[News] VHeadline.com publishes top secret US Army document

News at freedomarchives.org News at freedomarchives.org
Thu Dec 2 11:02:44 EST 2004

VHeadline.com today publishes top secret US Army document as a matter of 
public concern, relating to continuing belligerent interference by the 
United States of America in Venezuela's domestic political affairs


VHeadline.com editor & publisher Roy S. Carson writes: As a matter of 
public concern, especially where it relates to continuing belligerent 
United States of America interference in Venezuela's domestic political 
affairs and its not-s-covert support for anti-democratic forces within 
Venezuela weeking to overthrow the legitimate government of President Hugo 
Chavez Frias, VHeadline.com Venezuela today responsibly publishes (without 
permission) a top secret US Army document distributed to top Washington 
D.C. officials only last month in which United States' Counterinsurgency 
Operations are described in the form of a manual.
Distribution Restriction: Distribution authorized to the DOD and DOD 
contractors only to maintain operations security. This determination was 
made on 1 April 2004. Other requests for this document must be referred to 
Commander, US Army Combined Arms Center and Fort Leavenworth, ATTN: ATZL-CD 
(FMI 3-07.22), 1 Reynolds Avenue (Building 111), Fort Leavenworth, KS 

Destruction Notice: Destroy by any method that will prevent disclosure of 
contents or reconstruction of the document.

In an introduction, the document, 
<http://www.vheadline.com/USA-counterinsurgency-operations.pdf>which is 
available here in its 182-page entirety as a PDF file, informs its readers 
that " The American way of war includes mass, power, and the use of 
sophisticated smart weapons. However, large main force engagements that 
characterized conflict in World War II, Korea, and Operations Desert Storm 
and Iraqi Freedom in the Middle East have become the exceptions in American 
warfare. Since the American Revolution, the Army has conducted stability 
operations, which have included counterinsurgency operations. Over the past 
half-century alone, the Army gained considerable experience in fighting 
insurgents in Southeast Asia (Vietnam, Laos, Philippines), Latin America 
(Colombia, Peru, El Salvador, Guatemala, Nicaragua), Africa (Somalia), 
Southwest Asia (Afghanistan), and now the Middle East (Iraq).

Dealing with counterinsurgency since the Vietnam War has fallen largely on 
SOF; however, conventional forces have frequently come into contact with 
insurgent forces that seek to neutralize the inherent advantages of size, 
weaponry, and conventional force TTP.

Insurgents use a combination of actions that include terror, assassination, 
kidnapping, murder, guerrilla tactics such as ambushes, booby traps, and 
improvised explosive devices aimed at US and multinational forces, the host 
country's leaders, and ordinary citizens.

The stunning victory over Saddam Hussein's army in 2003 validated US 
conventional force TTP, but the ensuing aftermath of instability has caused 
review of lessons from the Army's historical experience and those of the 
other services and multinational partners. One of the key recurring lessons 
is that the United States cannot win other countries' wars for them, but 
can certainly help legitimate foreign governments overcome attempts to 
overthrow them. US forces can assist a country confronted by an insurgency 
by providing a safe and secure environment at the local level and 
continuously building on the incremental success.

The impetus for this FMI came from the Iraq insurgency and the realization 
that engagements in the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT) would likely use 
counterinsurgency TTPs. Consequently this FMI reviews what we know about 
counterinsurgency and explains the fundamentals of military operations in a 
counterinsurgency environment.


1-1. An insurgency is organized movement aimed at the overthrow of a 
constituted government through use of subversion and armed conflict (JP 
1-02). It is a protracted politicomilitary struggle designed to weaken 
government control and legitimacy while increasing insurgent control. 
Political power is the central issue in an insurgency.

1-2. Each insurgency has its own unique characteristics based on its 
strategic objectives, its operational environment, available resources, 
operational method, and tactics (For example, an insurgency may be based on 
mass mobilization through political action or the FOCO theory. Insurgencies 
frequently seek to overthrow the existing social order and reallocate power 
within the country.

1-3. The goal of an insurgency is to mobilize human and material resources 
in order to form an alternative to the state. This alternative is called 
the counterstate. The counterstate may have much of the infrastructure 
possessed by the state itself, but this must normally be hidden, since it 
is illegal. Thus the counterstate is often referred to by the term 
"clandestine infrastructure." As the insurgents gain confidence and power, 
the clandestine infrastructure may become more open, as observed 
historically in communist regions during the Chinese Revolution, in South 
Vietnam after the North Vietnamese 1972 Easter Offensive, and in Colombia 
in the summer of 1998.

1-4. Successful mobilization provides active and passive support for the 
insurgency's programs, operations, and goals. At the national level, 
mobilization grows out of dissatisfaction by some elite members with 
existing political, economic, or social conditions. At the regional level, 
members of an elite have become marginalized (that is, they have become 
psychologically alienated from the system), and have established links with 
followers by bringing them into the counterstate. At the local, district 
and province-levels, local movement representatives called the cadre 
address local grievances and do recruiting. The cadre gives credit to the 
insurgent movement for all local solutions. Loyalty to the insurgent 
movement is normally won through deeds but may occur through appeal to 
abstract principles. Promises to end hunger or eliminate poverty may appeal 
to a segment of the population, while appeals to eliminate a foreign 
presence or establish a government based on religious or political ideology 
may appeal to others. Nonetheless, these promises and appeals are 
associated with tangible solutions and deeds.

The complete document is available as PDF at:

The Freedom Archives
522 Valencia Street
San Francisco, CA 94110
(415) 863-9977
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