[News] Petras: Venezuela's myths and realities

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Venezuela's President Chavez Frias and the referendum: myths and realities

<http://www.vheadline.com/readnews.asp?id=22654>http://www.vheadline.com/readnews.asp?id=22654

Binghamton University (New York) Sociology Professor James Petras writes: 
Between rightwing frustration and leftwing euphoria, little has been 
written about the complex and contradictory reality of Venezuela politics 
and the specificities of President Chavez policies. Even less discussion 
has focused on the division between ideological Washington and pragmatic 
Wall Street, between the politics of confrontation and conciliation, and 
the convergences and divergences between Venezuela and the rest of Latin 
America. Both the right and left have substituted myths about the Chavez 
government rather than confronting realities.

Rightwing Myths

Myth 1 -- Chavez is an unpopular President who the rightwing opposition is 
capable of defeating in the referendum.

Reality -- The rightwing and its backers in Washington miscalculated on 
several counts. First the weakest moment of the Chavez government was right 
after the PDVSA executive lock-out (December 2002 – February 2003), when 
oil prices were much lower, the economy was devastated, the social welfare 
programs of the government were under funded and grass roots political 
organizations were weak.
    * By the time the referendum took place (August 2004), one and a half 
years later, socio-economic and political conditions had dramatically changed.

The economy was growing by 12%, oil prices were at record highs, social 
welfare expenditures were increasing and their social impact was highly 
visible and widespread, and the mass social organizations were deeply 
embedded in populous neighborhoods throughout the country.

Clearly the initiative had passed from the right to the left, but both the 
US and its opposition collaborators were blind to the realities.

Having lost control over the state petroleum industry and allocation of 
funds via the failed lockout in early 2003, having lost influence in the 
military after the failed coup of April 2002, the opposition possessed few 
resources to limit the government’s referendum campaign and no leverage in 
launching a post election ‘civic-military’ coup.

Myth 2 -- According to the rightwing analysts the referendum was based on 
the issue of Chavez ‘popularity’, ‘personality’, charisma and ‘autocratic’ 
style.

In reality the referendum was based on class/race divisions. Non-opposition 
trade union leaders indicated that over 85% of the working class and 
working poor voted for Chavez, while preliminary reports on voting in 
affluent neighborhoods and circumscriptions showed just the reverse over 
80% voting for the referendum.

A similar process or class/race polarization was evident in the 
extraordinary turnout and vote among poor Afro-Venezuelans: The higher the 
turnout, the higher the vote for Chavez, as an unprecedented 71% of the 
electorate voted. Clearly Chavez was successful in linking social welfare 
programs, class allegiances to electoral behavior.

Myth 3 -- Among both the Right and Left there is a belief that the mass 
media control mass voting behavior, limit political agendas and necessarily 
lead to the victory of the Right and the domestication of the Left.
    * In Venezuela the Right controlled 90% of the major television 
networks and print media and most of the major radio stations. Yet the 
referendum was crushed by an 18% margin (59% to 41%).

The results of the referendum demonstrates that powerful grass roots 
organizations built around successful struggles for social reforms can 
create a mass political and social consciousness which can easily reject 
media manipulation.

Elite optimism in their ‘structural power’ -- money, media monopoly, and 
backing by Washington -- blinded them to the fact that conscious collective 
organization can be a formidable counterweight to elite resources.

Likewise referendum results refute the argument put forth by the 
center-left that they lose elections because of the mass media. The 
center-left justify embracing neo-liberalism to “neutralize” the mass media 
during elections.

They refuse to recognize that elections can be won despite mass media 
opposition if previous mass struggle and organization created mass social 
consciousness.

Myth 4 -- According to many leftist journalists, Chavez victory reflected a 
new wave of popular nationalist politics in Latin America. Evidence to the 
contrary is abundant.

Brazil under Lula has sold oil exploration rights to US and European 
multinational corporations, provides a contingent of 1500 troops (along 
with Argentina, Chile etc) to Haiti to stabilize Washington’s puppet regime 
imposed through the kidnapping of President-elect Aristide.
    * Likewise in the other Andean countries (Ecuador, Peru, Bolivia and 
Colombia) the elected regimes propose to privatize public petroleum 
companies, support ALCA and Plan Colombia and pay their foreign debts.

The Broad Front in Uruguay promises to follow Brazil’s neo-liberal 
policies. While Chavez promotes the regional trading bloc MERCOSUR, the 
major members Brazil and Argentina are increasing their trade relations 
outside the region.

In effect there is a bloc of neo-liberal regimes arrayed against Chavez’s 
anti-imperialist policies and mass social movements. To the extent that 
Chavez continues his independent foreign policy his principle allies are 
the mass social movements and Cuba.

Myth 5 -- The defeat of the referendum was a major tactical defeat of US 
imperialism and its local vassals. But a defeat of imperialism does not 
necessarily mean or lead to a revolutionary transformation, as post-Chavez 
post-election appeals to Washington and big business demonstrate.

More indicative of Chavez politics is the forthcoming $5 billion dollar 
investment agreements with Texaco-Mobil and Exxon to exploit the Orinoco 
gas and oil fields. The euphoria of the left prevents them from observing 
the pendulum shifts in Chavez discourse and the heterodox social welfare -- 
neo-liberal economic politics he has consistently practiced.

President Chavez’ policy has always followed a careful balancing act 
between rejecting vassalage to the US and local oligarchic rentiers on the 
one hand and trying to harness a coalition of foreign and national 
investors, urban and rural poor to a program of welfare capitalism. He is 
closer to Franklin Roosevelt’s New Deal than Castro’s socialist revolution. 
In the aftermath of the three political crises -- the failed civil-military 
coup, the debacle of the oil executives lock out, and the defeat of the 
referendum -- Chavez offered to dialogue and reach a consensus with the 
media barons, big business plutocrats and US government, on the basis of 
the existing property relations, media ownership and expanded relations 
with Washington.

Chavez’ commitment to centrist-reformist policies explains why he did not 
prosecute owners of the mass media who had openly called for the violent 
overthrow of his government and also why he took no judicial action against 
the association of the business leaders (Fedecamaras) who has incited 
military rebellion and violent attacks on the constitutional order.

In Europe, North America and many other regions, democratically-elected 
governments would have arrested, and prosecuted these elites for acts of 
violent subversion.

President Chavez has constantly reiterated that their property, privileges 
and wealth is not in question. Moreover the fact that these elites have 
been able to engage in three unconstitutional efforts to overthrow the 
regime and still retain their class positions, strongly suggest that 
President Chavez still conceives of their playing an important role in his 
vision of development based on private-public partnership and social 
welfare spending.

After 5 years of government and after 3 major “class confrontations,” it is 
evident that at least at the level of the government, there has been no 
rupture in property or class relations and no break with foreign creditors, 
investors or oil clients. Within the fiscal framework of foreign debt 
payments, subsidies to private exporters, low-interest loans to 
industrialists, the government has increased the allocation of state 
spending for social programs in health, education housing, 
micro-enterprises and agrarian reform.

The Venezuelan government can maintain this balance between big business 
and the poor because of the high prices and revenue from petroleum exports.

Like President Roosevelt, Chavez’s positive social welfare programs attract 
millions of low income voters, but do not affect money income levels, nor 
create large scale employment projects.
    * Unemployment is still in the vicinity of 20% and poverty levels still 
remain over 50%.

Comprehensive social spending has positively affected the social lives of 
the poor but has not improved their class position. Chavez is both 
confrontational and radical when his rulership is threatened and 
conciliatory and moderate when he successfully overcomes the challenge.

Myth 6 -- The Left and Right have failed to recognize a divergence of 
tactics between an ideological Washington and a pragmatic Wall Street.

The US political class (both Republican and Democrats, the Presidency and 
Congress) have been actively threatening, intervening and supporting 
destructive lockouts, violent coups and a fraudulent referendum to oust Chavez.

In contrast the major US and European oil companies and banks have been 
engaged in stable, sustained and profitable economic relations with the 
Chavez government. Foreign creditors have received prompt and punctual 
payments of billions of dollars in payments and have not spoken or acted in 
a fashion to disrupt these lucrative transactions.

Major US multi-national oil companies project between US$5 billion and $20 
billion in new investments in exploration and exploitation. No doubt these 
MNCs would have liked the coup to succeed in order to monopolize all 
Venezuelan oil revenue, but perceiving the failures of Washington they are 
content to share part of the oil wealth with the Chavez regime.

The tactical divergences between Washington and Wall Street are likely to 
narrow as the Venezuelan government moves into the new conciliatory phase 
toward Fedecamaras and Washington. Given Washington’s defeat in the 
referendum, and the big oil deals with key US multinationals, it is likely 
that Washington will seek a temporary ‘truce’ until new, more favorable 
circumstances emerge.
    * It will be interesting to see how this possible “truce” will affect 
Venezuela’s critical foreign policy.

Myth 7 -- The main thrust of the current phase of Chavez revolution is a 
moral crusade against government corruption and a highly politicized 
judicial system tightly aligned with the discredited political opposition. 
For many on the Left, the radical content of the ‘No’ vote campaign was 
rooted in the proliferation of community based mass organizations, the 
mobilization of trade union assemblies, and the decentralized democratic 
process of voter involvement based on promises of future consequential 
social changes in terms of jobs, income and popular political power.
    * Moralization campaigns (anti-corruption) are commonly associated with 
middle class politics designed to create “national unity” and usually 
weaken class solidarity.

The Left’s belief that the mass organizations mobilized for the referendum 
will necessarily become a basis for a ‘new popular democracy’ has little 
basis in the recent past (similar mobilizations took place prior to the 
failed coup and during the bosses’ lockout). Nor do government-sponsored 
moralization campaigns attract much interest among the poor in Venezuela or 
elsewhere.

Moreover the focus of the Chavista political leaders is on the forthcoming 
elections for parliament, not in creating alternative sources of governance.

The Left’s facile projection of popular mobilization into the 
post-referendum period creates a political mythology, which fails to 
recognize the internal contradictions of the political process in Venezuela.

Conclusion
The massive popular victory of the ‘No’ vote in the Venezuelan referendum 
gave hope and inspiration to hundreds of millions in Latin America and 
elsewhere, that US-backed oligarchies can be defeated at the ballot box.
    * The fact that the favorable voting outcome was recognized by the OAS, 
Carter and Washington is a tribute to President Chavez strategic changes in 
the military, guaranteeing the honoring of the constitutional outcome.

At a deeper level of analysis, the conceptions and perceptions of the major 
antagonists among the Right and the Left however are open to criticism: The 
Right for underestimating the political and institutional support for 
Chavez in the current conjuncture and the Left for projecting an overly 
radical vision on the direction of politics in the post-referendum period.

 From a ‘realist’ position, we can conclude that the Chavez government will 
proceed with his “New Deal” social welfare programs while deepening ties 
with major foreign and domestic investors ... his ability to balance 
classes, leaning in one direction or the other will depend on the continued 
flow of high returns from oil revenues. If oil prices drop, hard choices 
will have to be made -- class choices.

James Petras
<mailto:jpetras at binghamton.edu>jpetras at binghamton.edu



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