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<font size=3><br><br>
</font><font face="Bookman Old Style, Bookman" size=5 color="#A80000">VHeadline.com
</font><font face="georgia" size=5 color="#A80000">today publishes top
secret US Army document as a matter of public concern, relating to
continuing belligerent interference by the United States of America in
Venezuela's domestic political affairs<br><br>
</font><font face="Arial, Helvetica" size=4><a href="http://www.vheadline.com/readnews.asp?id=23802">http://www.vheadline.com/readnews.asp?id=23802</a><br><br>
</font><font face="georgia" size=2>VH<b>eadline.com editor &
publisher Roy S. Carson writes:</b></font><font face="georgia" size=3> As
a matter of public concern, especially where it relates to continuing
belligerent United States of America interference in Venezuela's domestic
political affairs and its not-s-covert support for anti-democratic forces
within Venezuela weeking to overthrow the legitimate government of
President Hugo Chavez Frias,
</font><font face="Bookman Old Style, Bookman" size=3 color="#A80000"><b><i>VHeadline.com
Venezuela</i></b></font><font face="georgia" size=3> today responsibly
publishes <i><u>(without permission)</u></i> a top secret US Army
document distributed to top Washington D.C. officials only last month in
which United States' Counterinsurgency Operations are described in the
form of a manual.<br>
</font><div align="center"><font face="Courier New, Courier" size=2><b><u>Distribution
Restriction:</u></b> Distribution authorized to the DOD and DOD
contractors only to maintain operations security. This determination was
made on 1 April 2004. Other requests for this document must be referred
to Commander, US Army Combined Arms Center and Fort Leavenworth, ATTN:
ATZL-CD (FMI 3-07.22), 1 Reynolds Avenue (Building 111), Fort
Leavenworth, KS 66027-1352. <br><br>
<b><u>Destruction Notice:</u></b> Destroy by any method that will prevent
disclosure of contents or reconstruction of the document. <br><br>
</font></div>
<font face="georgia" size=3>In an introduction, the document,
<a href="http://www.vheadline.com/USA-counterinsurgency-operations.pdf">which
is available here in its 182-page entirety as a PDF file</a>, informs its
readers that " The American way of war includes mass, power, and the
use of sophisticated smart weapons. However, large main force engagements
that characterized conflict in World War II, Korea, and Operations Desert
Storm and Iraqi Freedom in the Middle East have become the exceptions in
American warfare. Since the American Revolution, the Army has conducted
stability operations, which have included counterinsurgency operations.
Over the past half-century alone, the Army gained considerable experience
in fighting insurgents in Southeast Asia (Vietnam, Laos, Philippines),
Latin America (Colombia, Peru, El Salvador, Guatemala, Nicaragua), Africa
(Somalia), Southwest Asia (Afghanistan), and now the Middle East
(Iraq).<br><br>
Dealing with counterinsurgency since the Vietnam War has fallen largely
on SOF; however, conventional forces have frequently come into contact
with insurgent forces that seek to neutralize the inherent advantages of
size, weaponry, and conventional force TTP.<br><br>
Insurgents use a combination of actions that include terror,
assassination, kidnapping, murder, guerrilla tactics such as ambushes,
booby traps, and improvised explosive devices aimed at US and
multinational forces, the host country’s leaders, and ordinary citizens.
<br><br>
The stunning victory over Saddam Hussein’s army in 2003 validated US
conventional force TTP, but the ensuing aftermath of instability has
caused review of lessons from the Army’s historical experience and those
of the other services and multinational partners. One of the key
recurring lessons is that the United States cannot win other countries’
wars for them, but can certainly help legitimate foreign governments
overcome attempts to overthrow them. US forces can assist a country
confronted by an insurgency by providing a safe and secure environment at
the local level and continuously building on the incremental success.
<br><br>
The impetus for this FMI came from the Iraq insurgency and the
realization that engagements in the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT) would
likely use counterinsurgency TTPs. Consequently this FMI reviews what we
know about counterinsurgency and explains the fundamentals of military
operations in a counterinsurgency environment. <br><br>
</font><font face="Courier New, Courier" size=4 color="#A80000"><b>DEFINITION
OF INSURGENCY <br><br>
</b></font>
<dl>
<dd><font face="Courier New, Courier" size=2 color="#000080">1-1. An
insurgency is organized movement aimed at the overthrow of a constituted
government through use of subversion and armed conflict (JP 1-02). It is
a protracted politicomilitary struggle designed to weaken government
control and legitimacy while increasing insurgent control. Political
power is the central issue in an insurgency. <br><br>
<dd>1-2. Each insurgency has its own unique characteristics based on its
strategic objectives, its operational environment, available resources,
operational method, and tactics (For example, an insurgency may be based
on mass mobilization through political action or the FOCO theory.
Insurgencies frequently seek to overthrow the existing social order and
reallocate power within the country. <br><br>
<dd>1-3. The goal of an insurgency is to mobilize human and material
resources in order to form an alternative to the state. This alternative
is called the counterstate. The counterstate may have much of the
infrastructure possessed by the state itself, but this must normally be
hidden, since it is illegal. Thus the counterstate is often referred to
by the term “clandestine infrastructure.” As the insurgents gain
confidence and power, the clandestine infrastructure may become more
open, as observed historically in communist regions during the Chinese
Revolution, in South Vietnam after the North Vietnamese 1972 Easter
Offensive, and in Colombia in the summer of 1998. <br><br>
<dd>1-4. Successful mobilization provides active and passive support for
the insurgency’s programs, operations, and goals. At the national level,
mobilization grows out of dissatisfaction by some elite members with
existing political, economic, or social conditions. At the regional
level, members of an elite have become marginalized (that is, they have
become psychologically alienated from the system)</i>, and have
established links with followers by bringing them into the counterstate.
At the local, district and province-levels, local movement
representatives called the cadre address local grievances and do
recruiting. The cadre gives credit to the insurgent movement for all
local solutions. Loyalty to the insurgent movement is normally won
through deeds but may occur through appeal to abstract principles.
Promises to end hunger or eliminate poverty may appeal to a segment of
the population, while appeals to eliminate a foreign presence or
establish a government based on religious or political ideology may
appeal to others. Nonetheless, these promises and appeals are associated
with tangible solutions and deeds.<br><br>
</font>
</dl><div align="center"><font face="Arial, Helvetica" size=4 color="#000080">The
complete document is available as PDF at:<br>
</font><font face="Arial, Helvetica" size=2 color="#000080"><b><a href="http://www.vheadline.com/USA-counterinsurgency-operations.pdf">http://www.vheadline.com/USA-counterinsurgency-operations.pdf</a><br><br>
</b></font><x-sigsep><p></x-sigsep>
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