[News] Seymour Hersh - Watching Lebanon: Washington's Interest in Israel's War
Anti-Imperialist News
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Mon Aug 14 16:08:19 EDT 2006
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WATCHING LEBANON
by SEYMOUR M. HERSH
Washingtons interests in Israels war.
Issue of 2006-08-21
Posted 2006-08-14
In the days after Hezbollah crossed from Lebanon
into Israel, on July 12th, to kidnap two
soldiers, triggering an Israeli air attack on
Lebanon and a full-scale war, the Bush
Administration seemed strangely passive. Its a
moment of clarification, President George W.
Bush said at the G-8 summit, in St. Petersburg,
on July 16th. Its now become clear why we dont
have peace in the Middle East. He described the
relationship between Hezbollah and its supporters
in Iran and Syria as one of the root causes of
instability, and subsequently said that it was
up to those countries to end the crisis. Two days
later, despite calls from several governments for
the United States to take the lead in
negotiations to end the fighting, Secretary of
State Condoleezza Rice said that a ceasefire
should be put off until the conditions are conducive.
The Bush Administration, however, was closely
involved in the planning of Israels retaliatory
attacks. President Bush and Vice-President Dick
Cheney were convinced, current and former
intelligence and diplomatic officials told me,
that a successful Israeli Air Force bombing
campaign against Hezbollahs heavily fortified
underground-missile and command-and-control
complexes in Lebanon could ease Israels security
concerns and also serve as a prelude to a
potential American preëmptive attack to destroy
Irans nuclear installations, some of which are also buried deep underground.
Israeli military and intelligence experts I spoke
to emphasized that the countrys immediate
security issues were reason enough to confront
Hezbollah, regardless of what the Bush
Administration wanted. Shabtai Shavit, a
national-security adviser to the Knesset who
headed the Mossad, Israels foreign-intelligence
service, from 1989 to 1996, told me, We do what
we think is best for us, and if it happens to
meet Americas requirements, thats just part of
a relationship between two friends. Hezbollah is
armed to the teeth and trained in the most
advanced technology of guerrilla warfare. It was
just a matter of time. We had to address it.
Hezbollah is seen by Israelis as a profound
threata terrorist organization, operating on
their border, with a military arsenal that, with
help from Iran and Syria, has grown stronger
since the Israeli occupation of southern Lebanon
ended, in 2000. Hezbollahs leader, Sheikh Hassan
Nasrallah, has said he does not believe that
Israel is a legal state. Israeli intelligence
estimated at the outset of the air war that
Hezbollah had roughly five hundred medium-range
Fajr-3 and Fajr-5 rockets and a few dozen
long-range Zelzal rockets; the Zelzals, with a
range of about two hundred kilometres, could
reach Tel Aviv. (One rocket hit Haifa the day
after the kidnappings.) It also has more than
twelve thousand shorter-range rockets. Since the
conflict began, more than three thousand of these have been fired at Israel.
According to a Middle East expert with knowledge
of the current thinking of both the Israeli and
the U.S. governments, Israel had devised a plan
for attacking Hezbollahand shared it with Bush
Administration officialswell before the July
12th kidnappings. Its not that the Israelis had
a trap that Hezbollah walked into, he said, but
there was a strong feeling in the White House
that sooner or later the Israelis were going to do it.
The Middle East expert said that the
Administration had several reasons for supporting
the Israeli bombing campaign. Within the State
Department, it was seen as a way to strengthen
the Lebanese government so that it could assert
its authority over the south of the country, much
of which is controlled by Hezbollah. He went on,
The White House was more focussed on stripping
Hezbollah of its missiles, because, if there was
to be a military option against Irans nuclear
facilities, it had to get rid of the weapons that
Hezbollah could use in a potential retaliation at
Israel. Bush wanted both. Bush was going after
Iran, as part of the Axis of Evil, and its
nuclear sites, and he was interested in going
after Hezbollah as part of his interest in
democratization, with Lebanon as one of the crown
jewels of Middle East democracy.
Administration officials denied that they knew of
Israels plan for the air war. The White House
did not respond to a detailed list of questions.
In response to a separate request, a National
Security Council spokesman said, Prior to
Hezbollahs attack on Israel, the Israeli
government gave no official in Washington any
reason to believe that Israel was planning to
attack. Even after the July 12th attack, we did
not know what the Israeli plans were. A Pentagon
spokesman said, The United States government
remains committed to a diplomatic solution to the
problem of Irans clandestine nuclear weapons
program, and denied the story, as did a State Department spokesman.
The United States and Israel have shared
intelligence and enjoyed close military
coöperation for decades, but early this spring,
according to a former senior intelligence
official, high-level planners from the U.S. Air
Forceunder pressure from the White House to
develop a war plan for a decisive strike against
Irans nuclear facilitiesbegan consulting with
their counterparts in the Israeli Air Force.
The big question for our Air Force was how to
hit a series of hard targets in Iran
successfully, the former senior intelligence
official said. Who is the closest ally of the
U.S. Air Force in its planning? Its not
Congoits Israel. Everybody knows that Iranian
engineers have been advising Hezbollah on tunnels
and underground gun emplacements. And so the Air
Force went to the Israelis with some new tactics
and said to them, Lets concentrate on the
bombing and share what we have on Iran and what
you have on Lebanon. The discussions reached
the Joint Chiefs of Staff and Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, he said.
The Israelis told us it would be a cheap war
with many benefits, a U.S. government consultant
with close ties to Israel said. Why oppose it?
Well be able to hunt down and bomb missiles,
tunnels, and bunkers from the air. It would be a demo for Iran.
A Pentagon consultant said that the Bush White
House has been agitating for some time to find a
reason for a preëmptive blow against Hezbollah.
He added, It was our intent to have Hezbollah
diminished, and now we have someone else doing
it. (As this article went to press, the United
Nations Security Council passed a ceasefire
resolution, although it was unclear if it would
change the situation on the ground.)
According to Richard Armitage, who served as
Deputy Secretary of State in Bushs first
termand who, in 2002, said that Hezbollah may
be the A team of terroristsIsraels campaign in
Lebanon, which has faced unexpected difficulties
and widespread criticism, may, in the end, serve
as a warning to the White House about Iran. If
the most dominant military force in the
regionthe Israel Defense Forcescant pacify a
country like Lebanon, with a population of four
million, you should think carefully about taking
that template to Iran, with strategic depth and a
population of seventy million, Armitage said.
The only thing that the bombing has achieved so
far is to unite the population against the Israelis.
[]
Several current and former officials involved in
the Middle East told me that Israel viewed the
soldiers kidnapping as the opportune moment to
begin its planned military campaign against
Hezbollah. Hezbollah, like clockwork, was
instigating something small every month or two,
the U.S. government consultant with ties to
Israel said. Two weeks earlier, in late June,
members of Hamas, the Palestinian group, had
tunnelled under the barrier separating southern
Gaza from Israel and captured an Israeli soldier.
Hamas also had lobbed a series of rockets at
Israeli towns near the border with Gaza. In
response, Israel had initiated an extensive
bombing campaign and reoccupied parts of Gaza.
The Pentagon consultant noted that there had also
been cross-border incidents involving Israel and
Hezbollah, in both directions, for some time.
Theyve been sniping at each other, he said.
Either side could have pointed to some incident
and said We have to go to war with these
guysbecause they were already at war.
David Siegel, the spokesman at the Israeli
Embassy in Washington, said that the Israeli Air
Force had not been seeking a reason to attack
Hezbollah. We did not plan the campaign. That
decision was forced on us. There were ongoing
alerts that Hezbollah was pressing to go on the
attack, Siegel said. Hezbollah attacks every
two or three months, but the kidnapping of the soldiers raised the stakes.
In interviews, several Israeli academics,
journalists, and retired military and
intelligence officers all made one point: they
believed that the Israeli leadership, and not
Washington, had decided that it would go to war
with Hezbollah. Opinion polls showed that a broad
spectrum of Israelis supported that choice. The
neocons in Washington may be happy, but Israel
did not need to be pushed, because Israel has
been wanting to get rid of Hezbollah, Yossi
Melman, a journalist for the newspaper Haaretz,
who has written several books about the Israeli
intelligence community, said. By provoking
Israel, Hezbollah provided that opportunity.
We were facing a dilemma, an Israeli official
said. Prime Minister Ehud Olmert had to decide
whether to go for a local response, which we
always do, or for a comprehensive responseto
really take on Hezbollah once and for all.
Olmert made his decision, the official said, only
after a series of Israeli rescue efforts failed.
The U.S. government consultant with close ties to
Israel told me, however, that, from Israels
perspective, the decision to take strong action
had become inevitable weeks earlier, after the
Israeli Armys signals intelligence group, known
as Unit 8200, picked up bellicose intercepts in
late spring and early summer, involving Hamas,
Hezbollah, and Khaled Meshal, the Hamas leader now living in Damascus.
One intercept was of a meeting in late May of the
Hamas political and military leadership, with
Meshal participating by telephone. Hamas
believed the call from Damascus was scrambled,
but Israel had broken the code, the consultant
said. For almost a year before its victory in the
Palestinian elections in January, Hamas had
curtailed its terrorist activities. In the late
May intercepted conversation, the consultant told
me, the Hamas leadership said that they got no
benefit from it, and were losing standing among
the Palestinian population. The conclusion, he
said, was Lets go back into the terror
business and then try and wrestle concessions
from the Israeli government. The consultant
told me that the U.S. and Israel agreed that if
the Hamas leadership did so, and if Nasrallah
backed them up, there should be a full-scale
response. In the next several weeks, when Hamas
began digging the tunnel into Israel, the
consultant said, Unit 8200 picked up signals
intelligence involving Hamas, Syria, and
Hezbollah, saying, in essence, that they wanted
Hezbollah to warm up the north. In one
intercept, the consultant said, Nasrallah
referred to Olmert and Defense Minister Amir
Peretz as seeming to be weak, in comparison
with the former Prime Ministers Ariel Sharon and
Ehud Barak, who had extensive military
experience, and said he thought Israel would
respond in a small-scale, local way, as they had in the past.
[]
Earlier this summer, before the Hezbollah
kidnappings, the U.S. government consultant said,
several Israeli officials visited Washington,
separately, to get a green light for the bombing
operation and to find out how much the United
States would bear. The consultant added, Israel
began with Cheney. It wanted to be sure that it
had his support and the support of his office and
the Middle East desk of the National Security
Council. After that, persuading Bush was never
a problem, and Condi Rice was on board, the consultant said.
The initial plan, as outlined by the Israelis,
called for a major bombing campaign in response
to the next Hezbollah provocation, according to
the Middle East expert with knowledge of U.S. and
Israeli thinking. Israel believed that, by
targeting Lebanons infrastructure, including
highways, fuel depots, and even the civilian
runways at the main Beirut airport, it could
persuade Lebanons large Christian and Sunni
populations to turn against Hezbollah, according
to the former senior intelligence official. The
airport, highways, and bridges, among other
things, have been hit in the bombing campaign.
The Israeli Air Force had flown almost nine
thousand missions as of last week. (David Siegel,
the Israeli spokesman, said that Israel had
targeted only sites connected to Hezbollah; the
bombing of bridges and roads was meant to prevent the transport of weapons.)
The Israeli plan, according to the former senior
intelligence official, was the mirror image of
what the United States has been planning for
Iran. (The initial U.S. Air Force proposals for
an air attack to destroy Irans nuclear capacity,
which included the option of intense bombing of
civilian infrastructure targets inside Iran, have
been resisted by the top leadership of the Army,
the Navy, and the Marine Corps, according to
current and former officials. They argue that the
Air Force plan will not work and will inevitably
lead, as in the Israeli war with Hezbollah, to
the insertion of troops on the ground.)
Uzi Arad, who served for more than two decades in
the Mossad, told me that to the best of his
knowledge the contacts between the Israeli and
U.S. governments were routine, and that, in all
my meetings and conversations with government
officials, never once did I hear anyone refer to
prior coördination with the United States. He
was troubled by one issuethe speed with which
the Olmert government went to war. For the life
of me, Ive never seen a decision to go to war
taken so speedily, he said. We usually go through long analyses.
The key military planner was Lieutenant General
Dan Halutz, the I.D.F. chief of staff, who,
during a career in the Israeli Air Force, worked
on contingency planning for an air war with Iran.
Olmert, a former mayor of Jerusalem, and Peretz,
a former labor leader, could not match his experience and expertise.
In the early discussions with American officials,
I was told by the Middle East expert and the
government consultant, the Israelis repeatedly
pointed to the war in Kosovo as an example of
what Israel would try to achieve. The NATO forces
commanded by U.S. Army General Wesley Clark
methodically bombed and strafed not only military
targets but tunnels, bridges, and roads, in
Kosovo and elsewhere in Serbia, for seventy-eight
days before forcing Serbian forces to withdraw
from Kosovo. Israel studied the Kosovo war as
its role model, the government consultant said.
The Israelis told Condi Rice, You did it in
about seventy days, but we need half of thatthirty-five days.
There are, of course, vast differences between
Lebanon and Kosovo. Clark, who retired from the
military in 2000 and unsuccessfully ran as a
Democrat for the Presidency in 2004, took issue
with the analogy: If its true that the Israeli
campaign is based on the American approach in
Kosovo, then it missed the point. Ours was to use
force to obtain a diplomatic objectiveit was not
about killing people. Clark noted in a 2001
book, Waging Modern War, that it was the threat
of a possible ground invasion as well as the
bombing that forced the Serbs to end the war. He
told me, In my experience, air campaigns have to
be backed, ultimately, by the will and capability
to finish the job on the ground.
Kosovo has been cited publicly by Israeli
officials and journalists since the war began. On
August 6th, Prime Minister Olmert, responding to
European condemnation of the deaths of Lebanese
civilians, said, Where do they get the right to
preach to Israel? European countries attacked
Kosovo and killed ten thousand civilians. Ten
thousand! And none of these countries had to
suffer before that from a single rocket. Im not
saying it was wrong to intervene in Kosovo. But
please: dont preach to us about the treatment of
civilians. (Human Rights Watch estimated the
number of civilians killed in the NATO bombing to
be five hundred; the Yugoslav government put the
number between twelve hundred and five thousand.)
Cheneys office supported the Israeli plan, as
did Elliott Abrams, a deputy national-security
adviser, according to several former and current
officials. (A spokesman for the N.S.C. denied
that Abrams had done so.) They believed that
Israel should move quickly in its air war against
Hezbollah. A former intelligence officer said,
We told Israel, Look, if you guys have to go,
were behind you all the way. But we think it
should be sooner rather than laterthe longer you
wait, the less time we have to evaluate and plan
for Iran before Bush gets out of office.
Cheneys point, the former senior intelligence
official said, was What if the Israelis execute
their part of this first, and its really
successful? Itd be great. We can learn what to
do in Iran by watching what the Israelis do in Lebanon.
The Pentagon consultant told me that intelligence
about Hezbollah and Iran is being mishandled by
the White House the same way intelligence had
been when, in 2002 and early 2003, the
Administration was making the case that Iraq had
weapons of mass destruction. The big complaint
now in the intelligence community is that all of
the important stuff is being sent directly to the
topat the insistence of the White Houseand not
being analyzed at all, or scarcely, he said.
Its an awful policy and violates all of the
N.S.A.s strictures, and if you complain about it
youre out, he said. Cheney had a strong hand in this.
The long-term Administration goal was to help set
up a Sunni Arab coalitionincluding countries
like Saudi Arabia, Jordan, and Egyptthat would
join the United States and Europe to pressure the
ruling Shiite mullahs in Iran. But the thought
behind that plan was that Israel would defeat
Hezbollah, not lose to it, the consultant with
close ties to Israel said. Some officials in
Cheneys office and at the N.S.C. had become
convinced, on the basis of private talks, that
those nations would moderate their public
criticism of Israel and blame Hezbollah for
creating the crisis that led to war. Although
they did so at first, they shifted their position
in the wake of public protests in their countries
about the Israeli bombing. The White House was
clearly disappointed when, late last month,
Prince Saud al-Faisal, the Saudi foreign
minister, came to Washington and, at a meeting
with Bush, called for the President to intervene
immediately to end the war. The Washington Post
reported that Washington had hoped to enlist
moderate Arab states in an effort to pressure
Syria and Iran to rein in Hezbollah, but the
Saudi move . . . seemed to cloud that initiative.
[]
The surprising strength of Hezbollahs
resistance, and its continuing ability to fire
rockets into northern Israel in the face of the
constant Israeli bombing, the Middle East expert
told me, is a massive setback for those in the
White House who want to use force in Iran. And
those who argue that the bombing will create
internal dissent and revolt in Iran are also set back.
Nonetheless, some officers serving with the Joint
Chiefs of Staff remain deeply concerned that the
Administration will have a far more positive
assessment of the air campaign than they should,
the former senior intelligence official said.
There is no way that Rumsfeld and Cheney will
draw the right conclusion about this, he said.
When the smoke clears, theyll say it was a
success, and theyll draw reinforcement for their plan to attack Iran.
In the White House, especially in the
Vice-Presidents office, many officials believe
that the military campaign against Hezbollah is
working and should be carried forward. At the
same time, the government consultant said, some
policymakers in the Administration have concluded
that the cost of the bombing to Lebanese society
is too high. They are telling Israel that its
time to wind down the attacks on infrastructure.
Similar divisions are emerging in Israel. David
Siegel, the Israeli spokesman, said that his
countrys leadership believed, as of early
August, that the air war had been successful, and
had destroyed more than seventy per cent of
Hezbollahs medium- and long-range-missile
launching capacity. The problem is short-range
missiles, without launchers, that can be shot
from civilian areas and homes, Siegel told me.
The only way to resolve this is ground
operationswhich is why Israel would be forced to
expand ground operations if the latest round of
diplomacy doesnt work. Last week, however,
there was evidence that the Israeli government
was troubled by the progress of the war. In an
unusual move, Major General Moshe Kaplinsky,
Halutzs deputy, was put in charge of the
operation, supplanting Major General Udi Adam.
The worry in Israel is that Nasrallah might
escalate the crisis by firing missiles at Tel
Aviv. There is a big debate over how much damage
Israel should inflict to prevent it, the
consultant said. If Nasrallah hits Tel Aviv,
what should Israel do? Its goal is to deter more
attacks by telling Nasrallah that it will destroy
his country if he doesnt stop, and to remind the
Arab world that Israel can set it back twenty
years. Were no longer playing by the same rules.
A European intelligence officer told me, The
Israelis have been caught in a psychological
trap. In earlier years, they had the belief that
they could solve their problems with toughness.
But now, with Islamic martyrdom, things have
changed, and they need different answers. How do
you scare people who love martyrdom? The problem
with trying to eliminate Hezbollah, the
intelligence officer said, is the groups ties to
the Shiite population in southern Lebanon, the
Bekaa Valley, and Beiruts southern suburbs,
where it operates schools, hospitals, a radio station, and various charities.
A high-level American military planner told me,
We have a lot of vulnerability in the region,
and weve talked about some of the effects of an
Iranian or Hezbollah attack on the Saudi regime
and on the oil infrastructure. There is special
concern inside the Pentagon, he added, about the
oil-producing nations north of the Strait of
Hormuz. We have to anticipate the unintended
consequences, he told me. Will we be able to
absorb a barrel of oil at one hundred dollars?
There is this almost comical thinking that you
can do it all from the air, even when youre up
against an irregular enemy with a dug-in
capability. Youre not going to be successful
unless you have a ground presence, but the
political leadership never considers the worst
case. These guys only want to hear the best case.
There is evidence that the Iranians were
expecting the war against Hezbollah. Vali Nasr,
an expert on Shiite Muslims and Iran, who is a
fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations and
also teaches at the Naval Postgraduate School, in
Monterey, California, said, Every negative
American move against Hezbollah was seen by Iran
as part of a larger campaign against it. And Iran
began to prepare for the showdown by supplying
more sophisticated weapons to Hezbollahanti-ship
and anti-tank missilesand training its fighters
in their use. And now Hezbollah is testing Irans
new weapons. Iran sees the Bush Administration as
trying to marginalize its regional role, so it fomented trouble.
Nasr, an Iranian-American who recently published
a study of the Sunni-Shiite divide, entitled The
Shia Revival, also said that the Iranian
leadership believes that Washingtons ultimate
political goal is to get some international force
to act as a bufferto physically separate Syria
and Lebanon in an effort to isolate and disarm
Hezbollah, whose main supply route is through
Syria. Military action cannot bring about the
desired political result, Nasr said. The
popularity of Irans President, Mahmoud
Ahmadinejad, a virulent critic of Israel, is
greatest in his own country. If the U.S. were to
attack Irans nuclear facilities, Nasr said, you
may end up turning Ahmadinejad into another
Nasrallahthe rock star of the Arab street.
[]
Donald Rumsfeld, who is one of the Bush
Administrations most outspoken, and powerful,
officials, has said very little publicly about
the crisis in Lebanon. His relative quiet,
compared to his aggressive visibility in the
run-up to the Iraq war, has prompted a debate in
Washington about where he stands on the issue.
Some current and former intelligence officials
who were interviewed for this article believe
that Rumsfeld disagrees with Bush and Cheney
about the American role in the war between Israel
and Hezbollah. The U.S. government consultant
with close ties to Israel said that there was a
feeling that Rumsfeld was jaded in his approach
to the Israeli war. He added, Air power and the
use of a few Special Forces had worked in
Afghanistan, and he tried to do it again in Iraq.
It was the same idea, but it didnt work. He
thought that Hezbollah was too dug in and the
Israeli attack plan would not work, and the last
thing he wanted was another war on his shift that
would put the American forces in Iraq in greater jeopardy.
A Western diplomat said that he understood that
Rumsfeld did not know all the intricacies of the
war plan. He is angry and worried about his
troops in Iraq, the diplomat said. Rumsfeld
served in the White House during the last year of
the war in Vietnam, from which American troops
withdrew in 1975, and he did not want to see
something like this having an impact in Iraq.
Rumsfelds concern, the diplomat added, was that
an expansion of the war into Iran could put the
American troops in Iraq at greater risk of
attacks by pro-Iranian Shiite militias.
At a Senate Armed Services Committee hearing on
August 3rd, Rumsfeld was less than enthusiastic
about the wars implications for the American
troops in Iraq. Asked whether the Administration
was mindful of the wars impact on Iraq, he
testified that, in his meetings with Bush and
Condoleezza Rice, there is a sensitivity to the
desire to not have our country or our interests
or our forces put at greater risk as a result of
whats taking place between Israel and Hezbollah.
. . . There are a variety of risks that we face
in that region, and its a difficult and delicate situation.
The Pentagon consultant dismissed talk of a split
at the top of the Administration, however, and
said simply, Rummy is on the team. Hed love to
see Hezbollah degraded, but he also is a voice
for less bombing and more innovative Israeli
ground operations. The former senior
intelligence official similarly depicted Rumsfeld
as being delighted that Israel is our stalking horse.
There are also questions about the status of
Condoleezza Rice. Her initial support for the
Israeli air war against Hezbollah has reportedly
been tempered by dismay at the effects of the
attacks on Lebanon. The Pentagon consultant said
that in early August she began privately
agitating inside the Administration for
permission to begin direct diplomatic talks with
Syriaso far, without much success. Last week,
the Times reported that Rice had directed an
Embassy official in Damascus to meet with the
Syrian foreign minister, though the meeting
apparently yielded no results. The Times also
reported that Rice viewed herself as trying to
be not only a peacemaker abroad but also a
mediator among contending parties within the
Administration. The article pointed to a divide
between career diplomats in the State Department
and conservatives in the government, including
Cheney and Abrams, who were pushing for strong American support for Israel.
The Western diplomat told me his embassy believes
that Abrams has emerged as a key policymaker on
Iran, and on the current Hezbollah-Israeli
crisis, and that Rices role has been relatively
diminished. Rice did not want to make her most
recent diplomatic trip to the Middle East, the
diplomat said. She only wanted to go if she
thought there was a real chance to get a ceasefire.
Bushs strongest supporter in Europe continues to
be British Prime Minister Tony Blair, but many in
Blairs own Foreign Office, as a former diplomat
said, believe that he has gone out on a
particular limb on thisespecially by accepting
Bushs refusal to seek an immediate and total
ceasefire between Israel and Hezbollah. Blair
stands alone on this, the former diplomat said.
He knows hes a lame duck whos on the way out,
but he buys itthe Bush policy. He drinks the
White House Kool-Aid as much as anybody in
Washington. The crisis will really start at the
end of August, the diplomat added, when the
Iraniansunder a United Nations deadline to stop
uranium enrichmentwill say no.
Even those who continue to support Israels war
against Hezbollah agree that it is failing to
achieve one of its main goalsto rally the
Lebanese against Hezbollah. Strategic bombing
has been a failed military concept for ninety
years, and yet air forces all over the world keep
on doing it, John Arquilla, a defense analyst at
the Naval Postgraduate School, told me. Arquilla
has been campaigning for more than a decade, with
growing success, to change the way America fights
terrorism. The warfare of today is not mass on
mass, he said. You have to hunt like a network
to defeat a network. Israel focussed on bombing
against Hezbollah, and, when that did not work,
it became more aggressive on the ground. The
definition of insanity is continuing to do the
same thing and expecting a different result.
[]
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