[News] Venezuela: Final Report on the August 15 recall
News at freedomarchives.org
News at freedomarchives.org
Wed Oct 13 15:03:31 EDT 2004
Gaviria's Final Report on the August 15 recall referendum; an opposition coup?
<http://www.vheadline.com/readnews.asp?id=23112>http://www.vheadline.com/readnews.asp?id=23112
VHeadline.com guest commentarist Glen Forbes writes: The Venezuelan
opposition has good reason to be pleased with Gaviria's Final Report.
It manages in a 47-page narration of the events leading up to, during and
after the Organization of American States (OAS) involvement in Venezuela to
portray them in ... to those who have been following events in Venezuela
and those of us who have lived and are still living through it ... an
overly generous light.
Part I -- Antecedents:
His best service, in this regard, is perhaps at the start of his report,
where the short-lived coup d'etat is blamed entirely on a group of military
officers. There is no mention of civilian participation ... not in the
planning and execution, nor in the swearing-in of Carmona.
Gaviria also, naturally, fails to mention the infighting that went on as
the political parties and sundry personalities jockeyed for positions of
power in the new administration, with the losers backing out of the process
altogether when they realized that they would be worse off than they were.
No mention of the media boasting of their contribution to the coup, nor of
the amount of champagne and whisky that flowed in certain sections of
Caracas on news of the fait accompli ... however hasty this celebration
subsequently turned out to be.
Not content with this outrageous whitewashing of their involvement, he then
credits the opposition with contributing to the overthrow of Carmona ...
giving them equal weight with the numerous supporters of President Chavez
who came out on to the streets and the cadre of constitutional military
officers who were instrumental in thwarting the coup.
He then goes on to give the opposition and the government equal political
weight, despite the government's clear electoral majority in the elections
in the year 2000, and the opposition's charges more weight still.
The President is then described as contrite and willing to reach out, and
therefore to blame for what Gaviria likes to call a constitutional lapse,
while the Opposition is said to be likewise disposed, though by implication
clearly provoked.<http://www.vheadline.com/readnews.asp?id=23112#[1]> [1]
Gaviria then goes on to state that he is worried by the fact that certain
sectors (unnamed) are distancing themselves from the constitutional path,
while in the very next sentence justifying their actions by repeating their
claims that there is a clear lack of independence between the organs of the
state and an inadequate balance of power.
<http://www.vheadline.com/readnews.asp?id=23112#[2]>[2]
He then goes on to list the opposition's grievances, starting with their
claims of Human Rights violations (no details), the Bolivarian Circles
(grass-root organizational groups based mainly in the shantytowns) which
are ... on the opposition's say so ... Circles of Terror.
The opposition has documented evidence of these groups congregating in
front of their TV stations and confronting reporters with what they claim
is overt intimidation. The demonstrators cry: "Digan La Verdad" (Tell the
truth) is portrayed as a threat to their freedom of expression.
Additionally the President's frequent nationally televised transmitions are
deemed excessive. And as if this were not enough, he then mentions the
opposition's outrage in that they are not able to dominate the National
Assembly (AN) despite their minority of seats.
Hardly enough to justify a coup one might think.
<http://www.vheadline.com/readnews.asp?id=23112#[3]>[3]
Gaviria then mentions that he fears a second coup ... something that thanks
to the Democratic Charter can no longer be accepted nor ignored by the OAS.
This would seem to contradict the report's claim that the opposition is
strictly democratic in nature, since what is at risk is the constitutional
continuity of the country due to their intransigence.
Part II -- The Negotiation Table:
The Report then goes on to outline the setting-up and the agreements
reached at the Negotiation Table.
<http://www.vheadline.com/readnews.asp?id=23112#[4]>[4]
It starts with the signing of the Declaration for Peace and Democracy, in
which the parties agreed to hold talks, renounce violence, respect the
Constitution and ask the OAS the Carter Center and the United Nations
Development Program (UNDP) to facilitate the talks.
The talks got underway on November 8, 2002, and were finalized 6 months
later on May 29, 2003, with an agreement to hold a referendum as provided
for in the Constitution.
During this period the opposition
<http://www.vheadline.com/readnews.asp?id=23112#[5]>[5] pulled out all the
stops in an attempt to steamroll the government into either stepping down
or accepting early elections. Among them are the collection of signatures
calling for a referendum before the date established in the Constitution,
the call by military officers to depose the President, the concocted oil
strike (managers only) and a hair-raising media propaganda campaign.
It was only the failure of these attempts that finally forced them to sign
the agreement. Of all these events Gaviria only expresses concern over the
actions of the military.
Part III -- The signature collection process:
The collection of the signatures to activate the recall referendum turned
out to be perhaps the part of the process most fraught with controversy.
The designation of the directors of the National Elections Council (CNE) by
the Supreme Tribunal of Justice (TSJ) ... given the inability of the
National Assembly to reach a consensus on the 5th member is accurate ...
and the opposition's initial approval (it was not to last very long) of the
TSJ's choice is mentioned.
The report starts with an appreciation of the signature collection process
(4 days long), which it qualifies as calm, ordered and transparent. It then
signals the disturbance caused by President Chavez on the last day of the
signature collection process in which he claimed that there had been a
Mega-fraud.
It may be helpful at this stage to backtrack a bit and take a wider view of
the signature collection process as a whole.
It should be remembered that referendums, particularly for elected
officials, let alone the President is something new and therefore untried.
The Constitution is almost too brief on the subject, it merely mentions in
Article 72 that all elected officials are subject to a recall referendum
once they have reached the halfway point of their mandate if 20% of the
electorate solicit it. How this is to come about, and who will organize,
supervise and validate the process is unclear. In the event the opposition
took it upon themselves to decide just how the Constitution should be
interpreted and applied, to the extent of conducting two self-initiated
signature collection processes of dubious validity which were subsequently
ruled invalid.
With the designation of the new CNE, norms governing the referendum were
established which allowed the process to proceed. The norms gave the CNE a
supervisory role in the collection facet of the process, a decisive role in
the verification facet yet left the collection and handing in of the
signatures to the petitioners.
The norms also allowed 12.5% of the collection forms to circulate ... that
is, to leave the collection tables in order to cater to the bedridden. They
also established that the verification stage was to be no longer than 30 days.
The number of forms (each had space for 10 signatures) at each collection
table was decided on by the petitioners. The instructions handed out to the
signature collectors stated that each person had to fill-out in their own
hand their Identity Number, Name, Signature and add their thumbprint and a
note was to accompany each form in which assistance was given, stating the
reason.
The problems started early, with the private media solidly in the
opposition's corner giving massive coverage to collection tables in known
opposition strongholds, regular reports of signature forms running out, all
the circulating forms returning filled in and an estimated similar number
of non-circulating forms were also circulating and being filled in.
Additionally ineligible voters such as foreigners and the under aged were
also signing, as were the dead.
The collection forms were then, at the end of the four-day collection
period, removed by the opposition to their verification center where they
were (according to them) copied and checked, after which they were then
handed in -- 19 days later, a few days before the stipulated 30-day
validation process which was to be conducted by the CNE was up.
Claims of fraud by the government and of delays by the opposition were a
daily occurrence during this period.
When the CNE was finally able to start the verification process it came
upon a series of what they considered irregularities that had not been
foreseen or clearly specified in the norms covering the referendum.
One of the most controversial was that of the forms filled in by what
appeared to be the same hand without an accompanying note stating the
reason. There were thousands of these forms in which all ten lines had been
filled-in this fashion, with a substantial number of them with likewise
similar signatures. Though the instructions to the signature collectors had
been very clear on this point, the norms covering the referendum did not
specify this as a reason to invalidate the form.
It is pertinent at this point to indicate that due to longstanding problems
at the Direccion Nacional de Identificacion (DIEX) ... the department
responsible for issuing Identification Documents & Passports ... that a
check on the correspondence of ID numbers and signatures was almost
impossible.
The report goes on to state that the OAS estimated that some 3,127,596
signatures had been collected ... without taking into account the
circulating signature forms, though these signatures had as yet, the OAS
admits, to be validated. He then states that there were difficulties
(though overcome) at first, in obtaining the total access that they deemed
necessary to a proper observation.
As the number of irregularities observed in many forms increased, and the
CNE struggled to deal with them, both the Carter Center and the OAS
publicly stated that in their opinion the will of the signers/citizens
should be given preference over what they called excessive technicalities.
The CNE in an attempt to limit potential fraud, decided to send not just
the forms in which similar signatures were apparent, but also those with
similar handwriting (names, numbers) and those where the handwriting of the
witnesses also appeared to be similar, to the repair process. The repair
process was originally conceived to allow those who had not signed to
withdraw their signatures, since the only verification that the CNE was
able to apply was to check that the signers appeared in the electoral
register.
At this stage the OAS and the Carter Center proposed a statistical solution
to the problem of the numerous similar forms. It consisted in choosing a
representative sample of signers, locating them, obtaining a sample of
their thumbprint and signature and comparing this with those on the
questioned forms. The CNE rejected this solution alleging that the margin
of error was too large in what looked to be a close referendum, and as such
would only intensify the controversy.
Despite the CNE's rejection of this proposal the OAS and the Carter Center
decided to make a public statement in which they insisted on the advantages
of their proposal, regretted that the CNE had rejected it and then,
unbelievably, reminded the population of their right to protest in a
democracy, in what has remained to this day a very controversial decision.
There is no doubt in my mind that the opposition's strategy consisted in
trying to overwhelm the CNE and have them, under pressure of the Carter
Center and the OAS acknowledge far more signatures than the opposition had,
putting them in the driver's seat come the referendum. Violence again
breaks out on a very localized scale, though not for want of
trying. Gaviria again expresses concern in his report, while attributing
it to the intransigence of the CNE.
There is no mention of the fact that there were many among the opposition
that felt that they would not be able to revalidate the necessary
signatures and were therefore looking for a shortcut. Talks among both
parties were again necessary in order to allow the process to reach the
repair stage. Gaviria qualifies the repair process as calm and ordered.
The final results of the verification process were as follows:
Valid 1,910,965
Invalid 375,241
Subject to repair 1,192,914
Total needed to activate the referendum:
20% of registered voters 2,436,083
Repaired signatures: 614,968
Final valid signatures after repair: 2,451,821
Part IV The Referendum
Gaviria begins his report of the referendum stage with the invitation that
the CNE extended to them as observers. He mentions that Valter Pecly
Moreira is to be in charge of the mission, a decision made in consultation
with the CNE and which he says is due to the interest Brazil has shown in
helping out.
He fails to mention that Fernando Jaramillo, the previous mission head was
no longer acceptable to the CNE due to what they considered definite bias
on his part.
He mentions that the CNE had serious reservations about extending an
invitation to the Carter Center and the OAS and that he had had to assure
the CNE of their impartiality. He also mentions some of the restrictions
that the CNE were considering in order to maintain the appropriate distance
between the roles of the CNE and the observers.
There was however more at stake than their impartiality. The Carter Center
and the OAS were in danger of assuming the functions of the CNE
<http://www.vheadline.com/readnews.asp?id=23112#[6]>[6], at least in the
eyes of many in the opposition who had waged a campaign to discredit the
CNE and place their own electoral arbiter, or failing that the OAS. and the
Carter Center in its place. I am referring of course to Sumate (an NGO
founded by the opposition which was created to promote the referendum).
Gaviria then mentions the steps taken by the CNE to prepare for the
referendum, the norms which he qualifies as very detailed, that were
brought into force to regulate the process, the formulation of the
referendum question, which he quotes and the procedures that were to be
followed at the voting tables.
He then mentions that the decision to purchase the electronic voting
machines from the consortium SBC (which consists of the companies
Smartmatic, Bizta and CANTV) was very strongly criticized by the opposition
due to the lack of transparency in the process. This claim of a lack of
transparency is due to the fact that the CNE chose what they considered to
be the best bid as opposed to the cheapest, as they had full authority to do.
He further mentions that the government had a 30% share stake, which he
says had not been made public .. clearly branding the purchase as
controversial.
He does not mention if this stake is in the consortium or if it is in one
of the companies that are part of it. In the event it turned out that it
was in Bizta. The Ministry of Science & Technology had a 28% stake as part
of an incentive program for small technological companies. The transaction
of US$200,000 was in the form of loan-for-shares guarantee project. Bizta
paid back the loan and that was that.
He goes on to mention the number of members of the OAS observation team and
the countries they were from ... 55 observers from the Americas, plus
observers from Spain, Norway and Japan. The core of the team consisted of
12 experts in what he terms "areas of particular importance" in the
observation of the referendum. 17 sub-observation centers were established
around the country which liaised with the main center in Caracas.
Gaviria identifies the electronic voting component of the referendum as a
key area due to the proportion of votes that were to be cast in this way.
Not all voting was to be via electronic voting machines ... sparsely
populated areas of the country, and those lacking or with poor
communications voted manually.
He mentions their interaction with both the CNE and the service providers
in their evaluation of the methodology, software and hardware to be used in
the referendum as well as their presence during the live testing of the
equipment and software that took place.
Not mentioned, though present at these tests, were the Carter Center and
witnesses for the opposition and those for the government.
Gaviria pronounces himself satisfied with the results of these tests,
qualifying them as accurate and secure.
On the day of the referendum the OAS observers were in place in 20 of the
22 states. He mentions that due to logistical problems and the low
population in the States of Delta Amacuro and Amazonas they were left out.
Observation started at 5.30 a.m., all observers were provided with the
means of communicating individually or en masse with all the other
observers. He notes that the voting proceeded normally, freely and without
obstacles though the lines were extremely long. By 9.30 a.m., 95% of all
voting tables were operating normally. Initial delay in some of the tables
was due to the absence of many of the operators of the fingerprint machines.
He attributes the delay to the massive turn out, which overwhelmed the
capacity of the voting centers coupled with the inevitable confusion caused
by the implementation of a new system.
The delays in voting, the extension of the voting centers closing time, and
the problems with the fingerprint machines produced he says a climate of
distrust that was not alleviated by the quick results.
What he does not say is that the climate of distrust was solely among those
of the opposition, fuelled by a steady diet of fear mongering by the
private media in which the problems with the fingerprint machines, the
delays and even the extension of the voting centers closing time were
construed as some sort of nebulous plot to alter the results.
* Gaviria then reports that, in several cases, people did not appear in
the voting lists despite bearing documentation that they should have.
He does not mention numbers. He mentions that the military, in charge of
the security at voting centers were on occasion overzealous in their
identity checks of those requiring or requesting access (the State of
Zulia) and that in some instances they were forced to take over certain
functions (e.g. briefing voters) due to missing voting center personnel.
Voting closing time was extended to 8:00 p.m. and finally until 12:00 a.m.
Voting closing procedures were followed as per instructions.
He dedicates a whole subsection to the voting in Miami (USA) having been
asked by the CNE to include observers in what is almost a second home for
many Venezuelans. The voting there proceeded normally, with witnesses from
both sides on hand as were the International and Venezuelan Press. He
mentions the peaceful demonstration at the voting center of one of the
tendencies (no prizes for guessing which) and the complaint by the
opposition that the rules precluded those without legal status in the USA
from voting.
He goes on to talk about the transmission and totalizing stages, in which
he says that it proceeded normally, that it was adequately audited and as
such preserved the confidentiality and integrity of each vote. Totals at
manual centers were scanned and then transmitted to the CNE. The OAS used
the quick count at voting centers and its participation in the audit to be
able to confirm this.
He then deals with the tools used to evaluate the transparency of the
electoral process. He mentions their quick count which they conducted on a
primary and secondary sample and the 3 audits conducted by the CNE in which
they participated in the first and third.
The first audit to be conducted on behalf of the CNE by Interideas was
originally envisaged to evaluate 1% of the electronic voting machines in a
random sample. The international observers and those of the opposition and
the government were invited at 4.30 p.m. on the day of the election to
witness the drawing of the random sample. Late closing caused some problems
and in the end 194 machines were audited. The OAS, due to their focus on
the quick count, were unable to be present at all of them. The results
however confirmed both the CNE numbers and those of the quick count.
The second audit was conducted between August 18 and 22. Proposed by the
Carter Center and the OAS in an attempt to allay the fears of the
opposition (who despite the urging of the international observers refused
to accept the results) this audit was accepted by the CNE and organized in
the following manner.
- A sample of 150 voting centers would be chosen at random, to be witnessed
by the Carter Center, the OAS. and opposition and government observers.
- The signed voting totals (at the CNE) would be, under the eyes of the
same witnesses, removed from their envelopes and kept in custody by the
witnesses at the CNE.
- The totals printed out by each electronic voting machine chosen and the
paper receipts of each which were at 24 military centers (one for each
state) would be brought to Caracas under custody of the Witnesses.
The first step was to send the witnesses to each of the 24 military
centers, where they waited for the results of the random sample of voting
centers to be chosen. The boxes were then identified and sent to Caracas in
the custody of the witnesses.
The signed voting totals, printed totals and the paper receipts were then
compared.
The outcome confirmed the CNE results, as such both the Carter Center and
the OAS again urged the opposition to accept them.
<http://www.vheadline.com/readnews.asp?id=23112#[7]>[7]
In order to recall President Chavez the opposition had not only to get more
votes against his mandate than were cast in his favor but also exceed the
number of votes that he had in the year 2000 Presidential Elections. In the
event the government received 5,800,629 votes (59%) and the opposition
3,989,008 (41%). Apart from a partial list of the Opposition's claims for
fraud and a series of recommendations for future referendums the report
effectively ends here.
The list of fraud allegations is as Gaviria hints weak, the full list
without any substantiation consists of over a thousand grievances ranging
from the long voting lines to (curiously enough) the extension of voting times.
One can't but help feel that the opposition .. now in total disarray ... is
not only anxious to deflect criticism but to lay the basis of some future
action based on an alleged fraud.
Glen Forbes
<mailto:glenforbes at cantv.net>glenforbes at cantv.net
[1] This professed willingness on their part lasted only as long as it
took the Supreme Court to rule that there had not been a coup, lifting the
specter of judicial proceedings.
[2] As in so many of the claims of the opposition, Venezuela, its
institutions and its functionaries are portrayed as models of democratic
ideals and pulchritude, that is, before Chavez.
[3] Not perhaps in other latitudes, but more than enough when long
established privileges are at stake.
[4] It is interesting to note just how much at odds were the goals of the
government and the opposition. The opposition were initially hoping that
the OAS would declare the government in breach of the Democratic Charter
and either force them to leave office or at the very least push them to
hold anticipated elections. The government were hoping that the presence of
the OAS would avoid another coup and force the opposition to follow the
Constitution.
[5] The composition of the opposition and the relationship between them is
subject of much debate. The Coordinadora Democratica: the most visible of
the opposition groups and the one that signed the agreement, is composed of
the main political parties and politicized civil organizations opposed to
the government, The Bloque Democratico: a much more radical grouping who
split from the Coordinadora Democratica who they consider spineless, and
powerful local interests (exemplified by the Media), then we have a cadre
of coup-mongering military officers, the Miami contingent who are known to
have close links to exiled Cuban anti-Castro groups and the inevitable
international meddlers of always, all tend to liaise on different levels
while quick to deny links, knowledge or even in some cases the existence of
many of these organizations.
[6] In the event the opposition publicly claimed that they would refuse to
acknowledge results that were not vouched for by the OAS and the Carter
Center. (Adverse results I imagine).
[7] Despite their previous claim that they would only accept the results
if vouched for by the OAS and the Carter Center the opposition refused, and
still refuses, to accept the results. They withdrew from the third audit
claiming it was not broad enough. (I think it was to avoid having to accept
the results, which in private, though not in public, they admitted would
not be in their favor).
The Freedom Archives
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San Francisco, CA 94110
(415) 863-9977
www.freedomarchives.org
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