[News] The Continuity of FARC-EP Resistance in Colombia
Anti-Imperialist News
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Fri Aug 1 12:13:45 EDT 2008
http://www.counterpunch.org/brittain08012008.html
August 1, 2008
Not the End of Guerrilla Warfare
The Continuity of FARC-EP Resistance in Colombia
By JAMES J. BRITTAIN
At the beginning of the 1970s, early in the
insurgencys formation, the FARC-EP received a
devastating blow at the hands of the Colombian
state when the Misael Pastrana Borrero
administration [1970-1974] implemented massive
military counterinsurgency offences against
specific guerrilla-extended regions (Premo, 1988:
230; Hobsbawm, 1970: 56). In 1973, the Colombian
state, with the assistance of the United States,
launched Operation Anori, which resulted in the
destruction of much of the FARC-EPs military
supplies and sections of its leadership (Avilés,
2006: 154n.25). After this and other
counterinsurgency campaigns took place during the
early-mid 1970s, it was documented that the
FARC-EP had lost seventy percent of its
ammunitions with as little as one-hundred-fifty
armed and trained combatants remaining (FARC-EP,
1999: 24; Premo, 1988: 243n.45; Ruhl, 1980: 196,
205n.63). While extensive press was given to the
FARC-EPs demise in a few short years such
assessments were shown to be premature. The
insurgency quickly bounced back from the
counterinsurgency campaign and was able to
regroup and conduct sporadic actions on an
increasing number of fronts by the mid 1970s
(Premo, 1988: 231; see also Petras and Morley,
2003: 101; Castro, 1999: xx-xxi). Following the
US and Colombian-state aggressions, the FARC-EP
succeeded in maintaining their activity, in spite
of the initial errors, in spite of the severe
handicap of having to arrange for the evacuation,
dispersion and resettlement of a civilian
population, in spite of the strength of long
anti-irregular experience of the Colombian army,
and in spite of the deep political divisions in
the countryside
[They] succeeded not merely by
tactical and technical adjustments, but above all
by a profound understanding of the political base
of guerrilla warfare (Hobsbawm, 1970: 56-57).
In the spring of 2008 two significant blows came
to the FARC-EP when not one but two of the
insurgencys most recognizable leaders were
killed coupled by the death of the guerrillas
Commander-in-Chief, Manuel Marulanda Vélez. In
the early days of March, it appeared as though
the FARC-EP may have been dealt a mortal blow
when Comandante Raúl Reyes and Iván Ríos, two of
the FARC-EPs highest ranking Secretariat leaders
and diplomatic representatives, were murdered.
Quickly accounts came flooding in of this
devastating upset for the guerrilla. Utilizing
state reports, Juan Forero (2008) published that
Colombians are for the first time raising the
possibility that a guerrilla group once thought
invincible could be forced into peace
negotiations or even defeated militarily.
Weakened by infiltrators and facing constant
combat and aerial bombardment, the insurgency is
losing members in record numbers. Using
government and military sources, one of
Colombias most popular newsmagazines published
that desertion and lack of internal support has
caused a devastating decline for the FARC-EP
potentially resulting in its internal eradication
(Cambio, 2008). Even Venezuelan President Hugo
Chávez voiced the opinion that the period of
organized class struggle through the medium of
guerrilla warfare had past. However, while the
death of three of the insurgencys primary
leaders was of great significance, reports
declaring the FARC-EPs decline are not new.
The Colombian government and those promoting
domestic and foreign economic interests remain
threatened by the FARC-EPs revolutionary push
for it continues to erode the state from below.
Well known anthropologist Michael Taussig (2004:
13) has argued that the guerrilla is far more
powerful than many state outlets will have the
international community believe. He noted that
there is an unstated fear that cities all over
Colombia could be isolated anytime by the
guerrilla who have the military capacity to
block external military support by blowing up
roads and bridges. In recognition of this power
the dominant class periodically employs hegemonic
tactics, through both state and media outlets, to
portray the FARC-EP as being structurally
weakened in the hopes of discouraging both
internal and external support for the insurgency.
It must be understood that reports claiming the
insurgencys defeat have been repeatedly proven false as time elapses.
Following several significant counter-insurgency
campaigns (Plan Colombia [1998-2006] and Plan
Patriota [2003-2006]) premature victories over
the FARC-EP were claimed. As time past it was
realized that the insurgency had not witnessed a
decline but rather saw a significant influx in
combatant growth and attacks against corporate
and state infrastructure (Brittain, 2005).
Similarly, the 2008 impulsive allegations of
deterioration saw the FARC-EP materially
responded by destabilizing Colombias most
important oil infrastructure facility while
eliminating entire military battalions. Between
the 29th of April and the 6th of May the FARC-EP
carried out a coordinated series of attacks which
isolated sectors of Colombias largest oil
pipeline and subsequently halted the production
of an estimated eight-hundred thousand to
three-million barrels of oil. In addition, the
guerrilla strategically destroyed important
transportation routes needed to control the flow
of oil and military supplies throughout various
departments in the north of the country.
Destroying an essential bridge near Catatumbo in
the department of César, the FARC-EP was able to
severe the movement of state and private security
forces thereby keeping existing military units
preoccupied (Weinberg, 2008). Following the
offence, another Front in Norte de Santander
pursued an aggressive attack against security
forces guarding the 770 kilometre Colombian-based
Ecopetrol and US-based Occidental Petroleum owned
Caño-Limón pipeline near Tibu the true target
of the attack. Ironically, all this took place
just a few short hours after William Brownfield,
the United States Ambassador to Colombia,
visited the area and applauded the growth in
security and economic progress as a result of the
FARC-EPs so-called decline (Reuters, 2008a). In
response to the FARC-EPs strike, Colombian
General Paulino Coronado coordinated a mounted
offensive on 3rd of May to eliminate the FARC-EP
attack and resume the flow of oil production. The
guerrilla quickly eliminated the deployed
battalion and continued their assault on the
pipeline facilities for an additional forty-eight
hours (Associated Press, 2008). Showing that
their campaign targeting the Caño-Limón pipeline
was not simply a one-time tactical success, the
FARC-EP carried out an additional attack on
Colombias largest coal mine the Cerrejón on
the forty-fourth anniversary of insurgencys
inception. On 27th of May 2008, roughly one month
after the transgressions aimed at oil production
took place, the guerrilla again targeted attacks
against exploitive multinational corporations and
state-infrastructure involved in the region by
derailing around 40 wagons out of the 120-wagon
train, carrying 110 tonnes of coal (Reuters,
2008b). While officials tried to downplay the
extensive damage it was quickly revealed that the
FARC-EP had considerably hampered trading by
destabilizing entire export routes (Reuters,
2008c). These are but two actions where the
FARC-EP demonstrated their continued military
capacity to respond to both state and private
security forces in relation to corporate
interests. Most interesting, however, was that
the coordinated FARC-EP campaigns silenced many
officials from both the Colombian and US state.
Many have perceived sectors of Colombias north
to be economically sheltered as sectors of the
countrys south have appeared to be the centre of
FARC-EP activities; however, the above events
demonstrated that FARC-EP support and capacity go
far beyond that mentioned in the popular press.
As Colombias own Interior Minister Carlos
Holguin announced, Colombia should not dream or
come close to proclaiming a victory over the
FARC-EP just yet (see Otis, 2008).
The administration of Álvaro Uribe Vélez
[2002-2010] has created a façade of general
security in a region that has witnessed a
half-century of civil war. It has become general
knowledge in Colombia that the state has actively
under-represented figures and information related
to the civil conflict to present a picture of
internal stability. In the summer of 2006, Jorge
Daniel Castro, then General Director of
Colombias national police, stated that 30,944
paramilitaries had taken amnesty since 2003
through Law 975 (Badawy, 2006). This number was
double that of any figure ever described by
scholars, military analysts, or governments
officials when concerning the size of Colombias
largest paramilitary organization, The United
Self-Defence Forces of Colombia (Autodefensas
Unidas de Colombia, AUC) (see International
Crisis Group, 2004: 2, 2n.7; Murillo and Avirama,
2004: 89, 108; Livingstone, 2003: 269n.15;
Crandall, 2002: 88; Ministerio de Defensa
Nacional, 2000: 10). Then in 2007, President
Uribe and Vice-President Francisco Santos
Calderón were accused of forcing state officials
to alter statistics related to issues of internal
security and state policy. Cesar Caballeros,
former director of Colombias National
Administrative Department of Statistics
(Departamento Administrativo Nacional de
Estadística, DANE), admitted that the state had
and continues to manipulate statistics to make
Colombia appear safer than it is, casting doubt
on achievements that have made him popular both
at home and with the U.S. government
the
presidents policy is
to maintain the
perception that security has improved, no matter
what the case (Crowe, 2007). An example of such
state-enforced disinformation can be realized
through a simple evaluation of internally
displaced persons (IDPs) in Colombia. When
examining the issue of displacement, Constanza
Vieira (2008) noted that the number of Colombian
IDPs jumped thirty-eight percent in 2007.
Colombia is now second only to the Sudan for the
largest number of IDPs in the world, which only
began after the rise of state-supported
paramilitarism in the 1980s. To put this into
perspective, Colombia has well over one million
more IDPs than the entire Middle-East combined
(including Iraq). The state stipulates that
Colombia has roughly 1.9 million IDPs yet this is
half the figure documented by various domestic
and international human rights organizations and
research centres. For example, the Consultancy
for Human Rights and Displacement (Consultoría
para los Derechos Humanos y el Desplazamiento,
CODHES), the Internal Displacement Monitoring
Centre (IDMC), and the Japan International
Cooperation Agency (JICA) all agree that the
actual figure of Colombian IDPs fluctuates
between 3.9 and 4.2 million (see Consultoría para
los Derechos Humanos y el Desplazamiento, 2007;
Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre, 2007;
Japan International Cooperation Agency, 2007). By
recognizing the above example of state-based
disinformation one can understand how reports
concerning the FARC-EPs disintegration may be suspect as well.
While it cannot be dismissed that in the past few
months the FARC-EP has experienced unprecedented
difficulties it must be realized that as long as
inequitable sociocultural and political-economic
conditions pervade Colombian society so too will
a base from which the FARC-EP can recruit. The
FARC-EP remain the longest running and most
powerful political-military movement in
contemporary Latin America with numbers still
ranging in the thousands, arguably tens of
thousands. Therefore, to buy into any suggestion
that Colombia finds itself in a period of
increased stability or that the FARC-EP have past
into the annals of history is to adopt a false
consciousness of the realities that exist within
this Andean country. Jennifer S. Holmes, Sheila
Amin Gutiérrez de Piñeres, and Kevin M. Curtin
(2006: 178) have clarified that a lack of
economic opportunity contributes to leftist
guerrilla violence. As the nation witnesses
accelerated levels of inequality, displacement,
and exploitation so too will increased levels of
opposition continue. Such are the causes of
instability and the true forum through which
people become aware of their class positioning;
hence, their subsequent engagement in acts of
resistance through more extreme measures. Peter
Calvert (1999: 128) has argued that
political-economic disparity enables insurgent
movements a ready-made mass of disaffected
supporters. Presenting that the FARC-EP is
experiencing a period of tactical reformation and
withdrawal is correct but to assess that the
insurgency movement is over is an ignorant
assessment and lacks an understanding of both
guerrilla warfare and the material conditions
which pervade Colombian society and its class
struggle. To suggest that the FARC-EP have
experienced defeat fails to understand the right
of self-determination through an internal
interpretation of revolutionary emancipation. The
internal struggle within Colombia is far from
over. It will continue to be waged through
radical and antagonistic forms. As the United
States and the Uribe administration continue to
engage a war against the poor so too will they
exacerbate and intensify Colombias internal
conflict by robbing families of their livelihoods
and leaving them with little option but to join
the left-wing guerrillas, particularly the FARC
(OShaughnessy and Branford, 2005: 7).
James J. Brittain is an Assistant Professor of
Sociology at Acadia University, Nova Scotia,
Canada and the co-founder of the Atlantic
Canada-Colombia Research Group. He can be reached
at <mailto:james.brittain at acadiau.ca>james.brittain at acadiau.ca.
Works Cited
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