[News] Zinn - The Impossible Victory: Vietnam
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News at freedomarchives.org
Thu Apr 28 12:05:16 EDT 2005
April 30th marks the 30th anniversary of the Vietnam victory. i was blessed
to celebrate this in Havana, Cuba...that week of the final offensive was
being followed by Cubans in the smallest towns and the larger cities on
these amazing maps on public display which documented daily news about the
retreat of u.s. troops. As we drove into Havana for the May 1st
celebration, it seemed like every billboard and intersection displayed the
Vietnamese flag and some victory slogans. It was as if Cuba was transformed
into Vietnam!
claude
The Impossible Victory: Vietnam
excerpted from a
People's History of the United States
by Howard Zinn
[]
*****
In the fall of 1945 Japan, defeated, was forced to leave Indochina, the
former French colony it had occupied at the start of the war. In the
meantime, a revolutionary movement had grown there, determined to end
colonial control and to achieve a new life for the peasants of Indochina.
Led by a Communist named Ho Chi Minh, the revolutionists fought against the
Japanese, and when they were gone held a spectacular celebration in Hanoi
in late 1945, with a million people in the streets, and issued a
Declaration of Independence. It borrowed from the Declaration of the Rights
of Man and the Citizen, in the French Revolution, and from the American
Declaration of Independence, and began: "All men are created equal. They
are endowed by their Creator with certain inalienable rights; among these
are Life, Liberty, and the pursuit of Happiness." Just as the Americans in
1776 had listed their grievances against the English King, the Vietnamese
listed their complaints against French rule:
They have enforced inhuman laws.... They have built more prisons than
schools. They have mercilessly slain our patriots, they have drowned
uprisings in rivers of blood. They have fettered public opinion.... They
have robbed us of our rice fields, our mines, our forests, and our raw
materials ...
They have invented numerous unjustifiable taxes and reduced our people,
especially our peasantry, to a state of extreme poverty.... . . . from the
end of last year, to the beginning of this year . . . more than two million
of our fellow-citizens died of starvation....
The whole Vietnamese people, animated by a common purpose, are deter mined
to fight to the bitter end against any attempt by the French colonialists
to reconquer their country.
The U.S. Defense Department study of the Vietnam war, intended to be "top
secret" but released to the public by Daniel Ellsberg and Anthony Russo in
the famous Pentagon Papers case, described Ho Chi Minh's work:
"... Ho had built the Viet Minh into the only Vietnam-wide political
organization capable of effective resistance to either the Japanese or the
French. He was the only Vietnamese wartime leader with a national
following, and he assured himself wider fealty among the Vietnamese people
when in August September, 1945, he overthrew the Japanese . . . established
the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, and staged receptions for in-coming
allied occupation forces.... For a few weeks in September, 1945, Vietnam
was-for the first and only time in its modern history-free of foreign
domination, and united from north to south under Ho Chi Minh...."
The Western powers were already at work to change this. England occupied
the southern part of Indochina and then turned it back to the French.
Nationalist China (this was under Chiang Kai-shek, before the Communist
revolution) occupied the northern part of Indochina, and the United States
persuaded it to turn that back to the French. As Ho Chi Minh told an
American journalist: "We apparently stand quite alone.... We shall have to
depend on ourselves."
Between October 1945 and February 1946, Ho Chi Minh wrote eight letters to
President Truman, reminding him of the self-determination promises of the
Atlantic Charter. One of the letters was sent both to Truman and to the
United Nations:
I wish to invite attention of your Excellency for strictly humanitarian
reasons to following matter. Two million Vietnamese died of starvation
during winter of 1944 and spring 1945 because of starvation policy of
French who seized and stored until it rotted all available rice....
Three-fourths of cultivated land was flooded in summer 1945, which was
followed by a severe drought; of normal harvest five-sixths was lost....
Many people are starving.... Unless great world powers and international
relief organizations bring us immediate assistance we face imminent
catastrophe....
Truman never replied.
In October of 1946, the French bombarded Haiphong, a port in northern
Vietnam, and there began the eight-year war between the Vietminh movement
and the French over who would rule Vietnam. After the Communist victory in
China in 1949 and the Korean war the following year, the United States
began giving large amounts of military aid to the French. By 1954, the
United States had given 300,000 small arms and machine guns, enough to
equip the entire French army in Indochina, and $1 billion; all together,
the U.S. was financing 80 percent of the French war effort. Why was the
United States doing this? To the public, the word was that the United
States was helping to stop Communism in Asia, but there was not much public
discussion. In the secret memoranda of the National Security Council (which
advised the President on foreign policy) there was talk in 1950 of what
came to be known as the "domino theory"-that, like a row of dominoes, if
one country fell to Communism, the next one would do the same and so on. It
was important therefore to keep the first one from falling.
A secret memo of the National Security Council in June 1952 also pointed to
the chain of U.S. military bases along the coast of China, the Philippines,
Taiwan, Japan, South Korea:
Communist control of all of Southeast Asia would render the U.S. position
in the Pacific offshore island chain precarious and would seriously
jeopardize fundamental U.S. security interests in the Far East.
Southeast Asia, especially Malaya and Indonesia, is the principal world
source of natural rubber and tin, and a producer of petroleum and other
strategically important commodities....
It was also noted that Japan depended on the rice of Southeast Asia, and
Communist victory there would "make it extremely difficult to prevent
Japan's eventual accommodation to communism." In 1953, a congressional
study mission reported: "The area of Indochina is immensely wealthy in
rice, rubber, coal and iron ore. Its position makes it a strategic key to
the rest of Southeast Asia." That year, a State Department memorandum said
that the French were losing the war in Indochina, had failed "to win a
sufficient native support," feared that a negotiated settlement "would mean
the eventual loss to Communism not only of Indochina but of the whole of
Southeast Asia, and concluded: "If the French actually decided to withdraw,
the U.S. would have to consider most seriously whether to take over in this
area."
In 1954, the French, having been unable to win Vietnamese popular support,
which was overwhelmingly behind Ho Chi Minh and the revolutionary movement,
had to withdraw.
An international assemblage at Geneva presided over the peace agreement
between the French and the Vietminh. It was agreed that the French would
temporarily withdraw into the southern part of Vietnam, that the Vietminh
would remain in the north, and that an election would take place in two
years in a unified Vietnam to enable the Vietnamese to choose their own
government.
The United States moved quickly to prevent the unification and to establish
South Vietnam as an American sphere. It set up in Saigon as head of the
government a former Vietnamese official named Ngo Dinh Diem, who had
recently been living in New Jersey, and encouraged him not to hold the
scheduled elections for unification. A memo in early 1954 of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff said that intelligence estimates showed "a settlement based
on free elections would be attended by almost certain loss of the
Associated States [Laos, Cambodia, and Vietnam-the three parts of Indochina
created by the Geneva Conference] to Communist control." Diem again and
again blocked the elections requested by the Vietminh, and with American
money and arms his government became more and more firmly established. As
the Pentagon Papers put it: "South Viet Nam was essentially the creation of
the United States."
*****
During 1965, over 200,000 American soldiers were sent to South Vietnam, and
in 1966, 200,000 more. By early 1968, there were more than 500,000 American
troops there, and the U.S. Air Force was dropping bombs at a rate unequaled
in history. Tiny glimmerings of the massive human suffering under this
bombardment came to the outside world. On June 5, 1965, the New York Times
carried a dispatch from Saigon:
As the Communists withdrew from Quangngai last Monday, United States jet
bombers pounded the hills into which they were headed. Many Vietnamese one
estimate is as high as 500 were killed by the strikes. The American
contention is that they were Vietcong soldiers. But three out of four
patients seeking treatment in a Vietnamese hospital afterward for burns
from napalm, or jellied gasoline, were village women.
On September 6, another press dispatch from Saigon:
"In Bien Hoa province south of Saigon on August 15 United States aircraft
accidentally bombed a Buddhist pagoda and a Catholic church . . . it was
the third time their pagoda had been bombed in 1965. A temple of the Cao
Dai religious sect in the same area had been bombed twice this year. In
another delta province there is a woman who has both arms burned off by
napalm and her eyelids so badly burned that she cannot close them. When it
is time for her to sleep her family puts a blanket over her head. The woman
had two of her children killed in the air strike that maimed her."
Few Americans appreciate what their nation is doing to South Vietnam with
airpower ... innocent civilians are dying every day in South Vietnam.
Large areas of South Vietnam were declared "free fire zones," which meant
that all persons remaining within them-civilians, old people, children-were
considered an enemy, and bombs were dropped at will. Villages suspected of
harboring Viet Cong were subject to "search and destroy" missions-men of
military age in the villages were killed, the homes were burned, the women,
children, and old people were sent off to refugee camps. Jonathan Schell,
in his book The Village of Ben Suc, describes such an operation: a village
surrounded, attacked, a man riding on a bicycle shot down, three people
picnicking by the river shot to death, the houses destroyed, the women,
children, old people herded together, taken away from their ancestral homes.
The CIA in Vietnam, in a program called "Operation Phoenix," secretly,
without trial, executed at least twenty thousand civilians in South Vietnam
who were suspected of being members of the Communist underground. A
pro-administration analyst wrote in the journal Foreign Affairs in January
1975: "Although the Phoenix program did undoubtedly kill or incarcerate
many innocent civilians, it did also eliminate many members of the
Communist infrastructure."
After the war, the release of records of the International Red Cross showed
that in South Vietnamese prison camps, where at the height of the war
65,000 to 70,000 people were held and often beaten and tortured, American
advisers observed and sometimes participated. The Red Cross observers found
continuing, systematic brutality at the two principal Vietnamese POW
camps-at Phu Quoc and Qui Nhon, where American advisers were stationed.
By the end of the war, 7 million tons of bombs had been dropped on Vietnam,
Laos, and Cambodia-more than twice the amount of bombs dropped on Europe
and Asia in World War II. In addition, poisonous sprays were dropped by
planes to destroy trees and any kind of growth- an area the size of the
state of Massachusetts was covered with such poi son. Vietnamese mothers
reported birth defects in their children. Yale biologists, using the same
poison (2,4,5,T) on mice, reported defective mice born and said they had no
reason to believe the effect on humans was different.
On March 16, 1968, a company of American soldiers went into the hamlet of
My Lai 4, in Quang Ngai province. They rounded up the inhabitants,
including old people and women with infants in their arms. These people
were ordered into a ditch, where they were methodically shot to death by
American soldiers. The testimony of James Dursi, a rifleman, at the later
trial of Lieutenant William Calley, was reported in the New York Times:
Lieutenant Calley and a weeping rifleman named Paul D. Meadlo the same
soldier who had fed candy to the children before shooting them-pushed the
prisoners into the ditch...
"There was an order to shoot by Lieutenant Calley, I can't remember the
exact words-it was something like 'Start firing.' "Meadlo turned to me and
said: 'Shoot, why don't you shoot?'
"He was crying. "I said, 'I can't. I won't.'
"Then Lieutenant Calley and Meadlo pointed their rifles into the ditch and
fired.
"People were diving on top of each other; mothers were trying to protect
their children...."
Journalist Seymour Hersh, in his book My Lai 4, writes:
"When Army investigators reached the barren area in November, 1969, in
connection with the My Lai probe in the United States, they found mass
graves at three sites, as well as a ditch full of bodies. It was estimated
that between 450 and 500 people-most of them women, children and old men-
had been slain and buried there."
The army tried to cover up what happened. But a letter began circulating
from a GI named Ron Ridenhour, who had heard about the massacre. There were
photos taken of the killing by an army photographer, Ronald Haeberle.
Seymour Hersh, then working for an antiwar news agency in Southeast Asia
called Dispatch News Service, wrote about it. The story of the massacre had
appeared in May 1968 in two French publications, one called Sud Vietnam en
Lutte, and another published by the North Vietnamese delegation to the
peace talks in Paris-but the American press did not pay any attention.
Several of the officers in the My Lai massacre were put on trial, but only
Lieutenant William Calley was found guilty. He was sentenced to life
imprisonment, but his sentence was reduced twice; he served three
years-Nixon ordered that he be under house arrest rather than a regular
prison-and then was paroled. Thousands of Americans came to his defense.
Part of it was in patriotic justification of his action as necessary
against the "Communists." Part of it seems to have been a feeling that he
was unjustly singled out in a war with many similar atrocities. Colonel
Oran Henderson, who had been charged with covering up the My Lai killings,
told reporters in early 1971: "Every unit of brigade size has its My Lai
hidden someplace."
Indeed, My Lai was unique only in its details. Hersh reported a letter sent
by a GI to his family, and published in a local newspaper:
"Dear Mom and Dad:
Today we went on a mission and I am not very proud of myself, my friends,
or my country. We burned every hut in sight!
It was a small rural network of villages and the people were incredibly
poor. My unit burned and plundered their meager possessions. Let me try to
explain the situation to you.
The huts here are thatched palm leaves. Each one has a dried mud bunker
inside. These bunkers are to protect the families. Kind of like air raid
shelters.
My unit commanders, however, chose to think that these bunkers are
offensive. So every hut we find that has a bunker we are ordered to burn to
the ground.
When the ten helicopters landed this morning, in the midst of these huts,
and six men jumped out of each "chopper", we were firing the moment we hit
the ground. We fired into all the huts we could....
It is then that we burned these huts.... Everyone is crying, begging and
praying that we don't separate them and take their husbands and fathers,
sons and grandfathers. The women wail and moan.
Then they watch in terror as we burn their homes, personal possessions and
food. Yes, we burn all rice and shoot all livestock."
*****
The massacre at My Lai by a company of ordinary soldiers was a small event
compared with the plans of high-level military and civilian leaders to
visit massive destruction on the civilian population of Vietnam. Assistant
Secretary of Defense John McNaughton in early 1966, seeing that large-scale
bombing of North Vietnam villages was not producing the desired result,
suggested a different strategy. The air strikes on villages, he said, would
"create a counterproductive wave of revulsion abroad and at home." He
suggested instead:
Destruction of locks and dams, however-if handled right-might . . . offer
promise. It should be studied. Such destruction doesn't kill or drown
people. By shallow-flooding the rice, it leads after a time to widespread
starvation (more than a million?) unless food is provided-which we could
offer to do "at the conference table." . . .
The heavy bombings were intended to destroy the will of ordinary Vietnamese
to resist, as in the bombings of German and Japanese population centers in
World War II-despite President Johnson's public insistence that only
"military targets" were being bombed. The government was using language
like "one more turn of the screw" to describe bombing. The CIA at one point
in 1966 recommended a "bombing program of greater intensity," according to
the Pentagon Papers, directed against, in the ClA's words, "the will of the
regime as a target system."
Meanwhile, just across the border of Vietnam, in a neighboring country,
Laos, where a right-wing government installed by the CIA faced a rebellion,
one of the most beautiful areas in the world, the Plain of Jars, was being
destroyed by bombing. This was not reported by the government or the press,
but an American who lived in Laos, Fred Branfman, told the story in his
book Voices from the Plain of Jars:
Over 25,000 attack sorties were flown against the Plain of Jars from May,
1964, through September, 1969; over 75,000 tons of bombs were dropped on
it; on the ground, thousands were killed and wounded, tens of thousands
driven underground, and the entire aboveground society leveled.
*****
In September 1973, a former government official in Laos, Jerome Doolittle,
wrote in the New York Times:
"The Pentagon's most recent lies about bombing Cambodia bring back a
question that often occurred to me when I was press attaché at the American
Embassy in Vientiane, Laos.
Why did we bother to lie?
When I first arrived in Laos, I was instructed to answer all press
questions about our massive and merciless bombing campaign in that tiny
country with: "At the request of the Royal Laotian Government, the United
States is conducting unarmed reconnaissance flights accompanied by armed
escorts who have the right to return if fired upon."
This was a lie. Every reporter to whom I told it knew it was a lie. Hanoi
knew it was a lie. The International Control Commission knew it was a lie.
Every interested Congressman and newspaper reader knew it was a lie....
After all, the lies did serve to keep something from somebody, and the
somebody was us."
By early 1968, the cruelty of the war began touching the conscience of many
Americans. For many others, the problem was that the United States was
unable to win the war, while 40,000 American soldiers were dead by this
time, 250,000 wounded, with no end in sight. (The Vietnam casualties were
many times this number.)
Lyndon Johnson had escalated a brutal war and failed to win it. His
popularity was at an all-time low; he could not appear publicly without a
demonstration against him and the war. The chant "LBJ, LBJ, how many kids
did you kill today?" was heard in demonstrations throughout the country. In
the spring of 1968 Johnson announced he would not run again for President,
and that negotiations for peace would begin with the Vietnamese in Paris.
In the fall of 1968, Richard Nixon, pledging that he would get the United
States out of Vietnam, was elected President. He began to withdraw troops;
by February 1972, less than 150,000 were left. But the bombing continued.
Nixon's policy was "Vietnamization"-the Saigon government, with Vietnamese
ground troops, using American money and air power, would carry on the war.
Nixon was not ending the war; he was ending the most unpopular aspect of
it, the involvement of American soldiers on the soil of a faraway country.
In the spring of 1970, Nixon and Secretary of State Henry Kissinger
launched an invasion of Cambodia, after a long bombardment that the
government never disclosed to the public. The invasion not only led to an
outcry of protest in the United States, it was a military failure, and
Congress resolved that Nixon could not use American troops in extending the
war without congressional approval. The following year, without American
troops, the United States supported a South Vietnamese invasion of Laos.
This too failed. In 1971, 800,000 tons of bombs were dropped by the United
States on Laos, Cambodia, Vietnam.
*****
... In August of 1965, 61 percent of the population thought the American
involvement in Vietnam was not wrong. By May 1971 it was exactly reversed;
61 percent thought our involvement was wrong. Bruce Andrews, a Harvard
student of public opinion, found that the people most opposed to the war
were people over fifty, blacks, and women. He also noted that a study in
the spring of 1964, when Vietnam was a minor issue in the newspapers,
showed that 53 percent of college educated people were willing to send
troops to Vietnam, but only 33 percent of grade school-educated people were
so willing.
It seems that the media, themselves controlled by higher-education,
higher-income people who were more aggressive in foreign policy, tended to
give the erroneous impression that working-class people were superpatriots
for the war. Lewis Lipsitz, in a mid-1968 survey of poor blacks and whites
in the South, paraphrased an attitude he found typical: "The only way to
help the poor man is to get out of that war in Vietnam . . . These
taxes-high taxes-it's going over yonder to kill people with and I don't see
no cause in it."
The capacity for independent judgment among ordinary Americans is probably
best shown by the swift development of antiwar feeling among American
GIs-volunteers and draftees who came mostly from lower-income groups. There
had been, earlier in American history, in stances of soldiers' disaffection
from the war: isolated mutinies in the Revolutionary War, refusal of
reenlistment in the midst of hostilities in the Mexican war, desertion and
conscientious objection in World War I and World War II. But Vietnam
produced opposition by soldiers and veterans on a scale, and with a fervor,
never seen before.
It began with isolated protests. As early as June 1965, Richard Steinke, a
West Point graduate in Vietnam, refused to board an aircraft taking him to
a remote Vietnamese village. "The Vietnamese war," he said, "is not worth a
single American life." Steinke was court-martialed and dismissed from the
service. The following year, three army privates, one black, one Puerto
Rican, one Lithuanian-Italian-all poor-refused to embark for Vietnam,
denouncing the war as "immoral, illegal, and unjust." They were
court-martialed and imprisoned.
In early 1967, Captain Howard Levy, an army doctor at Fort Jackson, South
Carolina, refused to teach Green Berets, a Special Forces elite in the
military. He said they were "murderers of women and children" and "killers
of peasants." He was court-martialed on the ground that he was trying to
promote disaffection among enlisted men by his statements. The colonel who
presided at the trial said: "The truth of the statements is not an issue in
this case." Levy was convicted and sentenced to prison.
The individual acts multiplied: A black private in Oakland refused to board
a troop plane to Vietnam, although he faced eleven years at hard labor. A
navy nurse, Lieutenant Susan Schnall, was court-martialed for marching in a
peace demonstration while in uniform, and for drop ping antiwar leaflets
from a plane on navy installations. In Norfolk, Virginia, a sailor refused
to train fighter pilots because he said the war was immoral. An army
lieutenant was arrested in Washington, D.C., in early 1968 for picketing
the White House with a sign that said: " 120,000 American Casualties-Why?"
Two black marines, George Daniels and William Harvey, were given long
prison sentences (Daniels, six years, Harvey, ten years, both later
reduced) for talking to other black marines against the war.
As the war went on, desertions from the armed forces mounted. Thousands
went to Western Europe-France, Sweden, Holland. Most deserters crossed into
Canada; some estimates were 50,000, others 100,000. Some stayed in the
United States. A few openly defied the military authorities by taking
"sanctuary" in churches, where, surrounded by antiwar friends and
sympathizers, they waited for capture and court-martial. At Boston
University, a thousand students kept vigil for five days and nights in the
chapel, supporting an eighteen-year old deserter, Ray Kroll.
Kroll's story was a common one. He had been inveigled into joining the
army; he came from a poor family, was brought into court, charged with
drunkenness, and given the choice of prison or enlistment. He enlisted. And
then he began to think about the nature of the war.
On a Sunday morning, federal agents showed up at the Boston University
chapel, stomped their way through aisles clogged with students, smashed
down doors, and took Kroll away. From the stockade, he wrote back to
friends: "I ain't gonna kill; it's against my will...." A friend he had
made at the chapel brought him books, and he noted a saying he had found in
one of them: "What we have done will not be lost to all Eternity.
Everything ripens at its time and becomes fruit at its hour."
The GI antiwar movement became more organized. Near Fort Jackson, South
Carolina, the first "GI coffeehouse" was set up, a place where soldiers
could get coffee and doughnuts, find antiwar literature, and talk freely
with others. It was called the UFO, and lasted for several years before it
was declared a "public nuisance" and closed by court action. But other GI
coffeehouses sprang up in half a dozen other places across the country. An
antiwar "bookstore" was opened near Fort Devens, Massachusetts, and another
one at the Newport, Rhode Island, naval base.
Underground newspapers sprang up at military bases across the country; by
1970 more than fifty were circulating. Among them: About Face in Los
Angeles; Fed Up! in Tacoma, Washington; Short Times at Fort Jackson;
Vietnam Gl in Chicago; Graffiti in Heidelberg, Germany; Bragg Briefs in
North Carolina; Last Harass at Fort Gordon, Georgia; Helping Hand at
Mountain Home Air Base, Idaho. These newspapers printed antiwar articles,
gave news about the harassment of GIs and practical advice on the legal
rights of servicemen, told how to resist military domination.
Mixed with feeling against the war was resentment at the cruelty, the
dehumanization, of military life. In the army prisons, the stockades, this
was especially true. In 1968, at the Presidio stockade in California, a
guard shot to death an emotionally disturbed prisoner for walking away from
a work detail. Twenty-seven prisoners then sat down and refused to work,
singing "We Shall Overcome." They were court-martialed, found guilty of
mutiny, and sentenced to terms of up to fourteen years, later reduced after
much public attention and protest.
The dissidence spread to the war front itself. When the great Moratorium
Day demonstrations were taking place in October 1969 in the United States,
some GIs in Vietnam wore black armbands to show their support. A news
photographer reported that in a platoon on patrol near Da Nang, about half
of the men were wearing black armbands. One soldier stationed at Cu Chi
wrote to a friend on October 26, 1970, that separate companies had been set
up for men refusing to go into the field to fight. "It's no big thing here
anymore to refuse to go." The French newspaper Le Monde reported that in
four months, 109 soldiers of the first air cavalry division were charged
with refusal to fight. "A common sight," the correspondent for Le Monde
wrote, "is the black soldier, with his left fist clenched in defiance of a
war he has never considered his own."
Wallace Terry, a black American reporter for Time magazine, taped
conversations with hundreds of black soldiers; he found bitterness against
army racism, disgust with the war, generally low morale. More and more
cases of "fragging" were reported in Vietnam-incidents where servicemen
rolled fragmentation bombs under the tents of officers who were ordering
them into combat, or against whom they had other grievances. The Pentagon
reported 209 fraggings in Vietnam in 1970 alone.
Veterans back from Vietnam formed a group called Vietnam Veterans Against
the War. In December 1970, hundreds of them went to Detroit to what was
called the "Winter Soldier" investigations, to testify publicly about
atrocities they had participated in or seen in Vietnam, committed by
Americans against Vietnamese. In April 1971 more than a thousand of them
went to Washington, D.C., to demonstrate against the war. One by one, they
went up to a wire fence around the Capitol, threw over the fence the medals
they had won in Vietnam, and made brief statements about the war, sometimes
emotionally, sometimes in icy, bitter calm.
In the summer of 1970, twenty-eight commissioned officers of the military,
including some veterans of Vietnam, saying they represented about 250 other
officers, announced formation of the Concerned Officers Movement against
the war. During the fierce bombings of Hanoi and Haiphong, around Christmas
1972, came the first defiance of B-52 pilots who refused to fly those missions.
On June 3, 1973, the New York Times reported dropouts among West Point
cadets. Officials there, the reporter wrote, "linked the rate to an
affluent, less disciplined, skeptical, and questioning generation and to
the anti-military mood that a small radical minority and the Vietnam war
had created."
But most of the antiwar action came from ordinary GIs, and most of these
came from lower-income groups-white, black, Native American, Chinese.
A twenty-year-old New York City Chinese-American named Sam Choy enlisted at
seventeen in the army, was sent to Vietnam, was made a cook, and found
himself the target of abuse by fellow GIs, who called him "Chink" and
"gook" (the term for the Vietnamese) and said he looked like the enemy. One
day he took a rifle and fired warning shots at his tormentors. "By this
time I was near the perimeter of the base and was thinking of joining the
Viet Cong; at least they would trust me. " Choy was taken by military
police, beaten, court-martialed, sentenced to eighteen months of hard labor
at Fort Leavenworth. "They beat me up every day, like a time clock." He
ended his interview with a New York Chinatown newspaper saying: "One thing:
I want to tell all the Chinese kids that the army made me sick. They made
me so sick that I can't stand it."
A dispatch from Phu Bai in April 1972 said that fifty GIs out of 142 men in
the company refused to go on patrol, crying: "This isn't our war!" The New
York Times on July 14,1973, reported that American prisoners of war in
Vietnam, ordered by officers in the POW camp to stop cooperating with the
enemy, shouted back: "Who's the enemy?" They formed a peace committee in
the camp, and a sergeant on the committee later recalled his march from
capture to the POW camp:
Until we got to the first camp, we didn't see a village intact; they were
all destroyed. I sat down and put myself in the middle and asked myself: Is
this right or wrong? Is it right to destroy villages? Is it right to kill
people en masse? After a while it just got to me.
Pentagon officials in Washington and navy spokesmen in San Diego announced,
after the United States withdrew its troops from Vietnam in 1973, that the
navy was going to purge itself of "undesirables"- and that these included
as many as six thousand men in the Pacific fleet, "a substantial proportion
of them black." All together, about 563,000 GIs had received less than
honorable discharges. In the year 1973, one of every five discharges was
"less than honorable." indicating something less than dutiful obedience to
the military. By 1971, 177 of every 1,000 American soldiers were listed as
"absent without leave," some of them three or four times. Deserters doubled
from 47,000 in 1967 to 89,000 in 1971.
One of those who stayed, fought, but then turned against the war was Ron
Kovic. His father worked in a supermarket on Long Island. In 1963, at the
age of seventeen, he enlisted in the marines. Two years later, in Vietnam,
at the age of nineteen, his spine was shattered by shellfire. Paralyzed
from the waist down, he was put in a wheelchair. Back in the States, he
observed the brutal treatment of wounded veterans in the veterans'
hospitals, thought more and more about the war, and joined the Vietnam
Veterans Against the War. He went to demonstrations to speak against the
war. One evening he heard actor Donald Sutherland read from the post-World
War I novel by Dalton Trumbo, Johnny Got His Gun, about a soldier whose
limbs and face were shot away by gunfire, a thinking torso who invented a
way of communicating with the outside world and then beat out a message so
powerful it could not be heard without trembling.
Sutherland began to read the passage and something I will never forget
swept over me. It was as if someone was speaking for everything I ever went
through in the hospital.... I began to shake and I remember there were
tears in my eyes.
Kovic demonstrated against the war, and was arrested. He tells his story in
Born on the Fourth of July:
They help me back into the chair and take me to another part of the prison
building to be booked. "What's your name?" the officer behind the desk says.
"Ron Kovic," I say. "Occupation, Vietnam veteran against the war."
"What?" he says sarcastically, looking down at me.
"I'm a Vietnam veteran against the war," I almost shout back.
"You should have died over there," he says. He turns to his assistant "I'd
like to take this guy and throw him off the roof."
They fingerprint me and take my picture and put me in a cell. I have begun
to wet my pants like a little baby. The tube has slipped out during my
examination by the doctor. I try to fall asleep but even though I am
exhausted, the anger is alive in me like a huge hot stone in my chest. I
lean my head up against the wall and listen to the toilets flush again and
again.
Kovic and the other veterans drove to Miami to the Republican National
Convention in 1972, went into the Convention Hall, wheeled themselves down
the aisles, and as Nixon began his acceptance speech shouted, "Stop the
bombing! Stop the war!" Delegates cursed them: "Traitor!" and Secret
Service men hustled them out of the hall.
In the fall of 1973, with no victory in sight and North Vietnamese troops
entrenched in various parts of the South, the United States agreed to
accept a settlement that would withdraw American troops and leave the
revolutionary troops where they were, until a new elected government would
be set up including Communist and non-Communist elements. But the Saigon
government refused to agree, and the United States decided to make one
final attempt to bludgeon the North Vietnamese into submission. It sent
waves of B-52s over Hanoi and Haiphong, destroying homes and hospitals,
killing unknown numbers of civilians. The attack did not work. Many of the
B-52s were shot down, there was angry protest all over the world-and
Kissinger went back to Paris and signed very much the same peace agreement
that had been agreed on before.
The United States withdrew its forces, continuing to give aid to the Saigon
government, but when the North Vietnamese launched at tacks in early 1975
against the major cities in South Vietnam, the government collapsed. In
late April 1975, North Vietnamese troops entered Saigon. The American
embassy staff fled, along with many Vietnamese who feared Communist rule,
and the long war in Vietnam was over. Saigon was renamed Ho Chi Minh City,
and both parts of Vietnam were unified as the Democratic Republic of Vietnam.
Traditional history portrays the end of wars as coming from the initiatives
of leaders-negotiations in Paris or Brussels or Geneva or Versailles-just
as it often finds the coming of war a response to the demand of "the
people." The Vietnam war gave clear evidence that at least for that war
(making one wonder about the others) the political leaders were the last to
take steps to end the war-"the people" were far ahead. The President was
always far behind. The Supreme Court silently turned away from cases
challenging the Constitutionality of the war. Congress was years behind
public opinion.
In the spring of 1971, syndicated columnists Rowland Evans and Robert
Novak, two firm supporters of the war, wrote regretfully of a "sudden
outbreak of anti-war emotionalism" in the House of Representatives, and
said: "The anti-war animosities now suddenly so pervasive among House
Democrats are viewed by Administration backers as less anti-Nixon than as a
response to constituent pressures."
It was only after the intervention in Cambodia ended, and only after the
nationwide campus uproar over that invasion, that Congress passed a
resolution declaring that American troops should not be sent into Cambodia
without its approval. And it was not until late 1973, when American troops
had finally been removed from Vietnam, that Congress passed a bill limiting
the power of the President to make war without congressional consent; even
there, in that "War Powers Resolution," the President could make war for
sixty days on his own without a congressional declaration.
The administration tried to persuade the American people that the war was
ending because of its decision to negotiate a peace-not because it was
losing the war, not because of the powerful antiwar movement in the United
States. But the government's own secret memoranda all through the war
testify to its sensitivity at each stage about "public opinion" in the
United States and abroad. The data is in the Pentagon Papers.
In June of 1964, top American military and State Department officials,
including Ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge, met in Honolulu. "Rusk stated that
public opinion on our SEA policy was badly divided and that, therefore, the
President needed an affirmation of support."
Diem had been replaced by a general named Khanh. The Pentagon historians
write: "Upon his return to Saigon on June 5 Ambassador Lodge went straight
from the airport to call on General Khanh . . . the main thrust of his talk
with Khanh was to hint that the United States Government would in the
immediate future be preparing U.S. public opinion for actions against North
Vietnam." Two months later came the Gulf of Tonkin affair.
On April 2, 1965, a memo from CIA director John McCone suggested that the
bombing of North Vietnam be increased because it was "not sufficiently
severe" to change North Vietnam's policy. "On the other hand . . . we can
expect increasing pressure to stop the bombing . . . from various elements
of the American public, from the press, the United Nations and world
opinion." The U.S. should try for a fast knockout before this opinion could
build up, McCone said.
Assistant Secretary of Defense John McNaughton's memo of early 1966
suggested destruction of locks and dams to create mass starvation, because
"strikes at population targets" would "create a counterproductive wave of
revulsion abroad and at home." In May 1967, the Pentagon historians write:
"McNaughton was also very deeply concerned about the breadth and intensity
of public unrest and dissatisfaction with the war . . . especially with
young people, the underprivileged, the intelligentsia and the women."
McNaughton worried: "Will the move to call up 20,000 Reserves . . .
polarize opinion to the extent that the 'doves' in the United States will
get out of hand-massive refusals to serve, or to fight, or to cooperate, or
worse?" He warned:
There may be a limit beyond which many Americans and much of the world will
not permit the United States to go. The picture of the world's greatest
superpower killing or seriously injuring 1000 non-combatants a week, while
trying to pound a tiny backward nation into submission, on an issue whose
merits are hotly disputed, is not a pretty one. It could conceivably
produce a costly distortion in the American national consciousness.
*****
One sign that the ideas of the antiwar movement had taken hold in the
American public was that juries became more reluctant to convict antiwar
protesters, and local judges too were treating them differently. In
Washington, by 1971, judges were dismissing charges against demonstrators
in cases where two years before they almost certainly would have been sent
to jail. The antiwar groups who had raided draft boards- the Baltimore
Four, the Catonsville Nine, the Milwaukee Fourteen, the Boston Five, and
more-were receiving lighter sentences for the same crimes.
The last group of draft board raiders, the "Camden 28," were priests, nuns,
and laypeople who raided a draft board in Camden, New Jersey, in August
1971. It was essentially what the Baltimore Four had done four years
earlier, when all were convicted and Phil Berrigan got six years in prison.
But in this instance, the Camden defendants were acquitted by the jury on
all counts. When the verdict was in, one of the jurors, a
fifty-three-year-old black taxi driver from Atlantic
City named Samuel Braithwaite, who had spent eleven years in the army, left
a letter for the defendants:
To you, the clerical physicians with your God-given talents, I say, well
done. Well done for trying to heal the sick irresponsible men, men who were
chosen by the people to govern and lead them. These men, who failed the
people, by raining death and destruction on a hapless country.... You went
out to do your part while your brothers remained in their ivory towers
watching . . . and hopefully some day in the near future, peace and harmony
may reign to people of all nations.
*****
The Freedom Archives
522 Valencia Street
San Francisco, CA 94110
(415) 863-9977
www.freedomarchives.org
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