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<font size=3><br>
</font><font face="georgia" size=5 color="#A80000">Venezuela's President
Chavez Frias and the referendum: myths and realities <br><br>
</font><font face="Arial, Helvetica" size=4><a href="http://www.vheadline.com/readnews.asp?id=22654">http://www.vheadline.com/readnews.asp?id=22654</a><br><br>
</font><font face="georgia" size=2><b>Binghamton University (New York)
Sociology Professor James Petras writes:</b> Between rightwing
frustration and leftwing euphoria, little has been written about the
complex and contradictory reality of Venezuela politics and the
specificities of President Chavez policies. Even less discussion has
focused on the division between ideological Washington and pragmatic Wall
Street, between the politics of confrontation and conciliation, and the
convergences and divergences between Venezuela and the rest of Latin
America. Both the right and left have substituted myths about the Chavez
government rather than confronting realities. <br><br>
</font><font face="georgia" size=4 color="#A80000">Rightwing Myths
<br><br>
</font><font face="georgia" size=2><b><u>Myth 1</u></b> -- Chavez is an
unpopular President who the rightwing opposition is capable of defeating
in the referendum. <br><br>
<b><u>Reality</u></b> -- The rightwing and its backers in Washington
miscalculated on several counts. First the weakest moment of the Chavez
government was right after the PDVSA executive lock-out <i>(December 2002
– February 2003)</i>, when oil prices were much lower, the economy was
devastated, the social welfare programs of the government were under
funded and grass roots political organizations were weak.
<ul>
<li>By the time the referendum took place <i>(August 2004)</i>, one and a
half years later, socio-economic and political conditions had
dramatically changed.</font>
</ul><font face="verdana" size=2><br>
</font><font face="georgia" size=2>The economy was growing by 12%, oil
prices were at record highs, social welfare expenditures were increasing
and their social impact was highly visible and widespread, and the mass
social organizations were deeply embedded in populous neighborhoods
throughout the country.<br><br>
<u>Clearly the initiative had passed from the right to the left, but both
the US and its opposition collaborators were blind to the
realities.<br><br>
</u>Having lost control over the state petroleum industry and allocation
of funds via the failed lockout in early 2003, having lost influence in
the military after the failed coup of April 2002, the opposition
possessed few resources to limit the government’s referendum campaign and
no leverage in launching a post election ‘civic-military’ coup.
<br><br>
<b><u>Myth 2</u></b> -- According to the rightwing analysts the
referendum was based on the issue of Chavez ‘popularity’, ‘personality’,
charisma and ‘autocratic’ style.<br><br>
In reality the referendum was based on class/race divisions.
Non-opposition trade union leaders indicated that over 85% of the working
class and working poor voted for Chavez, while preliminary reports on
voting in affluent neighborhoods and circumscriptions showed just the
reverse over 80% voting for the referendum.<br><br>
A similar process or class/race polarization was evident in the
extraordinary turnout and vote among poor Afro-Venezuelans: The higher
the turnout, the higher the vote for Chavez, as an unprecedented 71% of
the electorate voted. Clearly Chavez was successful in linking social
welfare programs, class allegiances to electoral behavior. <br><br>
<b><u>Myth 3</u></b> -- Among both the Right and Left there is a belief
that the mass media control mass voting behavior, limit political agendas
and necessarily lead to the victory of the Right and the domestication of
the Left.
<ul>
<li>In Venezuela the Right controlled 90% of the major television
networks and print media and most of the major radio stations. Yet the
referendum was crushed by an 18% margin <i>(59% to 41%)</i>.</font>
</ul><font face="verdana" size=2><br>
</font><font face="georgia" size=2>The results of the referendum
demonstrates that powerful grass roots organizations built around
successful struggles for social reforms can create a mass political and
social consciousness which can easily reject media
manipulation.<br><br>
Elite optimism in their ‘structural power’ -- money, media monopoly, and
backing by Washington -- blinded them to the fact that conscious
collective organization can be a formidable counterweight to elite
resources.<br><br>
Likewise referendum results refute the argument put forth by the
center-left that they lose elections because of the mass media. The
center-left justify embracing neo-liberalism to “neutralize” the mass
media during elections.<br><br>
<b>They refuse to recognize that elections can be won despite mass media
opposition if previous mass struggle and organization created mass social
consciousness. <br><br>
<u>Myth 4</u></b> -- According to many leftist journalists, Chavez
victory reflected a new wave of popular nationalist politics in Latin
America. Evidence to the contrary is abundant.<br><br>
Brazil under Lula has sold oil exploration rights to US and European
multinational corporations, provides a contingent of 1500 troops
<i>(along with Argentina, Chile etc)</i> to Haiti to stabilize
Washington’s puppet regime imposed through the kidnapping of
President-elect Aristide.
<ul>
<li>Likewise in the other Andean countries <i>(Ecuador, Peru, Bolivia and
Colombia)</i> the elected regimes propose to privatize public petroleum
companies, support ALCA and Plan Colombia and pay their foreign
debts.</font>
</ul><font face="verdana" size=2><br>
</font><font face="georgia" size=2>The Broad Front in Uruguay promises to
follow Brazil’s neo-liberal policies. While Chavez promotes the regional
trading bloc MERCOSUR, the major members Brazil and Argentina are
increasing their trade relations outside the region.<br><br>
In effect there is a bloc of neo-liberal regimes arrayed against Chavez’s
anti-imperialist policies and mass social movements. To the extent that
Chavez continues his independent foreign policy his principle allies are
the mass social movements and Cuba. <br><br>
<b><u>Myth 5</u></b> -- The defeat of the referendum was a major tactical
defeat of US imperialism and its local vassals. But a defeat of
imperialism does not necessarily mean or lead to a revolutionary
transformation, as post-Chavez post-election appeals to Washington and
big business demonstrate.<br><br>
More indicative of Chavez politics is the forthcoming $5 billion dollar
investment agreements with Texaco-Mobil and Exxon to exploit the Orinoco
gas and oil fields. The euphoria of the left prevents them from observing
the pendulum shifts in Chavez discourse and the heterodox social welfare
-- neo-liberal economic politics he has consistently practiced.
<br><br>
President Chavez’ policy has always followed a careful balancing act
between rejecting vassalage to the US and local oligarchic rentiers on
the one hand and trying to harness a coalition of foreign and national
investors, urban and rural poor to a program of welfare capitalism. He is
closer to Franklin Roosevelt’s New Deal than Castro’s socialist
revolution. In the aftermath of the three political crises -- the failed
civil-military coup, the debacle of the oil executives lock out, and the
defeat of the referendum -- Chavez offered to dialogue and reach a
consensus with the media barons, big business plutocrats and US
government, on the basis of the existing property relations, media
ownership and expanded relations with Washington. <br><br>
Chavez’ commitment to centrist-reformist policies explains why he did not
prosecute owners of the mass media who had openly called for the violent
overthrow of his government and also why he took no judicial action
against the association of the business leaders (Fedecamaras) who has
incited military rebellion and violent attacks on the constitutional
order.<br><br>
<b>In Europe, North America and many other regions,
democratically-elected governments would have arrested, and prosecuted
these elites for acts of violent subversion.<br><br>
</b>President Chavez has constantly reiterated that their property,
privileges and wealth is not in question. Moreover the fact that these
elites have been able to engage in three unconstitutional efforts to
overthrow the regime and still retain their class positions, strongly
suggest that President Chavez still conceives of their playing an
important role in his vision of development based on private-public
partnership and social welfare spending.<br><br>
After 5 years of government and after 3 major “class confrontations,” it
is evident that at least at the level of the government, there has been
no rupture in property or class relations and no break with foreign
creditors, investors or oil clients. Within the fiscal framework of
foreign debt payments, subsidies to private exporters, low-interest loans
to industrialists, the government has increased the allocation of state
spending for social programs in health, education housing,
micro-enterprises and agrarian reform.<br><br>
<b>The Venezuelan government can maintain this balance between big
business and the poor because of the high prices and revenue from
petroleum exports.<br><br>
</b>Like President Roosevelt, Chavez’s positive social welfare programs
attract millions of low income voters, but do not affect money income
levels, nor create large scale employment projects.
<ul>
<li>Unemployment is still in the vicinity of 20% and poverty levels still
remain over 50%.</font>
</ul><font face="verdana" size=2><br>
</font><font face="georgia" size=2>Comprehensive social spending has
positively affected the social lives of the poor but has not improved
their class position. Chavez is both confrontational and radical when his
rulership is threatened and conciliatory and moderate when he
successfully overcomes the challenge. <br><br>
<b><u>Myth 6</u></b> -- <b>The Left and Right have failed to recognize a
divergence of tactics between an ideological Washington and a pragmatic
Wall Street.<br><br>
</b>The US political class <i>(both Republican and Democrats, the
Presidency and Congress)</i> have been actively threatening, intervening
and supporting destructive lockouts, violent coups and a fraudulent
referendum to oust Chavez.<br><br>
In contrast the major US and European oil companies and banks have been
engaged in stable, sustained and profitable economic relations with the
Chavez government. Foreign creditors have received prompt and punctual
payments of billions of dollars in payments and have not spoken or acted
in a fashion to disrupt these lucrative transactions.<br><br>
Major US multi-national oil companies project between US$5 billion and
$20 billion in new investments in exploration and exploitation. No doubt
these MNCs would have liked the coup to succeed in order to monopolize
all Venezuelan oil revenue, but perceiving the failures of Washington
they are content to share part of the oil wealth with the Chavez
regime.<br><br>
The tactical divergences between Washington and Wall Street are likely to
narrow as the Venezuelan government moves into the new conciliatory phase
toward Fedecamaras and Washington. Given Washington’s defeat in the
referendum, and the big oil deals with key US multinationals, it is
likely that Washington will seek a temporary ‘truce’ until new, more
favorable circumstances emerge.
<ul>
<li>It will be interesting to see how this possible “truce” will affect
Venezuela’s critical foreign policy. </font>
</ul><font face="verdana" size=2><br>
</font><font face="georgia" size=2><b><u>Myth 7</u></b> -- The main
thrust of the current phase of Chavez revolution is a moral crusade
against government corruption and a highly politicized judicial system
tightly aligned with the discredited political opposition. For many on
the Left, the radical content of the ‘No’ vote campaign was rooted in the
proliferation of community based mass organizations, the mobilization of
trade union assemblies, and the decentralized democratic process of voter
involvement based on promises of future consequential social changes in
terms of jobs, income and popular political power.
<ul>
<li>Moralization campaigns <i>(anti-corruption)</i> are commonly
associated with middle class politics designed to create “national unity”
and usually weaken class solidarity.</font>
</ul><font face="verdana" size=2><br>
</font><font face="georgia" size=2>The Left’s belief that the mass
organizations mobilized for the referendum will necessarily become a
basis for a ‘new popular democracy’ has little basis in the recent past
<i>(similar mobilizations took place prior to the failed coup and during
the bosses’ lockout)</i>. Nor do government-sponsored moralization
campaigns attract much interest among the poor in Venezuela or
elsewhere.<br><br>
<b>Moreover the focus of the <i>Chavista</i> political leaders is on the
forthcoming elections for parliament, not in creating alternative sources
of governance.<br><br>
</b>The Left’s facile projection of popular mobilization into the
post-referendum period creates a political mythology, which fails to
recognize the internal contradictions of the political process in
Venezuela. <br><br>
</font><font face="georgia" size=5 color="#A80000">Conclusion <br>
</font><font face="georgia" size=2>The massive popular victory of the
‘No’ vote in the Venezuelan referendum gave hope and inspiration to
hundreds of millions in Latin America and elsewhere, that US-backed
oligarchies can be defeated at the ballot box.
<ul>
<li>The fact that the favorable voting outcome was recognized by the OAS,
Carter and Washington is a tribute to President Chavez strategic changes
in the military, guaranteeing the honoring of the constitutional
outcome.</font>
</ul><font face="verdana" size=2><br>
</font><font face="georgia" size=2>At a deeper level of analysis, the
conceptions and perceptions of the major antagonists among the Right and
the Left however are open to criticism: The Right for underestimating the
political and institutional support for Chavez in the current conjuncture
and the Left for projecting an overly radical vision on the direction of
politics in the post-referendum period. <br><br>
From a ‘realist’ position, we can conclude that the Chavez government
will proceed with his “New Deal” social welfare programs while deepening
ties with major foreign and domestic investors ... his ability to balance
classes, leaning in one direction or the other will depend on the
continued flow of high returns from oil revenues. If oil prices drop,
hard choices will have to be made -- class choices.<br><br>
</font><font face="georgia" size=5>James Petras<br>
<a href="mailto:jpetras@binghamton.edu">jpetras@binghamton.edu</a><br><br>
<br>
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