[News] VHeadline.com publishes top secret US Army document
News at freedomarchives.org
News at freedomarchives.org
Thu Dec 2 11:02:44 EST 2004
VHeadline.com today publishes top secret US Army document as a matter of
public concern, relating to continuing belligerent interference by the
United States of America in Venezuela's domestic political affairs
<http://www.vheadline.com/readnews.asp?id=23802>http://www.vheadline.com/readnews.asp?id=23802
VHeadline.com editor & publisher Roy S. Carson writes: As a matter of
public concern, especially where it relates to continuing belligerent
United States of America interference in Venezuela's domestic political
affairs and its not-s-covert support for anti-democratic forces within
Venezuela weeking to overthrow the legitimate government of President Hugo
Chavez Frias, VHeadline.com Venezuela today responsibly publishes (without
permission) a top secret US Army document distributed to top Washington
D.C. officials only last month in which United States' Counterinsurgency
Operations are described in the form of a manual.
Distribution Restriction: Distribution authorized to the DOD and DOD
contractors only to maintain operations security. This determination was
made on 1 April 2004. Other requests for this document must be referred to
Commander, US Army Combined Arms Center and Fort Leavenworth, ATTN: ATZL-CD
(FMI 3-07.22), 1 Reynolds Avenue (Building 111), Fort Leavenworth, KS
66027-1352.
Destruction Notice: Destroy by any method that will prevent disclosure of
contents or reconstruction of the document.
In an introduction, the document,
<http://www.vheadline.com/USA-counterinsurgency-operations.pdf>which is
available here in its 182-page entirety as a PDF file, informs its readers
that " The American way of war includes mass, power, and the use of
sophisticated smart weapons. However, large main force engagements that
characterized conflict in World War II, Korea, and Operations Desert Storm
and Iraqi Freedom in the Middle East have become the exceptions in American
warfare. Since the American Revolution, the Army has conducted stability
operations, which have included counterinsurgency operations. Over the past
half-century alone, the Army gained considerable experience in fighting
insurgents in Southeast Asia (Vietnam, Laos, Philippines), Latin America
(Colombia, Peru, El Salvador, Guatemala, Nicaragua), Africa (Somalia),
Southwest Asia (Afghanistan), and now the Middle East (Iraq).
Dealing with counterinsurgency since the Vietnam War has fallen largely on
SOF; however, conventional forces have frequently come into contact with
insurgent forces that seek to neutralize the inherent advantages of size,
weaponry, and conventional force TTP.
Insurgents use a combination of actions that include terror, assassination,
kidnapping, murder, guerrilla tactics such as ambushes, booby traps, and
improvised explosive devices aimed at US and multinational forces, the host
country's leaders, and ordinary citizens.
The stunning victory over Saddam Hussein's army in 2003 validated US
conventional force TTP, but the ensuing aftermath of instability has caused
review of lessons from the Army's historical experience and those of the
other services and multinational partners. One of the key recurring lessons
is that the United States cannot win other countries' wars for them, but
can certainly help legitimate foreign governments overcome attempts to
overthrow them. US forces can assist a country confronted by an insurgency
by providing a safe and secure environment at the local level and
continuously building on the incremental success.
The impetus for this FMI came from the Iraq insurgency and the realization
that engagements in the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT) would likely use
counterinsurgency TTPs. Consequently this FMI reviews what we know about
counterinsurgency and explains the fundamentals of military operations in a
counterinsurgency environment.
DEFINITION OF INSURGENCY
1-1. An insurgency is organized movement aimed at the overthrow of a
constituted government through use of subversion and armed conflict (JP
1-02). It is a protracted politicomilitary struggle designed to weaken
government control and legitimacy while increasing insurgent control.
Political power is the central issue in an insurgency.
1-2. Each insurgency has its own unique characteristics based on its
strategic objectives, its operational environment, available resources,
operational method, and tactics (For example, an insurgency may be based on
mass mobilization through political action or the FOCO theory. Insurgencies
frequently seek to overthrow the existing social order and reallocate power
within the country.
1-3. The goal of an insurgency is to mobilize human and material resources
in order to form an alternative to the state. This alternative is called
the counterstate. The counterstate may have much of the infrastructure
possessed by the state itself, but this must normally be hidden, since it
is illegal. Thus the counterstate is often referred to by the term
"clandestine infrastructure." As the insurgents gain confidence and power,
the clandestine infrastructure may become more open, as observed
historically in communist regions during the Chinese Revolution, in South
Vietnam after the North Vietnamese 1972 Easter Offensive, and in Colombia
in the summer of 1998.
1-4. Successful mobilization provides active and passive support for the
insurgency's programs, operations, and goals. At the national level,
mobilization grows out of dissatisfaction by some elite members with
existing political, economic, or social conditions. At the regional level,
members of an elite have become marginalized (that is, they have become
psychologically alienated from the system), and have established links with
followers by bringing them into the counterstate. At the local, district
and province-levels, local movement representatives called the cadre
address local grievances and do recruiting. The cadre gives credit to the
insurgent movement for all local solutions. Loyalty to the insurgent
movement is normally won through deeds but may occur through appeal to
abstract principles. Promises to end hunger or eliminate poverty may appeal
to a segment of the population, while appeals to eliminate a foreign
presence or establish a government based on religious or political ideology
may appeal to others. Nonetheless, these promises and appeals are
associated with tangible solutions and deeds.
The complete document is available as PDF at:
<http://www.vheadline.com/USA-counterinsurgency-operations.pdf>http://www.vheadline.com/USA-counterinsurgency-operations.pdf
The Freedom Archives
522 Valencia Street
San Francisco, CA 94110
(415) 863-9977
www.freedomarchives.org
-------------- next part --------------
An HTML attachment was scrubbed...
URL: <http://freedomarchives.org/pipermail/news_freedomarchives.org/attachments/20041202/6223f8b1/attachment.htm>
More information about the News
mailing list