[News] Colombia: The Significance of the Killing of FARC Leader Mono Jojoy
Anti-Imperialist News
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Mon Sep 27 14:52:34 EDT 2010
Colombia: The Significance of the Killing of FARC Leader Mono Jojoy
Written by Garry Leech
Sunday, 26 September 2010 15:02
[]
http://colombiajournal.org/the-significance-of-the-killing-of-farc-leader-mono-jojoy.htm
On September 23, a massive operation conducted by
the Colombian military targeted a large
encampment of guerrillas belonging to the
Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) in
eastern Colombia. The military action killed FARC
commander and secretariat member Jorge Briceño,
also known by the nickname Mono Jojoy. It is
only the second time in more than 45 years of
armed conflict that the government has killed a
member of the guerrilla groups seven-person
secretariatthe previous instance being the
assassination of Raúl Reyes two-and-a-half years
ago. But what will be the significance of the killing of Mono Jojoy?
Not surprisingly, Colombian government officials
quickly began trumpeting the importance of the
successful military operation that involved 400
troops and more than 30 aircraft and helicopters.
In reference to the killing of Mono Jojoy,
Colombias President Juan Manuel Santos declared,
It is the most resounding blow against the Farc
in is entire history. Meanwhile, Defense
Minister Rodrigo Rivera, in reference to the fact
that information provided by a FARC deserter led
the military to Mono Jojoys hideout, stated,
The Farc are falling apart from within.
Undoubtedly, the loss of a longtime leader such
as Mono Jojoy will impact the FARC. The guerrilla
commander joined the FARC in 1975 at 12 years of
age and rose up through the ranks to command the
rebel groups largest bloc, which consists of
some 40 percent of its fighters. Along the way he
became one of the most respected of the FARCs
leaders among rank and file guerrillas. This
respect was not simply a result of his military
prowess which, along with his blocs extensive
role in capturing soldiers and police as well as
kidnapping civilians, led many to view him as the
most ruthless of the FARCs leaders. This respect
was also due to the social and economic policies implemented under his command.
In many ways, Mono Jojoy encompassed the
complexities and contradictions evident in the
FARC. He was a ruthless military tactician who in
the late 1990s orchestrated a series of
large-scale, successful attacks against military
bases in eastern Colombia that caught the
attention of Washington and led to a dramatically
increased U.S. military intervention under Plan
Colombia. At the same time, Mono Jojoy was
responsible for extensive human rights violations
including the kidnapping and killing of civilians
in the regions under his command.
Meanwhile, what has been frequently ignored in
the reporting on Mono Jojoy is the fact that the
bloc he commanded has implemented some of the
FARCs most progressive social and economic
policies, which have benefited peasants in
eastern Colombia. Over the past 20 years, many
small towns in remote regions under Mono Jojoys
control experienced significant infrastructure
improvements as a result of the FARCs public
works programs. The FARC has built hundreds of
miles of roads that connected dozens of
communities to each other. In 2003, according to
a Washington Post report, Efrain Salazar, the
FARCs public works director in Meta, had an
annual budget of $1 million and paid civilians
who worked for him a monthly salary of $125.
And during the 1990s, Mono Jojoy used some of the
FARCs tax revenues to construct electrical grids
in dozens of remote towns and villages long
neglected by the national government. The
guerrilla commander also oversaw agrarian reform
projects such as the breaking up of ten large
ranches in the southern part of Meta in 2002 and
2003 with the smaller properties then distributed to subsistence farmers.
So, ultimately, what will be the impact of Mono
Jojoys death? Colombian government officials and
many analysts are already claiming that his
demise constitutes the beginning of the end for
the FARC. However, the same claims were made
after the deaths of three members of the FARCs
secretariatManuel Marulanda, Raúl Reyes and Iván
Ríosin March 2008 and the guerrilla group not
only survived those setbacks, it actually
increased its military actions over the past
year. In fact, the FARC has killed more than 50
Colombian soldiers and police over the past month
in one of the bloodiest periods of combat in many years.
While the death of Mono Jojoy will undoubtedly
prove to be a setback for the FARC in the short
term, particularly with regard to troop morale
and desertion rates, it will probably not have a
significant impact over the long term. After all,
Mono Jojoys influence and role had already
diminished in recent years due to health reasons,
primarily diabetes. Furthermore, despite military
setbacks, the FARC still has many experienced
mid-level commanders who are capable of moving up
the ranksa fact made evident following the
deaths of Marulanda, Reyes and Ríos two-and-a-half years ago.
Many analysts also argueas they did following
the deaths of Marulanda, Reyes and Ríosthat the
FARCs new supreme commander Alfonso Cano is more
likely to engage in negotiations as a result of
the military setbacks. Their latest arguments are
based on the premise that Cano is the guerrilla
groups long-time political leader and therefore
will be more willing to engage in negotiations
than military leaders such as Mono Jojoy. But the
assumption that Cano is more open to negotiations
is flawed, because the FARC commander is an
ideologue who is actually less likely to
compromise the rebel groups political ideals.
Interestingly, the principal obstacle to
negotiations both before Mono Jojoys death and
now is not the FARC, but the government.
Previously, the Uribe administration refused to
engage in negotiations with the FARC as long as
the guerrillas demanded certain conditions, such
as the establishment of a safe-haven in which to
conduct talks. Last week, FARC commander Cano
announced that the guerrilla group is willing to
talk with the current government and find a
political solution to the social and armed
conflict in the country and without any kind of
conditions. But now it is the Santos government
that is setting conditions in order to initiate
peace talks, demanding that the FARC first cease
its military attacks and kidnapping.
The death of Mono Jojoy, like the killing of
Reyes, illustrates the impact of U.S. military
aid under Plan Colombia. The military operations
that killed the two FARC commanders would not
have been possible a decade ago. The Colombian
militarys increased intelligence gathering
capabilities along with its capacity to rapidly
deploy well-trained combat units with
U.S.-supplied helicopters has put the FARC on the
defensive. The guerrilla groups internal
communications have been compromised and the
ability of its leaders to remain undetected in
remote jungle regions has been seriously restricted.
Given the Colombian militarys vastly improved
capabilities, it will not be a surprise if the
FARCs supreme commander Cano is its next
battlefield trophy. After all, the military has
deployed more than 4,000 soldiers with the sole
mission of tracking down Cano. However, as has
occurred in the past, new leaders will simply
replace those killed and, given that most FARC
units operate on the local level with little
regular communication with the groups
secretariat, the death of Mono Jojoy, Cano or any
other high-ranking commander will have little
direct impact on the daily activities of the
rank-and-file. Therefore, the FARC will likely
continue its armed struggle in some form or another for many more years.
Ultimately, a negotiated solution is the only way
to bring peace to Colombia, but it would have to
be a peace with social justice in order to truly
end the violence. But the government, empowered
by its military successes in recent years, has
little desire to engage in any peace process that
would affect the social and economic status quo
by addressing the countrys gross inequalities
and threatening the interests of the ruling elites.
Freedom Archives
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