[News] Venezuelan Elections: a Choice and Not an Echo
Anti-Imperialist News
news at freedomarchives.org
Fri Oct 5 10:53:08 EDT 2012
Venezuelan Elections: a Choice and Not an Echo
10.04.2012 *::* Latin America <http://petras.lahaine.org/?cat=2>
http://petras.lahaine.org/?p=1912
*Introduction:* On October 7th, Venezuelan voters will decide whether to
support incumbent President Hugo Chavez or opposition candidate Henrique
Capriles Radonski. The voters will choose between two polar opposite
programs and social systems:
Chavez calls for the expansion of public ownership of the means of
production and consumption, an increase in social spending for welfare
programs, greater popular participation in local decision-making, an
independent foreign policy based on greater Latin American integration,
increases in progressive taxation,the defense of free public health and
educational programs and the defense of public ownership of oil
production. In contrast Capriles Radonski represents the parties and
elite who support the privatization of public enterprises, oppose the
existing public health and educational and social welfare programs and
favor neo-liberal policies designed to subsidize and expand the role and
control of foreign and local private capital. While Capriles Radonski
claims to be in favor of what he dubs "the Brazilian model" of "free
markets and social welfare", his political and social backers, in the
past and present, are strong advocates of free trade agreements with the
US, restrictions on social spending and regressive taxation. Unlike the
US, the Venezuelan voters have a choice and not an echo: two candidates
representing distinct social classes, with divergent socio-political
visions and international alignments. Chavez stands with Latin America,
opposes US imperial intervention everywhere, is a staunch defender of
self-determination and supporter of Latin American integration. Capriles
Radonski is in favor of free trade agreements with the US, opposes
regional integration, supports US intervention in the Middle East and is
a diehard supporter of Israel. In the run-up to the elections, as was
predictable the entire US mass media has been saturated with anti-Chavez
and pro-Capriles propaganda, predicting a 'victory' or at least a close
outcome for Washington's protégé.
The media and pundit predictions and propaganda are based entirely on
selective citation of dubious polls and campaign commentaries; and worst
of all there is a total lack of any serious discussion of the historical
legacy and structural features that form the essential framework for
this historic election.
*Historical Legacy*
For nearly a quarter of a century prior to Chavez election in 1998,
Venezuela's economy and society was in a tailspin, rife with corruption,
record inflation, declining growth, rising debt, crime, poverty and
unemployment.
Mass protests in the late 1980's early 1990's led to the massacre of
thousands of slum dwellers, a failed coup and mass disillusion with the
dual bi-party political system. The petrol industry was privatized; oil
wealth nurtured a business elite which shopped on 'Fifth Avenue,
invested in Miami condos , patronized private clinics, for face-lifts
and breast jobs, and sent their children to private elite schools to
ensure inter-generational continuity of power and privilege. Venezuela
was a bastion of US power projections toward the Caribbean, Central and
South America. Venezuela was /socially polarized/ but political power
was monopolized by two or three parties who competed for the support of
competing factions of the ruling elite /and /the US Embassy.
Economic pillage, social regression, political authoritarianism and
corruption led to an electoral victory for Hugo Chavez in 1998 and a
gradual change in public policy toward greater political accountability
and institutional reforms which signaled a turn toward greater social
equity.
The failed US backed military-business coup of April 2002 and the defeat
of the oil executive lockout of December 2002 -- February 2003 marked a
decisive turning point in Venezuelan political and social history: the
violent assault mobilized and radicalized millions of pro-democracy
working class and slum dwellers, who in turn pressured Chavez "to turn
left". The defeat of the US-capitalist coup and lockout was the first of
several popular victories which opened the door to vast social programs
covering the housing, health, educational and food needs of millions of
Venezuelans. The US and the Venezuelan elite suffered significant losses
of strategic personnel in the military, trade union bureaucracy and oil
industry as a result of their involvement in the illegal power grab.
Capriles was an active leader in the coup, heading a gang of thugs which
assaulted the Cuban embassy, and an active collaborator in the petrol
lockout which temporarily paralyzed the entire economy.
The coup and lockout were followed by a US funded referendum which
attempted to impeach Chavez and was soundly trounced. The failures of
the right strengthened the socialist tendencies in the government,
weakened the elite opposition and sent the US in a mission to Colombia,
ruled by narco-terrorist President Uribe, in search of a military ally
to destabilize and overthrow the regime from outside. Border tensions
increased, US bases multiplied to seven, and Colombian death squads
crossed the border .But the entire Latin and Central American and
Caribbean regions lined up against a US backed invasion out of
principle, or because of fear of armed conflicts spilling beyond their
borders.
This historical legacy of elite authoritarianism and Chavez successes is
deeply embedded in the minds and consciousness of all Venezuelans
preparing to vote in the election of October 7th. The legacy of profound
elite hostility to democratic outcomes favoring popular majorities and
mass defense of the 'Socialist president' is expressed in the profound
political polarization of the electorate and the intense mutual dislike
or 'class hatred' which percolates under the cover of the electoral
campaign. For the masses the elections are about past abuses and
contemporary advances, upward social mobility and material improvements
in living standards; for the upper and affluent middle class there is
intense resentment about a relative loss of power, privilege, prestige
and private preferences. The rightwing elite's relative losses have
fueled a resentment with dangerous overtones for democracy in case of
lost elections and revanchist policies if they win the elections.
*Institutional Configuration*
The rightwing elite may not control the government but they certainly
are not without a strong institutional base of power. Eighty percent of
the banking and finance sector is in private hands, as are most of the
services manufacturing and a substantial proportion of retail and
wholesale trade. Within the public bureaucracy, the National Guard and
military the opposition has at least a minority actively or passively
supportive of the rightwing political groups. The principle business,
financial and landowners associations are the social nuclei of the
right. The rightwing controls approximately one third of the mayors and
governors and over forty percent of the national legislators. Major U.S.
and EU petroleum multi-nationals have a substantial minority share in
the oil sector.
The rightwing still monopolizes the print media and has a majority TV
and radio audience despite government inroads. The government has gained
influence via the nationalization of banks -- a 20% share of that
sector, a share of the mining and metal industry and a few food
processing plants and a substantial base in agriculture via the agrarian
reform beneficiaries.
The government has gained major influence among the public sector
employees and workers in the oil industry, social services and the
welfare and housing sector. The military and police appears to be
strongly supportive and constitutionalist. The government has
established mass media outlets and promoted a host of community based
radio stations.
The majority of the trade unions and peasant associations back the
government. But the real strength of the government is found in the
quasi-institutional community based organizations rooted in the vast
urban settlements linked to the 'social missions'.
In terms of money power, the government draws on substantial oil
earnings to finance popular long term and short term social impact
programs, effectively countering the patronage programs of the private
sector and the overt and clandestine "grass roots" funding by US
foundations, NGOs and "aid" agencies. In other words despite suffering
major political defeats and past decades of misrule and corruption, the
rightwing retains a powerful /institutional/ bases to /contest /the
powerful socio-economic advances of the Chavez government and to mount
an aggressive electoral campaign.
*Social Dynamics and the Presidential Campaign*
The key to the success of the Chavez re-election is to keep the focus on
socio-economic issues: the universal health and education programs, the
vast public housing program underway, the state subsidized supermarkets,
the improved public transport in densely populated areas. The sharper
the national social polarization between the business elite and the
masses, the less likely the rightwing can play on popular disaffection
with corrupt and ineffective local officials. The greater the degree of
social solidarity of wage, salaried and informal workers the less likely
that the right can appeal to the status aspirations of the upwardly
mobile workers and employees who have risen to middle class life styles,
ironically during the Chavez induced prosperity.
The Chavez campaign plays to the promise of continued social prosperity,
greater and continuing social mobility and opportunity, an appeal to a
greater sense of social equality and fairness; and it has a bed rock 40%
of the electorate ready to go to the barricades for the President.
Capriles appeals to several contradictory groups: a solid core of 20% of
the electorate, made up of the business, banking and especially agrarian
elite and their employees, managers, and professionals who long for a
return to the neo-liberal past, to a time when police and army and
intelligence agencies kept the poor confined to their slums and the
petrol treasury flowed into their coffers. The second group which
Capriles appeals to are the professionals and the small business people
who are fearful of the expansion of the public domain and the 'socialist
ideology' and yet who have prospered via easy credits, increased
clientele and public spending. The sons and daughters of affluent
sectors of this class provide the "activists" who see in the downfall of
the Chavez government an opportunity to regain power and prestige that
they pretend to have had before the 'revolt of the masses'. Capriles
past open embrace of neo-liberalism and the military coup of 2002 and
his close ties to the business elite, Washington and his rightwing
counterparts in Colombia and Argentina assures the enraged middle class
that his promise to retain Chavez social missions is pure electoral
demagoguery for tactical electoral purposes.
The third group which Capriles does not have, but is vital if he is to
make a respectable showing, is among the small towns, provincial lower
middle class and urban poor. Here Capriles presents himself as a
"progressive" supporter of Chavez social missions in order to attack the
local administrators and officials for their inefficiencies and
malfeasance and the lack of public security -- Capriles, hyper-activity,
his populist demagogy and his effort to exploit local discontent is
effective in securing some lower class votes; but his upper class links
and long history of aggressive support for rightwing authoritarianism
has undermined any mass defection to his side.
Chavez on the other hand is highlighting /his social accomplishments/, a
spectacular decade of high growth, the decline of inequalities
(Venezuela has the lowest rate of inequalities in Latin America) and the
high rates of popular satisfaction with governance. Chavez funding for
social impact programs benefits from a year-long economic recovery from
the world recession(5% growth for 2012), triple digit oil prices and a
generally favorable regional political environment including a vast
improvement in Colombian-Venezuelan relations.
*The Correlation of Forces: International, Regional, National and Local*
The Chavez government has benefited enormously from very favorable world
prices for its main export-petroleum; it has also increased its revenues
through timely expropriations and increases in royalty and tax payments,
as well as new investment agreements from new foreign investors in the
face of opposition from some US MNC.
Washington, deeply involved in conflicts in oil rich Muslim countries,
is in no position to organize any boycott against Venezuela one of its
principle and reliable petrol providers; its last big effort at "regime
change" in 2002-03,during the "lockout" by senior executives of the
Venezuelan oil company backfired --it resulted in the firing of almost
all US 'assets' and the radicalization of nationalist oil policy.
US efforts to 'isolate' the Chavez regime internationally has failed;
Russia and China have increased their trade and investment, as have a
dozen other European, Middle Eastern and Asian countries. The EU
recession and the slowdown of the US and world economy has not been
conducive to fostering any sympathy for any restrictions in economic
ties with Venezuela.
Most significantly the rise of center-left regimes in Latin America, the
Caribbean and Central America, has favored increasing diplomatic and
economic ties with Venezuela and greater Latin American integration.In
contrast Obama's's backing for the Honduran and Paraguayan coups and
Washington-centered free trade agreements and neo-liberal policies have
gone out of favor. In brief, the international and regional correlation
of forces has been highly favorable to the Chavez government, while
Washington's dominant influence has waned.
One of the last Latin American bastions of US efforts to destabilize
Chavez, Colombia, has sharply shifted policy toward Venezuela,. With the
change in regime from Uribe to Santos, Colombia has reached
multi-billion dollar trade and investment agreements and joint
diplomatic and military agreements with Venezuela, signaling a kind of
'peaceful coexistence'. Despite a recent free trade agreement and the
continuance of US military bases, Colombia has, at least in this
conjuncture, ruled out joint participation in any US sponsored military
or political intervention or destabilization campaign.
US political leverage in Venezuela is largely dependent on channeling
financial resources and advisors toward its electoral clients. Given the
decline in external regional allies, and given its loss of key assets in
the Venezuelan military and among Colombian para-military forces,
Washington has turned to its electoral clients .Via heavy financial
flows it has successfully imposed the unification of all the disparate
opposition groups, fashioned an ideology of moderate 'centrist' reform
to camouflage the far right, neo-liberal ideology of the Capriles
leadership and contracted hundreds of community agitators and 'grass
roots' organizers to exploit the substantial gap between Chavez's
programatic promises and the incompetent and inefficient implementation
of those policies by local officials.
The strategic weakness of the Chavez government is local, the incapacity
of officials to keep the lights on and the water running. At the
international, regional and national level the correlation of forces
favors Chavez. Washington and Capriles try to compensate for Chavez
regional strength by attacking his regional aid programs, claiming he is
diverting resources abroad instead of tending to problems at home.
Chavez has allocated enormous resources to social expenditures and
infrastructure -- the problem is not diversion abroad, it is
mismanagement by local Chavista officials, many offspring of past
clientele parties and personalities. The issue of rising crime and poor
low enforcement would certainly cost Chavez more than a few lost votes
if the same high crime rates were not also present in the state of
Miranda where candidate Capriles has governed for the past four years
*Electoral Outcome*
Despite massive gains for the lower classes and solid support among the
poor, the emerging middle class product of Chavez era prosperity, has
rising expectations of greater consumption and less crime and
insecurity; they look to distance themselves from the poor and to
approach the affluent; their eyes look upward and not downward. The
momentum of a dozen years in power is slowing, but mass fears of a
neo-liberal reversion limits the possible electorate that Capriles can
attract. Despite crime and official inefficiencies and corruption,the
Chavez era has been a period extremely favorable for the lower class and
sectors of business, commerce and finance.This year -2012-is no
exception.According to the UN ,Venezuela,s growth rate (5%)exceeds that
of Argentina(2%) Brazil(1.5%) and Mexico(4%).Private consumtion has been
the main driver of growth thanks to the growth of labor
markets,increased credit and public investment.The vast majority of
Venezuelans ,including sectors of business will not vote against an
incumbent government generating one of the fastest economic recovery in
the Hemisphere. Capriles radical rightist past and present covert agenda
could provoke class conflict , political instability , economic decline
and an unfavorable climate for international investors.
Washington is probably not in favor of a post-election coup or
destabilization campaign if Capriles loses by a significant margin. The
popularity of Chavez, the social welfare legislation and material gains
and the dynamic growth this year ensures him of a victory margin of
10%.Chavez will receive 55% of the votes against Capriles 45%.
Washington and their rightist clients are planning to consolidate their
organization and prepare for the congressional elections in December.
The idea is a "march through the institutions" to paralyze executive
initiatives and frustrate Chavez's efforts to move ahead with a
socialized economy. The Achilles heel of the Chavez government is
precisely at the /local/ and /state level/: a high priority should be
the replacement of incompetent and corrupt officials with efficient and
democratically controlled local leaders who can implement Chavez's
immensely popular programs. And Chavez must devote greater attention to
local politics and administration to match his foreign policy successes:
the fact that the Right can turn out a half a million demonstraters in
Caracas is not based on its ideological appeal to a ruinous, coup driven
past, but in its success in exploiting chronic local grievances which
have not been addressed -- crime, corruption., blackouts and water
shortages .
What is at stake in the October 2012 election is not only the welfare of
the Venezuelan people but the future of Latin America's integration and
independence,and the prosperity of millions dependent on Venezuelan aid
and solidarity.
A Chavez victory will provide a platform for rectification of a
basically progressive social agenda and the continuation of an
anti-imperialist foreign policy. A defeat will provide Obama or Romney
with a trampoline to re-launch the reactionary neo-liberal and
militarist policies of the pre-Chavez era -- the infamous Clinton
decade(of the 1990's) of pillage, plunder , privatization and poverty.
--
Freedom Archives 522 Valencia Street San Francisco, CA 94110 415
863.9977 www.freedomarchives.org
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