[News] Venezuela - Feet of Clay or an Achilles Heel?
Anti-Imperialist News
news at freedomarchives.org
Fri Nov 28 11:48:41 EST 2008
Feet of Clay or an Achilles Heel?
<http://www.venezuelanalysis.com/analysis/3991>http://www.venezuelanalysis.com/analysis/<http://www.venezuelanalysis.com/analysis/3991>3991
George Ciccariello-Maher
Media outlets were predicting a disaster for
Venezuela's Chavistas. Desperate for news that
was fit to print, the opposition-controlled
Venezuelan press and its foreign counterparts
convinced many that the time had come for Hugo
Chávez and his Bolivarian Revolution, after
stumbling a year ago in a slim referendum defeat,
to finally reveal its feet of clay and come
crashing down under its own weight. But the
opposition had already squandered the slight
momentum it achieved a year ago on partisan
bickering, and would not live up to the
unrealistic optimism it sought to foster in the media.
In reality, the catastrophic collapse of Chavismo
was not to be, but nor was this a crushing
victory or a clear mandate for the drastic
radicalization of the revolutionary process. What
was revealed was not feet of clay, but an
Achilles' heel, giving necessary pause to
revolutionaries and imposing reflection on some serious strategic losses.
Opposition Scaremongering
For a Venezuelan opposition still not entirely
comfortable with the notion of democracy,
elections have much more to do with media
maneuvering than the actual vote, and they would
find in Simon Romero of the New York Times a
convenient mouthpiece. Either through trademark
laziness or unprecedented effort to distort the
truth,
<http://www.nytimes.com/2008/11/24/world/americas/24venez.html?_r=2&hp&oref=slogin>Romero
took aim [1] at Chávez's recent statements
regarding the election in the state of Carabobo,
suggesting that the president was threatening to
refuse to recognize an opposition victory in the
state, instead sending tanks to quell the
opposition. Unsurprisingly, what Chávez had
actually said was quite different: he had noted
that the opposition candidate for the state
governorship, Enrique Salas Feo, had been an
active participant in the 2002 coup, suggesting
that an opposition victory in Carabobo might
provide a staging ground for another effort at
his ouster. "I won't let them overthrow me,"
<http://nuevaprensa.com.ve/content/view/10006/2>Chávez
insisted [2], "and I might have to bring out the
tanks to defend this revolutionary government."
With the mediatic framework in place, the
opposition on the ground engaged in the perennial
strategy of preemptively undermining the eventual
results of the election. At 4pm on election day,
opposition leaders---conspicuously including
Ismael García, leader of the formerly-Chavista
PODEMOS---declared "generalized fraud" as some
electoral centers remained open after the nominal
closing time, demanding that voting centers be
closed immediately. But such calls were in open
violation of Venezuelan law, under which voting
centers are obligated to remain open as long as a
line of voters remains. The day's high
participation-the opposition knew from the outset-was not to their favor.
Participation was indeed high: some 66% of
registered voters are reported to have turned
out, a record of sorts for local elections. And
this despite the torrential rains that have
pelted much of the country in recent days,
prompting inevitable comparison to the notorious
rains and cataclysmic mudslides that plagued the
1999 constitutional referendum, and the
equally-notorious declarations by the Catholic
Church that the rains constituted a punishment
for Chávez's impudence. This vote, however, was
not that of an exuberantly young process as in
1999, but rather a necessary hurdle to be
surpassed as a sign of institutional
revolutionary maturity, and therein lay the specific challenges it posed.
Modest Opposition Gains
In the western oil state of Zulia, Chavista
candidate and former mayor of Maracaibo Giancarlo
Di Martino put up a valiant fight, garnering some
45% of the vote in what had been an opposition
stronghold against hand-picked successor of
former opposition presidential candidate Manuel
Rosales, Pablo Pérez, with 53%. While this
victory for the opposition---like the win in
Nueva Esparta state---was no surprise, the
relative tightness of the race was. And equally
surprising was the fact that Chavistas managed to
<http://aporrea.org/actualidad/n124559.html>pick
up a majority [3] of mayoral races in the
escualido stronghold of Nueva Esparta.
More surprising, however, were slim opposition
pickups in Táchira and Carabobo states. In
traditionally conservative Táchira, Chavistas
have fared poorly in recent years, a fact not
helped by the departure of Luis Tascón, a fiery
Tachirense, from the PSUV ranks. In Carabobo,
incumbent former Chavista Felipe Acosta
Carlez---best known for offending the press by
belching and farting on television---refused to
comply with PSUV internal elections, insisting on
running for re-election against the official
Chavista candidate and TV personality Mario
Silva. While Acosta Carlez only took 6.5%, this
was almost certainly enough to tip the scales in
a close race only decided by three percentage points.
A Key Loss in Metropolitan Caracas
The two most surprising and significant victories
for the opposition were certainly in metropolitan
Caracas and the neighboring state of Miranda, and
both have clear repercussions for the future,
since the defeated Chavista candidates were the
two most likely successors to the president
himself. But the lessons to be taken from the two
are different. While Chávez's own support is
highest in rural areas, in past elections the
president has generally been able to win many of
the country's large metropolitan areas, albeit by
small margins. Caracas itself is a city divided,
with poor barrios voting overwhelmingly for
Chávez and the wealthier-but less populated-areas
voting up to 80% against. It has been from these
opposition zones that the young leadership of the
right has emerged, in the charismatic figures of
Leopoldo López and Henrique Radonski, both with
their origins in the far-right, U.S.-sponsored Primero Justicia party.
While López was disqualified from seeking
election as metropolitan mayor due to pending
corruption charges, he threw his significant
weight behind far-right former Caracas mayor and
previously intransigent abstentionist Antonio
Ledezma. Indeed, for an opposition which tends to
be its own worst enemy, López's disqualification
may have proven a blessing in disguise, as it
avoided the always messy process of selecting a
joint candidate. The Chavista candidate,
Aristóbulo Isturiz, is a former education
minister and one of the most respected names
within the Revolution, having risen from union
ranks to the Congress when Chávez himself was a
young coup plotter. In the end, however, Ledezma
pulled off an upset, returning him to a post that
he held more than a decade ago, when he had close
ties to the now-discredited politicians of the Venezuelan ancien regime.
For an explanation as to how Ledezma managed this
upset victory, we need to look at the five
municipalities that make up metropolitan Caracas.
Three are traditionally opposition bastions, and
it is from two of these that López and Radonski
emerged, whereas the sprawling municipality of
Libertador in western Caracas has consistently
gone Chavista. Despite multiple candidacies on
either side, Chavistas maintained this control of
Libertador, with former vice president Jorge
Rodríguez winning handily over opportunist
student leader Stalin González by a double-digit
margin. But the only Caracas municipality to
shift hands was Sucre in the east, a complex
combination of upper-middle-class residential
areas and the infamous Petare slums, in which
Primero Justicia's Carlos Ocariz defeated former
Chavista interior minister Jesse Chacón by 8
percentage points. Testifying both to discontent
with prior Chavista municipal leadership as well
as PJ's concerted efforts to build support in the
less-revolutionary barrios of Petare, it seems as
though Sucre may have been the cause of the
metropolitan area tipping toward the opposition.
We would be wrong to interpret this opposition
coup in the metropolitan area of Caracas as
having merely political implications: in the last
real coup, in 2002, the opposition-controlled
Metropolitan Police played a key role in staging
the bloodbath used to justify Chávez's ouster.
And given the fact that in many areas the
Metropolitan Police have effectively withdrawn,
allowing revolutionary popular militias to
control security, the next few years could see
open warfare once again on the streets of
Caracas. This victory for the opposition, while
slim in margin, is potentially massive in its implications.
Diosdado Goes Down
The other shock defeat for the Chavistas came in
neighboring Miranda state, which itself contains
half of the metropolitan area of Caracas. Here,
Chávez's right-hand-man (emphasis on the
"right"), Diosdado Cabello, has been governing
and consolidating a significant power base during
the past four years. Originally a participant in
Chávez's failed coup efforts, Cabello has since
come to be a powerful and loyal ally of the
president, stepping in as vice president during
the 2002 coup to help undermine the coup. But
Cabello has also come to represent the
"endogenous right," quietly heading up the
significant contingent of Chavistas who would
like to take power themselves and moderate the
revolutionary process. As a result of this
uncomfortably public role as leader of the
Chavista right, Cabello has suffered the scorn of
voters before, notably within the PSUV itself,
where he didn't manage to score within the top 15
elected members of the party leadership (only to
be subsequently appointed by Chávez).
If Cabello's star is fading, his opponent
Henrique Capriles Radonski is himself a rising
star of the opposition and currently mayor of
Baruta municipality. A young, charismatic
heartthrob, whose personal website features the
mayor in several shirtless, modelesque poses,
Radonski has also (like López) run afoul of the
law, for participating in a public attack and
siege on the Cuban Embassy during the 2002 coup.
Luckily for Radonski, however, charges were
dropped in time for the elections, in which his
record of governance in wealthy Baruta combined
with Diosdado's waning popularity to deliver a
heavy defeat in Miranda. Here, certainly,
Cabello's own electoral feet were shown to be
made of clay. If this bodes well for the
superstar of the Venezuelan opposition---himself
a possible presidential opponent in years to
come---the result isn't entirely negative for
those Chavistas who had grown wary of Cabello's
increasingly visible role within the governing movement.
The Map is Still Red
The mainstream press has made every effort to
frame these elections in such a way that the
opposition would inevitably appear as the winner.
Central to this framing was the oft-repeated
claim that, prior to the election, Chavistas
controlled 21 of 23 state governments.
<http://aporrea.org/actualidad/n124548.html>This
is simply nonsense [4]. While it is true that
after the 2004 gubernatorial elections, Chavistas
had gained control of 21 states, such control
wouldn't last, and the social-democratic PODEMOS
coalition would soon move toward the opposition,
taking with it the states of Aragua and Sucre.
Furthermore, as incumbent governors refused to be
displaced by the PSUV primary process, further
ruptures ensued in Guárico, Carabobo, and
Yaracuy, reducing PSUV control of incumbents to 16.
As first vice president of the PSUV Alberto
<http://aporrea.org/actualidad/n124544.html>Müller
Rojas [5] put it in his post-election press
conference, "we regained four states lost through
treason," further noting that the PSUV had
consolidated itself as the first political force
in the country. Chávez himself
<http://aporrea.org/actualidad/n124542.html>echoed
this [6] sentiment in a surprise appearance just moments later:
We're almost ten years from that initial victory,
and the people have expressed their will, and
vaya, con qué contundencia! ... Once again we see
the shattering of those irrational, outlandish,
and unsubstantiated arguments that some still
dare to make about Venezuela... both those who
voted for the Revolution and those who voted for
other candidates, they all showed that here we
have a democratic system, that here we respect
the decision of the people... Who could say that
there is a dictatorship in Venezuela?
Speaking directly to opposition claims to have
defeated Chávez and the PSUV, his response was
stark: "If they want to fall into lies, let them
fall into lies... we have won 17 gubernatorial
races, our party has been consolidated, we are
headed for 6 million votes, and the map [of
Venezuela] is dressed almost totally in red!" But
the president warned nevertheless of the need to
self-criticize, recognize errors, and take
responsibility for the losses incurred, "because
it's like a war, when an advancing army takes 20
hills and loses two, but takes three more on the
way. What is most important is to maintain the
rhythm of the march and the rhythm of victory."
<http://aporrea.org/actualidad/n124541.html>According
to the early count [7], the PSUV obtained 5.3
million votes, compared with the 4.3 million
garnered by the opposition, and this despite
losing the two most densely-populated states in
the country.
<http://aporrea.org/actualidad/n124549.html>Jorge
Rodríguez insisted [8] that the opposition
recognize the clear PSUV mandate, arguing that
"when it comes to the strength of Venezuelan
democracy, you can't block out the sun with your
finger." But we can expect the
privately-controlled Venezuelan press and their
international counterparts to attempt to do just
that, insisting that the Chavistas have dropped
from 21 to 17 states, when in reality, seen
correctly, they have actually gained in the
overall picture. And where they won, they often
did so somewhat astoundingly, claiming some 73%
in Lara and 61% in Vargas. Chavistas won a total
of 8 states by 10% or more, 4 states by 20% or
more, and 2 states by 50% or more, as compared to
the opposition's best showing of 57% in Nueva Esparta.
The Achilles Heel of the Revolution
If we were to follow the mainstream press talking
points, the lesson of the elections was the
failure of the Revolution in dealing with the
everyday wants and needs of the Venezuelan
population. This is half true, but the issue is
too often reduced to its most mundane aspects,
depriving the Venezuelan people of the capacity
for political judgment. Certainly, the fact that
garbage often piles up in the streets and that
violence continues to plague Venezuelan cities
contributed to the shock defeat of Chavista
forces in the metropolitan area. But the banality
of the everyday doesn't quite capture the gap
between Chávez's 63% approval rating and the
tangible repulsion that many Venezuelans feel for
their local officials, who are often seen---with
more than a little justification---as corrupt opportunists.
The municipal and state officials that were
elected Sunday, while representing an
institutional level that remains necessary at the
present moment, are nevertheless merely a
stepping stone for many on the road to a more
substantive popular-communal
<http://www.monthlyreview.org/0907maher.php>"dual
power." [9] As alternative institutions develop,
specifically the local and directly-democratic
communal councils, many hope to see the more
heavily bureaucratized levels of government
replaced entirely. And as the councils flex their
muscles, these elected officials will become all
the more rabidly defensive of their power quota.
Which is all to say that, if local elections
represent the Achilles' heel of the Bolivarian
Revolution, perpetually threatening to trip up
its progress and disrupt its connection with the
grassroots, we can only expect this conflict to intensify in the short term.
George Ciccariello-Maher is a Ph.D. candidate in
political theory at UC Berkeley. He is currently
writing a people's history of the Bolivarian
Revolution entitled We Created Him. He can be
reached at gjcm(at)berkeley.edu.
*
<http://www.venezuelanalysis.com/analysis/politics>Political Developments
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----------
Source URL (retrieved on Nov 28 2008 - 12:49):
<http://www.venezuelanalysis.com/analysis/3991>http://www.venezuelanalysis.com/analysis/3991
Links:
[1]
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/11/24/world/americas/24venez.html?_r=2&hp&oref=slogin
[2] http://nuevaprensa.com.ve/content/view/10006/2
[3] http://aporrea.org/actualidad/n124559.html
[4] http://aporrea.org/actualidad/n124548.html
[5] http://aporrea.org/actualidad/n124544.html
[6] http://aporrea.org/actualidad/n124542.html
[7] http://aporrea.org/actualidad/n124541.html
[8] http://aporrea.org/actualidad/n124549.html
[9] http://www.monthlyreview.org/0907maher.php
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