
<http://newpol.org/content/february-traumas-third-insurrectionary-moment-venezuelan-right#_edn4> A
closer inspection reveals, however, that the situation is less
two-sided, to put it mildly, than Kerry and his spokespeople in the
mainstream media would have us believe. Indeed, this February the
counter-revolutionary forces have once again demonstrated blatant
disregard for the basic principles of liberal democracy to which they
theoretically subscribe.
One of the reasons that it is easy to defeat the opposition's claims in
Venezuela (at least in rational argument) is that their attempts to
manufacture consent are largely based upon a series of half-truths, lies
and misdemeanors. Unfortunately these misdeeds are continually parroted
in the mainstream press as if they were true with no apparent need for
fact-checking. For example, on February 20, /The New York Times/,
reported that "The only television station that regularly broadcast
voices critical of the government was sold last year, and the new owners
have softened its news coverage."[5]
<http://newpol.org/content/february-traumas-third-insurrectionary-moment-venezuelan-right#_edn5> This
is an outright lie according to the Carter Centre, which reported in
2013 that private TV media has about 74 percent of the audience share
for news, with the state share at just 26 percent, for "recent key
newsworthy events."[6]
<http://newpol.org/content/february-traumas-third-insurrectionary-moment-venezuelan-right#_edn6>While
withering budgets for investigative journalism might be to blame for
some of this inaccuracy in reporting, it is more likely that the
corporate media shares the opposition's vision of "democracy." In such a
vision, any attempt to redistribute a mere fraction of the social wealth
in a way that curtails the "freedom" to accumulate capital is a threat
to social justice.
As John Kerry lambasts the Maduro government, "This is not how
democracies behave," referring to the imprisonment of some instigators
of the protests. By way of context and juxtaposition, on February 12, 30
students were arrested in Venezuela in the wake of barricade building,
Molotov cocktail attacks, and tire burning; 7,000 protesters were
arrested during the days of Occupy in 122 cities of the United States
between 2011 and 2013; and 153 students were arrested in the UK during
the 2010 demonstrations against 300-percent hikes in tuition.[7]
<http://newpol.org/content/february-traumas-third-insurrectionary-moment-venezuelan-right#_edn7> This
is not even to get into what British journalist Gary Younge has called
an "open season on black boys" in the United States by vigilantes, and
the propensity for police officers to regularly kill unarmed black men
with impunity in that country.[8]
<http://newpol.org/content/february-traumas-third-insurrectionary-moment-venezuelan-right#_edn8>
The real problem, it seems, is that democracy is supposed to entail
competitive elitism and an exchange of office between bourgeois
political parties (such as the Republicans and Democrats); it is not
supposed to create room for alternative projects whose aim is to reform
capitalism, the foundation of liberal democracy itself, by curtailing
some of the "freedoms" associated with owning private property, such as
controlling the media, buying elections, orchestrating corporate welfare
projects, and supporting a foreign policy that keeps the world "free"
for accumulation.
Unfortunately, the "democratic" space of the Internet has not fared much
better. As Julia Buxton documents in her excellent analysis of social
media coverage of recent protests, Twitter feeds have repeatedly
circulated false and misleading images of the supposed state-sponsored
violence in Venezuela, including images that are in fact of Egypt or of
the repression by state security forces that have been disbanded. While
such false reporting on social media by average folk might be expected,
what is highly problematic is that such "reports" have then been
circulated in mainstream press outlets such as the /ABC/ paper in Spain
and the /Guardian/ newspaper in the UK. As Buxton concludes,
"journalists have yet to learn that authoritative reporting requires
fact-based accounts, not recycled and unchecked tweets from Twitter -- a
mechanism that can be used to promote delusion as well as democracy."[9]
<http://newpol.org/content/february-traumas-third-insurrectionary-moment-venezuelan-right#_edn9>
Where were the mainstream reporters during the post-election violence in
April 2013, when a dozen government supporters died at the hand of the
opposition? Where were they when the Chavistas swept the municipal
elections by a margin of 10 percent of the popular vote in December
2013? And where have they been every time a landowner has murdered a
peasant leader?[10]
<http://newpol.org/content/february-traumas-third-insurrectionary-moment-venezuelan-right#_edn10> While
opposition supporters complain about the violations of human rights in
Venezuela, the supporters of the Bolivarian process talk about the right
to information, which is best produced by public and independently
controlled and operated community media rather than by the employees of
profit-seeking media conglomerates.
*Forgotten Archives of a "Democratic" Opposition*
It is tempting to imagine that there might be some truth in the
pro-democracy slogans of the young people coalescing on the streets of
Caracas, but the right-wing opposition in Venezuela, of which this
student revolt is a part, has a less than stellar record of comporting
itself within the constitutional parameters of bourgeois liberalism.
They attempted a coup d'état in April 2002, which temporarily removed
Chávez from office with the support of the US government. When that
avenue closed, and Chávez returned to power with the help of massive
demonstrations of public support and military forces loyal to the
President, they orchestrated a lockout of the oil industry in late-2002
and early 2003, in an attempt to bleed the economy dry and foment
discord among broad swathes of society. That effort soured as well.
Indeed, with each lashing of the reactionary whip in these years there
was an unintended deepening of self-activity, self-organization, and
creativity of popular organizing from below.
The opposition logged a new electoral failure when their attempt to
recall the President through a referendum in 2004 was defeated. They
cried fraud, as they do in each election they lose, despite universal
praise of the fairness and transparency of the Venezuelan electoral
system from independent international observers. In 2005, the
opposition boycotted the National Assembly elections, withdrawing
themselves from the electoral game in a misguided hope that the
legitimacy of the political system under Chávez would be undermined
altogether.[11]
<http://newpol.org/content/february-traumas-third-insurrectionary-moment-venezuelan-right#_edn11> Similar
to a small child who has lost her temper after losing the game for the
umpteenth time in a row, the opposition's boycott amounted to a tantrum
in which the opposition took its ball and went home. And similar to a
small child who has become frustrated with playing by the rules, it has
resorted to other options when faced with continual defeat: lying,
cheating, and challenging the referee.
Last April, following the death of Chávez, presidential elections saw
Maduro best Henrique Capriles, the right-wing candidate for the Mesa
Unida Democrática (Roundtable for Democratic Unity, MUD), albeit it by a
narrow margin of less than one percent of the vote. While this result
was too close for many supporters of the Bolivarian revolution who had
previously gained comfort from large margins of 10 percent, it would
still count as a landslide victory in a country such as Canada where the
Conservative Party formed a majority government in 2009 with only 38
percent of the popular vote.
Predictably, the opposition's response to yet another electoral defeat
was rage. Capriles and his supporters refused to recognize the veracity
of the results and then staged violent protests causing the death of a
dozen Bolivarian activists, while leaving another hundred or so injured.
The violent vandals of last April also committed extensive property
damage to public buildings and institutions. It is worth noting,
furthermore, that unlike in the case of the recent Honduran elections --
widely recognized by mainstream human rights organizations to have been
fraudulent, and which further consolidated right-wing strong man
Porfirio 'Pepe' Lobo's grip on that country -- the US has never
formally recognized the legitimacy of Maduro's presidency.[12]
<http://newpol.org/content/february-traumas-third-insurrectionary-moment-venezuelan-right#_edn12>
Once it was evident that provocation in the streets following the April
elections was failing to destabilize the regime, or to rally new social
sectors to the side of the opposition, the latter regrouped and
reconsidered its tactics.[13]
<http://newpol.org/content/february-traumas-third-insurrectionary-moment-venezuelan-right#_edn13> The
MUD held internal elections to establish a new mandate for its
leadership. Capriles came out on top once again, beating Leopoldo López
and María Corina Machado, two personalities to which we will have
occasion to return in a moment. The revised agenda for the Right was to
frame the December 2013 municipal elections as a plebiscite on the
legitimacy of the Maduro administration.
In the municipal elections, Chavismo won decisively, regaining some of
the political ground lost in the presidential elections eight months
earlier. In spite of a voluntary voting regime and a historical tendency
of abstention in local elections, there was a turnout of 60 percent.
Chavismo won by approximately 10 percent, capturing 242 mayoralties to
MUD's 75. This unanticipated outcome for the opposition signified its
failure since April last year to undermine the legitimacy of the Maduro
presidency.[14]
<http://newpol.org/content/february-traumas-third-insurrectionary-moment-venezuelan-right#_edn14> MUD
proved itself incapable of disputing the hegemony of Chavismo in the
electoral field, even during a year in which inflation rose very sharply
to 56 percent and shortages of foodstuffs and other basic commodities
began to proliferate.[15]
<http://newpol.org/content/february-traumas-third-insurrectionary-moment-venezuelan-right#_edn15>
*Surface Divisions, Integral Unities*
Shortly after the results were in, Capriles, now acting as governor of
the state of Miranda, changed gears and responded to the second call in
the post-municipal election period by President Maduro for opposition
mayors and governors to meet with him in the presidential palace and
work out a plan of peace and national reconciliation. A photo of
Capriles and Maduro shaking hands in the palace was circulated widely in
the media, ostensibly ending the Right's strategy of openly questioning
the legitimacy of the constitutional President.
Alongside Capriles, the majority of oppositional mayors and governors
also attended the dialogues with the President, and agreed to
participate in a new program designed to reduce crime and enhance
citizen security. The move toward moderation and dialogue was
unpersuasive to the hardest elements of the ultra-Right within the MUD
coalition, however, and the recent manoeuvring of López and Machado is
in part an expression of this tension internal to the opposition.[16]
<http://newpol.org/content/february-traumas-third-insurrectionary-moment-venezuelan-right#_edn16>
For many on the Left of Chavismo, however, it is easy to exaggerate the
divisions within the counter-revolutionary bloc, and in so doing
dangerously obscure their basic unity of purpose.[17]
<http://newpol.org/content/february-traumas-third-insurrectionary-moment-venezuelan-right#_edn17> "We
are facing the classic counter-revolutionary schema," reads a recent
communiqué of the revolutionary socialist current Marea Socialista
(Socialist Tide, MS), which operates within the governing United
Socialist Party of Venezuela (PSUV). "It consists of applying pressure
on the government to implement anti-popular measures and in so doing
completely lose its social base, deepen its exhausted image in front of
the Bolivarian people. As a result, they will be more open to the
ousting of the government, whether that ousting is violent or soft. The
government of Maduro is committing a grave error insofar as it believes
that there is a 'violent' Right and another one that's 'peaceful,' with
which the government can negotiate and which will respect the
Constitution. As in the old combination of the 'carrot and the stick'
these sectors converge among themselves around a common objective, the
defeat of the Bolivarian Process."[18]
<http://newpol.org/content/february-traumas-third-insurrectionary-moment-venezuelan-right#_edn18>
"These days, fascist violence and the potential of a coup are taking
place in a very distinct situation," to the one of 2002, notes Denis in
the same essay cited above. His reservations on the depth of division of
purpose in the camp of the Right are of the same register as the Marea
Socialista communiqué. "That fascist subjectivity planted in 2002 has
always remained, diminished but consolidated. In fact, López and
Capriles, as the personalities most representative of this 'citizen'
movement, have never separated themselves from it, albeit starting from
their individually distinct hysterical psychologies and pathologies, and
the divisions between them in their original party Primero Justicia.
Today they appear as the leaders of the opposition, competing between
each other for its singular leadership."[19]
<http://newpol.org/content/february-traumas-third-insurrectionary-moment-venezuelan-right#_edn19>
Leopoldo López, together with National Assembly congressperson María
Corina Machado, called for the initial demonstration that kicked off the
latest events on Youth Day, February 12, under the slogan "La Salida,"
or "exit," unambiguously signifying their intention to overthrow the
democratically-elected government. "Opposition leader Leopoldo López --
competing with Capriles for leadership -- has portrayed the current
demonstrations as something that could force Maduro from office," the
American economist Mark Weisbrot reports. "It was obvious that there
was, and remains, no peaceful way that this could happen."[20]
<http://newpol.org/content/february-traumas-third-insurrectionary-moment-venezuelan-right#_edn20>
The cartography of protest in Caracas has closely mirrored the
socio-geographic divisions of the capital, featuring as it does a
lighter-skinned and richer east, and a darker-skinned and poorer west.
Middle class barricades were erected in the east, populated by the
students of elite private universities, alongside students of the main
state university -- historically, a cordoned off stomping ground for
kids of the rich.[21]
<http://newpol.org/content/february-traumas-third-insurrectionary-moment-venezuelan-right#_edn21>
The west, on the other hand, was relatively free of unrest. In the days
following the initial explosion of activity, the "peaceful" protests of
the Right included attacks on 50 of the public buses from a new system
that acts as affordable transport for the poor. The Bolivarian
University, a new institutional network designed to incorporate the
lower orders into the higher education system, was also besieged. And
Cuban medical personnel working for the Barrio Adentro health program
have been the targets of fierce physical offensives. According to
numerous observers, paramilitary shock troops are operating behind the
cannon fodder of right-wing students in the streets. In protests that
are supposedly driven in part by the scarcity of foodstuffs and other
basic commodities available to the population, rightist militants had
the audacity to attack government vehicles delivering precisely such
products.[22]
<http://newpol.org/content/february-traumas-third-insurrectionary-moment-venezuelan-right#_edn22>
Capriles, meanwhile, has been reluctant to join the call for
demonstrations in the streets, and indeed has piously condemned
excessive violence by protesters while hoping that popular memory has
faded with sufficient rapidity to leave in the past his leading role in
calling out protests that led to a dozen deaths last April. With
Capriles there is always one hand discretely, cautiously maintaining its
measure of the pulse of insurgent conspiracy. If that pulse grows
sufficiently strong, he'll abandon the path of negotiation.
In another sign that the effects of aggressive student protests have
thus far alienated moderate sections of the counter-revolutionary bloc,
it seems that few political leaders on the Right of any importance --
beyond López and Machado -- have lent their formal backing to the
violent posturing of student and paramilitary demonstrations.
One salient expression of this reality is the active twitter account of
Ramón Muchacho, the conservative and fervently anti-Chavista mayor of
Chacao, a wealthy eastern district of Caracas. This is what he had to
say after a night of student protests in that municipality left the Bank
of Venezuela and Provincial Bank damaged, alongside a judicial building,
the offices of the Ministry of Transportation, and a local station of
Metro Caracas: : "We can see a terrible lack of leadership and
direction. Only anarchy. Is this what we want? Will there be some limit
to the violence and vandalism? Is what is occurring justified? Is
someone going to assume responsibility?"[23]
<http://newpol.org/content/february-traumas-third-insurrectionary-moment-venezuelan-right#_edn23>
*Portrait of an Unrepentant Coup Plotter*
López, in state custody since February 17, and facing an array of
charges related to sedition, is the most visible face of this third
insurrectionary moment of the Venezuelan Right -- the first being April
2002 and the second being the oil lockout of 2002-2003.[24]
<http://newpol.org/content/february-traumas-third-insurrectionary-moment-venezuelan-right#_edn24> He
hardly emerged out of nowhere. López was the mayor of wealthy Chacao
before Muchacho. After finishing prep school in the United States, he
studied at the Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University in the
1990s, where he made contact with US establishment figures such as David
Petraeus, ex-chief of the Central Intelligence Agency and confidant of
Barack Obama in all matters connected to national security.
After the stint at Harvard, López returned to Venezuela, where he
established relations with the Caracas offices of the International
Republican Institute, an entity of the US Republican Party -- the
institute lent López strategic and financial support. Beginning in 2002,
the Republican Party, then in office under George W. Bush, flew López to
Washington on multiple occasions to meet with functionaries of the Bush
administration. That same year, López led the opposition march on the
Miraflores Presidential Palace in the capital, which resulted in dozens
of deaths and precipitated the short-lived coup and kidnapping of
then-President Chávez. López is also a longstanding associate of
ex-Colombian President Álvaro Uribe (2002-2010), with whom he met on
numerous occasions over the last decade. Uribe was well known for his
hard-line against the Chávez regime, which corresponded with his
domestic war of terror against large sections of the civilian population
in Colombia under the banner of "democratic security."[25]
<http://newpol.org/content/february-traumas-third-insurrectionary-moment-venezuelan-right#_edn25>
*Social Forces on the Right*
Back in 2002-2003, the counter-revolutionary bloc consisted mainly of
the US embassy in Caracas, the highest echelons of management of the
state-oil company PDVSA, the business confederation Fedecámaras, the
Central de Trabajadores de Venezuela (Venezuelan Workers Central, CTV),
the domestic hierarchy of the Catholic Church, and a variety of other
oligarchic and conservative cross-sections of political society. This
ugly melange was prettified through the lens of private media empires,
both national and international, transforming the coup attempt into a
struggle of democracy against tyranny.[26]
<http://newpol.org/content/february-traumas-third-insurrectionary-moment-venezuelan-right#_edn26>
Beginning in roughly 2008, the right-wing of the perennially divided
student movement was sought out as a new vanguard through which to
advance the opposition agenda. The counter-revolution had not enjoyed
significant successes in linking organically to any other social subject
that might otherwise have flag-shipped their enterprise. The large
landowners and big business sectors that constitute their leadership are
incapable of forging a national, unifying movement with the
incorporation of wider social layers. The presence of the oppositional
Right within the formal working class is minimal, as is its influence
among the popular sectors more generally, at least for now. It is thus
understandable, within its own logic, why the Right has sought out the
students as a field of struggle.[27]
<http://newpol.org/content/february-traumas-third-insurrectionary-moment-venezuelan-right#_edn27>
In 2008, the US-based Cato Institute awarded the $US 500,000 Milton
Friedman Prize for Advancing Liberty to student leader Yon Goicoechea
for his role in mobilizing protests against the government's suspension
of private broadcaster RCTV's licence. Subsequently, a considerable
chunk of the US$ 45 million in annual funding from US institutions to
the Venezuelan opposition was directed toward "youth outreach" programs.
As an outcome of such financial backing and logistical training in media
campaigns the right-wing Juventud Activa Venezuela Unida (United
Venezuelan Active Youth, JAVU) became an increasingly active
organization. In 2010, for example, JAVU led protests against ostensible
state censorship of private broadcasters, as well as struggles framed as
defending the "autonomy" of universities from state intrusion. Inside
the heat of the internal divisions of the Right today, the students have
openly aligned with the López-Machado faction, transforming themselves
into the cannon fodder serving the ultra-Right. [28]
<http://newpol.org/content/february-traumas-third-insurrectionary-moment-venezuelan-right#_edn28> "Students
as the new social subject of the counter-revolutionary Right is
something distinct from 2002," Denis observes. "They are favoured for
their capacity to engage in permanent activism, above all students who
do not work and who do not have any social responsibilities."[29]
<http://newpol.org/content/february-traumas-third-insurrectionary-moment-venezuelan-right#_edn29>
If the students are the visible brigades tearing up the cityscapes, a
complex configuration of national and transnational networks forms the
counter-revolutionary bloc of the present. Fedecámaras remains active,
as do the major players in private media, national and international.
Political parties, NGOs, and churches are all articulated under the
umbrella of MUD. In terms of parties, this fragile unity contains Acción
Democrática (Democratic Action, AD); Primero Justicia (First Justice,
PJ); COPEI, Causa Radical (Radical Cause, CR); Voluntad Popular (Popular
Will, VP); Proyecto Venezuela (Project Venezuela, PV), and a series of
other smaller entities of the Right.
Among the multimillionaires backing the opposition is Pedro Carmona,
often considered the father of/golpismo/ (coupism) in Venezuela. Carmona
was briefly declared President by coup supporters in the midst of their
abortive attempt to oust Chávez in 2002. Exiled in Colombia at the
moment, he is said to maintain a network of complicity in Venezuela.
Jorge Roig is one of the businessmen of Carmona's politicized network in
Caracas, and Eligio Cedeño is a key contact in Miami. Both Roig and
Cedeño are openly promoting economic boycott, shortage of goods, and
hoarding at the moment. They are also alleged to have financed various
/golpista /civil society groups, such as the NGO Humano y Libre (Human
and Free).
In the international sphere, US institutions such as USAID and the
National Endowment for Democracy (NED) have forged intimate ties with
the right-wing opposition, providing logistical and financial support at
every turn. The full extent of their involvement is unlikely to be known
for several years, but through Wikileaks we know already a considerable
amount.
NGOs proliferate domestically in the shadows of other actors. Among them
is the Centro de Divulgación del Conocimiento Económico para la Libertad
(Centre for the Popularization of Economic Knowledge for Freedom,
CEDICE). CEDICE generates sustained critique of the economic policy of
the government and openly supports boycott campaigns. Among its most
important financial backers is the US-based Center for International
Private Enterprise (CIPE).[30]
<http://newpol.org/content/february-traumas-third-insurrectionary-moment-venezuelan-right#_edn30> It
is a widespread belief within Chavismo, and with good historical
precedent, that the whole range of domestic actors on the Right are in
regular communication with the Pentagon, CIA, and State Department in
terms of determining the range of tactics to be deployed over the next
period.
*The Regular Misery of Capital*
If that's the manufactured landscape of the Right, the latest impulse to
return to extra-parliamentary insurrection is taking place within a real
set of contradictions and crises internal to Chavismo. The eruption
coincides with heightened expressions of structural weaknesses in the
economic development strategy of the government. Underlying problems
have come much more boldly to the fore since we wrote our recent article
on the afterlives of Chávez in Venezuela last summer -- not least of
these are the issues of inflation and shortages.[31]
<http://newpol.org/content/february-traumas-third-insurrectionary-moment-venezuelan-right#_edn31>
Discontent among layers of the Chavista grassroots is real, with a
second move to devalue the currency very recently being introduced in
capitulation to demands from the Capriles "soft-Right" contingent.[32]
<http://newpol.org/content/february-traumas-third-insurrectionary-moment-venezuelan-right#_edn32>High
inflation is destroying workers' real salaries and makes virtually
meaningless the recently decreed 10 percent increase in salaries. The
social base of Bolivarianism has long been calling for an iron fist in
dealings with the bourgeoisie, but the Maduro government has restricted
itself to ad hoc and ineffective controls, laws, sanctions, and a series
of other measures that do not cohere into an economic strategy.[33]
<http://newpol.org/content/february-traumas-third-insurrectionary-moment-venezuelan-right#_edn33>
Government accusations that the capitalist class is waging "economic
warfare," while substantiated,[34]
<http://newpol.org/content/february-traumas-third-insurrectionary-moment-venezuelan-right#_edn34>tend
to downplay the absolutely routine problems created by capitalist
activity in the normal process of capital accumulation in Venezuela.
Manuel Sutherland, one of the boldest Marxist economists writing on the
Venezuelan process at present is worth quoting at length on this topic:
"The government continues to believe in the fantasy of a patriotic
bourgeoisie that will renounce the extraordinary profits it can capture
through illegal imports and currency speculation. Unfortunately, the
government cannot imagine a country in which capitalists don't
appropriate 70 percent of the private sector GDP and massively exploit
the workforce.... In sum, chavismo dreams of a reasonable and loving
capitalist who obviously does not exist. With him it wants to negotiate,
even though the normal action of these capitalists, that is to say the
process of the accumulation of capital, is the cause of the country's
misery."[35]
<http://newpol.org/content/february-traumas-third-insurrectionary-moment-venezuelan-right#_edn35>
It is very difficult to sustain the process even in its current state,
never mind deepening and extending any long transition toward socialism,
given the weight that private capital still enjoys in the economy.
According to Sutherland, Venezuela experienced capital flight during the
period of fixed exchange rates of around $US 150 billion, the
equivalent to approximately 43 percent of GDP in 2010. This looting of
capital is part of what is driving the devaluation of the local currency
and strengthening speculation in the parallel black market in dollars
(in which dollars are sold for 15 times the official exchange rate).
The black market rate is the rate used by commercial vendors to set
their prices, with the exception of the few products subject to
regulation. So escalating prices, even setting aside the issue of
hoarding, would still be a major issue requiring resolution. Those
commercial actors who legally obtain dollars through official channels
in order ostensibly to purchase imports of goods from abroad have no
incentive to actually use the dollars obtained to this end; rather they
have every incentive to divert those dollars illegally onto the black
market in order to make extraordinary profits. This causes further
scarcity of goods, increases in prices, and a fall in the quality of
goods and services -- i.e. it is less a conspiracy of capital through
economic warfare, than its regular behaviour given incentive structures
that is at the root of the present economic crisis.[36]
<http://newpol.org/content/february-traumas-third-insurrectionary-moment-venezuelan-right#_edn36>
According to the communiqué of Marea Socialista -- a group which has
repeatedly declared its decisive commitment to defending any and all
rightist conspiracies against the Maduro administration -- the principal
error of the government consists in its vacillation in economic policy
since April 2013. The intervening period has witnessed the introduction
of certain measures that can only be read as adaptations to demands from
the Right. With the announcement the latest devaluation of the currency
introduced earlier this month (called "SICAD 2"), which is similar to
the system introduced in 2010 under Chávez, the government aims to free
up an even more substantial part of the oil rent, the result of which
will be even higher inflation. All of this, Marea Socialists warns, will
deepen the crisis of scarcity. This announcement of a new Permuta
dollar, embedded within the SICAD 2 arrangements, will achieve nothing
but the deepening of social discontent and disorientation among the
Chavista social base.[37]
<http://newpol.org/content/february-traumas-third-insurrectionary-moment-venezuelan-right#_edn37>
An appropriate redirection of economic policy, from the defensive to the
offensive, according to Marea Socialista, would include the immediate
escalation of anti-capitalist measures, such as: the establishment of a
state monopoly under social control of all external commerce, and the
assurance that the state be the only importer of essential goods for
Venezuelan people; national centralization under social control of all
dollars available in the country, whether they are dollars that enter
through the oil trade, or those that are deposited in foreign accounts;
massive intervention and state and social control over the entirety of
the private banking system that presently operates in the country, in
order both to finance economic planning and to simultaneously centralize
control of all funds presently managed by the public banking system; the
urgent recovery of state production of basic subsistence products to
respond to the authentic shortage crisis; expropriation under workers'
and popular control of the largest corporations involved in the biggest
operations of hoarding, speculation, and contraband; a call for the
peoples and governments of Latin America to lend support and solidarity
through the supply of basic goods and medicines to confront the problems
of the immediate moment and of the transition to the implementation of
such measures.[38]
<http://newpol.org/content/february-traumas-third-insurrectionary-moment-venezuelan-right#_edn38>
*Bureaucratic Sclerosis*
In our recent article in /New Politics/, we tried to establish some of
the basic analytical and empirical foundations for understanding a
creeping bureaucratic sclerosis within the various organizations
constituting the popular movement.[39]
<http://newpol.org/content/february-traumas-third-insurrectionary-moment-venezuelan-right#_edn39> It
is perhaps more evident than ever that a rigorous Marxist theorization
of bureaucracy is required in order to understand some of the structural
obstacles standing in the way of the advancement of the Bolivarian
process in an anti-capitalist direction.
In a recent open letter from Caracas, Mike González, author of a
just-released biography of Chávez, calls our attention to a "new
bureaucratic class who are themselves the speculators and owners of this
new and failing economy... they are to be seen delivering fierce
speeches against corruption and wearing the obligatory red shirt and cap
of chavismo. But literally billions of dollars have 'disappeared' in
recent years, the extraordinary wealth accumulated by leading Chavistas,
are the clearest sign that it is their interests that have prevailed,
while the institutions of popular power have largely withered on the
vine.... The right has hoped to trade on that disillusionment."[40]
<http://newpol.org/content/february-traumas-third-insurrectionary-moment-venezuelan-right#_edn40> To
speak of withering on a vine is perhaps to exaggerate, but but otherwise
this is perceptive analysis. González singles out for treatment the
growing military presence within the government, grouped around Diasdado
Cabello, and the head of the oil company PDVSA and Vice President of the
Economy, Rafael Rodríguez, but notes that there are others.
According to Roland Denis, there are real divisions within the
capitalist class that are partially being expressed through the visible
tensions in the current leadership struggle for hegemony in the
right-wing opposition. There is, according to Denis, a national section
of the bourgeoisie that has enjoyed a "paradise of profits over the last
number of years, operating beneath a model of bureaucratic-corporatism
and the state capitalism promoted through the economic development plan
of the government." In this analysis, the rent captured through
corruption and clientelist networks has generated profits for this
national section of the bourgeoisie, just as it has for the internal
bureaucratic layer of Chavismo identified in passing by González. As a
result, the national section, represented politically by Capriles within
the latest dispute on the Right, has not immediately lent its potential
force (business strikes, open sabotage of the economy, internal coups,
etc.) to the assault on power being orchestrated by López and Machado.
Instead, the national section is interested in relative stability, and a
regime transition which would not put into jeopardy the current paradise
of profits.[41]
<http://newpol.org/content/february-traumas-third-insurrectionary-moment-venezuelan-right#_edn41>
The process of bureaucratization, according to Denis, is also
responsible for the loss of an original vitality on the part of the
grassroots organizations of Bolivarian process that have been
transformed, to an ever deepening degree, into mere clients of the state
-- made to respond to the incentive structures of a state-capitalist
model of development in an oil-rich country, and too often mobilized in
the interests of the bureaucrats of that structure rather than being the
self-determining subjects of a revolutionary potential which at one time
seemed more clearly present on the horizon: "the rentist, parasitic
model of state capitalism... delivers a politics of control,
concentration of power and the substitution of social control with
technocratic and bureaucratic functionaries.... This is a model which if
it is not called fundamentally into question, with measures to transform
it radically in the short term, will lead to the continuation of out of
control shortages and inflation...."[42]
<http://newpol.org/content/february-traumas-third-insurrectionary-moment-venezuelan-right#_edn42>
*Buying "Peace" within the Structural Violence of Capitalism*
A strategy of national reconciliation is destined to lead in time to
full capitalist restoration and the reversal of the social gains
achieved since Chávez assumed office in 1999. The "pacificism" of the
Maduro government offers, for Denis, "a 'peace' that does not produce,
does not create challenges and new levels of mobilization, but simply
calls for support for the victimized figure of Nicolás and his
government, sending off clear signals of weakness and the absence of an
epic sense that every revolution must have."[43]
<http://newpol.org/content/february-traumas-third-insurrectionary-moment-venezuelan-right#_edn43>
Likewise, for Carlos Carcione, an incisive commentator on the socialist
Left of Chavismo:
"A governmental campaign of calling for 'peace,' at a minimum untimely
and bound to be frustrated. The maintenance of a doomed plan to search
for an interlocutor in the bourgeoisie to establish a process of
conciliation, rather than searching for democratic participation of the
people who live from their labour, leading toward immediate
anticapitalist measures. These are the salient symptoms of the times
that over the coming weeks or months will decide, with a heavy emphasis
on the weight of actions taken in the streets, the immediate future of
what the world knows as the Bolivarian Process."[44]
<http://newpol.org/content/february-traumas-third-insurrectionary-moment-venezuelan-right#_edn44>
Some Chavista supporters, lacking such a critique of the
bureaucratization of the process to date, offer an overly complacent
view on the possibilities of resolving the present conflict. They point
to the fact that, unlike in 2002, the Bolivarian forces are now much
more consolidated. They control the oil rent which is obtained through
the state oil company PDVSA. They control the armed forces and access to
international reserves. And they have a much more prominent presence in
the field of production and arena of the media.[45]
<http://newpol.org/content/february-traumas-third-insurrectionary-moment-venezuelan-right#_edn45> On
its own, this is more a recipe for the consolidation of a bureaucratic
state capitalism than a project of emancipatory socialism.
A recent communiqué from the Corriente Revolucionario Bolívar y Zamora
-- Poder Popular Socialista (The Bolívar and Zamora Revolutionary
Current -- Socialist Popular Power) resonates more profoundly with the
best impulses of the poor in their own struggles for liberation within
the Bolivarian process of the last 15 years. The winds of reaction in
Venezuela in 2002 and 2003 unintentionally instigated the richest phase
of self-organization and activity of the oppressed and exploited that we
have witnessed thus far in the course of the Bolivarian process. The
question is whether the Left of chavismo can win in the present
conjuncture; can it put to rest all illusions fostered by the most
conservative sections, and bureaucratized layers of the ruling party in
any technocratic, negotiated "peace" with the "democratic" sections of
the bourgeoisie. If the Chavista Left can manage this, it's not
impossible that transformative renewal and vitalization of the process
generally would be the result. It's on the table. It matters not just
that this third insurrectionary moment of the counter-revolutionary
Right is defeated, but /how/ it is defeated, and that it is
/actually/defeated.
The Bolívar and Zamora Revolutionary Current calls for the "ever greater
opening of spaces to the people and not to assume that the people are
merely a reserve bequeathed by the comandante [Chávez] that is available
to be convoked in moments of risk or electoral conjunctures. It is
necessary to free popular protagonism, its incipient power, popular
power, the communal councils and communes, the collectives and social
fronts, all of the enormous and marvelous diversity that if unleashed in
full will be capable of storming heaven. Our biggest strength is the
resonance of our ideas in the fertile soil of the grassroots - in
political, cultural, ethnic, sexual, popular diversity. There we will
find enormous concentrated energies. It's with these people that the
struggle will be won in the street, but also in the struggle of ideas,
of values, of ethics and of aesthetics, as they push to fully realize
their concrete, revolutionary, fulfillment."
The project of counter-revolution nourishes itself on the diminution of
revolutionary capacities, the bureaucratization of the once dynamic
forces from below within the Bolivarian process. The project of
defeating the counter-revolution therefore becomes one of
re-establishing, through popular dialogue and grassroots assembly, the
revolutionary initiative, to agree "on defensive actions, communication,
the takeover of institutions, and the means of production -- all of
which will no doubt take us to a higher level of confrontation, where it
becomes a matter of raising unconditional demands rather than
negotiation, much less submission."[46]
<http://newpol.org/content/february-traumas-third-insurrectionary-moment-venezuelan-right#_edn46>
Concretely, this might mean, among other things, putting an end to the
impunity of the Right -- not just enforcing the full letter of the law
against Leopoldo López, but calling for the detention of Capriles and
all those responsible for the government supporters assassinated in
April 2013 following the presidential elections. It might mean the
incorporation of the grassroots into the highest levels of
decision-making power in the government -- that is, the inclusion of the
social and political organizations of the Bolivarian people, their
rank-and-file unions, and their communes and councils, as well as the
endowment of these bodies with authentic power. It might mean the
encouragement and support for the independent struggles of the exploited
who are currently fighting for improvement in their salaries and for the
defence of their jobs, as in the case of the auto workers, or for their
collective contracts, as in the case of electrical workers -- that is,
the government must encourage, not criminalize, the legitimate,
autonomous struggle of working people living from their labour even as
it encounters the forces of counter-revolution, indeed to better its
chances in this encounter.[47]
<http://newpol.org/content/february-traumas-third-insurrectionary-moment-venezuelan-right#_edn47>
Such a redirection would also likely require the renovation of
leadership circles and the bringing to justice of those in the highest
offices of the state -- judicial, legislative, and military -- who have
used their posts for enriching themselves, resulting in the
consolidation of a bureaucratic layer within the regime. One place to
start might be the renovation of the cabinet, beginning with the
Ministry of the Economy. What of the reactivation of the commission for
the transformation of the state, abandoned since 2003? It is also
obvious to many that if a socialist transition out of the present crisis
is desired, it will be necessary to establish a system of democratic
planning, from below to above, from municipalities up to regions, with
an immediate emphasis on restoring productive capacity, meeting the
basic consumption needs of the population, and moving toward the
socialization of the country's economy.[48]
<http://newpol.org/content/february-traumas-third-insurrectionary-moment-venezuelan-right#_edn48>
"The gravity of the current crisis," Carcione observes, "can be resolved
in the manner in which we triumphed over the April coup [of 2002] and
the oil sabotage [2002-2003], decisively unleashing the constituent
power, the Bolivarian people. The search for conciliation with
supposedly 'democratic' sectors within the pro-imperialist domestic
Right will lose us the whole Process. It's a historic moment for this
project of emancipation. The hour of truth has arrived."
------------------------------------------------------------------------
[1]
<http://newpol.org/content/february-traumas-third-insurrectionary-moment-venezuelan-right#_ednref1> Roland
Denis, "Desactivar el fascismo," /Aporrea/, February 19, 2014. Available
online at: http://www.aporrea.org/oposicion/a182411.html. Accessed on
February 23, 2014.
[2]
<http://newpol.org/content/february-traumas-third-insurrectionary-moment-venezuelan-right#_ednref2> Belen
Fernandez, "Towards Another Coup in Venezuela?" Al Jazeera, February 19,
2014. Available onling:
http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2014/02/towards-another-coup-venezuela-201421952658348169.html.
Accessed February 25, 2014.
[3]
<http://newpol.org/content/february-traumas-third-insurrectionary-moment-venezuelan-right#_ednref3> Jake
Johnson, "Venezuela: Who Are They and How Did They Die?" CEPR, February
23, 2014. Available online:
http://www.cepr.net/index.php/blogs/the-americas-blog/venezuela-who-are-they-and-how-did-they-die?utm_source=feedburner&utm_medium=feed&utm_campaign=Feed%3A+TheAmericasBlog+%28The+Americas+Blog%29&utm_content=FaceBook
<http://www.cepr.net/index.php/blogs/the-americas-blog/venezuela-who-are-they-and-how-did-they-die?utm_source=feedburner&utm_medium=feed&utm_campaign=Feed%3A+TheAmericasBlog+%28The+Americas+Blog%29&utm_content=FaceBook>.
Accessed February 25, 2014.
[4]
<http://newpol.org/content/february-traumas-third-insurrectionary-moment-venezuelan-right#_ednref4> John
Kerry, "Situation in Venezuela," U.S. Department of State, February 21,
2014. Available online
at:http://www.state.gov/secretary/remarks/2014/02/221919.htm. Accessed
February 25, 2014.
[5]
<http://newpol.org/content/february-traumas-third-insurrectionary-moment-venezuelan-right#_ednref5> William
Neuman, "Protests Swell in Venezuela as Places to Rally Disappear,"/ New
York Times, /February 20, 2014. Available online at:
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/02/21/world/americas/protests-swell-in-venezuela-as-places-to-rally-disappear.html?_r=1.
Accessed February 25, 2014.
[6]
<http://newpol.org/content/february-traumas-third-insurrectionary-moment-venezuelan-right#_ednref6> Cited
by Mark Weisbrot, "Does Venezuelan Television Provide Coverage That
Opposes the Government?" Centre for Economic and Policy Research,
February 24, 2014. Available online
at:http://venezuelanalysis.com/analysis/10400. Accessed February 25, 2014.
[7]
<http://newpol.org/content/february-traumas-third-insurrectionary-moment-venezuelan-right#_ednref7> Julia
Buxton, "Venezuela: The Real Significance of the Student Protests"
/Latin American Bureau/, February 20, 2014. Available online at:
http://lab.org.uk/venezuela-%E2%80%93-student-protests. Accessed on
February 22, 2014. Fort he occupy arrest figures see
http://occupyarrests.moonfruit.com
<http://occupyarrests.moonfruit.com/>. Accessed on February 25, 2014.
[8]
<http://newpol.org/content/february-traumas-third-insurrectionary-moment-venezuelan-right#_ednref8> Gary
Younge, "Open Season on Black Boys after a Verdict Like This,"
/Guardian/, July 14, 2013. Available online at:
http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2013/jul/14/open-season-black-b...
<http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2013/jul/14/open-season-black-boys-verdict>.
Accessed on February 25, 2014.
[9]
<http://newpol.org/content/february-traumas-third-insurrectionary-moment-venezuelan-right#_ednref9> Julia
Buxton, "Venezuela: The Real Significance of the Student Protests."
[10]
<http://newpol.org/content/february-traumas-third-insurrectionary-moment-venezuelan-right#_ednref10>
Jeb Sprague
<http://alainet.org/active/show_author.phtml?autor_apellido=Sprague&autor_nombre=Jeb> and
Joe Emersberger
<http://alainet.org/active/show_author.phtml?autor_apellido=Emersberger&autor_nombre=Joe>,
"Impunity for Venezuela's big landowners," ALAI, December 20, 2011.
Available online at: http://alainet.org/active/51700. Accessed on
February 25, 2014.
[11]
<http://newpol.org/content/february-traumas-third-insurrectionary-moment-venezuelan-right#_ednref11> For
a recent commentary on the Right's record, see Mark Weisbrot, "US
Support for Regime Change in Venezuela is a Mistake," /Guardian/,
February 18, 2014. Available online at:
http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2014/feb/18/venezuela-protests-...
<http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2014/feb/18/venezuela-protests-us-support-regime-change-mistake>.
Accessed on February 21, 2014.
[12]
<http://newpol.org/content/february-traumas-third-insurrectionary-moment-venezuelan-right#_ednref12> Atilio
Borón, "La amenaza fascista," /Rebelión/, February 19, 2014. Available
online at:
http://www.rebelion.org/noticia.php?id=181044&titular=la-amenaza-fascist...
<http://www.rebelion.org/noticia.php?id=181044&titular=la-amenaza-fascista->.
Accessed on February 21, 2014.
[13]
<http://newpol.org/content/february-traumas-third-insurrectionary-moment-venezuelan-right#_ednref13> See
the illuminating discussion of these matters by Gregory Wilpert on /The
Real News Network/, February 22, 2014. Available online at:
http://therealnews.com/t2/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=31&I...
<http://therealnews.com/t2/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=31&Itemid=74&jumival=11517>.
Accessed on February 23, 2014.
[14]
<http://newpol.org/content/february-traumas-third-insurrectionary-moment-venezuelan-right#_ednref14> Pedro
Santander, "Diálogo o golpismo: Lo que está en juego en Venezuela,"
/Rebelión/, February 19, 2014. Available online at:
http://www.rebelion.org/noticia.php?id=181024&titular=di%E1logo-o-golpis...
<http://www.rebelion.org/noticia.php?id=181024&titular=di%E1logo-o-golpismo->.
Accessed on February 23, 2014.
[15]
<http://newpol.org/content/february-traumas-third-insurrectionary-moment-venezuelan-right#_ednref15> See
Andrés Schipani, "Venezuela: Amid Unrest, Another Forex Mechanism,"
/Financial Times/, February 20, 2014. Available online at:
http://blogs.ft.com/beyond-brics/2014/02/20/venezuela-amid-unrest-anothe...
<http://blogs.ft.com/beyond-brics/2014/02/20/venezuela-amid-unrest-another-foreign-exchange-mechanism/#axzz2u4V0vinF>.
Accessed on February 21, 2014. The figure of 56 percent inflation cited
in this article is also the standard figure reported in sources close to
the government.
[16]
<http://newpol.org/content/february-traumas-third-insurrectionary-moment-venezuelan-right#_ednref16> Santander,
"Diálogo o golpismo."
[17]
<http://newpol.org/content/february-traumas-third-insurrectionary-moment-venezuelan-right#_ednref17> Nicmer
N. Evans, "Oposición dividida pero no desunida y 'la salida',"
/Rebelión/, February 6, 2014. Available online at:
http://www.rebelion.org/noticia.php?id=180472&titular=oposici%F3n-dividi...
<http://www.rebelion.org/noticia.php?id=180472&titular=oposici%F3n-dividida-pero-no-desunida-y-%93la-salida%94->.
Accessed on February 21, 2014.
[18]
<http://newpol.org/content/february-traumas-third-insurrectionary-moment-venezuelan-right#_ednref18> Marea
Socialista, "Rectificar y avanzar hacia la revolución económica: Para
frenar la ofensiva de la derecha," /Rebelión/, February 15, 2014.
Available online at:
http://www.rebelion.org/noticia.php?id=180860&titular=rectificar-y-avanz...
<http://www.rebelion.org/noticia.php?id=180860&titular=rectificar-y-avanzar-hacia-la-revoluci%F3n-econ%F3mica->.
Accessed on February 21, 2014.
[19]
<http://newpol.org/content/february-traumas-third-insurrectionary-moment-venezuelan-right#_ednref19> Denis,
"Desactivar el fascismo."
[20]
<http://newpol.org/content/february-traumas-third-insurrectionary-moment-venezuelan-right#_ednref20> Mark
Weisbrot, "US Support for Regime Change in Venezuela is a Mistake,"
/Guardian/, February 18, 2014. Available online at:
http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2014/feb/18/venezuela-protests-...
<http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2014/feb/18/venezuela-protests-us-support-regime-change-mistake>.
Accessed on February 21, 2014.
[21]
<http://newpol.org/content/february-traumas-third-insurrectionary-moment-venezuelan-right#_ednref21> Although
it is also true that the student movement has always been divided, and
its left-wing has had at different historical moments a presence within
the elite state universities as well.
[22]
<http://newpol.org/content/february-traumas-third-insurrectionary-moment-venezuelan-right#_ednref22> Mike
González, "Is Venezuela Burning? A Letter from Caracas," /Revolutionary
Socialism/. Available online at:
http://revolutionarysocialism.tumblr.com/post/77478189373/is-venezuela-b...
<http://revolutionarysocialism.tumblr.com/post/77478189373/is-venezuela-burning-a-letter-from-caracas>.
Accessed on February 22, 2014.
[23]
<http://newpol.org/content/february-traumas-third-insurrectionary-moment-venezuelan-right#_ednref23> Quoted
in Manuel Sutherland, "Siete apuntes sobre las protestas en Venezuela,"
/Aporrea/, February 17, 2014. Available online at:
http://www.aporrea.org/ideologia/a182254.html. Accessed on February 22,
2014.
[24]
<http://newpol.org/content/february-traumas-third-insurrectionary-moment-venezuelan-right#_ednref24> Andrés
Schipani, "Opposition Leader Detained in Venezuela," /Financial Times/,
February 18, 2014. Available online at:
http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/6afe551e-98d2-11e3-a32f-00144feab7de.html#axzz...
<http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/6afe551e-98d2-11e3-a32f-00144feab7de.html#axzz2u4WW7HU4>.
Accessed on February 21, 2014.
[25]
<http://newpol.org/content/february-traumas-third-insurrectionary-moment-venezuelan-right#_ednref25> Ana
Esther Ceceña, "Leopoldo López: Agente de la CIA, el golpe, guarimbas,
Uribe y el fascism,"/Herramienta/. Available online at:
http://www.herramienta.com.ar/content/leopoldo-lopez-agente-de-la-cia-el...
<http://www.herramienta.com.ar/content/leopoldo-lopez-agente-de-la-cia-el-golpe-guarimbas-uribe-y-el-fascismo>.
Accessed on February 22, 2014.
[26]
<http://newpol.org/content/february-traumas-third-insurrectionary-moment-venezuelan-right#_ednref26> Luciano
Wexell Severo, "Golpe de Estado suave," /Rebelión/, February 21, 2014.
Available online at: http://www.rebelion.org/noticia.php?id=181112.
Accessed on February 21, 2014.
[27]
<http://newpol.org/content/february-traumas-third-insurrectionary-moment-venezuelan-right#_ednref27> Corriente
Revolucionario Bolívar y Zamora -- Poder Popular Socialista, "Momento y
perspectivas: la nueva asonada contrarrevolucionaria" /Rebelión/,
February 19, 2014. Available online at:
http://www.rebelion.org/noticia.php?id=181029. Accessed on February 21,
2014.
[28]
<http://newpol.org/content/february-traumas-third-insurrectionary-moment-venezuelan-right#_ednref28> This
paragraph draws on Julia Buxton, "The Real Significance of the Student
Protests." See also, Ana Navea, "Mentiras de la derecha para impulsar un
golpe de Estado," /AVN/, February 20, 2014. Available online at:
http://www.avn.info.ve/contenido/mentiras-derecha-para-impulsar-golpe-es...
<http://www.avn.info.ve/contenido/mentiras-derecha-para-impulsar-golpe-estado>.
Accessed on February 21, 2014.
[29]
<http://newpol.org/content/february-traumas-third-insurrectionary-moment-venezuelan-right#_ednref29> Denis,
"Desactivar el fascismo."
[30]
<http://newpol.org/content/february-traumas-third-insurrectionary-moment-venezuelan-right#_ednref30> Information
in the last three paragraphs is drawn in part from Ricardo Martínez,
"Los actores del golpismo en Venezuela," /RT Actualidad/, February 18,
2014. Available online at:
http://actualidad.rt.com/blogueros/ricardo-martinez/view/120209-actores-...
<http://actualidad.rt.com/blogueros/ricardo-martinez/view/120209-actores-golpismo-venezuela>.
Accessed on February 23, 2014.
[31]
<http://newpol.org/content/february-traumas-third-insurrectionary-moment-venezuelan-right#_ednref31> Susan
Spronk and Jeffery R. Webber, "Sabaneta to Miraflores: The Afterlives of
Hugo Chávez in Venezuela," /New Politics /(Winter), 2014. Available
online at:
http://newpol.org/content/sabaneta-miraflores-afterlives-hugo-ch%C3%A1ve...
<http://newpol.org/content/sabaneta-miraflores-afterlives-hugo-ch%C3%A1vez-venezuela>.
Accessed on February 23, 2014.
[32]
<http://newpol.org/content/february-traumas-third-insurrectionary-moment-venezuelan-right#_ednref32> Andrés
Schipani, "Venezuela: Amid Unrest, Another Forex Mechanism," /Financial
Times/, February 20, 2014. Available online at:
http://blogs.ft.com/beyond-brics/2014/02/20/venezuela-amid-unrest-anothe...
<http://blogs.ft.com/beyond-brics/2014/02/20/venezuela-amid-unrest-another-foreign-exchange-mechanism/#axzz2u4V0vinF>.
Accessed on February 21, 2014.
[33]
<http://newpol.org/content/february-traumas-third-insurrectionary-moment-venezuelan-right#_ednref33> Manuel
Sutherland, "Siete apuntes sobre las protestas en Venezuela," /Aporrea/,
February 17, 2014. Available online at:
http://www.aporrea.org/ideologia/a182254.html. Accessed on February 22,
2014.
[34]
<http://newpol.org/content/february-traumas-third-insurrectionary-moment-venezuelan-right#_ednref34> George
Ciccariello-Maher, "#LaSalida? Venezuela at a Crossroads," /The Nation/,
February 21, 2014. Available online at:
http://www.thenation.com/article/178496/lasalida-venezuela-crossroads#.
Accessed on February 23, 2014.
[35]
<http://newpol.org/content/february-traumas-third-insurrectionary-moment-venezuelan-right#_ednref35> Manuel
Sutherland, "Siete apuntes sobre las protestas en Venezuela."
[36]
<http://newpol.org/content/february-traumas-third-insurrectionary-moment-venezuelan-right#_ednref36> Manuel
Sutherland, "Siete apuntes sobre las protestas en Venezuela."
[37]
<http://newpol.org/content/february-traumas-third-insurrectionary-moment-venezuelan-right#_ednref37> Marea
Socialista, "Rectificar y avanzar hacia la revolución económica."
[38]
<http://newpol.org/content/february-traumas-third-insurrectionary-moment-venezuelan-right#_ednref38> Marea
Socialista, "Rectificar y avanzar hacia la revolución económica."
[39]
<http://newpol.org/content/february-traumas-third-insurrectionary-moment-venezuelan-right#_ednref39> Spronk
and Webber, "From Sabaneta to Miraflores."
[40]
<http://newpol.org/content/february-traumas-third-insurrectionary-moment-venezuelan-right#_ednref40> González,
"Is Venezuela Burning?" See also, Mike González, /Hugo Chávez: Socialist
for the Twenty-First Century/, London: Pluto, 2014.
[41]
<http://newpol.org/content/february-traumas-third-insurrectionary-moment-venezuelan-right#_ednref41> Denis,
"Desactivar el fascismo."
[42]
<http://newpol.org/content/february-traumas-third-insurrectionary-moment-venezuelan-right#_ednref42> Denis,
"Desactivar el fascismo."
[43]
<http://newpol.org/content/february-traumas-third-insurrectionary-moment-venezuelan-right#_ednref43> Denis,
"Desactivar el fascismo."
[44]
<http://newpol.org/content/february-traumas-third-insurrectionary-moment-venezuelan-right#_ednref44> Carlos
Carcione, "El Proceso Bolivariano en la hora de verdad," /Rebelión/,
February 20, 2014. Available online at:
http://www.rebelion.org/noticia.php?id=181061&titular=el-proceso-bolivar...
<http://www.rebelion.org/noticia.php?id=181061&titular=el-proceso-bolivariano-en-la-hora-de-la-verdad->.
Accessed on February 21, 2014.
[45]
<http://newpol.org/content/february-traumas-third-insurrectionary-moment-venezuelan-right#_ednref45> Luciano
Wexell Severo, "Golpe de Estado suave," /Rebelión/, February 21, 2014.
Available online at: http://www.rebelion.org/noticia.php?id=181112.
Accessed on February 21, 2014.
[46]
<http://newpol.org/content/february-traumas-third-insurrectionary-moment-venezuelan-right#_ednref46> Denis,
"Desactivar el fascismo."
[47]
<http://newpol.org/content/february-traumas-third-insurrectionary-moment-venezuelan-right#_ednref47> Marea
Socialista, "Rectificar y avanzar hacia la revolución económica."
[48]
<http://newpol.org/content/february-traumas-third-insurrectionary-moment-venezuelan-right#_ednref48> This
paragraph draws on proposals that conclude Denis's extraordinary essay
cited throughout this work.
Source: New Politics
<http://newpol.org/content/february-traumas-third-insurrectionary-moment-venezuelan-right>
--
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