[News] The Arab revolutions: A year after

[Anti-Imperialist News]

The Arab revolutions: A year after
Samir Amin

2012-03-14, Issue 576
http://pambazuka.org/en/category/features/80745

WHY THE SO-CALLED ARAB SPRING?

The uprising of Arab peoples in 2011 (Tunisia, 
Egypt, Bahrein and Yemen, later Syria) was not 
unexpected, at least by many Arab leftist 
activists, if not by the Western powers.

During the Bandung and Non-Alignment period 
(1955-1970) Arab countries were in the forefront 
of the struggles of the peoples, nations and 
states of the South for a better future and a 
less unequal global system. Algeria’s FLN and 
Boumedienne, Nasser’s Egypt, the Baas regimes in 
Iraq and Syria and the South Yemen Republic 
shared common characteristics. These were not 
‘democratic’ regimes according to the Western 
criteria (they were ‘one-party’ systems), nor 
even according to our criteria, which implies 
positive empowerment of the peoples. But they 
were nevertheless legitimate in the eyes of their 
peoples, for their actual achievements: mass 
education, health and other public services, 
industrialisation and guarantees for employment 
and social upward mobility associated with 
independent initiatives and anti-imperialist 
postures. Therefore they were continuously 
fiercely fought by the Western powers, in 
particular through repeated Israeli aggressions.

These regimes achieved whatever they could in 
that frame within a short period, say 20 years, 
and then thereafter ran out of steam as a result 
of their internal limits and contradictions. 
This, coinciding with the breakdown of the Soviet 
power, facilitated the imperialist ‘neo-liberal’ 
offensive. The ruling circles, in order to remain 
in office, have chosen to retreat and submit to 
the demands of neo-liberal globalisation. The 
result was a fast degradation of the social 
conditions and all that had been achieved in the 
era of the national popular state to the benefit 
of the popular and middle classes was lost in a 
few years; poverty and mass unemployment have 
become the normal result of the neo liberal 
policies pursued. That created the objective 
conditions for the revolts. It is curious to note 
that some of the most vocal supporters of the 
‘democratic revolutions’ calling the West to 
their rescue are some of the former leaders who 
supported with enthusiasm the neo-liberal alignment!

The revolts were therefore not unexpected and 
many indicators suggested it, such as the 
Egyptian mass strikes of 2007/8, the growing 
resistance of small peasants to the accelerated 
process of their expropriation by the rich 
peasants, the protest of new middle classes 
organisations (such as ‘Kefaya’), etc.

I have attempted to give a picture of the 
components of both ‘the movement’ and of the 
reactionary ‘anti revolutionary’ bloc (the 
leadership of the Army and the Moslem 
Brotherhood) supported by the Western powers 
operating in Egypt, in particular in my book 
published in Arabic in may 2011 (Thawra Misr), in 
French in September (Le monde arabe dans la 
longue durée, le printemps arabe?) and coming 
soon at Fahamu Books under the title of ‘The 
peoples’ Spring, the Future of the Arab revolutions’.

I also refer here to other similar processes in 
Bahrain, which were savagely crushed by the army 
of Saudi Arabia (without the least protest of the 
West!), and in Yemen (where al Qaeda was 
‘introduced’ in order to neutralise the ‘menace’ 
coming from the progressive forces, particularly strong in the South).

This chapter was concluded with the elections in Tunisia and Egypt.

TRIUMPH OF POLITICAL ISLAM IN TUNISIAN AND EGYPTIAN ELECTIONS

The elections in Tunisia (October 2011) opened 
the way to crystallisation of the right-wing 
block that includes Al-Nahda-Renaissance Party 
(Brotherhood) and personalities who ‘claim’ to be 
now ‘bourguibists’ (followers of Bourguiba, the 
first Tunisian president), after their following 
of the Ben Ali regime. This coalition relies on 
the majority of the council charged with producing the new constitution.

This new regime is likely to achieve some 
democratic improvements (respect for pluralism 
and freedom of opinion and stop the worst types 
of police repression) along with regression in 
key social issues (women’s rights, secular 
education, and the state), in the context of 
ensuring the maintenance of the status quo in the area of economic development.

It is worth keeping in mind that the 
revolutionary movement in Tunisia has not 
challenged the dependent pattern of development 
of the era of Ben Ali, but considered it as 
‘sound’ in itself, and accepted the narrative of 
the World Bank! And it was merely satisfied in 
directing its criticism at the repressive police 
state, and the imposition of ‘royalties’ to all 
economic activities which were grabbed by members 
of the family of the president. And the general 
public (with the exception of isolated left-wing) 
did not comprehend that this style of dependent 
development is the cause of the deterioration of 
social conditions, which prepared the conditions 
for the uprising of the masses. The new ruling 
coalition will not modify the pattern of 
development created by the first Tunisian 
president — Bourguiba— but rather will infuse it 
with increased doses to solidify the alleged Islamic particularism.

The president of the new regime in Tunisia, 
Marzouki, happens to be a former Left activist 
who suffered real repression by Ben Ali, but who 
seems not to have understood what is actually 
economic ‘liberalism’. Curiously, this man 
organised in Tunis in February 2012 a 
‘conference’ on Syria, which supported indirectly 
an eventual Western intervention in this country.

In Egypt, the results were followed by Islamist 
victory on a larger scale. What can be expected 
from the achievements of political Islam and its 
deep-rootedness in the public and the rise of the 
echo of the slogan ‘Islamisation of society’, 
hence its electoral victories? The answer 
requires a return to uncover the reasons for this success.

Anyway the success of the Islamist parties, in 
Egypt at least, is certainly not the end of the 
story. The ‘legitimacy’ of the elected 
parliament, which the Western powers consider as 
exclusive, is questioned and counterbalanced by 
the no less legitimacy of the continuation of the 
struggles for social progress and authentic 
democratisation of politics and social life.

Yet the obstacles for the radicalisation of the 
struggles remain great, as long as the major 
components of the movement have not reached the 
required level of awareness with respect to the 
destructive effects of continuing along a liberal 
political economy, and the alignment on a US 
guided globalisation. But progress is to be 
noticed in the growing of that consciousness.


SUCCESS OF POLITICAL ISLAMIC PARTIES

I argued previously that the de-politicisation of 
the society due to the modus operandi of the 
Nasserist regime is behind these achievements. 
Note that Nasserism was not the only system that 
took this approach. Rather, most populist 
nationalist regimes of the first wave of 
awakening in the South had a similar approach in 
the management of politics. Note also that the 
actually existing socialist regimes have also 
taken this approach, at least after the 
revolutionary phase, that was democratic in 
nature, when they solidified their rule.

So, the common denominator is the abolition of 
democratic praxis. And I do not mean here to 
equalise between democracy and multiparty 
elections management. Rather, the practice of 
democracy in the proper sense of the word, i.e. 
respect for the plurality of political views and 
political schemes and to respect its organising. 
Because politicisation assumes democracy and 
democracy does not exist only if those who differ 
in opinion with the authority enjoy freedom of 
expression. But, the obliteration of the right to 
organise around different political views and 
projects eliminates the politicisation, which is 
ultimately caused the subsequent disaster.

This disaster has manifested itself in the return 
to the bygone archaic views (religious or 
otherwise), and this was also reflected in the 
acceptance of the project of the ‘consumer 
society’ based on solidification of the so-called 
trend of ‘individualism’, a trend which spread 
not only among the middle class that is 
benefiting from such a pattern of development, 
but also among the poor masses who call for 
participation in what appear to be a minima 
welfare — even though with its maximum simplicity 
— in the absence of credible real alternative. 
Therefore one must consider this as a legitimate 
demand from the popular classes.

The de-politicisation in Islamic societies took a 
prevailing form that was manifested in the 
apparent or superficial ‘return’ to ‘Islam’. 
Consequently, the discourse of the mosque along 
with the discourse of authority became the only 
allowed ones in Nasser’s period, and more so 
during the periods of Sadat and Mubarak. This 
discourse was then used to stop the emergence of 
an alternative based on the entrenching of a 
socialist aspiration. Then this ‘religious’ 
discourse was encouraged by Sadat and Mubarak to 
accompany and cope with the deteriorating living 
conditions resulting from the subjugation of 
Egypt to the requirements of imperialist 
globalisation. This is why I argued that 
political Islam did not belong to the opposition 
block, as claimed by the Muslim Brotherhood, but 
was an organic part of the power structure.

The success of political Islam requires further 
clarification regarding the relationship between 
the success of imperialist globalisation on the 
one hand and the rise of Brotherhood slogans on the other hand.

The deterioration that accompanied this 
globalisation produced proliferation in the 
activities of the informal sector in economic and 
social life, which represents the most important 
sources of income for the majority of people in 
Egypt (statistics say 60 percent). The 
Brotherhood’s organisations have real ability to 
work in these circumstances, so that the success 
of the Brotherhood in these areas in turn has 
produced more inflation in these activities and 
thus ensured its reproduction on a larger scale. 
The political culture offered by the Brotherhood 
is known for its great simplicity. As this 
culture is content with only conferring Islamic 
‘legitimacy’ to the principle of private property 
and the ‘free’ market relations, without 
considering the nature of the activities 
concerned, which are rudimentary (‘Bazaar’) 
activities that are unable to push forward the 
national economy and lead to its development.

Furthermore, the provision of funds widely by the 
Gulf states has allowed for the boom of such 
activities as these states have been pumping in 
the required funds in the form of small loans or 
grants. This is in addition to charity work 
(clinics, etc.) that has accompanied this 
inflated sector, thanks to the support of Gulf 
states. The Gulf states do not intend to 
contribute to the development of productive 
capacity in Egyptian economy (building 
factories
etc.), but only the development of this 
form of ‘lumpen development’, since reviving 
Egypt as a developing state would end the 
domination of the Gulf states ( that are based on 
the acceptance of the slogan of Islamization of 
the society), the dominance of the United States 
(which assumes Egypt as a comprador state 
infected with worsening poverty), and the 
domination of Israel (which assumes the impotence 
of Egypt in the face of Zionist expansion).

This axis between an authority that hides behind 
the ‘Islamic’ slogans and at the same time 
succumbs to the prevailing imperialist capitalism 
and the consequent impoverishment of the people 
is not specific only to Egypt. It is a common 
feature of most Arabic and Islamic societies. 
This axis is at work in Iran, where Khumainism 
insured the dominance of the ‘Bazaar economy’ 
from the beginning. It is also the cause for 
catastrophe in Somalia, which is a state that was 
removed from the list of states of the modern contemporary world.

What then can we expect from the likelihood of 
political Islam’s rule in Egypt (and in other countries)?

There is a prevailing media discourse, that is 
extremely naïve, that contends that ‘the victory 
of political Islam became inevitable because 
Islamic self-identity dominates the reality of 
our societies, and it is a reality that some had 
rejected, and thus this reality imposed itself on them.’

However, this argument completely ignores another 
reality, namely, that the de-politicisation 
process was deliberate, and without which no 
political Islam would have been able to impose 
itself on these societies. Furthermore, this 
discourse argues that ‘there is no risk from this 
political Islam’s victory because it is 
temporary, for the authority emerging from it is 
doomed to fail and thus the public opinion will 
depart from it’. This is as if the brotherhoods 
are those who accept implementation of the 
principles of democracy if it worked against their interests!

However, the regime in Washington adopts, 
apparently, this discourse, as well as the public 
opinion there, which is manufactured by the 
media. And there is an ensemble of Egyptian and 
Arab intellectuals who also became convinced by 
this discourse, apparently, perhaps 
opportunistically, or because of lack of clarity in thought.

But this is a mistake. Let it be known that 
political Islam, in the supposition of taking 
over the governments/rule, will continue to 
impose itself if not ‘forever’, at least for a 
long time (50 years? And let us look at the case 
of Iran for example). During this phase of 
‘transition’ other nations will continue their 
march of development, and so we will find 
ourselves eventually in the bottom of the list. 
So I don't see the Brotherhood as an ‘Islamic 
party’ primarily, but it is first a reactionary 
party, and if it managed to take the government, 
this will represent the best security for the imperialist system.

A WORD ABOUT THE SALAFISM (SALAFIYYA)

Salafism came to complement an obscurantist 
advocacy by Rashid Reda and the Brotherhood. It 
openly rejects the idea of ‘liberty’ (and 
therefore democracy) as it contradicts, in their 
view, the nature of the human being, as he/she is 
created as a slave (note the word) to serve his 
creator-master, like a slave required to serve 
his/her master. Of course, this doctrine does not 
explain how we come to know the concrete demands 
of this master-creator in the modern world. Does 
he accept or reject the increase in wages for 
example? This opens the way for a ‘religious 
Iranian-style rule (wilayat al-faqih),’ and 
through the dictatorship of the clerics who 
declared themselves ‘scientists/ulemah,’ who monopolize this knowledge!


The Salafis are the enemies of modernity, as 
modernity is grounded on the right to human 
creativity in dealing with earthly matters and 
questions concerning human society. And 
creativity requires freedom and free critical 
thought, which is rejected by the Salafis. What 
then about Salafi leaders who say that they 
‘belong to the modern world’ because they teach 
their students how to use the computer and 
‘business management’ (this by resorting to the 
mediocre kind of American pamphlets distributed 
by USAID)? These statements are not only a real 
farce, but the real master here is the prevailing 
capitalist imperialism that is in need for 
‘servants’ who practice this ‘art’ and not more. 
The famous British Mr. Dunlop, ‘the expert’ on 
education during the days of British occupation 
of Egypt, had realised that perfectly and made it 
a blueprint that was implemented in schools!

Modernity begins when overcoming these 
limitations and accepting the principle of 
freedom, which is conditional for developing the 
capacity of the nation to be able to belong to 
the modern world in the actual and active sense.

Moslem Brotherhood and Salafis operate in 
conjunction, with a division of tasks. The Moslem 
Brotherhood needed a ‘certificate’ of democracy, 
which Obama gave them, and to that effect had to 
‘separate’ from the ‘extremists’, the Salafis.

ARE THERE CONDITIONS THAT ALLOW FOR A DEMOCRATIC REFORM IN ALGERIA?

Egypt and Algeria are the two Arab countries 
which have occupied a prominent and leading 
position during the first wave of ‘awakening of 
the South’ in the era of Bandung and Non-Aligned 
Movement. They achieved a successful progress in 
their building of a state/nation entity that 
deserves to be considered ‘post-colonial’, 
accompanied by noticeable progressive economic 
and social achievements, despite its limitations, 
which planted hopes for its continuation on the 
road to liberation. But that process was halted 
in the two countries, and both moved back to the 
status of countries and societies ruled by the dominant imperialism.

The Algerian pattern seems to have enjoyed 
superior consistency to that of Egypt, which was 
reflected in its ability to limit the subsequent 
erosion, so that the Algerian ruling class is 
still divided between a patriotic wing and a 
comprador one. In some cases, these two 
contradictory characters are shared in the same 
one person that belongs to the ruling class. This 
is unlike the situation in Egypt where the ruling 
class, during Sadat and Mubarak rule, completely 
abandoned any nationalist inclination altogether.

There are two reasons that explain this difference.

The war of liberation in Algeria bred naturally a 
radical trend ideologically and socially. Unlike 
Egypt, where on one hand Nasserism came after the 
liberation wave of the revolution starting as of 
1919, which went through periods of expansion and 
retreat, before the seeds of its radicalisation 
were rooted after World War II. Then came the 
coup 1952 in an ambiguous character that stopped 
the development of the radicalisation of the 
liberation movement. This was followed by the 
Nasserist coup of 1954, which amended this 
rightwing trend, but that amendment adopted an 
elitist approach that excluded the popular 
classes from actively being involved in contributing to it.

On the other hand, we must take into account the 
devastating effects that independent Algeria 
inherited from the pattern of French settler 
colonialism, where the Algerian ‘traditional’ 
society had disintegrated so that the new society 
of independent Algeria has become endowed with a 
pervasive plebeian nature. Thus the demand ‘for 
equality’ became a distinguishing feature of the 
behavior and aptitudes of citizens, a degree 
unparalleled in all other Arabic countries. This 
is also in contrast to the history of Egypt as 
the ruling classes, since the time of Muhammad 
Ali Pasha, had stirred the evolution of society 
and the Egyptian project of revival. And the 
Egyptian project remained under aristocratic 
leadership calling for modernisation, so that it 
gradually became a project of an ‘aristocratic bourgeois.’

And these two differences have created different 
conditions in the challenge posed by the rise of 
political Islam. As Hocine Bellaloufi explained, 
in his book (Democracy in Algeria: Reform or 
Revolution, under print) that political Islam in 
Algeria revealed early on its ugly face, and then 
came to failure and defeat. But this did not 
signify that political Islam has become something 
of the past and unable to recover. Yet there is a 
huge difference between Algeria and Egypt from 
this angle so that political Islam in Egypt still 
enjoys ‘legitimacy’ among the general public. And 
the alliance between the comprador bourgeois and 
political Islam remains representative of the 
main axis that will ensure long-term rule of the 
dependent capitalist economic pattern in Egypt.

 From this, we can imagine different developments 
in the face of contemporary challenges in both 
countries, at least in the short term, because we 
should not rule out the possibility of controlled 
reforms in Algeria. At least that this 
possibility has a portion of realism, unlike the 
situation in Egypt where it is inconceivable to 
imagine a development that avoids violent 
collision between the popular movement and the 
cluster of reactionary ‘Islamic/comprador’ alliance.

Furthermore, while Egypt and Algeria are the two 
Arab countries which can be conceived as 
candidates in the accession to the group of 
‘emerging’ states, they also can come to 
represent a sad model for failure to climb to 
that level. Although the responsibility of the 
ruling classes in this failure is crucial, it is 
not correct to ignore the responsibility of rest 
of the society and its intellectuals and activists in the political movements.

With regard to the Arab states in the Maghreb 
generally, it is claimed that the Kingdom of 
Morocco is another positive example of change 
based on the achievement of gradual democratic 
reforms by peaceful means. Let the reader allow 
me to make my reservations on the likelihood of 
achieving such goal, as such evolution is 
conditioned by a Royal Decree that excludes from 
the start any questioning about the dependent 
capitalist pattern that frames it.

Furthermore, as long as the Moroccan people 
remain content with the principle of the rule of 
religious-monarchial regime (as the king is ‘Amir 
Al-mu'minin’), these restricted and limited 
reforms won't open the way for the real democracy required.

Perhaps this is the reason for the impossibility 
of Moroccans to understand the significance of 
the problem of Western Sahara, as the free people 
of Western Sahara are proud of another 
interpretation of Islam that does not allow them 
to kneel except before God, and not before any human being, even a king.

THE SYRIAN DISASTER

The Syrian Baathist regime belonged in the past 
to the cluster of national popular experiences 
(though not democratic) in the style of Nasserism 
and other experiences in the era of Bandung. And 
when the limits of possible real achievements in 
this framework became apparent, Hafez el Assad 
turned to a project that sought to combine the 
preservation of nationalist patriotism that is 
oppositional to colonialism on the one hand, and 
on the other hand, to benefit from the 
right-conservative concessions reflected in the 
‘openness’ (liberalisation) similar to the route 
taken by Nasser following the defeat of 1967.

The subsequent history of this project became 
apparent. In Egypt, it led immediately after the 
death of Nasser in 1970 to surrender without 
reservation to the demands of the reactionary 
axis consisting of the United States, the Gulf and Israel.

In Syria, this ‘opening’ led to the same results 
as it happened in other countries. That is, to 
serious rapid deterioration of social conditions 
for poorer classes and which eroded the legitimacy of the regime.

In the current developments, the Syrian regime 
has faced protests with repression and nothing 
else. The Brotherhood took advantage of the 
opportunity to appear as the ‘opposition’. Thus a 
coherent plan crystallised under the leadership 
of imperialism and its allies that sought not to 
‘rid the Syrian people of a dictator,’ but to 
destroy the Syrian state, modeled on the United States work in Iraq and Libya.

Here also where the profound relationship of the 
tripartite interests is apparent as the goal 1) 
for the U.S. is the breaking of the 
Iran/Syria/Hezbollah alliance, which is an 
obstacle to U.S. entrenching of its control over 
the region, 2) for Israel to have Syria 
fragmented into sectarian mini-states, and 3) for 
the Gulf Arab states, it is the entrenching of a 
‘Sunni’ dictatorship in the Wahabbi style, 
although this dictatorship will be established on 
the massacres and criminal elimination of Alawis, 
Druze and Christians. In the face of danger of 
this possible fate, the Assad regime remains 
unable to respond with the only needed and 
effective method, which is supposed to exclude 
the use of violence and to engage in genuine 
reforms, as the only acceptable solution assumes 
the opening of the way to genuine negotiations, 
which is conditional for the strengthening of a 
democratic front whose components are present in 
the ground, despite the effort to mute its voice. 
Simply opposing State terrorism to the so called 
“ Islamic/Salafi” terrorism leads nowhere.

SOME CONCLUSIONS

1.The strategy of contemporary imperialism for 
the region (the ‘great Middle East’) does not aim 
at all at establishing some form of ‘democracy’. 
It aims at destroying the countries and societies 
through the support of so-called Islamic regimes 
which guarantee the continuation of a ‘lumpen 
development’ (to use the words of my late friend 
A G Frank), i.e. a process of continuous 
pauperisation. Eventual ‘high rates of growth’, 
praised by the World Bank, are meaningless, being 
based on the plunder of natural resources, 
associated with fast growing inequality in the 
distribution of income and pauperisation for the majorities.

Iraq provides the ‘model’ for the region. The 
dictatorship of Saddam Hussein has been replaced 
by three no less (even more) terror regimes, in 
the name of ‘religion’ (Sunna and Shia) and of 
ethnicity (the Kurds), associated with the 
systematic destruction of the infrastructures and 
industries, and the planned assassination of tens 
of thousands of the elite citizens, in particular 
engineers and scientists, as well as the 
destruction of the education system (which was 
not bad in the time of Saddam) to reduce it to 
the teaching of religion and business!

Those are also the targets for Syria.

Isn’t it a curiosity that we see now the Emir of 
Qatar and the King of Saudi Arabia among the most 
vocal advocates of ‘democracy’. A farce.

2. Turkey plays an active role, along with the US 
(never forget that Turkey is a Nato member) in 
the implementation of that plan. It has 
established in the Hatay province camps for the 
recruitment and training of killers (so called 
‘Moslems’) who are infiltrated in Syria. Refer 
here to the book of Bahar Kimyongur ( Syriana, la 
conquète continue, Couleur Livre, Charleroi, 2011).

3. The US was ‘surprised’ by the Tunisian and 
Egyptian popular revolts. They now plan to 
‘preempt’ possible similar movements by 
initiating armed revolts of small groups 
supported by them. This strategy was tested with 
success in Libya (now a disintegrated country), 
and now in Syria. The reader can refer here to my 
papers on Libya (Lybia could break up like 
Somalia, Pambazuka, 07/09/2011) and Somalia (Is 
there a solution to the problems of Somalia?, Pambazuka, 17/02/2011 ).

The following target is Iran, under the pretext 
of its nuclear development, using to that effect 
Israel, which is unable to do the job without the 
active implication of the US forces. Iran, 
whatever one may think of its regime (in fact 
associating ‘Islam’s rule’ and market economy!) 
does constitute an obstacle to the deployment of 
the US military control over the region. This 
country must therefore be destroyed.

4. The final real target of contemporary 
imperialism is ‘containment and then after 
rolling back’ by preemptive war the most 
dangerous emerging countries (China first). Add 
here Russia, which, if it succeeds in modernising 
its army, can put an end to the exclusive military power of the US.

That implies the total subordination of all other 
countries of the South with a view to ensuring 
exclusive access to the natural resources of the 
whole planet to the benefit of the societies of 
the triad (US, Europe and Japan), their plunder 
and waste. It implies therefore more of lumpen 
development, more of pauperisation and more of 
terrorist regimes. Contemporary capitalism has nothing else to offer.
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* Samir Amin is director of the Third World 
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