[News] Bolivian Referendum Analysis

[Anti-Imperialist News]

Bolivian Referendum Analysis
August 14, 2008 By Andrew Lyubarsky

http://www.zcommunications.org/znet/viewArticle/18440

As more results from rural areas flood in, last Sunday's recall 
referendum keeps looking better and better for Evo Morales and his 
Movimiento a Socialismo party. After having won the Bolivian 
presidency in 2005 with approximately 54% of the popular vote, Evo 
surprised everyone by not only winning the recall referendum convoked 
by the right-wing opposition, but by winning big, with the Bolivian 
daily Los Tiempos reporting him taking almost 67% of the vote as of 
10 AM Wednesday. Commentators that had lamented Evo's loss of support 
by his "frightening of the middle class" and "loss of the urban vote" 
were left surprised that Evo was able to not only consolidate his 
support in rural Bolivia to near unanimity, but make substantial 
inroads in urban centers such as Cochabamba, in which vocal 
anti-Morales sentiment is frequently heard. He even captured about 
40% of the vote in Santa Cruz, the heart of the autonomist movement, 
and a 53.88% majority in Chuquisaca, where just weeks ago he was 
violently prevented from entering its capital Sucre. A minor opponent 
of the government, Jose Luis Paredes, the governor of La Paz, was 
easily recalled, as was a major opponent, Manfred Reyes Villa of Cochabamba.

It is extremely likely that, as he announced in his victory speech, 
Evo will use this as a mandate to push more aggressively for his 
project of social transformation - a new, indigenous-centered 
constitution, nationalization of formerly-privatized industries, and 
a pursuit of land reform in Eastern Bolivia. He would be correct in 
doing so - with his achievement of such a clear mandate, it may be 
now or never for his government to act decisively. However, he needs 
to be conscious of numerous pitfalls along the way.

Government Support in Autonomist Regions Surprisingly High

Looking at the bright side, Evo's surprising approval in the 
autonomist states suggests that the opposition to his government 
voiced by regional leaders and the press does not represent 
significant sectors of society in the so-called "Media Luna" of 
opposition. He appears to have won a slim majority of 52.7% in the 
peripheral but Santa Cruz-aligned state of Pando and nearly 49% in 
the important oil-rich state of Tarija. Despite the radical 
opposition voiced to his government in his two years in power from 
these areas, this percentage represents a significant increase over 
the level of support he got there in 2005. However, the easy margins 
of victory for the opposition governors suggest that the application 
of any kind of assertive policy that affects elite interests will be 
bitterly contested. While the right-wing is likely to wince at the 
magnitude of Evo's victory and some of its ideologists may have held 
millenarian ideas of recalling him and restoring the order that had 
been broken by the "indio's" victory, it is quite possible that 
defeating the president outright was never part of their strategy.

After the discrediting of neoliberal economic policy and the growing 
assertiveness of indigenous movements in the 1990s, the Bolivian 
right wing and traditional political structure realized that it had 
to prepare to lose hegemonic control over the national government. 
They were a predominantly white minority in a society still rife with 
colonial elements and an ideology of racial distinction, and a 
minority whose ideas of development and Bolivian society had long 
failed to resonate with the predominantly indigenous population. 
Thus, instead of waging the losing battle of contesting national 
control, they undertook, quite successfully, a project of regional 
consolidation in Eastern Bolivia, a wealthier region of the country 
with significant natural gas deposits and an export-based economy 
that grew under the neoliberal free-marketeers as its Andean 
neighbors struggled. A folkloric sense of "Santa Cruz-ness" which 
incorporated even recent migrants from highland Bolivia recast the 
question of power in regional terms in the universalistic language of 
a "struggle against centralism and dictatorship".

The results of the referendum confirm this struggle for them, and 
they will continue unabated in their confrontational discourse. It is 
likely that despite winning a level of support unheard of for a 
Bolivian president in the democratic era, Evo will still be unable to 
visit 5 out of the country's 9 states unless he is willing to use 
force to subdue violent right-wing youth groups, actions which could 
spark a wider conflagration. The tone of his latest speech was 
conciliatory to the victorious opposition prefects and called for 
dialogue, but as it becomes increasingly clear that they will agree 
only to a dialogue that preserves their rights to rule the East as 
their private fiefdoms, the government may have to become more aggressive.

Cochabamba in the Balance

The most proximate struggle will be over the blowout loss of Manfred 
Reyes Villa in Cochabamba, who got crushed by an almost 65-35% 
margin, but has repeatedly refused to accept the results of the 
referendum. The regional left-wing and MAS have a visceral hatred for 
Manfred, and will remove him by violence if he refuses to go quietly.

In January 2007, MAS tried to force Manfred to resign, angered after 
he attempted to call a second autonomy referendum after the question 
had already once been defeated in the state. They occupied the 
central square, and Manfred-sponsored goons from the upper-middle 
class areas of the cities descended on them, eager to "beat up some 
Indians". Two MAS backers from rural areas and one upper-middle class 
teenager were killed in the conflict, the state building was briefly 
set on fire, and Manfred came off as the defender of democracy 
against an unruly mob.

This time, the democracy card is on the side of MAS. The question of 
the day is whether the right-wing opposition will circle its wagons 
to defend its ally in Cochabamba or decide that he is a lost cause 
and consent to a potential MAS takeover of the heartland of the 
country. As of Wednesday, Manfred has not officially renounced, but 
has "stepped away" from the governor's office and left daily 
responsibilities in the hands of his chief of staff. For the moment, 
he appears to have decided that he would no longer benefit from 
provoking a conflict.

Dialogue or Confrontation?

The rhetoric of the mainstream political commentators in Bolivia have 
always sought to call the left and right wings to a "dialogue", in 
which their widely divergent visions of the country could be made 
compatible. This type of idea is reminiscent to that pushed by former 
Bolivian president Carlos Mesa, who valued the idea of "social peace" 
by trying (and ultimately failing) to maintain a centrist politics 
between the indigenous left and the autonomist right. The goals of 
Evo Morales, however, involve the deepening of the revolutionary 
process of indigenous empowerment, which is inherently a process that 
creates conflict when it hits the wall of the entrenched resistance 
of privileged classes. Dialogue there may be, but it is extremely 
unlikely that either the government or the opposition can compromise 
on their core positions. For Evo to forego the pursuit of land reform 
in the East would be to break his promises to transform the social 
structure of the country; for the autonomists to allow it would 
challenge the very foundations of their power. Dialogue can and will 
happen, but it is not to be viewed as a universal panacea that will 
accommodate everyone.

The Bolivian daily La Razon described the situation thusly. "If we 
were tied 1-1 [before the vote], now we have returned to a tie, but a 
3-3 tie. What use will these actors get from their victories?" This 
is an analysis that doesn't take into account the very real boost 
that Evo and his supporters will take out of these elections, but it 
does capture the idea that both the left and the right wing have won, 
at different scalar levels of the Bolivian state. After a great deal 
of theater and the dispatching of some minor characters, we are left 
with both the heroes and villains standing emboldened as the dust settles.

However, it seems that the opposition is numerically smaller than its 
significantly loud barking and dramatic spectacular manifestations 
have made it seem. The level of support that Evo has achieved was not 
predicted by almost anyone, and is reminiscent of his actual 2005 
election landslide, in which the most surprised person may have been 
Evo himself. Let us make no mistake - in the great soccer match that 
is Bolivian politics, MAS is up a goal. The autonomists may continue 
to retain their bases of power, but they can no longer credibly 
blather on about a "corrupt dictatorship" on the national level. 
These are historic times, and it is time for Evo to make a move.





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