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<font size=4><b>Colombia: The Significance of the Killing of FARC Leader
“Mono Jojoy” <br><br>
<br>
</b></font><font size=3>Written by Garry Leech <br>
Sunday, 26 September 2010 15:02 <br>
<img src="http://upsidedownworld.org/main/images/stories/monojojoy.bmp" alt="[]">
<a href="http://colombiajournal.org/the-significance-of-the-killing-of-farc-leader-mono-jojoy.htm" eudora="autourl">
http://colombiajournal.org/the-significance-of-the-killing-of-farc-leader-mono-jojoy.htm<br>
<br>
</a>On September 23, a massive operation conducted by the Colombian
military targeted a large encampment of guerrillas belonging to the
Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) in eastern Colombia. The
military action killed FARC commander and secretariat member Jorge
Briceño, also known by the nickname “Mono Jojoy.” It is only the second
time in more than 45 years of armed conflict that the government has
killed a member of the guerrilla group’s seven-person secretariatthe
previous instance being the assassination of Raúl Reyes two-and-a-half
years ago. But what will be the significance of the killing of Mono
Jojoy?<br><br>
Not surprisingly, Colombian government officials quickly began trumpeting
the importance of the successful military operation that involved 400
troops and more than 30 aircraft and helicopters. In reference to the
killing of Mono Jojoy, Colombia’s President Juan Manuel Santos declared,
“It is the most resounding blow against the Farc in is entire history.”
Meanwhile, Defense Minister Rodrigo Rivera, in reference to the fact that
information provided by a FARC deserter led the military to Mono Jojoy’s
hideout, stated, “The Farc are falling apart from within.”<br><br>
Undoubtedly, the loss of a longtime leader such as Mono Jojoy will impact
the FARC. The guerrilla commander joined the FARC in 1975 at 12 years of
age and rose up through the ranks to command the rebel group’s largest
bloc, which consists of some 40 percent of its fighters. Along the way he
became one of the most respected of the FARC’s leaders among rank and
file guerrillas. This respect was not simply a result of his military
prowess which, along with his bloc’s extensive role in capturing soldiers
and police as well as kidnapping civilians, led many to view him as the
most ruthless of the FARC’s leaders. This respect was also due to the
social and economic policies implemented under his command.<br><br>
In many ways, Mono Jojoy encompassed the complexities and contradictions
evident in the FARC. He was a ruthless military tactician who in the late
1990s orchestrated a series of large-scale, successful attacks against
military bases in eastern Colombia that caught the attention of
Washington and led to a dramatically increased U.S. military intervention
under Plan Colombia. At the same time, Mono Jojoy was responsible for
extensive human rights violations including the kidnapping and killing of
civilians in the regions under his command.<br><br>
Meanwhile, what has been frequently ignored in the reporting on Mono
Jojoy is the fact that the bloc he commanded has implemented some of the
FARC’s most progressive social and economic policies, which have
benefited peasants in eastern Colombia. Over the past 20 years, many
small towns in remote regions under Mono Jojoy’s control experienced
significant infrastructure improvements as a result of the FARC’s public
works programs. The FARC has built hundreds of miles of roads that
connected dozens of communities to each other. In 2003, according to a
Washington Post report, Efrain Salazar, the FARC’s public works director
in Meta, had an annual budget of $1 million and paid civilians who worked
for him a monthly salary of $125.<br><br>
And during the 1990s, Mono Jojoy used some of the FARC’s tax revenues to
construct electrical grids in dozens of remote towns and villages long
neglected by the national government. The guerrilla commander also
oversaw agrarian reform projects such as the breaking up of ten large
ranches in the southern part of Meta in 2002 and 2003 with the smaller
properties then distributed to subsistence farmers.<br><br>
So, ultimately, what will be the impact of Mono Jojoy’s death? Colombian
government officials and many analysts are already claiming that his
demise constitutes the beginning of the end for the FARC. However, the
same claims were made after the deaths of three members of the FARC’s
secretariatManuel Marulanda, Raúl Reyes and Iván Ríosin March 2008 and
the guerrilla group not only survived those setbacks, it actually
increased its military actions over the past year. In fact, the FARC has
killed more than 50 Colombian soldiers and police over the past month in
one of the bloodiest periods of combat in many years.<br><br>
While the death of Mono Jojoy will undoubtedly prove to be a setback for
the FARC in the short term, particularly with regard to troop morale and
desertion rates, it will probably not have a significant impact over the
long term. After all, Mono Jojoy’s influence and role had already
diminished in recent years due to health reasons, primarily diabetes.
Furthermore, despite military setbacks, the FARC still has many
experienced mid-level commanders who are capable of moving up the ranksa
fact made evident following the deaths of Marulanda, Reyes and Ríos
two-and-a-half years ago.<br><br>
Many analysts also argueas they did following the deaths of Marulanda,
Reyes and Ríosthat the FARC’s new supreme commander Alfonso Cano is more
likely to engage in negotiations as a result of the military setbacks.
Their latest arguments are based on the premise that Cano is the
guerrilla group’s long-time political leader and therefore will be more
willing to engage in negotiations than military leaders such as Mono
Jojoy. But the assumption that Cano is more open to negotiations is
flawed, because the FARC commander is an ideologue who is actually less
likely to compromise the rebel group’s political ideals.<br><br>
Interestingly, the principal obstacle to negotiations both before Mono
Jojoy’s death and now is not the FARC, but the government. Previously,
the Uribe administration refused to engage in negotiations with the FARC
as long as the guerrillas demanded certain conditions, such as the
establishment of a safe-haven in which to conduct talks. Last week, FARC
commander Cano announced that the guerrilla group is willing “to talk
with the current government and find a political solution to the social
and armed conflict in the country and without any kind of conditions.”
But now it is the Santos government that is setting conditions in order
to initiate peace talks, demanding that the FARC first cease its military
attacks and kidnapping.<br><br>
The death of Mono Jojoy, like the killing of Reyes, illustrates the
impact of U.S. military aid under Plan Colombia. The military operations
that killed the two FARC commanders would not have been possible a decade
ago. The Colombian military’s increased intelligence gathering
capabilities along with its capacity to rapidly deploy well-trained
combat units with U.S.-supplied helicopters has put the FARC on the
defensive. The guerrilla group’s internal communications have been
compromised and the ability of its leaders to remain undetected in remote
jungle regions has been seriously restricted.<br><br>
Given the Colombian military’s vastly improved capabilities, it will not
be a surprise if the FARC’s supreme commander Cano is its next
battlefield trophy. After all, the military has deployed more than 4,000
soldiers with the sole mission of tracking down Cano. However, as has
occurred in the past, new leaders will simply replace those killed and,
given that most FARC units operate on the local level with little regular
communication with the group’s secretariat, the death of Mono Jojoy, Cano
or any other high-ranking commander will have little direct impact on the
daily activities of the rank-and-file. Therefore, the FARC will likely
continue its armed struggle in some form or another for many more
years.<br><br>
Ultimately, a negotiated solution is the only way to bring peace to
Colombia, but it would have to be a peace with social justice in order to
truly end the violence. But the government, empowered by its military
successes in recent years, has little desire to engage in any peace
process that would affect the social and economic status quo by
addressing the country’s gross inequalities and threatening the interests
of the ruling elites.<br><br>
<br><br>
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