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<font size=3>Bolivian Referendum Analysis<br>
August 14, 2008 By Andrew Lyubarsky <br><br>
<a href="http://www.zcommunications.org/znet/viewArticle/18440" eudora="autourl">
http://www.zcommunications.org/znet/viewArticle/18440<br><br>
</a>As more results from rural areas flood in, last Sunday's recall
referendum keeps looking better and better for Evo Morales and his
Movimiento a Socialismo party. After having won the Bolivian presidency
in 2005 with approximately 54% of the popular vote, Evo surprised
everyone by not only winning the recall referendum convoked by the
right-wing opposition, but by winning big, with the Bolivian daily <i>Los
Tiempos </i>reporting him taking almost 67% of the vote as of 10 AM
Wednesday. Commentators that had lamented Evo's loss of support by his
"frightening of the middle class" and "loss of the urban
vote" were left surprised that Evo was able to not only consolidate
his support in rural Bolivia to near unanimity, but make substantial
inroads in urban centers such as Cochabamba, in which vocal anti-Morales
sentiment is frequently heard. He even captured about 40% of the vote in
Santa Cruz, the heart of the autonomist movement, and a 53.88% majority
in Chuquisaca, where just weeks ago he was violently prevented from
entering its capital Sucre. A minor opponent of the government, Jose Luis
Paredes, the governor of La Paz, was easily recalled, as was a major
opponent, Manfred Reyes Villa of Cochabamba.<br><br>
It is extremely likely that, as he announced in his victory speech, Evo
will use this as a mandate to push more aggressively for his project of
social transformation - a new, indigenous-centered constitution,
nationalization of formerly-privatized industries, and a pursuit of land
reform in Eastern Bolivia. He would be correct in doing so - with his
achievement of such a clear mandate, it may be now or never for his
government to act decisively. However, he needs to be conscious of
numerous pitfalls along the way. <br><br>
Government Support in Autonomist Regions Surprisingly High<br><br>
Looking at the bright side, Evo's surprising approval in the autonomist
states suggests that the opposition to his government voiced by regional
leaders and the press does not represent significant sectors of society
in the so-called "Media Luna" of opposition. He appears to have
won a slim majority of 52.7% in the peripheral but Santa Cruz-aligned
state of Pando and nearly 49% in the important oil-rich state of Tarija.
Despite the radical opposition voiced to his government in his two years
in power from these areas, this percentage represents a significant
increase over the level of support he got there in 2005. However, the
easy margins of victory for the opposition governors suggest that the
application of any kind of assertive policy that affects elite interests
will be bitterly contested. While the right-wing is likely to wince at
the magnitude of Evo's victory and some of its ideologists may have held
millenarian ideas of recalling him and restoring the order that had been
broken by the "indio's" victory, it is quite possible that
defeating the president outright was never part of their strategy. <br>
<br>
After the discrediting of neoliberal economic policy and the growing
assertiveness of indigenous movements in the 1990s, the Bolivian right
wing and traditional political structure realized that it had to prepare
to lose hegemonic control over the national government. They were a
predominantly white minority in a society still rife with colonial
elements and an ideology of racial distinction, and a minority whose
ideas of development and Bolivian society had long failed to resonate
with the predominantly indigenous population. Thus, instead of waging the
losing battle of contesting national control, they undertook, quite
successfully, a project of regional consolidation in Eastern Bolivia, a
wealthier region of the country with significant natural gas deposits and
an export-based economy that grew under the neoliberal free-marketeers as
its Andean neighbors struggled. A folkloric sense of "Santa
Cruz-ness" which incorporated even recent migrants from highland
Bolivia recast the question of power in regional terms in the
universalistic language of a "struggle against centralism and
dictatorship". <br><br>
The results of the referendum confirm this struggle for them, and they
will continue unabated in their confrontational discourse. It is likely
that despite winning a level of support unheard of for a Bolivian
president in the democratic era, Evo will still be unable to visit 5 out
of the country's 9 states unless he is willing to use force to subdue
violent right-wing youth groups, actions which could spark a wider
conflagration. The tone of his latest speech was conciliatory to the
victorious opposition prefects and called for dialogue, but as it becomes
increasingly clear that they will agree only to a dialogue that preserves
their rights to rule the East as their private fiefdoms, the government
may have to become more aggressive. <br><br>
Cochabamba in the Balance<br><br>
The most proximate struggle will be over the blowout loss of Manfred
Reyes Villa in Cochabamba, who got crushed by an almost 65-35% margin,
but has repeatedly refused to accept the results of the referendum. The
regional left-wing and MAS have a visceral hatred for Manfred, and will
remove him by violence if he refuses to go quietly. <br><br>
In January 2007, MAS tried to force Manfred to resign, angered after he
attempted to call a second autonomy referendum after the question had
already once been defeated in the state. They occupied the central
square, and Manfred-sponsored goons from the upper-middle class areas of
the cities descended on them, eager to "beat up some Indians".
Two MAS backers from rural areas and one upper-middle class teenager were
killed in the conflict, the state building was briefly set on fire, and
Manfred came off as the defender of democracy against an unruly mob.
<br><br>
This time, the democracy card is on the side of MAS. The question of the
day is whether the right-wing opposition will circle its wagons to defend
its ally in Cochabamba or decide that he is a lost cause and consent to a
potential MAS takeover of the heartland of the country. As of Wednesday,
Manfred has not officially renounced, but has "stepped away"
from the governor's office and left daily responsibilities in the hands
of his chief of staff. For the moment, he appears to have decided that he
would no longer benefit from provoking a conflict. <br><br>
Dialogue or Confrontation?<br>
<br>
The rhetoric of the mainstream political commentators in Bolivia have
always sought to call the left and right wings to a "dialogue",
in which their widely divergent visions of the country could be made
compatible. This type of idea is reminiscent to that pushed by former
Bolivian president Carlos Mesa, who valued the idea of "social
peace" by trying (and ultimately failing) to maintain a centrist
politics between the indigenous left and the autonomist right. The goals
of Evo Morales, however, involve the deepening of the revolutionary
process of indigenous empowerment, which is inherently a process that
creates conflict when it hits the wall of the entrenched resistance of
privileged classes. Dialogue there may be, but it is extremely unlikely
that either the government or the opposition can compromise on their core
positions. For Evo to forego the pursuit of land reform in the East would
be to break his promises to transform the social structure of the
country; for the autonomists to allow it would challenge the very
foundations of their power. Dialogue can and will happen, but it is not
to be viewed as a universal panacea that will accommodate everyone.<br>
<br>
The Bolivian daily La Razon described the situation thusly. "If we
were tied 1-1 [before the vote], now we have returned to a tie, but a 3-3
tie. What use will these actors get from their victories?" This is
an analysis that doesn't take into account the very real boost that Evo
and his supporters will take out of these elections, but it does capture
the idea that both the left and the right wing have won, at different
scalar levels of the Bolivian state. After a great deal of theater and
the dispatching of some minor characters, we are left with both the
heroes and villains standing emboldened as the dust settles. <br>
<br>
However, it seems that the opposition is numerically smaller than its
significantly loud barking and dramatic spectacular manifestations have
made it seem. The level of support that Evo has achieved was not
predicted by almost anyone, and is reminiscent of his actual 2005
election landslide, in which the most surprised person may have been Evo
himself. Let us make no mistake - in the great soccer match that is
Bolivian politics, MAS is up a goal. The autonomists may continue to
retain their bases of power, but they can no longer credibly blather on
about a "corrupt dictatorship" on the national level. These are
historic times, and it is time for Evo to make a move.<br>
<br><br>
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