<html>
<body>
<font size=3><br>
</font><font face="georgia" size=5 color="#A80000">Gaviria’s Final Report
on the August 15 recall referendum; an opposition coup?<br><br>
</font><font face="Arial, Helvetica" size=4 color="#A80000"><a href="http://www.vheadline.com/readnews.asp?id=23112">http://www.vheadline.com/readnews.asp?id=23112</a><br><br>
</font><font face="georgia" size=2><b>VHeadline.com guest commentarist
Glen Forbes writes:</b> The Venezuelan opposition has good reason to be
pleased with Gaviria’s Final Report.<br><br>
It manages in a 47-page narration of the events leading up to, during and
after the Organization of American States (OAS) involvement in Venezuela
to portray them in ... to those who have been following events in
Venezuela and those of us who have lived and are still living through it
... an overly generous light. <br><br>
</font><font face="georgia" size=4><u>Part I -- Antecedents:<br><br>
</u></font><font face="georgia" size=2>His best service, in this regard,
is perhaps at the start of his report, where the short-lived coup d'etat
is blamed entirely on a group of military officers. There is no mention
of civilian participation ... not in the planning and execution, nor in
the swearing-in of Carmona.<br><br>
Gaviria also, naturally, fails to mention the infighting that went on as
the political parties and sundry personalities jockeyed for positions of
power in the new administration, with the losers backing out of the
process altogether when they realized that they would be worse off than
they were.<br><br>
No mention of the media boasting of their contribution to the coup, nor
of the amount of champagne and whisky that flowed in certain sections of
Caracas on news of the <i>fait accompli</i> ... however hasty this
celebration subsequently turned out to be. <br><br>
Not content with this outrageous whitewashing of their involvement, he
then credits the opposition with contributing to the overthrow of Carmona
... giving them equal weight with the numerous supporters of President
Chavez who came out on to the streets and the cadre of constitutional
military officers who were instrumental in thwarting the coup. <br><br>
<b>He then goes on to give the opposition and the government equal
political weight, despite the government's clear electoral majority in
the elections in the year 2000, and the opposition’s charges more weight
still. <br><br>
</b>The President is then described as contrite and willing to reach out,
and therefore to blame for what Gaviria likes to call a constitutional
lapse, while the Opposition is said to be likewise disposed, though by
implication clearly
provoked.<a href="http://www.vheadline.com/readnews.asp?id=23112#[1]">
[1] </a><br><br>
Gaviria then goes on to state that he is worried by the fact that certain
sectors <i>(unnamed)</i> are distancing themselves from the
constitutional path, while in the very next sentence justifying their
actions by repeating their claims that there is a clear lack of
independence between the organs of the state and an inadequate balance of
power. <a href="http://www.vheadline.com/readnews.asp?id=23112#[2]">[2]
</a><br><br>
He then goes on to list the opposition's grievances, starting with their
claims of Human Rights violations <i>(no details)</i>, the Bolivarian
Circles <i>(grass-root organizational groups based mainly in the
shantytowns)</i> which are ... on the opposition's say so ... Circles of
Terror.<br><br>
The opposition has documented evidence of these groups congregating in
front of their TV stations and confronting reporters with what they claim
is overt intimidation. The demonstrators cry: <i>“Digan La Verdad” (Tell
the truth)</i> is portrayed as a threat to their freedom of
expression.<br><br>
Additionally the President’s frequent nationally televised transmitions
are deemed excessive. And as if this were not enough, he then mentions
the opposition’s outrage in that they are not able to dominate the
National Assembly (AN) despite their minority of seats. <br><br>
</font><font face="georgia" size=4>Hardly enough to justify a coup one
might think.</font><font face="georgia" size=2>
<a href="http://www.vheadline.com/readnews.asp?id=23112#[3]">[3]
</a><br><br>
Gaviria then mentions that he fears a second coup ... something that
thanks to the Democratic Charter can no longer be accepted nor ignored by
the OAS. This would seem to contradict the report’s claim that the
opposition is strictly democratic in nature, since what is at risk is the
constitutional continuity of the country due to their intransigence.
<br><br>
</font><font face="georgia" size=4><u>Part II -- The Negotiation
Table:<br><br>
</u></font><font face="georgia" size=2>The Report then goes on to outline
the setting-up and the agreements reached at the Negotiation Table.
<a href="http://www.vheadline.com/readnews.asp?id=23112#[4]">[4]
</a><br><br>
</font>
<dl>
<dd>It starts with the signing of the Declaration for Peace and
Democracy, in which the parties agreed to hold talks, renounce violence,
respect the Constitution and ask the OAS the Carter Center and the United
Nations Development Program (UNDP) to facilitate the talks. <br><br>
</dl><font face="georgia" size=2><b>The talks got underway on November 8,
2002, and were finalized 6 months later on May 29, 2003, with an
agreement to hold a referendum as provided for in the
Constitution.<br><br>
</b></font><font face="georgia" size=3>During this period the opposition
<a href="http://www.vheadline.com/readnews.asp?id=23112#[5]">[5]</a>
pulled out all the stops in an attempt to steamroll the government into either stepping down or accepting early elections. Among them are the collection of signatures calling for a referendum <b><u>before</u></b> the date established in the Constitution, the call by military officers to depose the President, the concocted oil strike <i>(managers only)</i> and a hair-raising media propaganda campaign.<br><br>
It was only the failure of these attempts that finally forced them to sign the agreement. Of all these events Gaviria only expresses concern over the actions of the military.<br><br>
</font><font face="georgia" size=4><u>Part III -- The signature collection process:<br><br>
</u></font><font face="georgia" size=3>The collection of the signatures to activate the recall referendum turned out to be perhaps the part of the process most fraught with controversy. <br><br>
The designation of the directors of the National Elections Council (CNE) by the Supreme Tribunal of Justice (TSJ) ... given the inability of the National Assembly to reach a consensus on the 5th member is accurate ... and the opposition’s initial approval <i>(it was not to last very long)</i> of the TSJ's choice is mentioned. <br><br>
The report starts with an appreciation of the signature collection process <i>(4 days long)</i>, which it qualifies as calm, ordered and transparent. It then signals the disturbance caused by President Chavez on the last day of the signature collection process in which he claimed that there had been a Mega-fraud. <br><br>
</font><font face="georgia" size=2><b>It may be helpful at this stage to backtrack a bit and take a wider view of the signature collection process as a whole. <br><br>
</b></font><font face="georgia" size=3>It should be remembered that referendums, particularly for elected officials, let alone the President is something new and therefore untried. The Constitution is almost too brief on the subject, it merely mentions in Article 72 that all elected officials are subject to a recall referendum once they have reached the halfway point of their mandate if 20% of the electorate solicit it. How this is to come about, and who will organize, supervise and validate the process is unclear. In the event the opposition took it upon themselves to decide just how the Constitution should be interpreted and applied, to the extent of conducting two self-initiated signature collection processes of dubious validity which were subsequently ruled invalid. <br><br>
With the designation of the new CNE, norms governing the referendum were established which allowed the process to proceed. The norms gave the CNE a supervisory role in the collection facet of the process, a decisive role in the verification facet yet left the collection and handing in of the signatures to the petitioners. <br><br>
</font>
<dl>
<dd>The norms also allowed 12.5% of the collection forms to circulate ... that is, to leave the collection tables in order to cater to the bedridden. They also established that the verification stage was to be no longer than 30 days. <br><br>
</dl>The number of forms (each had space for 10 signatures)</i> at each collection table was decided on by the petitioners. The instructions handed out to the signature collectors stated that each person had to fill-out in their own hand their Identity Number, Name, Signature and add their thumbprint and a note was to accompany each form in which assistance was given, stating the reason. <br><br>
The problems started early, with the private media solidly in the opposition’s corner giving massive coverage to collection tables in known opposition strongholds, regular reports of signature forms running out, all the circulating forms returning filled in and an estimated similar number of non-circulating forms were also circulating and being filled in. Additionally ineligible voters such as foreigners and the under aged were also signing, as were the dead. <br><br>
The collection forms were then, at the end of the four-day collection period, removed by the opposition to their verification center where they were (according to them) copied and checked, after which they were then handed in -- 19 days later, a few days before the stipulated 30-day validation process which was to be conducted by the CNE was up. <br><br>
<font face="georgia" size=2>Claims of fraud by the government and of delays by the opposition were a daily occurrence during this period. <br><br>
</b></font><font face="georgia" size=3>When the CNE was finally able to start the verification process it came upon a series of what they considered irregularities that had not been foreseen or clearly specified in the norms covering the referendum. <br><br>
One of the most controversial was that of the forms filled in by what appeared to be the same hand without an accompanying note stating the reason. There were thousands of these forms in which all ten lines had been filled-in this fashion, with a substantial number of them with likewise similar signatures. Though the instructions to the signature collectors had been very clear on this point, the norms covering the referendum did not specify this as a reason to invalidate the form. <br><br>
</font><font face="georgia" size=2>It is pertinent at this point to indicate that due to longstanding problems at the Direccion Nacional de Identificacion (DIEX) ... the department responsible for issuing Identification Documents & Passports ... that a check on the correspondence of ID numbers and signatures was almost impossible. <br><br>
</b></font><font face="georgia" size=3>The report goes on to state that the OAS estimated that some 3,127,596 signatures had been collected ... without taking into account the circulating signature forms, though these signatures had as yet, the OAS admits, to be validated. He then states that there were difficulties (though overcome)</i> at first, in obtaining the total access that they deemed necessary to a proper observation. <br><br>
<dl>
<dd>As the number of irregularities observed in many forms increased, and the CNE struggled to deal with them, both the Carter Center and the OAS publicly stated that in their opinion the will of the signers/citizens should be given preference over what they called excessive technicalities. <br><br>
</dl>The CNE in an attempt to limit potential fraud, decided to send not just the forms in which similar signatures were apparent, but also those with similar handwriting (names, numbers)</i> and those where the handwriting of the witnesses also appeared to be similar, to the repair process. The repair process was originally conceived to allow those who had not signed to withdraw their signatures, since the only verification that the CNE was able to apply was to check that the signers appeared in the electoral register. <br><br>
At this stage the OAS and the Carter Center proposed a statistical solution to the problem of the numerous similar forms. It consisted in choosing a representative sample of signers, locating them, obtaining a sample of their thumbprint and signature and comparing this with those on the questioned forms. The CNE rejected this solution alleging that the margin of error was too large in what looked to be a close referendum, and as such would only intensify the controversy. <br><br>
Despite the CNE’s rejection of this proposal the OAS and the Carter Center decided to make a public statement in which they insisted on the advantages of their proposal, regretted that the CNE had rejected it and then, unbelievably, reminded the population of their right to protest in a democracy, in what has remained to this day a very controversial decision. <br><br>
There is no doubt in my mind that the opposition’s strategy consisted in trying to overwhelm the CNE and have them, under pressure of the Carter Center and the OAS acknowledge far more signatures than the opposition had, putting them in the driver's seat come the referendum. Violence again breaks out on a very localized scale, though not for want of trying. Gaviria again expresses concern in his report, while attributing it to the intransigence of the CNE. <br><br>
There is no mention of the fact that there were many among the opposition that felt that they would not</u></b> be able to revalidate the necessary signatures and were therefore looking for a shortcut. Talks among both parties were again necessary in order to allow the process to reach the repair stage. Gaviria qualifies the repair process as calm and ordered. <br><br>
</font><font face="georgia" size=2>The final results of the verification process were as follows: <br>
</font><div align="center"><font face="arial" size=2 color="#000080">Valid 1,910,965<br>
Invalid 375,241<br>
Subject to repair 1,192,914<br>
Total needed to activate the referendum: <br>
20% of registered voters</b></font><font size=3> </font><font face="arial" size=2 color="#000080">2,436,083<br>
Repaired signatures: 614,968<br>
Final valid signatures after repair: 2,451,821<br><br>
</b></font></div>
<font face="georgia" size=4>Part IV The Referendum <br><br>
</u></font><font face="georgia" size=3>Gaviria begins his report of the referendum stage with the invitation that the CNE extended to them as observers. He mentions that Valter Pecly Moreira is to be in charge of the mission, a decision made in consultation with the CNE and which he says is due to the interest Brazil has shown in helping out. <br><br>
</font><font face="georgia" size=2>He fails to mention that Fernando Jaramillo, the previous mission head was no longer acceptable to the CNE due to what they considered definite bias on his part. <br><br>
</b></font><font face="georgia" size=3>He mentions that the CNE had serious reservations about extending an invitation to the Carter Center and the OAS and that he had had to assure the CNE of their impartiality. He also mentions some of the restrictions that the CNE were considering in order to maintain the appropriate distance between the roles of the CNE and the observers. <br><br>
There was however more at stake than their impartiality. The Carter Center and the OAS were in danger of assuming the functions of the CNE <a href="http://www.vheadline.com/readnews.asp?id=23112#[6]">[6]</a>, at least in the eyes of many in the opposition who had waged a campaign to discredit the CNE and place their own electoral arbiter, or failing that the OAS. and the Carter Center in its place. I am referring of course to Sumate (an NGO founded by the opposition which was created to promote the referendum)</i>. <br><br>
Gaviria then mentions the steps taken by the CNE to prepare for the referendum, the norms which he qualifies as very detailed, that were brought into force to regulate the process, the formulation of the referendum question, which he quotes and the procedures that were to be followed at the voting tables. <br><br>
He then mentions that the decision to purchase the electronic voting machines from the consortium SBC (which consists of the companies Smartmatic, Bizta and CANTV)</i> was very strongly criticized by the opposition due to the lack of transparency in the process. This claim of a lack of transparency is due to the fact that the CNE chose what they considered to be the best bid as opposed to the cheapest, as they had full authority to do. <br><br>
</font><font face="georgia" size=2>He further mentions that the government had a 30% share stake, which he says had not been made public .. clearly branding the purchase as controversial. <br><br>
</b></font>
<dl>
<dd><font face="georgia" size=3>He does not</u></b> mention if this stake is in the consortium or if it is in one of the companies that are part of it. In the event it turned out that it was in Bizta. The Ministry of Science & Technology had a 28% stake as part of an incentive program for small technological companies. The transaction of US$200,000 was in the form of loan-for-shares guarantee project. Bizta paid back the loan and that was that. <br><br>
</u>
</dl>He goes on to mention the number of members of the OAS observation team and the countries they were from ... 55 observers from the Americas, plus observers from Spain, Norway and Japan. The core of the team consisted of 12 experts in what he terms "areas of particular importance" in the observation of the referendum. 17 sub-observation centers were established around the country which liaised with the main center in Caracas. <br><br>
Gaviria identifies the electronic voting component of the referendum as a key area due to the proportion of votes that were to be cast in this way. Not all voting was to be via electronic voting machines ... sparsely populated areas of the country, and those lacking or with poor communications voted manually.<br><br>
He mentions their interaction with both the CNE and the service providers in their evaluation of the methodology, software and hardware to be used in the referendum as well as their presence during the live testing of the equipment and software that took place. <br><br>
</font><font face="georgia" size=2>Not mentioned, though present at these tests, were the Carter Center and witnesses for the opposition and those for the government. <br><br>
</b></font>
<dl>
<dd><font face="georgia" size=3>Gaviria pronounces himself satisfied with the results of these tests, qualifying them as accurate and secure. <br><br>
</dl>On the day of the referendum the OAS observers were in place in 20 of the 22 states. He mentions that due to logistical problems and the low population in the States of Delta Amacuro and Amazonas they were left out. <br><br>
Observation started at 5.30 a.m., all observers were provided with the means of communicating individually or en masse with all the other observers. He notes that the voting proceeded normally, freely and without obstacles though the lines were extremely long. By 9.30 a.m., 95% of all voting tables were operating normally. Initial delay in some of the tables was due to the absence of many of the operators of the fingerprint machines. <br><br>
<dl>
<dd>He attributes the delay to the massive turn out, which overwhelmed the capacity of the voting centers coupled with the inevitable confusion caused by the implementation of a new system.<br><br>
</font>
</dl><font face="georgia" size=2>The delays in voting, the extension of the voting centers closing time, and the problems with the fingerprint machines produced he says a climate of distrust that was not alleviated by the quick results. <br><br>
</b></font><font face="georgia" size=3>What he does not say</u></b> is that the climate of distrust was solely among those of the opposition, fuelled by a steady diet of fear mongering by the private media in which the problems with the fingerprint machines, the delays and even the extension of the voting centers closing time were construed as some sort of nebulous plot to alter the results.
<ul>
<li>Gaviria then reports that, in several cases, people did not appear in the voting lists despite bearing documentation that they should have. </font>
</ul><br>
<font face="georgia" size=3>He does not mention numbers. He mentions that the military, in charge of the security at voting centers were on occasion overzealous in their identity checks of those requiring or requesting access (the State of Zulia)</i> and that in some instances they were forced to take over certain functions (e.g. briefing voters)</i> due to missing voting center personnel. <br><br>
</font><font face="georgia" size=2>Voting closing time was extended to 8:00 p.m. and finally until 12:00 a.m.<br><br>
</b></font><font face="georgia" size=3>Voting closing procedures were followed as per instructions. <br><br>
</u>He dedicates a whole subsection to the voting in Miami (USA) having been asked by the CNE to include observers in what is almost a second home for many Venezuelans. The voting there proceeded normally, with witnesses from both sides on hand as were the International and Venezuelan Press. He mentions the peaceful demonstration at the voting center of one of the tendencies (no prizes for guessing which)</i> and the complaint by the opposition that the rules precluded those without legal status in the USA from voting. <br><br>
He goes on to talk about the transmission and totalizing stages, in which he says that it proceeded normally, that it was adequately audited and as such preserved the confidentiality and integrity of each vote. Totals at manual centers were scanned and then transmitted to the CNE. The OAS used the quick count at voting centers and its participation in the audit to be able to confirm this. <br><br>
He then deals with the tools used to evaluate the transparency of the electoral process. He mentions their quick count which they conducted on a primary and secondary sample and the 3 audits conducted by the CNE in which they participated in the first and third. <br><br>
The first audit to be conducted on behalf of the CNE by Interideas was originally envisaged to evaluate 1% of the electronic voting machines in a random sample. The international observers and those of the opposition and the government were invited at 4.30 p.m. on the day of the election to witness the drawing of the random sample. Late closing caused some problems and in the end 194 machines were audited. The OAS, due to their focus on the quick count, were unable to be present at all of them. The results however confirmed both the CNE numbers and those of the quick count. <br><br>
The second audit was conducted between August 18 and 22. Proposed by the Carter Center and the OAS in an attempt to allay the fears of the opposition (who despite the urging of the international observers refused to accept the results)</i> this audit was accepted by the CNE and organized in the following manner. <br><br>
<dl>
<dd>- A sample of 150 voting centers would be chosen at random, to be witnessed by the Carter Center, the OAS. and opposition and government observers. <br><br>
<dd>- The signed voting totals (at the CNE)</i> would be, under the eyes of the same witnesses, removed from their envelopes and kept in custody by the witnesses at the CNE. <br><br>
<dd>- The totals printed out by each electronic voting machine chosen and the paper receipts of each which were at 24 military centers (one for each state)</i> would be brought to Caracas under custody of the Witnesses. <br><br>
</dl>The first step was to send the witnesses to each of the 24 military centers, where they waited for the results of the random sample of voting centers to be chosen. The boxes were then identified and sent to Caracas in the custody of the witnesses. <br><br>
</font><font face="georgia" size=2>The signed voting totals, printed totals and the paper receipts were then compared. <br><br>
</b></font><font face="georgia" size=3>The outcome confirmed the CNE results, as such both the Carter Center and the OAS again urged the opposition to accept them. <a href="http://www.vheadline.com/readnews.asp?id=23112#[7]">[7] </a><br><br>
In order to recall President Chavez the opposition had not only to get more votes against his mandate than were cast in his favor but also exceed the number of votes that he had in the year 2000 Presidential Elections. In the event the government received 5,800,629 votes (59%) and the opposition 3,989,008 (41%). Apart from a partial list of the Opposition’s claims for fraud and a series of recommendations for future referendums the report effectively ends here. <br><br>
<dl>
<dd>The list of fraud allegations is as Gaviria hints weak, the full list without any substantiation consists of over a thousand grievances ranging from the long voting lines to (curiously enough)</i> the extension of voting times.<br><br>
</dl>One can’t but help feel that the opposition .. now in total disarray ... is not only anxious to deflect criticism but to lay the basis of some future action based on an alleged fraud.<br><br>
</font><font face="georgia" size=5>Glen Forbes<br>
<a href="mailto:glenforbes@cantv.net">glenforbes@cantv.net</a><br><br>
</font>
<dl>
<dd><font face="Courier New, Courier" size=2 color="#000080"><a name="[1]"></a>[1] This professed willingness on their part lasted only as long as it took the Supreme Court to rule that there had not been a coup, lifting the specter of judicial proceedings. <br><br>
<dd><a name="[2]"></a>[2] As in so many of the claims of the opposition, Venezuela, its institutions and its functionaries are portrayed as models of democratic ideals and pulchritude, that is, before Chavez. <br><br>
<dd><a name="[3]"></a>[3] Not perhaps in other latitudes, but more than enough when long established privileges are at stake. <br><br>
<dd><a name="[4]"></a>[4] It is interesting to note just how much at odds were the goals of the government and the opposition. The opposition were initially hoping that the OAS would declare the government in breach of the Democratic Charter and either force them to leave office or at the very least push them to hold anticipated elections. The government were hoping that the presence of the OAS would avoid another coup and force the opposition to follow the Constitution. <br><br>
<dd><a name="[5]"></a>[5] The composition of the opposition and the relationship between them is subject of much debate. The Coordinadora Democratica: the most visible of the opposition groups and the one that signed the agreement, is composed of the main political parties and politicized civil organizations opposed to the government, The Bloque Democratico: a much more radical grouping who split from the Coordinadora Democratica who they consider spineless, and powerful local interests (exemplified by the Media)</i>, then we have a cadre of coup-mongering military officers, the Miami contingent who are known to have close links to exiled Cuban anti-Castro groups and the inevitable international meddlers of always, all tend to liaise on different levels while quick to deny links, knowledge or even in some cases the existence of many of these organizations.<br><br>
<dd><a name="[6]"></a>[6] In the event the opposition publicly claimed that they would refuse to acknowledge results that were not vouched for by the OAS and the Carter Center. (Adverse results I imagine)</i>. <br><br>
<dd><a name="[7]"></a>[7] Despite their previous claim that they would only accept the results if vouched for by the OAS and the Carter Center the opposition refused, and still refuses, to accept the results. They withdrew from the third audit claiming it was not broad enough. (I think it was to avoid having to accept the results, which in private, though not in public, they admitted would not be in their favor)</i>. <br><br>
</font><x-sigsep><p></x-sigsep>
</dl><font size=3 color="#FF0000">The Freedom Archives<br>
522 Valencia Street<br>
San Francisco, CA 94110<br>
(415) 863-9977<br>
</font><font size=3><a href="http://www.freedomarchives.org/" eudora="autourl">www.freedomarchives.org</a></font></body>
</html>