[News] Venezuela - How to Stop The Violent Offensive of the Neoliberal Right-Wing

Anti-Imperialist News news at freedomarchives.org
Tue Apr 1 12:11:20 EDT 2014


  The Debate Today is How to Stop The Violent Offensive of the
  Neoliberal Right-Wing

By Valeria Ianni -- Rebelion, March 31st 2014

http://venezuelanalysis.com/analysis/10561

Venezuela is torn between the destabilising attempts of the right-wing, 
the limits of the Bolivarian process and the possibility the working 
class and the popular movements will advance the [revolutionary] 
project, [but] not without tensions and contradictions.

[The following is] an interview with Franck Gaudichaud, member of the 
editorial team of Rebelión.org, a doctor of political science and author 
of several books on Latin America, with a directed research by Michael 
Löwy on people power and industrial ties under the Allende government in 
Chile (1970 -1973).

How can you characterise the current situation in Venezuela? What is the 
issue here?

Franck Gaudichaud: As a starting point, we must recognise that we are in 
the midst of a tremendous global media war against the Bolivarian 
process. It's therefore essential to create spaces of 
counter-information. To start with, in front of so much misinformation, 
we must again emphasise that the Bolivarian process is a long term 
process of broad social gains (health, education, reducing inequality), 
democratisation (the new constitution), growing empowerment and 
inclusion of the popular classes, in a very tense relationship with the 
charismatic leader that [Hugo] Chavez had been.

This process has also been instrumental in the establishment of new 
popular national sovereignties in the creation of ALBA, UNASUR and 
CELAC. Thus, a relapse and a neoliberal regression in Venezuela would 
have important, immediate collateral effects on the entire region. All 
this seems obvious, but it is essential to stress the essential 
relations and geopolitical forces, [particularly] at a time when the 
mainstream media, and the Venezuelan opposition are talking about a 
"Castro-communist dictatorship" and a "genocide in Venezuela ..."

The current situation is extremely tense because the most reactionary 
sectors of the opposition have wagered on violence and destabilisation 
from the street. In this context, there is a tendency within the rank 
and file of the leftists to simplify our understanding of the 
circumstances, expressing opposition to imperialism or support of the 
coup against the "fascist" state. To me, this binary reading [of the 
situation] seems disastrous. Of course, the united manner of the 
right-wing's "insurrectionist" intentions must be denounced and opposed.

We know that the United States has clear geopolitical interests in this 
destabilisation. The link between Washington "hawks" and the faction of 
the opposition led by Leopoldo López in Venezuela isn't a conspiracy 
theory, but is an objective fact. There is also a real intervention from 
Colombia and Uribismo,  and paramilitary incursions, especially in the 
border state of Táchira. These factors are important. Now, is there a 
coup in the style of April, 2002? [...] I think not. Firstly, the real 
power relations differ from 2002. The armed forces and military chiefs 
clearly support the government without division -- for now -- and the 
big bourgeoisie aren't betting on the violence or an unconstitutional 
exit [from the Maduro administration]. Fedecámaras and its masters (like 
Polar's [head, Lorenzo] Mendoza) are participating in the peace 
conference with Maduro and condemning the violence in the streets. In 
other words, the key elements of the situation of April, 2002 aren't 
part of the current situation today. Mind you, there is a sector of the 
opposition around Leopoldo López that clearly is betting on street 
violence [and] calling to overthrow Maduro. Worryingly, this sector has 
succeeded in holding very significant demonstrations -- in the state of 
Tachira, in Merida with the student movement, but also in the streets of 
Caracas. It's true that the participants of these demonstrations 
essentially come from the wealthy neighbourhoods, from the upper and 
middle classes; but now [protesters] also come from the less wealthy 
middle class. Violent sectors have gained space in society, using 
violence against the workers and barrio militants, constructing 
barricades (the "guarimbas"); they're responsible for the majority of 
killings in recent weeks. The neoliberal opposition is partially 
fragmented, but each [faction of the opposition] plays its role against 
the [revolutionary] process; from Henrique Capriles or COPEI (Political 
Electoral Independent Organisation Committee) that say they back 
dialogue after successive electoral defeats, to parties like Leopoldo 
López's Voluntad Popular or like the organisation Súmate and the 
legislator María Corina Machado. [The latter] back the creation of a 
semi-insurrectionalist climate without awaiting the next elections. 
Other analysts like Ignacio Ramonet have noted the existence of a "slow 
coup" based on the destabilisation theories of Gene Sharp.
However, I think from the anti-capitalist left, the key issue isn't just 
to denounce all this, without also continuing to think "downwards and to 
the left" in a manner both critical and dialectical; [and] who are the 
elements within Chavismo that allow such expression of discontent in 
various strata of society -- not just from the student movement. In this 
sense, we also have to explore the contradictions and weaknesses of the 
Bolivarian revolution and listen to the critical voices of the popular 
and revolutionary movement, within and outside of Chavismo. At Rebelión, 
we have published various Venezuelan authors that go in this direction: 
Roland Denis, Simón Rodríguez P., Javier Biardeau, Gonzalo Gómez, etc.

What are these main weaknesses of Chavismo?

First you have to differentiate between the governmental Chavismo and 
the working Bolivarian people. I understand there are tensions here, 
especially a year after the departure of the central manager of the 
[revolutionary] process, Hugo Chavez; [who was] capable of oscillating 
between the vertical leader and the horizontal-ness of popular 
participation. In the era of "Chavismo wihout Chavez", Maduro has the 
legitimacy of electoral democracy. He won the [April, 2013] presidential 
election in a just manner, and the [December, 2013] municipal elections 
confirmed a new Bolivarian victory at the ballot box (with 17 victories 
in 18 elections). But, Maduro doesn't have the charismatic leadership of 
Chavez, while at the same time a degradation of the economy accelerated. 
Of course, much is said about insecurity, particularly from the 
right-wing, though this is also a significant, daily concern for the 
popular classes. [However,] most of the recent problems appear on the 
economic level. The Central Bank of Venezuela [BCV] acknowledges a 
scarcity level of [consumer] goods above 28% and in 2013 inflation of 
56% eroded the salaries of the workers. Poor economic and [currency] 
exchange management reinforces speculation, the black market and 
hoarding on the part of the bourgeois consumer on a greater scale. Other 
Marxist economists like Manuel Sutherland or Víctor Álvarez speak of the 
greatest capital flight from South America. Several Marshall Plans are 
escaping to Miami. It's true that inflation and scarcity are products of 
an offensive from the ruling classes, but they're also [caused by] 
inefficient economic policy. Corruption is another underlying issue 
after 15 years of the Bolivarian process. How to pretend to build 
"socialism of the 21st Century" in these conditions of bureaucratic 
corruption? Faced with a phenomenon of this nature, a model of 
petro-rentier capitalism is still hegemonic [i]. It's not enough to have 
a ministry of "popular power"* [see editor's notes]. I don't see a 
solution other than to create control from below, [with] participatory 
democracy, workers' councils [and a] strengthening of the existing 
communal councils. Otherwise, how is the right-wing offensive to be 
lastingly stopped? With dialogue and peace with the ruling sectors, with 
the Democratic Unity Roundtable [MUD], with [Venezuelan-born media mogul 
and billionaire Gustavo] Cisneros and the boli-bourgeoisie**? Moreover, 
remember impunity that continues today for those responsible for the 
coup of April, 2002 and the April, 2013 killings. The impunity facing 
the anti-unionist killings that take place in the country are also very 
concerning, along with the the level of repression against some labour 
strikes and the growing militarisation of some regions (which caused 
distress and the distancing of the public from the Bolivarian governor 
of Tachira). These days, President Maduro and the Attorney General have 
acknowledged the responsibility of the National Guard and the Bolivarian 
Police in the death and mistreatment of demonstrators. Hopefully this 
doesn't go unpunished, because the state has to be the guarantor of 
basic [human] rights.

Here you have referred critically to the path being taken by the 
government to stop the right-wing's offensive. For you, what is the most 
effective way to confront the right-wing?

Without doubt, as proposed by some Venezuelan anti-capitalists, the best 
defense for the deepening of the revolution and the achievements of the 
[revolutionary] process is to strengthen a critical, popular and 
independent view of the bureaucracy or the boli-bourgeoisie, pointing to 
an empowerment from below. I think this perfectly justifies the intent 
of the government to pour cold water on the street violence, [and] call 
for dialogue and peace. Now, dialogue and peace, yes, but for what and 
with whom? Hopefully, the dialogue prioritises the mobilisation of the 
popular sectors, the organised workers that search for the paths of 
popular power, the ... [rural poor and agricultural workers] that want 
agricultural reform, the indigenous people, together with more concrete 
announcements to improve the economic situation. Of course, Maduro has 
already announced a front to face the "economic war", but as well as the 
"law of just prices", positively, were measures to adjust [economic 
policy] and devaluation. To the contrary, small [political] currents 
like Marea Socialista and others outside Chavismo (libertarians, 
Marxists [and] Trotskyists) propose dealing with the neoliberal right by 
taking revolutionary measures: for example, taking control of foreign 
trade, but with citizen oversight (to prevent corruption), strongly 
combating speculation and centralising foreign currency exchange, 
intervening to bring the banking system under social control so that oil 
revenue isn't partially captured by hoarders, supporting more decisions 
by the communal councils, [supporting] national food production, 
[creating] a national, democratic system of planning etc. I emphasise, 
I'm only reiterating the declarations of Bolivarian collectives and 
anti-capitalist Venezuelans.
Certainly, progress in this direction also means starting to think about 
the internal contradictions the popular movement -- its weaknesses and 
limitations, as well as the weight of the political bonapartism present 
in the PSUV, for example.


What similarities and differences do you find between the process of 
Chile during the Allende government and that of Venezuela? More than 
anything, the role of the relationship between the spaces of popular 
organisation and a state that -- despite all the changes -- remains a 
capitalist state.

First, this seems essential to me: there still exists a capitalist state 
in Venezuela, though with a new institutionalism that's more democratic. 
Predominantly, [there is] state-rentier capitalism and more than 70% of 
GDP is in the private sector. To strategically orient [ourselves], first 
we must know where we stand. Like in Venezuela, in 1973 Chile the Unidad 
Popular signified great democratic and social conquests, empowerment 
from below, as well as support from a very well organised working class 
on the union and political level. Actually, the big deficiency in 
Venezuela is the inability to build a democratic movement that is 
working and union class-conscious, independent of the state bureaucracy. 
Another interesting aspect of the Chilean experience is the tense 
relationship between the popular movement and the Allende government. I 
studied the industrial ties [ii] as sui generis [unique] forms of 
popular power, and, at various moments, elements were able to stand 
against Allende and claim revolutionary measures. Another point of 
debate is just how much we can trust the institutions, the possibility 
of  "using" the state to reform society from above. That is, if we build 
socialism from the state or build socialism from the popular constituent 
power, workers' control and citizen participation. When in Venezuela, 
for example, joint management initiatives [between the state and 
workers] such as Sidor have been rapidly suffocated. It's the same with 
the extremely complicated issue of political violence, the role of 
imperialism and the armed forces.
The fact is that in Venezuela, unlike the Chilean way, the process has 
been thought as "peaceful, but armed". In Venezuela there is a very 
different civil-military dynamic [compared] to the Chilean experience. 
Beyond that, the Bolivarian revolution updates an unresolved debate of 
Unidad Popular: what can we do with the state, and what kind of state? 
To what extent are the government [and] elections tools of democratic 
conquest, and how to support this using grassroots organising to 
advance. How to deal with the rightists and imperialism from the best 
relationship that's as strong as possible?


Valeria Ianni is an Argentinian historian, and member of the collective 
"Hombre Nuevo".
Translated for Venezuelanalysis by Ryan Mallett-Outtrim.

Editor's notes
*All Venezuela government ministries include the words "Popular Power" 
in their official titles; eg, Ministry of Popular Power for Education.
** Boli-bourgeoisie (boliburguesía) is a colloquial term mostly used to 
describe wealthy, corrupt Chavista bureaucrats.


References (in Spanish)
[i] Ver: F. Gaudichaud, "Las tensiones del proceso bolivariano: 
nacionalismo popular, conquistas sociales y capitalismo rentista", 
Rebelión, dic. 2012, www.rebelion.org/noticia.php?id=160554 
<http://www.rebelion.org/noticia.php?id=160554>.

[ii] Ver: F. Gaudichaud, Poder popular y cordones industriales en Chile, 
Santiago, LOM, 2004.

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