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KILUSAN

Publication of Komite ng Sambayanang, Pilipino (Filipino People's Committee) Volume One No. 1 and 2


IN THE FACE OF ADVERSITY

**Major patterns of
militarization in the
Philippines,
and the
people's resistance**

The military commander said,
Your town was like a beautiful lake;
But rebels infested it like bad fish.
The lake had to be drained of its water
To catch them.
Move further down;
Leave your rebel-infested lands for
guarded grounds.
Strip your house,
So rebels may not use it.

Moving down,
We carried not a shingle.
Whither they consigned us,
We do not know.
Nor do we know,
When we will be back on our land again.
For yesterday, men in droves were
conscripted
To labor for a new clearing —
For a rubber plantation,
To develop our 'rebel infested' land.

Now fear, now anger, override grief.
Our long watchful vigil is only beginning.



Introduction

18, military troops arrested Felixberto Olalia and Crispin Beltran, chairman and vice-chairman of Kilusan Mayo Uno (KMU — May 1st Movement) and attorney Rolando Olalia and Banguila also of KMU, along with twelve other worker leaders and organizers. The military also raided and ransacked the KMU offices and three other labour federations.

The agenda for 1981 was normalization with the cosmetic lifting of martial law and the presidential elections. However, under the impact of the advancing mass movement and the recessionary economic crisis, increasing polarization has marked the present trend in Philippine politics. The NDF and the NPA have established themselves as a significant force in national politics even as the Reagan administration steps up its open support for the Marcos regime. It is these factors which have set the conditions for the extreme militarization which we are witnessing throughout the Philippines during the first half of 1982.

In the Face of Adversity attempts to present comprehensively the many faces of militarization and to indicate the major trends and patterns in military repression during the past year. It is a chronicle of continuing arrests and bare-faced tortures; brave struggles in prison of individuals in long solitary detention or collective protests and hunger-strikes in many prison camps; disappearance and salvaging and the anguish of relatives and family; ominously frequent mass murders and massacres and marauding paramilitaries; fleeing refugees under shelling and strafing, and the tactics of counter-insurgency have reached new proportions with the herding of an estimated 250,000 people into strategic hamlets.

These are the realities inside the Philippines. However, Filipinos abroad are not spared the long reach of the US-Marcos dictatorship. A worsening economic situation at home has led to massive export of labor. There are approximately 300,000 Filipino migrants in Europe, Africa and the Middle East. More than one million live in the US and Canada. Migrant labor has become the Marcos government's number one dollar earner. But the dictatorship's harassment of these migrant Filipinos is not confined only to prescribed remittances; it also includes frequent strike breaking and recently unexplained incidents of death and disappearance. In the United States, the US-RP Extradition Treaty awaits ratification.

Overshadowing all, there is the emerging spectre of large scale US intervention. US military bases in the Philippines are not only logistical warehouses and springboards for intervention elsewhere in the world. US marines have recently participated in operations in Bataan and in war games in Mindoro and Dingalan. Lessons and expertise of extensive US hamletting in Vietnam are being refined and modified for a new situation of struggle in the Philippines in 1982. US imperialism first hamletted the Filipino people more than eighty years ago.

In the Face of Adversity also testifies to the onward march of the Filipino people's resistance. It recounts widespread popular resistance to the onslaught of the multinationals by peasants and workers; militant rallies, symposia and people's tribunals; multisectoral open resistance and the growing organized underground of armed struggle and mass movements.

The Filipino people's resolute struggle against the strong enemy of the US backed Marcos dictatorship is waged on the principle of self-reliance. This grows from the conviction that the mobilization of the broad masses of the Filipino people is the key to the successful overthrow of the present regime. But this self-reliance is firmly linked to another imperative — international solidarity and militant support of peoples across the world.

It is in this spirit, in the year of the strategic hamlets, that the Filipino people remain steadfast and resolute in the face of adversity.

In the Face of Adversity is a chronicle of the Filipino people's determined resistance and courage in the face of intense and increasing militarization.

1982 has witnessed a dramatic escalation of militarization throughout the Philippines; extensive hamletting in Mindanao and Luzon being the most extreme tactic of harsh military repression. There are on-going arrests and tortures, disappearances, salvaging, mass murder, massacre, bombing and strafing as the arsenal of the US-backed Marcos dictatorship is unleashed on the Filipino people.

Why militarization on this scale?


Firstly, there are the vast economic and strategic military interests of US imperialism in the Philippines. Strategic military interests in the Philippines has become more crucial now to the United States, as the Reagan Administration develops a more aggressive military strategy for Asia-Pacific, Indian Ocean and Persian Gulf region.

Besides US interests, other foreign economic interests, Japanese and European are also at stake. Multinational companies from these countries daily increase their profits — Marcos' open door policies making the Philippines among the most lucrative countries for investments. The Filipino people suffer increasing impoverishment while natural resources are exploited, the rich land despoiled, and the majority of the people are dispossessed of their rightful heritage.

Secondly, there is the worsening economic crisis, as several big dollar-earning industries collapse — most notably the coconut, sugar and banana industries. The external debt is quoted at \$15.8 billion for the end of 1981 — more than seven times the 1972 figures; the balance of trade deficit is given at \$2.5 billion. Another indicator of the deep economic crisis is the unemployment figure for the early months of 1982 — this is a staggering 43 per cent.

Thirdly, and most significantly, there is the widespread mounting resistance to the US-Marcos regime. During the past decade, the historic struggle of the Filipino people, dating back more than three hundred years of resistance to Spanish, Japanese and American colonialism has made significant advances. A broad united front, under the leadership of the National Democratic Front (NDF) has been forged in the midst of intense struggle during the seventies.

Recently, in the urban centers the advance of the workers struggles has been very substantial. There has been a wave of strikes account-ing for the loss of nearly five million production manhours in the first quarter of 1982 alone. Quite recently there has been a massive walkout of 14,000 workers from 22 factories in solidarity with 54 workers who were jailed on June 4, in the Bataan Free Trade Zone. Marcos on the eve of his scheduled official state visit to the United States has singled out the labour movement in a rampage of suppression. Between August 13 and



NOTE:
As of March 1982 the number of guerrilla fronts has increased to 34

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KSP

Published by KSP — Komite ng Sambayanang Pilipino
Prepared by the KSP editorial team from resources of the KSP and the Philippine Documentation Centre (PDC) Rome.

KSP
Admiral Van Gentstraat, 26 Bis
3572 XL Utrecht,
Holland.

PDC
Via Capo d'Africa 37,
Int. IV.
00184 Rome,
Italy

Typeset by Grassroots Typeset, London.
Printed by Spider Web, London N7.

1. Muzzled Voices, Struggling Spirits: Political Prisoners

A total of 1332 political prisoners languish in jails as of December 1981



On February 17-18, 1982, the First National Conference on Human Rights was held in Manila. The convention was organized and sponsored by the Task Force Detainees of the Philippines (TFDP), the Ecumenical Movement for Justice and Peace (EMJP), the National Priests and Religious Union (NAPRU), the National Movement for the Advancement of Justice (MAKIISA-KA), the Movement of Attorneys for Brotherhood, Integrity and Nationalism, Inc. (MABINI) and the Protestant Lawyers' League (PLL). Their joint effort became a milestone in the people's struggle for genuine independence and democracy. Representatives of 70 organisations attended the conference and eventually issued a declaration which denounced 'the Marcos regime's blatant disregard for the people's rights' as well as 'the unabashed collusion of the United States government with the Marcos regime' and called for 'a broad, militant and sustained movement against militarization and for the protection of the basic rights of the Filipino people'.

Besides others, the conference took up the issue of the political prisoners in the Philippines where a total of 1,332 political detainees still languish in jails as of December, 1981. To expose the political detainees' plight but unbroken spirit we reprint parts of the conference reader, followed by documents illustrating their hardship and their struggle as well as rising solidarity inside and outside the Philippines.

The situation inside prison

(Excerpt: *Muzzled voices, struggling spirits*)

Who are the political prisoners?

The existence of political prisoners serves as a living reminder that amidst us there are living witnesses to the government's suppression of the citizenry's democratic rights.

Political prisoners come from all walks of life. They are:

- workers who fight for just wages and better working conditions;
- peasants and farm workers who fight for better shares and ultimately, the right to own the land and/or are suspected of sympathizing or giving aid to guerillas of the New People's Army or the Moro National Liberation Front;
- urban poor settlers who defend their right to have homes;
- students who express legitimate grievances against the educational system or openly sympathize with the plight of the oppressed;

- religious and lay leaders who minister to the needs of the poor and take up their struggle for justice;
- national minorities who defend their ancestral homelands against landgrabbers and the encroachment of government projects undertaken in the name of 'progress';
- artists, writers, journalists, teachers, lawyers, doctors, nurses and other intellectuals and professionals who are committed to and fight for human rights; and
- suspected members of groups branded as 'subversive' such as the Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP), the New People's Army (NPA), the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF), Light-a-Fire Movement, and the April 6 Liberation Movement.

Political prisoners have been called 'public order violators' (POVs) ever since the government denied their existence. These are those found in regular detention centers or isolation cells.

Another group of political prisoners are those who were arrested for political reasons but were tried and convicted for criminal offences. They are found in the National Penitentiary in Muntinlupa together with the common criminals.

There are ten such prisoners in Muntinlupa, (National Penitentiary) most of whom are alleged members of the Hukbong Mapagpalaya ng Bayan (HMB), the military arm of the old Communist Party of the Philippines. Five of them — Manuel Dimatulac, Oscar Santiago, Alfonso Sabilano, Sebastian del Monte and Alfredo Celestino — were originally accused of rebellion and other acts against national security. Celestino has been sent to the electric chair seven times and each time he was given a reprieve.

The three other political prisoners in the penitentiary are allegedly members of the MNLF. All ten of these prisoners, except for one, have been detained for four to 13 years. One has been given amnesty but he is still detained.

Basically, the existence of political prisoners arises from the people's struggle against worsening political and economic repression, and the government's suppression of democratic rights.

Constitutional violations on detainees

In many instances, arrests of suspected 'subversives' are done without an arrest, search and seizure order (ASSO) or warrant of arrest. Sometimes, these warrants are presented days after the

arrest. Fr. Pepito Bernardo, a Catholic priest was apprehended on August 10, 1981, but was issued a 'presidential order of arrest' only on August 21.

Many arrests have been done in the wee hours of the morning. In many cases, the arresting officers do not notify the detainee's relatives about his arrest and whereabouts. Inquiries made by the kin are often answered in the negative or with unfulfilled promises that the military authorities will help.

Tortures during interrogations sometimes culminate in the execution of affidavits under duress. Then, after months of detention, summary preliminary investigations (SPI) are conducted. Sometimes, detainees are released without having undergone the SPI. Trials and hearings even more rarely occur.

Presently, however, the military tribunals and civil courts are speeding up the legal processes of several cases. But testimonies of 'witnesses' against the accused are indefinitely perpetuated as in the Karagatan-Andrea case wherein the accused were charged with the smuggling of arms to the country for the use of the NPA. Hearings of this case have been dragging before the Military Commission No. 1 since July 9, 1981. The case of Sixto Carlos, Jr. has been on trial at Manila's Court of First Instance since March 26, 1981.

Twenty-eight persons, including former Senators Raul Manglapus and Eva Estrada Kalaw and several retired military officials, accused in the December 31, 1979 aborted coup were charged at the Quezon City Court of First Instance last February 9. Similarly, the bombing cases of the April 6 Liberation Movement are being heard at the court. A term of 13-year imprisonment was meted out to some of the accused who pleaded guilty.

In preparation for the government announced normalization and in anticipation of the lifting of martial law, five petitions for habeas corpus were dismissed by the Supreme Court last January 15, 1981. Among those dismissed were the petitions filed by Bernabe Buscayno, alleged head of the New People's Army, convicted in 1977 by the Military Commission of murder and subversion and sentenced to death by firing squad; Kalaw and Rondon who were released for humanitarian reasons but were re-arrested February this year; and Fr. Edicio de la Torre who was released.¹

On February 9, 1981, seven detainees from Davao were refused the writ of habeas corpus on the grounds that the writ remains suspended in the provinces of Davao, Surigao del Sur and South Cotabato. Solicitor General Estelito Mendoza stated that the power of the president to order the arrest of persons believed to be engaged in acts against the national security remain in these areas.

Prison life and conditions

A lone figure stands, stretches and walks — all the time confining himself to the 4' x 11' cell. He looks to the sole window and wishes there was more air and sunlight in the room.

Victor Corpuz, a former cadet of the Philippine Military Academy who defected to the NPA, has been in solitary confinement at Camp Aguinaldo. Along with six other detainees in isolation, including Bernabe Buscayno, alleged leader of the NPA, and Milagros Lumabi-Enchanis,² a community worker from Isabela who was arrested August 1980 with her nine-month old son, Corpuz is locked up from day to night. Two times a week he leaves the room for an hour of sun and exercise. Reading materials allowed inside Corpuz's cells are limited and only immediate relatives are allowed to visit him once a week for two hours.

Jose Ma. Sison, alleged chairman of the CPP, his wife, Juliet, and their two-month old baby stay together in one isolation cell. Before the child was born, however, the Sison couple stayed in separate isolation cells since they were arrested in 1977.³

At the Death Row and at Camp Sampaguita of the National Penitentiary, sentenced political prisoners mingle with common crime violators. Inside the detention centers in Misamis Oriental, too many detainees are confined in a single, miserable cell. The roof has no ceiling and the heat coming from the galvanized iron elicits colourful curses from the prisoners. Flies and larva crawl in the toilet bowls inside the cell. Meals consists of corn grits with small dried fish.

At the provincial jail and at Camp Alagar in Cagayan de Oro, each prisoner subsists on a daily food budget of P3. Drinking water is placed in a can to be shared by 50 people. Water for other needs would depend on the discretion of the guards.

The Bicutan Rehabilitation Center in Taguig remains the government's showcase for 'compassionate rule'. Yet, detainees here are allowed visits only from immediate family members.

All over the country, subhuman conditions in the detention centers prevail, characterised by unsanitary and inadequate food and water supply, poor ventilation, over-crowded cells, and unavailable medical facilities. These detention centers miserably fall short of the Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners endorsed by UNESCO in 1975 and the Bureau of Prisoners Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners in 1959.

Of star chambers and tortures

Sixto Carlos Jr.'s body lay flat on a wide surface like a flat iron sheet. His hands were hogtied and his feet, buckled to the sheet. A hook was fastened to the rope around his numb hands. Each time Sixto refused to answer a question, his interrogators pulled the hook higher and higher, stretching his body. Sixto felt his outstretched arms and legs become increasingly tense and painful as the interrogation continued.

Sixto has felt the piercing touch of scalding water when once, his interrogators poured hot water over his body. In a similar sadistic outbursts of his torturers, his testicles were repeatedly struck with a small wooden hammer.

Former political science professor and chairman of the Samahan ng Demokratikong Kabataan, Sixto was arrested for his active participation in political activities. The 'stretching exercise' he went through originated from the Middle Ages. It is one of several practices revived, modified or newly invented under a 'system where star chamber methods have been used on a wide scale to literally torture evidence into existence.'

Many political prisoners know what Amnesty International referred to by 'star chamber methods'. Based on collated experiences, they identify the following as conventional forms of torture:



Children sometimes stay in prison with their fathers, because their mothers cannot provide for them.

- application of lighted cigarette tips to various parts of the body, including the ear and genital area;
- electric shocks on different parts of the body, especially the finger tips and the genitalia;
- stripping, sexual abuse and sometimes rape of female detainees;
- beating with fists and/or gun butts, sticks and rubber hoses;
- forcing the face into faeces-contaminated toilet bowls;
- water cure treatment
- squeezing the fingers with bullets inserted in between;
- using bright lights for long periods of time causing eye strain and damage;
- keeping the detainees from sleeping through continuous interrogation;
- pressing a hot iron against the sole of the feet; and
- use of the truth serum.

Outside of these conventional forms, the military has evolved other methods as repugnant, if not as hideous. In one instance, two detainees in Bataan were buried in upright positions with their heads protruding above the ground. One of them was used as a bowling pin while the other, as a shooting target.

One other detainee's ear was slashed while gasoline was poured on another's soles and then burned. Many more died in the process. Jaime Nera, an 18-year old high school student of Davao del Sur, died in the municipal jail two days after he was tortured. Another, Ben Pancovilla, a peasant from Davao del Norte, died of brain hemorrhage and atrophy after he was repeatedly pounded with the dull edge of an axe.

In between those who survived the torture sessions and those who died in the process are the detainees who suffered psychologically because of severe torture. One such political detainee is presently confined at the Philippine Mental Hospital with the violently insane cases. As a prison inmate, his torturers had banged his head several times on the cement floor.

Pablo Bocacao, a Kalinga who was arrested in March 1979, suffered from psychosis after he was tied to the running board of a Philippine Constabulary patrol van and was kept in a squatting position for days. He has now recovered.

The large dose of truth serum given to a respondent in the Andrea-Karagatan case, similarly affected his mental condition. He was confined in the psychiatric ward of the Armed Forces of the Philippines General Hospital until 1979.

Certain officers of the Philippine military have become notoriously popular, inviting hatred and contempt from victims of repression and human rights advocates. Among these hatchmen of the Marcos regime the more familiar are Capt. Rodolfo Aguinaldo, Col. Ismael Rodrigo, and Col. Miguel Aure of the Regional Security Unit-4; Maj. Cesar Garcia of the Intelligence section (C2) of the Philippine Constabulary; Col. Rolando Abadilla of the Metrocom Intelligence Unit; and 1st Lt. Dencio Laurico and Constable 1st Class Pat Ordon of the Military Intelligence and Security Group. Many other military officers and elements and members of the paramilitary units have made their marks in the people's unpopularity list.

Their military training has tempered the drive for torture of the Philippine armed forces personnel. Selected individuals undergo advanced studies in US military schools such as Fort Bragg, Fort Benning, and Fort Leavenworth. This craftsmanship is passed on from the officers to the soldiers. Understandably, too, some torture methods are similar to political torture forms employed in South Vietnam by American GIs.

The Marcos regime is answerable for all the abuses and atrocities perpetrated by these men against the population. However, instead of standing by the victims' side, abusive military men are at the most reprimanded for propaganda play and then transferred to other regions where they continue to sow



Sixto Carlos Jr. on hunger strike.

terror, torture, maim, rape, kill and salvage the citizens.

In prison there is struggle

Despite the barbed wire, padlocked gates, and towering halls of prison, political detainees launch prison struggles to demand immediate release, and a gamut of welfare issues like better prison conditions, end to practices of torture and salvaging, transfer of detainees in isolation to regular detention centers and fair trial in civilian courts and not in military tribunals.

In the past nine years, the political detainees in 17 major detention centers all over the country have launched 32 hunger strikes. For their efforts, the detainees were able to handle concessions that amount to prisoner-of-war status despite government insistence on classifying political cases as criminal cases. Prison regulations have been liberalized and occasionally, detainees have been released. One of the first successful hunger strikes on December 24, 1974 was participated in by two religious — Fr. Edicio de la Torre and Fr. Manuel Lahoz — who brought to the attention of the people of the world the Filipino people's struggle, rallying friends, fellow Filipinos, civil libertarians and support groups to their side.

Hunger strikes are launched not without sacrifices. When detainees of the 5th Constabulary Unit held their prison protest, they were padlocked, their quarters raided and their suspected leaders manhandled. A more recent case was the solitary confinement of Saturnino Ocampo and Jose Luneta, alleged leaders of the 17-day fast/hunger strike of 135 detainees in Bicutan Rehabilitation Center, Manila last November, 1980.⁴ For the first time, too, sentenced political prisoners at the National Penitentiary staged a 16-day hunger strike August last year.

Similar prison struggles have been launched by detainees in the provincial jails. At the 41st Sub-Recad in Cotabato City, the worst detention center according to an investigative team of the International Red Cross, political prisoners twice held hunger strikes — in February, and then in April, 1979. Threats of massacre and arrogant show of force by the military failed to douse the spirits of the detainees and their relatives and friends.

At the PC-INP Detention Center, Legaspi City, an eight-day hunger strike last December, 1980 brought about the release of two mothers and the granting of several privileges. Finally, 17 detainees in the PC-INP Recom 7 Detention Center pressed for and successfully won their freedom after prison struggle.

Despite the mocking walls of prison, collective struggle behind bars assert the political prisoners just grievances, sustain their resolve to carry to ultimate victory the goals of freedom and

democracy, side by side with brother Filipinos outside prison.

The state of human rights violations in the Philippines has not changed. In truth, it has even worsened. While there is a decline in the number of political prisoners languishing in jail, mass arrests with short-term detention, and increasing cases of salvaging and disappearances are the trends. Those branded by the regime as 'viciously militant' still remain detained, and prison conditions have not markedly improved. Without the slightest tinge of doubt, the Marcos regime maintains a policy of extirpation towards political dissenters.

NUMBER OF ARRESTS From 1977-1981

Region	1977	1978	1979	1980	1981	Total Arrests
Metro Manila	414	320	265	170	52	1021
Luzon	345	202	183	125	304	1159
Visayas	214	193	111	141	255	914
Min-danao	378	905	1402	359	217	3261
Total	1352	1620	1961	795	828	6355

Number of Releases: 5023

Total No. of Detainees still in Prison: 1332

Notes

1. Fr. Edicio de la Torre was rearrested in Makati, Manila on April 22, 1982 while conducting socio-theological research for his post graduate studies at Belgium's University of Louvain. Doing his field research into church participation in social change, he contacted representatives of the National Democratic Front.
2. Milagros was released on February 5, 1982. Her son was released July 15, 1981.
3. Juliet Delima-Sison was granted temporary release as a nursing mother on March 31, 1982, with her baby.
4. Satur Ocampo, arrested January 14, 1976; Jose Luneta, arrested January 17, 1976; and Jose Ma. Sison, arrested November 10, 1977 are long-term prisoners charged with rebellion and subversion, all of whom have been severely tortured.

Political detainees update — Mass arrests and torture on the rise

Within a short span of barely two months since late February, 1982 reports of arbitrary arrests, tortures and killing in the cities have increased alarmingly.

In Metro Manila, from April 21 to 23, 1982, at least 10 persons were arrested by military operatives. These include Horacio Morales, Jr., former executive vice-president of the Development Academy of the Philippines (DAP) and 1977 Ten Outstanding Young Men Awardee (TOYM); Fr. Edicio de la Torre, a priest of the Society of the Divine Word and former detainee (released last April 18, 1980); Atty. Efren Moncupa Jr., of the Free Legal Assistance Group (FLAG) and his younger brother, Antonio Moncupa Jr., a certified public accountant. Others reported arrested were Gilbert Torres, a free lance artist; Fe Joseph, a student of St. Joseph's College; Christopher Sorio; Lucia Pagador; Erlan Pagador; Erlan Navarro, and Jaime Bernal.

Earlier, these persons were reported missing. Inquiries by relatives and friends led them to the doorstep of military authorities. But the military refused to confirm reports of their arrest. It was only after separate habeas corpus petitions had been filed and because of pressure from relatives and friends of those missing that the military finally revealed their whereabouts. They were held incommunicado for weeks at the headquarters of the 15th Military Intelligence Group at Bago Bantay Quezon City.

As of June, 1982 information received indicates that Morales was repeatedly brought to secretive places and subjected to severe torture.

Earlier this year, between February 26 and March 1, 1982, a similar case had occurred. 24 persons were arrested in different parts of Metro Manila and held by military intelligence operatives in the same manner that Morales and others were. They were reportedly denied visits from relatives and access to legal counsel while being subjected to 'tactical interrogation'. At least 17 persons were reported subjected to various forms of physical and mental torture. Like Morales and others, they were 'produced' by the military only after the relatives filed habeas corpus petitions with the Supreme Court.

In another incident in Catbalogan, Samar, Victor G. Bulatao, former national secretary of the Federation of Free Farmers (FFF), was dragged into a military jeep on the night of March 26, 1982. This was the last seen of him until military authorities disclosed having custody of him almost three weeks later. Bulatao was held incommunicado even from his family and legal counsel all throughout the period.



Political prisoners (L-R) Fr. Ed de la Torre, Gilbert Torres, Lucia Pagador, Christopher Sorio.

Mass arrests are not limited to professionals even though the above mentioned cases clearly show new trends in the government's policy towards dissenters: being a professional with high legal status does not prevent arrest and torture even when the case is widely known. Mass arrests of farmers and workers are also on-going. Apparently, the Marcos regime is rankled by the advancing movement for nationalism and democracy, and vainly seeks to discredit it by attributing to 'subversives', the basest and vilest of motives and by picturing them as 'terrorists'. Increasingly, the regime reacts with more and more severe armed repression against the people even as it sings hosannas to 'normalization', 'democratization' and the like.

Most of the February-March detainees were arrested without any warrant of arrest. The legal justification of the arbitrary procedure dates March 9, 1982 — Letter of Instruction (LOI) 1211. According to this LOI, persons charged with insurrection, rebellion, subversion and conspiracy or proposal to commit such crimes may be arrested without any warrant if the military commander or head of the law enforcement agency decides that there is probability of escape or danger of further acts endangering public order and safety.

Arbitrary Arrests from January to July, 1982

Metro Manila	127
Luzon	83
Visayas	125
Mindanao	214
Total	549

Interrogation and torture

Most of those arrested were subjected to so called 'tactical interrogation' and severe torture. Here, we document the notes on arrest and torture of Arturo Tabara — a case which is representative of many others.

(Excerpt: Notes on Arrest and Torture of 17 political detainees arrested in Metro Manila between February 26 and March 1, 1982)

Detainee: ARTURO G. TABARA, 31 years old, married with 3 children, a resident of 2349 Raymundo St., San Andres Bukid, Manila;
Circumstances of arrest: Arrested with three others on February 26, 1982 at 88B Yale Street, Cubao, Quezon City (in the office of the Community Integrated Development Services), no arrest warrant;

Arresting unit: Composite teams of MISG and MIG-15

Places of torture: MISG headquarters in Camp Crame (from midnight of February 26 to morning of February 27), and MIG-15 (from February 27 to March 11);

Duration of torture: From February 26 to March 11, continually;

Principal torturer identified: MSgt. Balaba of MISG;

Forms of torture:

At MISG

— handcuffed, blindfolded and denied access to lawyer (he was told that 'rebel cases don't deserve any lawyer')

— fist blows on stomach and chest, and on sides

— simultaneous slapping on both ears

— kick on shins and testicles, buttocks

— head knocked against wall

— boxed several times on left side of back where the mark of a surgical operation is evident

— choking with the hand

— rubber tire pushed down torso while victim was seated, then slapped on head many times

— feet pounded with big and heavy objects (rocks wrapped in clothes?)

— one torturer ordered: 'Don't hit him on the face, we don't want any evidences!'


At MIG-15

— handgun tucked in victim's pants (in back of waistband) and photo was taken of him to show he was caught with a gun

— slapped, punched, and kicked on several parts of the body, particularly the forearms, ribs and the back (alternately or simultaneously by interrogators from MISG, RSU-5 and others)

— mental torture through aiming torture instruments at him to force out answers to questions, interrogation during unholy hours, threats (methods used by MIG-15 and MIG-Visayas)

— held in a small concrete cell (4' x 9') which lacked ventilation (hot during the day, cold at night)



Bicutan Rehabilitation Centre

— kept awake by constant questioning and by sounds of torture of fellow detainees from February 26 to March 11

— no food from February 26 to 27

For several days, Arturo Tabara's chest showed bluish welts and swelling; there were blood clots on his toes; feet and shins were swollen; he coughed incessantly for two weeks; lost 10 pounds by March 13.

Mass arrests of workers

Increasingly, Marcos is hitting harder at the workers sector. On August 13, 1982 Mr Felixberto Olalia, Chairman of Kilusan Mayo Uno (KMU) and twelve other labor unionists were arrested in Manila. The arrests took place after the raiding and ransacking of the National Federation of Labor (NFL), Philippine Alliance of Nationalist Labor Organizations (PANALO), National Federation of Labor Unions (NAFLU) and KMU offices. All those arrested, including Mr Cipriano Molonzo, Chairman of NFL, were released except for Mr Olalia. Several days later it was reported that Mr Crispine Beltran, Vice Chairman of KMU was arrested and detained along with two KMU lawyers. Many labor leaders had to go into hiding as the result of this latest wave of arrests.

Recent news received say that during a strike at Bataan Export Processing Zone (BEPZ) last May-June, 1982, a total of 53 workers of Inter-Asia Container Industries were arrested on the picket line on June 4 by the Zone Police. Only a massive solidarity walk out of 13,325 workers — 73 per cent of the entire BEPZ labor force — could eventually enforce their release after 4 days of detention.

In prison, there is struggle, outside, solidarity

In spite of their grievances, the spirit of the political detainees is still unbroken. Far from being desperate, the struggle of Filipino political prisoners adds to the wider struggle throughout the country. Prison has borne great artists and writers; in prison, many a song and poem was composed and became part of a new culture of a struggling people. Prison is even a place where dedication and direction are generated. On April 12, 1982, 29 political detainees of Camp Bagon Diwa (Bicutan Detention Center) began a 7-day fast to protest the gross violation of the human and legal rights of those 24 arrested between February 26 and March 1, 1982.

The detainees' spirit of struggle is vigorously supported by moral and material solidarity from inside and outside the country. In the Philippines, organizations like TFDP and Kapatid make efforts to add the necessary pressure to their demands. Internationally, the case of the February-March arrests, for instance, was taken up by Amnesty International and, immediately, turned into an 'Urgent Action' urging access to lawyers, medical examination and transfer to regular detention centers. On behalf of Fr. Ed de la Torre and those others arrested in April, motions moved in the Irish and Italian Parliament as well as in the European Parliament urge their release or, at least, access to due process.

Below, we present excerpts from a letter written by Juliet Delima-Sison shortly after her release to raise support for her husband who is again in solitary confinement.

May 25, 1982

Dear Friends,

I would like to seek the support of your organization in carrying out a campaign all over the world for the release of my husband Jose Ma. Sison from his prolonged detention in the fascist prison and, pending such release, for the immediate end to his solitary confinement and for his transfer to the Bicutan detention center where he can have a social life with his fellow political prisoners and freer movement.

Petitions for my husband's release can be based on universal humanitarian and democratic assumptions and on the very claims of Philippine President Ferdinand E. Marcos that his regime is humane and compassionate and that he has lifted martial law and has normalized and democratized the Philippine situation.

You are aware that in the case of my husband and other political prisoners these claims of President Marcos are belied by

the facts. Repeated legal petitions to the courts for the writ of habeas corpus, the right to bail and the right against double jeopardy have been consistently blocked by autocratic and anti-democratic assumptions. What is shamelessly wrong about the Philippine situation is that it is those accused of the most despicable anti-social crimes, like murder, rape, robbery and arson, who enjoy the rights of which political prisoners are deprived.

The Marcos regime also practices discrimination among political prisoners who are accused of the same alleged offenses as subversion and rebellion. There are those who are simply put on house arrest and tried by civilian courts. But there are those like my husband who remain under the most difficult conditions of detention and are more subject to the whims and caprices of the autocrat and his military minions.

While some of the most cruel authorities have already made clear that my husband's imprisonment is coterminous with the fascist rule, unless he is earlier killed or destroyed one way or another, petitions for his release can help to expose the injustices and false claims of the regime and thereby influence this regime to at least improve the conditions of his detention according to civilized standards.

Juliet Delima-Sison



Demonstrations calling for release of political prisoners

2. Disappearances: Is Your Neighbour Missing?

The last persons seen with the disappeared are often men in uniform carrying arms.



Arbitrary arrests which often result in torture are still the main instrument of repression. But more and more two relatively new terms in the vocabulary of human rights abuses in the Philippines keep cropping up: 'disappearances' and 'salvaging'. During the past six years, the number of those who have mysteriously disappeared for political reasons has been on the upswing. Some of them turned up later floating in a river or buried in a secret mass grave. The whereabouts of some of them remain a deep mystery to this day, leaving no clue as to where they end up.¹

In the Philippines, three general categories of disappearances have been documented:

- political dissenters, arrested under circumstances when there are no witnesses or when witnesses fail to positively identify the arresting persons, are never found again;
- remains of political dissenters are suddenly found in some isolated spot, apparently tortured and maimed. This method of disposing an unwanted dissenter is done after heavy torture. The term salvaging (which should properly mean saving rather than destroying life) is the military's jargon for summary execution. According to Armed Forces Chief Fabian Ver, the practice is also called the terminate and dispose method;
- political dissenters are kept in complete isolation for a period ranging from weeks to several months before they are brought to regular detention centers.²

Disappearances between January and September, 1981

(Excerpt: *The Philippines: The 'Disappeared'*)

During 1981, the year President Marcos was supposed to have lifted martial law and restored some of the basic rights of Filipinos, the number of the disappeared showed no sign of

dwindling. An initial compilation prepared by the Canada Asia Working Group (CAWG), the Toronto chapter and the San Francisco-based national staff of the Coalition Against the Marcos Dictatorship (CAMD) showed that 38 persons 'disappeared' in 1981. The partial list was based on confidential Telex messages from Manila and reports from the *Political Detainees Update*, a fortnightly publication of the Task Force Detainees of the Philippines led by Sister Marianni Dimaranan. The 1981 figure is expected to come close to the 1980 total of 65 disappearances when last year's list is completed.

The January 17, 1981 lifting of martial law did not seem to deter the practice by the military of making suspected enemies of the Marcos government vanish. Three days after the supposed end of military rule, the first case of disappearance was reported. More cases came to light particularly after the June 16, 1981 presidential elections. Those cases appeared to indicate that this form of repression was increasingly being favoured by the military. It was a pernicious but effective alternative to throwing people in jail where political prisoners still have a chance to tell the world of any injustices or atrocities they suffer. As long as the disappeared do not reappear as dead bodies, there are no signs of crimes committed. They do not disturb the facade of normalization which the Marcos government is trying hard to build up, according to the Coalition Against Marcos Dictatorship (CAMD).

While the term 'disappeared' first gained currency 15 years ago in Guatemala and caught worldwide attention after developments in Chile following the September 1973 coup, it was a word that human rights activists in the Philippines began using only in 1975. This does not mean, however, that nobody had disappeared for political reasons prior to that year. During the early years of martial law, there were no systematic efforts yet of

counting people who were being rounded up by the thousands.

With the birth of the Task Force Detainees of the Philippines, a more organized effort of trying to follow up the fate of persons picked up by the military or paramilitary came about. In 1975, the Task Force reported the first set of cases of the disappeared. There were only 12 verified cases but this rose to 50 in 1976 and to 73 in 1977. The figure dropped to 40 in 1978 apparently as a result of a pledge made by Mr Marcos before the World Peace Through Law Conference that violations of the rights of detainees would be stopped. But that vow appeared quickly forgotten and in the following year, the record of disappeared increased to 73.

The Task Force grouped disappearance cases into three categories: those arrested without witnesses and who are never found again; those prisoners held in isolation for weeks or months without their relatives knowing their whereabouts until they resurface in a detention center; and those who are reported missing until their dead bodies are discovered.

Like most cases of the disappeared in the Philippines, the majority of the 1981 cases fall into the first two categories. According to the partial list compiled by CAMD, some of those who were reported missing after their arrest were involved in union activities which are frowned upon by the Marcos government. Some of them had church connections. At least seven Muslims were apprehended allegedly for plotting to disrupt the June 16, 1981 presidential elections. As in many of the previous cases of the disappeared, some of the victims of disappearances in 1981 are accused of being subversives or being members of the New People's Army (NPA).

Under the 1981 partial list of disappearances, some were taken to the private homes of persons in authority where they were seen last. One whose leg was blasted off was first taken to the hospital but authorities denied his whereabouts when relatives made inquiries. Two prisoners reportedly escaped, according to the military and have not been heard of since.

The last persons seen with the 'disappeared' are often men in uniforms carrying firearms. The Task Force has good reasons to believe that the cases of disappearances have the sanction of top military and civilian officials as a standard practice though not necessarily as a matter of policy. On paper, the Marcos government is avowedly against such practices. Marcos' own ruling, General Order No. 60, of June 24, 1977 provides that the family of any person detained must be informed of the arrest within 48 hours in Metro Manila and within 72 hours elsewhere. Also, Letter of Instruction No. 621, issued by President Marcos on October 27, 1977 states that under Section 7 that prisoners be delivered to the Inquest Authority within 18 hours for minor offenses, 48 hours for more serious offenses and within 72 hours for grave offenses.

But in effect, those presidential directives are merely formal since the military and the paramilitary wantonly ignore them. The over-all statistics of disappearances recorded by the Task Force from 1975 to December 30, 1980 substantiate those violations. Within that period of time 229 people disappeared with no evidence of death. Mindanao registered 84 disappearances; Luzon, 83; Visayas, 16 and Metro Manila, 12. There were 34 cases with insufficient data obviously because of the lack of communication facilities in isolated areas in the provinces. Disappearances ending in 'salvaging' totalled 34. There were 18 verified in Luzon, eight in the Visayas, five in Mindanao and three in Metro Manila. Luzon, Visayas and Mindanao are the three major islands in the Philippines.

It is not surprising that the usual targets of disappearance and 'salvaging' schemes are the poor and the middle classes of Philippine society. In Metro Manila, the premier and largest urban area in the country, the victims are often student activists

and professionals. In other regions, those who are likely to disappear are peasants and farmers. National Minority tribes like the Tinguians of Abra and the Kalingas of Mountain Province are also susceptible to this unlawful military practice. So are the Muslims of Mindanao and other tribal groups like the Higaonons.

Despite the avowed lifting of martial law and the well-heralded promise of a return to the full restoration of democracy with the June 16 presidential election, this same pattern of repression was very much at play in 1981. The following cases are from a partial list covering the period January to September 1981. They show the pattern involved in disappearances.

Mario Molong, a farm worker, was summoned by an ex-convict connected with the military, Tomas Artista, last January 20, 1981. His body was found one week later in Barrio Luisiana, Laguna. He had burns all over his body and his fingernails were pulled out.



Four Ilocano farmers from Mindanao 'salvaged'

Rey Payag, 18, food vendor, of Sitio Pipitik, Barrio Dila-dila, Sta. Rita, Pampanga, was selling a kind of rice cake February 8, 1981 when he was arrested by the paramilitary CHDF (Civilian Home Defense Forces). It was later claimed that he escaped. His bullet-riddled body with stab wounds was found on February 11, 1981 in a bushy area of Barrio Mitla, Bacolor, Pampanga.

Antonio Sta. Ana, *Jemiliana Paguio*, *Vivencio Santos*, all detainees at Camp Tolentino, Balanga, Bataan, were said to have escaped July 7, 1981. Their relatives, however, suspect that they have been made to 'disappear' by the military. Sta. Ana, married with two children, and former student of the Jose Rizal College in Mandaluyong, Rizal, was arrested June 23, 1981 at a house in the Bataan Export Processing Zone (BEPZ) where he was working in a factory. He was whisked to Camp Tolentino, with co-worker *Jemiliana Paguio*, his wife *Procesa* and seven-year-old daughter *Jenny*. He was tortured in front of his wife and child. Santos was arrested June 8, 1981 by members of the 176th PC Coy stationed in Morong, Bataan. He was manhandled by the arresting officers, namely, Lt. Malabanan, Sgt. Quibuyen, Sgt. Vistan and three others. By the time of their alleged escape, Sta. Ana was said to be ready for release provided he had guarantors; *Paguio* who had a former mayor for guarantor was also said to be awaiting her freedom; and Santos was scheduled to be bailed out

on July 8, 1981 after trial.

Benjamin de Vera, was reported missing July 13, 1981 after he was transferred from Camp Catiptipan, Davao City where he was held incommunicado since he was arrested July 13, 1981. After a phone call he made from the camp, his father Jose S. de Vera, Sr., expressed concern over his subsequent disappearance in a letter the old man sent July 22, 1981 to Brig. Gen. Alfredo S. Olano, Regional Commander, RECOM XI, PC Barracks, Davao City. He was brought back to the PC Barracks September 4, 1981. According to *Political Detainees Update* of April, 1982 Benjamin de Vera, allegedly secretary general of the Communist Party of the Philippines-Mindanao Region, together with three other detainees held at the 431st PC barracks, Davao, succeeded in escaping on the early dawn of April 28, 1982.

Curran Macapundag, *Alai Balindong*, (picked up May 23, 1981), *Arsad Malawan*, Casim Sarip, Acob Marohom, Bolcano Marohom, Mangomenta Sarip (arrested May 27, 1981) and *Sam-pato (Sammy) Maulana* (apprehended June 21, 1981), are all Muslims. The military took them in during a wave of arrests aimed at Muslims allegedly conspiring to disrupt the June 16, 1981 presidential elections. Curran, a 28-year-old fourth year engineering student, married with three children, was arrested with Balindong, alleged commander of the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) by presidential security men led by a certain Col Dumpit. After their arrest, their relatives were kept in the dark as to where they were detained.

Edgardo Bangoy, 17, was picked up September 15, 1981 in Mintal, Tugbok, Davao City. Subsequently, his four sisters made inquiries as to where he was detained from Lt. Gerry Ingalla, station commander and Lt. Delfin Olano, PC barracks head, but received no positive reply. Later, on September 7, 1981 Bangoy's family was told about a radio report regarding a dead body taken to Funeraria Villa on Monteverde Avenue, Davao City. There were signs of torture, gun wounds and stabbing. The military said he was killed in an 'encounter'.

**Over-all Statistics of Disappearances
(with no evidence of death)
as of December 1981**

Year	Insuffi- cient Data	Metro Manila	Luzon	Visayas	Mindanao
1975	2	1	5		1
1976	4	4	35		1
1977	14	3	9	1	
1978	6	1	4	2	20
1979	8	2	11	5	38
1980		1	19	8	25
1981		2			36
Total	34	14	83	16	121

Over-all Total: 268

(Source: *Muzzled Voices, Struggling Spirits*)

Each single case of disappearance causes fear and nightmares to relatives and friends of the beloved person who is missing. The uncertainty of his/her whereabouts, the unawareness of his/her condition is hard to bear. Here we document the grievance of a father who was looking for his son already for five months — and three months later he reportedly had not heard of him yet.

Republic of the Philippines
Kiangon, Ifugao
Barangay Camandag

Hon. Zosimo Paredes
Office of the Governor
Lagawe, Ifugao

Dec. 11, 1981

Lt. Col. Jesus Cuerzon
Office of the Provincial PC Command
Lagawe, Ifugao

Dear Sirs,

It is already five months since the disappearance of our son, Daulayan Tadao. Numerous letters, even delegations, have been sent to various government offices in his behalf. To wit:

a) July 21, 1981 — Mayor Jose Guyguyon of Kiangon, Ifugao wrote letter to Major Esteban, Assistant Provincial Commander of Bayombong, Nueva Vizcaya and Mayor de la Cruz of Bayombong, Nueva Vizcaya to ask his whereabouts. This letter was personally delivered by Simplicia Pullupol of Barrio Amduntog, Kiangon on July 22, 1981 to the office of Major Esteban and Mayor Adriano de la Cruz.

b) On August 17, 1981 a teenager claimed to have seen and talked with Daulayan who was escorted by a policeman in Bintawan, Villaverde, Nueva Vizcaya. An affidavit of the said teenager was made in the presence of Amado Cuyahon, Probation Officer of Bayombong, Nueva Vizcaya, Mayor Guyguyon of Kiangon and Mayor Quirino Vicente of Ambaguio, Nueva Vizcaya. This statement was submitted to the PC Provincial Command of Nueva Vizcaya. This office in turn promised to send an investigating team to Bintawan, Villaverde, Nueva Vizcaya.

c) September 19, 1981 — Mayor Guyguyon and a companion again went to Bayombong to check the result of the Affidavit. They were able to talk with the Provincial Commander about the case. The PC Commander said that if an investigation will start, he would send a message to the Mayor of Kiangon.

d) September 23, 1981 — a barrio delegation of 10 which included the barrio Captain of Camandag, the Mayor of Kiangon and the Mayor of Ambaguio went to the Bayombong PC Command and had a talk once more with the PC Commander regarding the case. Lt. Col. Guerzon was also present.

e) November 3, 1981 — a petition signed by 183 people was delivered by Angelito Tadao to Mayor Guyguyon of Kiangon. Another copy was addressed to the Ifugao PC and personally given by Mayor Guyguyon and three others.

But until now, we have to see visible results of our efforts and petitions.

For the sake of justice and human consideration, we appeal to your office to help us locate our son, and to make proper investigation surrounding his mysterious disappearance. And we demand his immediate release, from whatever detention he may be in within a period of one week. Thus, immediate and prompt action from your office would greatly relieve us of present anguish and untold worries.

Respectfully yours,

Signed by 233 residents of
Barrio Camandag, Kiangon, Ifugao

Copy Furnished:

Defense Minister — Juan Ponce Enrile
Hon. Assemblyman — Gualberto Lumauig
Provincial Command, Nueva Vizcaya
Judge Gabriel Dulnuan (ret)
Mayor Jose Guyguyon (Kiangon, Ifugao)
Mayor Adriano de la Cruz (Bayombong, Nueva Vizcaya)
Parish Priest of Kiangon
Parish Priest of Lagawe

Footnotes

1. *The Philippines: The Disappeared* — Submission prepared for the 38th session of the UN Commission on Human Rights, February-March, 1982.
2. *Muzzled Voices, Struggling Spirits* — First National Conference on Human Rights, February, 17-18, 1982.

3. Emerging Patterns: From Individual Salvaging to Massacres and War Tactics

The lifting of martial law in 1981 has done nothing to minimize carnage in the Philippines.



Despite the return to 'normalization' there has been an alarming escalation of violence against the people in 1981-82, along with the emergence of disturbing new trends. Military atrocities have reached an all time high as popular resistance continues to grow. Individual salvagings of people summarily executed have given way to mass murders on an unprecedented scale. A notable feature is the more systematic use of bombing, strafing, and shelling against the people.

These latest measures to quell dissent can truly be termed 'war tactics', and represent the intensifying efforts of the regime to maintain 'public order' in the face of growing organized opposition. The emerging patterns are most apparent in those areas where the revolutionary struggle is most advanced (e.g. Samar, Mindanao and Cagayan Valley) or where the existence of development projects and foreign interests demand such measures.

Another ominous trend is the use of paramilitary groups, especially fanatical religious sects with strong links to the military. Many killings have been attributed to these sects in the past year, particularly in Mindanao.

But as these trends develop and heighten into even more vicious forms of repression on the people a corresponding pattern of determined and growing opposition also emerges. In an ironic twist the intensified militarization has led to growing resistance against the regime.

Extrajudicial execution: salvaging

The dictionary defines the word 'salvage' as an act to save from shipwreck, fire or the like but in the human rights jargon in the Philippines, it means the reverse: it refers to the atrocious practice by the police, the military and paramilitary of 'eliminating' suspected enemies of the state or even innocent civilians. The 'salvaged' victims are often dumped in watery graves, or impaled like pigs ready for roasting, beheaded, mutilated (ears are cut off and strung together as evidence of killings) or burned. The savage ways by which the Marcos government brought death to many have been verified and documented by the Task Force Detainees of the Philippines (TFD) and accurately reported in publications such as the book *Pumipiglas* (Struggling for Freedom).

In 1981, the lifting of martial law on paper did nothing to minimize carnage in the Philippines. The list of killings — totall-

ing 500 between 1975 and 1980 — appeared to be getting longer each year. Some of the brutal murders against the citizenry in 1981 were carried out either in isolated areas such as cemeteries or in public places such as streets during rallies, some of them either ambush-style or in a military fashion by lining up victims against the wall. Others 'salvaged' were killed either singly or in a group, ranging from an entire family to almost the entire population of a village.¹

The most recent figures available from TFD for January-July 1982 show no let up in 'salvagings'. The partial list for this period shows that Mindanao sustains the most number of salvaging cases. As in the past years documented cases in 1982 reveal that the salvaging victims usually belong to the poor and middle classes of the Philippines.

**Salvaging
Overall Statistics
As of July 1982**

Year	Luzon	Visayas	Mindanao	Total
1975	3			3
1976	12			12
1977	17	21	6	44
1978	19	44	15	78
1979	47	42	123	212
1980	23	19	109	151
1981	34	49	224	307
'75-'81 total	155	175	477	807
1982 Jan-Jul	21	20	30	71

(Partial list)

Assassination: a new trend in extrajudicial executions

Recent events indicate that the Marcos regime is hitting more and more at the professional and religious ranks, and is willing to resort to outright assassination of public figures. The recent assassination of Dr. Bobby de la Paz, a medical doctor in Samar, on March 24, 1982, is a case in point. The main suspect in the assassination is the military, who branded Dr. de la Paz as a 'subversive'.

The attempted assassination of Fr. Sucilla, a board member of the National Secretariat for Social Action (NASSA) on March 5, 1982 further points to a new trend of executing well-known public figures whom Marcos perceives as a threat to the regime.



Mass murder: a qualitative leap

Mass murder, often in the specific form of open massacre perpetrated against ordinary peasants — men, women, children, young and old alike, gives further evidence to the increasing blatancy and ruthlessness by which the regime is presently pursuing its policy of 'preserving the national security'. The increasing frequency of massacres indicates an emerging pattern, rather than isolated incidences.

Economic interests

Not surprisingly mass murders usually occur where there is strong resistance or where economic interests are at stake. They are committed by both the military and paramilitary groups, and perpetrated in the name of 'public order'. This often camouflages the underlying economic reasons for the massacres.

The recent massacre in Masaymon, Leyte on March 23, 1982, where nine people were killed by the PC demonstrates this very clearly. The fact-finding mission to Leyte, in the wake of the massacre, links the massacre with the military's five-year old counter-insurgency campaign in the area. Militarization began there as far back as 1976, coinciding with the implementation of the Imelda Resettlement Project in the region. In that year, the land of about fifty thousand families was declared 'forestal' land by the Ministry of Agrarian Reform, and was taken over for resettlement sites. The families were offered three hectares in compensation. However, some of the project sites were actually not forestal areas and had long been cultivated. Furthermore, there were reports that there were gold and copper ore deposits in the sites. These reports were given credence when a German mining firm arrived in 1981, and conducted tests in the area. Protests began as early as 1976. Immediately, the iron arm of the state became evident. The recent massacre is just one further step in the regime's policy of repression in the area.

1981 massacres

In 1981, there were several massacres which culminated in the Sagod massacre (Samar), on September 15, 1981. 45 people were killed by members of the Special Forces of the Integrated Civilian Home Defense Force (ICHDF or CHDF), a para-military group of the armed forces. The salaries of the Special Forces are paid through the security agency at the San Jose Timber Corp., a logging concession in the area.

- The Sagod massacre had several precedents, for example:
- Guinagayen, Quezon: two people were killed and 21 wounded on Feb. 1, 1981.
 - Daet, Camarines Norte: four people were killed and 50 wounded on July 13, 1981.
 - Culasi, Antique: seven people were killed and seven wounded on December 19, 1981.

No let up in Mindanao

Mindanao bore the brunt of the new trend in mass abuse. The following is a partial list of massacres committed in 1981 against the people of Mindanao.

- On February 9, 1981 at 5.15 early in the morning, barrio Bagumbayan and Kauswagan town in Lanao del Norte were assailed by unidentified heavily armed men. 12 people were massacred (ten of them died on the spot), 22 others were wounded in which 17 of them were brought to the hospital. It was also reported that the said group burned down a house. Loud successive bursts were heard that echoed like thunder. The armed men were believed to have used AK-47, BAR, M-79, M-16, M-14, Garand rifles and Carbine as evidenced by the bullet shells that were found later.
- Five farmers of Sitio Kiatga, Rizal, Buenavista, Agusan del Norte were massacred on March 17, 1981 by unidentified military men in Sitio Kiatga at about 9.00 in the morning.
- Three residents of Bacolod, Lanao del Norte were massacred on April 1, 1981 by unidentified armed men. Their dead bodies were severely mutilated. Their ears and heads were cut. Around their eyeballs were punctured with sharpened bamboo sticks.
- Three persons died and one was seriously wounded when a member of the Lost Command identified as Edgar Tutor, fired his gun indiscriminately at the passengers aboard a ford fiero, on April 10, 1981 without any apparent reason, near the gate of Bututan Logs office.
- Six unidentified persons were killed on May 18, 1981 by unidentified airborne elements in Crismor, Bagumbayan, Sultan Kudarat while having a vigil. The place was raided by the military authorities who ordered all the women to get out from the house leaving all the men inside. They began strafing the house with their M-16 rifles and razed the house to the ground killing the six unidentified men inside.
- Three persons were shot to death on May 22, 1981 by six elements of the 35th IB, PA near the police outpost, fronting the main gate of the Cotabato supermarket. The three came from the old market in Cotabato City on their way to the supermarket.



Family massacred in Mindanao

Upon reaching the outpost, they were ordered to stop by six drunk soldiers. They were bodily searched and questioned about a rebel commander whom the soldiers suspected to be one of them. Without any warning, the military authorities fired their guns at closed range and killed them on the spot.

- Three persons were killed on May 22, 1981 by unidentified military men in South Upi, Maguindanao at 7.00 in the evening. Their money worth P1,000.00 was looted by their assailants.
- Five persons were killed on May 23, 1981 by soldiers belonging to the 42nd IB, PA at 4.00 p.m. in Campo Uno, Parang, Maguindanao. They were suspected MNLF members. They were on their way to Parang Poblacion to buy some things needed for their graduation rites when the incident happened.
- Five persons were strafed to death on May 25, 1981 by elements of the 42nd IB, Bravo Company, PA who were manning the checkpoint in Campo uno, Parang, Maguindanao at about 7.00 in the evening. The victims were aboard the two Ford Fiera heading towards the municipality of Matanog. Upon reaching the checkpoint, they were ordered to disembark from their vehicles and were immediately hogtied, beaten and shot to death. They were suspected as MNLF members.
- Five persons were massacred on May 27, 1981 by CHDF and 4Ks members, a fanatical religious sect in Pyate, Likabang, Dumingag, Zamboanga del Sur. They were farming when shot to death.
- Ten unidentified farmers of Kapatagan, Digos, Davao del Sur, were arrested and shot to death sometime in August, 1981 by elements of the 22nd Marine company under Lt. Adel Andaya. Their dead bodies were burned.
- Three farmers of Dulop, Dumingag, Zamboanga del Sur, were killed on August 27, 1981 by CHDF and 4Ks members after attending a benefit dance in Dulop.
- Five unidentified farmers were slain on August 27, 1981 by members of the Rock Christ, another fanatical religious sect, in Gitason.
- Three residents of Roxas, Aloran, Misamis Occidental were killed on September 20, 1981 by elements of the 9th IB, PA and some CHDF members. Their house was strafed with M-16 bullets at 3.00 in the morning. They were killed instantly.
- The Adapon family was massacred on October 2, 1981 at 10 in the evening while they were sleeping in their house. Their house was strafed with M-16, M-14 and garand rifles by members of the CHDF and airborne elements stationed in Josefina, Zamboanga del Sur.²

Altogether there were 103 people killed in massacres in 1981 in Mindanao. There are no absolute figures available for the number massacred in the whole of the Philippines, in 1981 or 1982. However, it is clear that the trend continues.

Recent massacres

- Nueva Ecija: 11 people were killed in three massacres between January and March, 1982.
- Sitio Lanapan, Canibongan, Roxas, Zamboanga del Norte: 13 people were killed by PC troopers, on January 27, 1982.
- Barrio Seri-ac, Dumingag, Zamboanga del Sur: 12 people were killed by the Iiaga, a terror group with links to the Civilian Home Defense Force, on February 12, 1982.
- Bulacan: Five people were killed on June 21, 1982.

War tactics

This pattern of mass abuse is further heightened by the more frequent resort to methods of warfare. In what is reminiscent of the

Vietnam war, villages have been bombed, strafed or shelled in an effort to terrorise the population, and flush out the NPA guerrillas. Mindanao in particular, has suffered from this escalation of violence against the people, which is tantamount to open warfare. Figures from Jan-April 1981 show that 23 people were killed in bombing incidences in Mindanao, with over 200 injured.

Davao City cathedral bombing

This occurred on Easter Sunday, April 19, 1981, a few meters from the altar of St Peter's Cathedral. There were two grenades exploding within 30 minutes of each other. After the second explosion bursts of M-16 rifles were heard. The bombings were allegedly carried out by the 'Lost Command' and elements from the PC headquarters in Davao City. 17 people were killed in the blast, over 200 injured.

Four other bombing incidences took place in Mindanao in 1981, with six people killed and several others wounded.

In May 1982, four warplanes of the Philippine Air Force dropped sixteen bombs in the Barrio of Bayog, Zamboanga del Sur, killing three people, wounding eight, and causing 116 families to evacuate.

Strafing

Strafing incidences have been reported even in areas outside of Mindanao; in Nueva Ecija, the Cordillera and in Samar.

In Bataan, for example, on January 7, 1982, certain elements of the Philippine Constabulary and the military secret unit strafed a house in barrio Wakas, Pilar following an intelligence report that subversives were hiding in the house. Five suspects reportedly went out of the house to surrender but were herded back to the house where they were killed. The military claimed that it was an encounter.³

'We are here to lend support to the province which is a high resource of big business especially at Mariveles where the Bataan Export Processing Zone is located and at Bagao where the Bataan Nuclear Power Plan is situated,' contributed Captain Benedicto Corona, Executive Officer of the 4th Marine battalion, in an interview with the military in the province.⁴

Shelling

Shelling attacks have been reported from Mindanao-Sulu and Samar in 1981-82. The biggest attack was directed against the civilian population on Pata Island, Sulu. A report from the *Far Eastern Economic Review* of May 8, 1981, states that the government moved against a former MNLF commander, Unad, who was allegedly involved in arms dealing, piracy and kidnapping, on Pata, in April 1981. According to the report, Unad knew of the military's plan, and opened fire on the troops after succeeding in having them remove their ammunition magazines so that both sides could talk. The government forces reloaded, and opened fire, killing Unad and many of his followers. The survivors retreated inland. Within 24 hours government forces stripped the engines of all the island boats, and blew up the hulls. Then naval bombardment began. The military then moved inland, shooting and burning as they went, and they reduced barrio after barrio to ruins. Later they shelled the island, and conducted operations in several areas. Lowest official figures of civilian deaths came from the region's constabulary commander — he estimated that 400 people were killed. Unofficial estimates based on refugees' reports ranged up to 2000 people killed.

More shelling

As a result of shelling on April 7, 1981, many families fled from the three barrios of Pugpog, Tudaya, and Tampurong, Mindanao. An old man died from shell shock in Tampurong. The shelling was repeated in the same areas in July 1981, and was ex-

tended to four neighboring barrios.

Shelling seems to be most prevalent in Mindanao, and is emerging as a definite trend, in areas thought to be harboring, or sympathetic to, the NPA or the MNLF.

In Samar, it is reported that 2,000 people from four villages of Roxas, Hibonaon, Paguiti and Samuroy fled their homes after a shelling attack on their areas on April 8, 1982. There has been no verification of casualties, as the area was closed off shortly after the shelling.

The latest trends, from individual salvaging to massacres, to the more frequent resort to tactics like shelling and strafing, indicate that the militarization drive has shifted gears, and that the people will be subjected to even more intense repression in the future. Side by side with this heightened militarization is the corresponding development of para-military forces, including fanatical sects, particularly in Mindanao. Many of these groups have close links with the military.

Paramilitaries

The most notorious of these is the 'Lost Command' of Agusan, reportedly headed by a lieutenant colonel of the Philippine Constabulary. A string of murders, salvagings and even massacres have been attributed to this 100-odd men unit. The group also provides security to the vast palm oil plantations in Agusan. The multinationals in the area rely heavily on the Lost Command for assistance in evicting farmers and indigenous Manobo tribesmen from the plantation sites. For example, Guthrie, an English owned firm, engages the help of the Lost Command to throw peasants off their lands, in order to make way for a palm-oil plantation. The Lost Command also forays into nearby provinces; the San Pedro Cathedral bombing was allegedly done by this group.

The regime has also mobilized such groups as the barangay brigades. Tanod, and even Metro Manila aides to harass civilian populations, especially at rallies and demonstrations, etc. In early August of this year, Marcos established a new 1000 strong, heavily armed and non-uniformed force ('secret marshals') to ride the Metro Manila buses and jeepneys, supposedly to protect civilians against 'criminal elements'. Within the first week 41 people were gunned down by the marshals in the city. Under public pressure Marcos ordered that half of the force were to wear uniform, and reminded them that they were to shoot to disable, not to kill. With the creation of this new force a new wave of terror has swept over Manila, with the police and

military becoming the enforcers, accusers, prosecutors, judges and executioners of the law.

The Integrated Civilian Home Defense Force which numbers 175,000 throughout the Philippines, frequently engages in military operations, together with either the military or paramilitary groups.

Fanatical religious sects


Many of the emerging religious sects are actually paramilitary forces. Although professing to be 'Christians' the sect members have engaged in the atrocious killings and mutilations of defenseless barrio inhabitants, settlers and tribal Filipinos. Among these notorious groups are the Rock Christ and Likos-Likos in Zamboanga and Misamis area; the KKKKs, the Patik and the Tadtad in Bukidnon; Rizalistas in Agusan and the PBMA in Surigao. As gathered from among various reports and testimonies, these groups recruit barrio residents to join them. Those who refuse are usually killed and mutilated to serve as warning to the others. Residents are frightened, flee their barrios and end up in evacuation centers. What is disturbing is that apparently these groups have been trained and armed by the local military or are CHDF members themselves. These groups are also concentrated in the areas where the presence of the NPA or MNLF are strongly felt. Military investigations of these incidents have dragged along and it seems no perpetrators have been apprehended at all.

Another religious sect is the Rural Reformist Movement (RRM), which operates in Davao and North Cotabato. It serves to secure banana and pineapple plantations along with logging concessions in the area. The sect members are responsible for several atrocities; in Davao del Norte, for example, they shot or beheaded about one hundred people in early 1981. About four hundred inhabitants of the area fled to the town of Calinan to escape the terror campaign. Sources in Davao claim that the RRM is controlled by the National Intelligence and Security Authority (NISA), and that the leader, Alitrap, has been receiving orders from Quirico Urgab, alleged to be a NISA officer.⁶

The Charismatic Movement of the Philippines (CMP) also operates in Mindanao. Its main functions have been to observe NPA movements in strategic areas where guerrilla bases are thought to be set up. It also puts armed men on NPA pathways with orders to kill any armed men entering the area, and to confiscate arms for their own use. The CMP are responsible for an incident in Tiko early 1981, where several NPA men were killed



Government forces: Integrated Civilian Home Defense Force in Mindanao



Cebu public hearing

without a fight. The villagers were persuaded to identify the NPA at a CMP session, the NPA were then killed.

Resistance

The massacres and other military atrocities have caused public outrage and condemnation, largely through the efforts of human rights groups. In the militarized areas themselves, the people have shown their resistance by a remarkable display of militance in the face of human tragedy.

Last November 22, at a public hearing organized by the 'Makabayang Kilusan para Isulong ang Katarungan' (MAKIISAKA — Nationalist Movement for the Advancement of Justice), the jury, composed of two lawyers, a nun, a bishop of the United Church of Christ in the Philippines, a bishop of the Philippine Independent Church, a Catholic priest and a Cebu politician, concluded, after hearing the testimony of witnesses and survivors of military terrorism in Samar, that 'there is... a continuing pattern of torture, of sadism, of killing in cold blood. There are no subversives except the military.' The hearing was part of a 3-month campaign against military atrocities and abuses launched by the organization which culminated on December 10, 1981, the 33rd anniversary of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.⁷

Footnotes

1. Submission to the 38th session of the UN Commission on Human Rights, Feb-March 1982.
2. *Mindanao: the bleeding land* (an update, 1981)
3. Task Force for Detainees, 'Update' March 15, 1982.
4. *ibid.*
5. *Katarungan*, April-May 1982.
6. *Far Eastern Economic Review*, April 24, 1981.
7. *NDF Update*, November-December, 1981.

Postscript

A Dutch visitor who visited Mindanao recently writes his observations of a paramilitary group, the ICHDF, in a barrio in the valley of the Agusan River.

...The military left a few weeks before and turned over the responsibility for 'security' to the 'integrated' civil home defense force (ICHDF), which is a civilian force (vigilantes) of over 20 villagers. In such an isolated place, the distribution of weapons to such a group of 'well-motivated' inhabitants is a perfect show-case of the 'divide and rule' strategy. Before fellow-Filipinos were used as military guards, now fellow-villagers are set against each other! For the people it becomes more dangerous, now that guarding 'law and order' has been handed over to such elements.

While going back from the village this became very clear to me: twice we met a group of four armed 'guardsmen', some of the second group were really drunk! We had to shake hands and answer all sorts of questions. The power of a weapon, the isolated place, the unpredictability of a drunken man, this all added up to convince me how relatively easy it is for killings to take place and be sure to stay unknown and unreported. This was the first time during my stay in the Philippines that I felt real fear!

The story of one of our guides show how well founded this fear is: he and his friend were stopped by the military, some of whom were drunk. One soldier threatened them with his gun, while some others tried to stop him. The soldier however started to shoot. The guide and his friend ran for their lives and escaped. One of the soldiers was fatally injured.

The population is being pressured and intimidated in such a dramatic way that they dare not refuse to sell the land and stay in the fertile valley of the Agusan river.

4. An Old Tactic Revived: Strategic Hamlets

Counter-insurgency or land takeover?



The anguish of an evacuee, Mindanao

History repeats itself

The phenomenon of hamletting is not new to the Filipino people. Philippine history records the 'reducciones' during the Spanish colonial period and the 'reconcentration camps' started by Gen. Franklin Bell in December 1901 during the American occupation.

Constantino enlightens us as to how simple the 'reconcentration' was:

The strategic hamlets of Vietnam were preceded by the reconcentration camps in the Philippines... Bell directed his commanders to set up the outer limits of an area around each town chosen as a zone of reconcentration and to inform the people that before December 25, 1901, they must move into this zone... all property found outside the zone after said date would be confiscated and destroyed. Furthermore, after January 1, 1902 any man found outside the reconcentration area would be arrested and imprisoned if he could not produce a pass or would be shot if he attempted to run away.¹

The extent of economic dislocation caused by the reconcentration can be gleaned from the fact that the rice harvest was down to one-fourth of the normal production level, 90 per cent of the carabaos had died or had been slaughtered for food and the lands planted to coffee, sugar and tobacco became virtually a jungle.

As for casualties, 'General Bell himself estimated that one-sixth of the population of Luzon had died as a result of the various campaigns to crush resistance. This would put the number of casualties to 600,000. Other authorities put the death directly caused by the war at 200,000.'²

Counter-insurgency tactic

By the time US imperialism had to face the heroic liberation struggle of the Vietnamese people, its war experts had further improved their skills and techniques of counter-insurgency:

To meet growing insurgency among the rural population, the strategic hamlet program was initiated in 1962. The purpose of the strategic hamlets was to prevent contact between villagers and the Viet Cong. Villagers were either encouraged or ordered to move into central locations and then dig a moat and build a stockade around their settlement. It was felt that by concentrating many people in

one place, the Viet Cong could be prevented from getting food and intelligence. At the same time, social and economic services such as schools and first-aid stations were to be provided.³

The program was meant to imitate the successful British counter-insurgency campaign in Malaya. But while in Malaya almost all insurgents were Chinese and thus easily distinguishable from the darker Malayan majority, and further, during a period of ten years (1950-1960), relatively few people had to suffer the upsets of relocation, in Vietnam over half the population was claimed to have been put in the strategic hamlets in slightly more than a year.

As everybody knows, the US counter-insurgency program in Vietnam was a tremendous disaster. As a Vietnamese official summed up the Program:

Asking the villagers to dig a hole around their village in the hot sun while their rice became overripe and fell to the ground was perfect propaganda for the Viet Cong. Instead of separating the population from the Viet Cong, we were making Viet Cong.⁴

Hamletting Filipino style

Nevertheless, the US backed Marcos government adopted the program, and US trained military personnel implemented 'hamletting' in the Philippines. As early as 1972, after martial law was declared, Isabella and other areas in Northern Luzon became testing ground for hamlets 'Filipino style'. Thousands of peasants were driven away by the PC from their homes and fields, and resettled in refugee camps. In Isabella alone, provincial officials estimate that 50,000 barrio folk were forced to abandon their meagre belongings, crops and work animals and were turned into refugees and nomads.⁵

Areas preferred for forced relocation were areas of NPA or MNLF activities. According to the Department of Social Welfare Annual Report for 1973-74, there were 1.9 million 'evacuees' as a result of government operations. The largest number of refugees were Muslim Filipinos, reflecting the intensity of fighting in the Muslim area at that time. In 1975, the MNLF estimated that as many as 500,000 Muslims had been forced out of their lands and homes.

In June and July 1974, the government's new strategy reached the Ifugao people in the mountain province famous for its rice terraces. The whole population of Unit 5 (one of Banaue's five

districts) was forcibly evacuated from their homes to places of concentration, where the military could monitor their activities. The rationale behind this displacement method was supposedly to deprive the revolutionary New People's Army (NPA), which is active in the area, of its 'mass base'.

In these concentration areas, the people could not go to their mountain clearings (*kaingin*) where they could dig some of their staple food (*camote*). They neglected their rice terraces (*payew*). Farm animals died under stress or were lost in the confusion of transferring. Many Igorots were ordered to work without any pay in the road constructions. Consequently, they got hungrier everyday. Ailments spread rapidly, especially among children.⁶

Displacement spreads

In December 1975, evacuation started in the Benguet boundary town of Buguias. Nearly the whole municipality, accounting for more than 420 families (approx. 2,500 people) was displaced. Early 1977, some barrios of the adjacent town of Hungduan (Ifugao-Benguet boundary) were evacuated; and then, some barrios of Units 2 and 5 of Banaue. The ejected Igorots were either concentrated in PC detachments or simply ordered to live near the highways, far from the NPA and their former homes.

Instead of providing food, appropriate housing and medical treatment to compensate for the harm they had caused, PC-PA teams called the people for meetings to 'convince' them by threats and promises. There was no doubt about the efficiency and success of such methods: Psy-war expert Col. Dulay was heard to have said in one of these meetings in Banaue: 'I'll bring forth the unity between the government and the people of Unit 5 in one month.'⁷

Wherever the military didn't succeed in convincing the people that way, more compelling methods were introduced.

On March 9, 1977, an Armed Forces of the Philippines helicopter strafed the mountain forests of Unit 5 from the sitio of Kibakdayan to Loboong. It was a lucky thing that nobody was

hurt because the area was Igorot hunting ground, *kaingin* site, as well as wood source for fuel, housing and wood carvings.

But the warning was clear: Evacuate Your Homes! Don't Resist!⁸

Economic interests

But as early as 'hamletting' was first implemented by the Marcos government forces, people, too, started asking for the real score behind this scheme.

The presence of the New People's Army is of course a fast answer. This fact has never been denied by the government and military who have in fact, made this, the excuse for the evacuation.

Another explanation for the serious attention that the boundary region has been getting, lies in the economic possibilities that these mountains present.

Bo. Baculungan, Buguias has been attracting but eluding prospectors for gold and copper; Bo. Asin, for its natural gas; and barrios Tukucan, Tollodan and Binablayan for sulfur. In fact, there is a government plan to build roads that shall embrace the general area and penetrate the particular places where the mines are located. But such plans have long been frustrated by the Igorots harassing technicians and destroying machinery.

In Tukucan, the people have been using sulfur powder for medical purposes. Boils, wounds, weak lungs, dysentery are claimed to be cured by either the powder or the sulfur hot springs. So the Tukucan people say, 'Why should we want the government roads? These are being built so they can take away the sulfur! We have the road, they have the sulfur. Was the government ever interested in building any trails when it was not aware of the sulfur?' Now that the Tukucan people have been evacuated, road-building may at last be started.⁹

Displacement in Samar

What is true for the Mountain Province of Northern Luzon is even more obvious for the island of Samar where forced reloca-



Homes are dismantled so that interiors are visible to passing soldiers

Photo: Rolf Kharberg

tion started in the east in 1975, and then spread to the west and to the north. Samar is rich in natural resources: coconut (R.P.'s top export), rich pastureland, abundant minerals (copper, iron, aluminium, chromite, zinc, manganese, lead, nickel, cobalt and uranium), the best of Philippine hardwood, and plenty of fish. But the people of Samar belong to the poorest in the country. 74 per cent of their land is allotted and used for logging, mining and cattle-grazing by a few corporations and individuals. Australian interests are moving in to exploit mineral resources in the north-west. Likewise, Japanese interests are intruding into fishing grounds in the western area. The following observations of an international fact finding mission to Samar in 1979 give a clear idea of how people in Samar are deprived of their livelihood and their land:

It was said that in 1971, bauxite was discovered in the upper part of Samar. This prompted President Marcos to close the island to business prospectors. To this day, only the government can issue permits to those wishing to engage in business there...

Gandara occupies a significant position in the quest of bauxite. Sometime ago, the establishment of a cattle ranch drove the people away from their homes. The people were fenced in and their lands were fenced out to provide grazing ground for the cattle. The cattle came from Biliran Island which is reputedly owned by the First Lady.

When the people were driven out of their lands, the supply of cattle was mysteriously cut, leading to the death of the ranch. It was only after some time that people realized the ranch was merely being used as a ploy to ease them out of the land in the least obtrusive way. The real importance of the land lay not in the grazing ground it could provide but in its rich deposit of bauxite.

It was observed that where there are rich mineral deposits in Samar, there the military presence is most acutely felt. Gandara, Gamay, Arteche, San Jose de Buan, Dolores, Can-Avid, and others belong to the rich mining areas. They are also heavily concentrated with troops.¹⁰

Figures on the extent of forced evacuation in Samar are given by a more recent source which indicates the real reasons behind the hamletting:

A conservative estimate places the number of refugees in Samar at 100,000: 50,000 in the north, 40,000 in the west, and 10,000 in the east. As of last December, 1980, 43 barrios in Northern Samar had been completely evacuated.

Farmers are driven out of their lands to make way for mopping-up operations and to starve out the NPA fighters. Another reason behind the forced evacuation is the need to facilitate foreign investment in the extraction of raw materials.¹¹

Recent hamletting

In the early eighties, experiments made with relocation in various areas in the Philippines seem to bear fruit. It's only since the second half of 1981 that the whole pattern of strategic hamletting has fully emerged. There are strong indications that the 'strategic hamlets' program will be implemented wherever people's resistance to the 'development' plans of the government and foreign interests is anticipated. Obviously, the lesson learned from Vietnam is that the strategic hamlet program only works if it is implemented in the early stages of a liberation war. As soon as half of the population is organized by liberation forces, strategic hamlets turn into a disadvantage rather than being a counter-insurgency measure. In Vietnam, whole hamlets became organized and effectively used by the Viet Cong.



An evacuated family, Mindanao

Photo: Renato Alonso

In October 1981, strategic hamlets were set up in the mountain province of Abra where the Tinguians are opposing the Philippine government's P1.5 billion-worth pulp and paper processing venture Cellophil Resources Corporation (CRC). At the same time the first so-called 'groupings' or 'live-in' areas were reported from the town of Laac, Davao del Norte. Here the land take-over of Industrial Tree Plantations (ITP) — a government program — would lead to peasant resistance in the area. By May, 1982, reports received indicate that there are now a total of 169 town and barrio-wide hamlets in Mindanao. Involving a staggering population of 217,644, these hamlets are spread over the provinces of Davao del Norte, Davao del Sur, Davao Oriental, Agusan del Norte, Agusan del Sur, Bukidnon, North Cotabato, Zamboanga del Sur and Misamis Occidental. Outside Mindanao, hamletting is reported not only from Abra but Cagayan Valley and the islands of Panay and Samar. Fact finding missions are still collecting information about the extent of hamletting and the conditions in the different areas.

Due to the rash of protest by farmers, civic and church groups the government could not but admit to the existence of strategic hamlets in several parts of the country. The minister of defense, Juan Ponce Enrile vigorously denies that these were ever authorized by the national government or the defense ministry. Last March 3, 1982 Enrile even ordered the dismantling of 'forcible groupings' in the Agusan and Davao Provinces. However, specific guidelines for dismantling the hamlets, if there were any, were not made public. Hamlets continue to exist, and they are rapidly growing in number. And wherever it comes to the point of enforcement, military operatives and local government officials are seen to join hands.

Here, we reprint the report of a research team of the Concerned Citizens of Laac which provides an overview of hamletting in Laac and, at the same time serves as an example of conditions in hamletted areas throughout the country. Some facts and figures on the extent and pattern of strategic hamletting proves that it is a nation-wide program with a common pattern introduced in various parts of the country almost at the same time. Nevertheless there is a growing people's resistance in the affected areas supported by civic and religious human rights groups. Fact finding missions survey the hamletted towns, barangays and sitios, talk with the people, list down their complaints about military abuses, gather data about casualties among civilians due to hamletting and militarization. These missions are often a response to open letters of appeal and protest to concerned citizens, from the people of the affected areas. The teams are always met by the people's courage and determination to oppose the onslaught of the government's programs. Wherever documentation is secured

it is the result of the people's own investigations, and reflects their militant opposition and resistance.

Testing ground for a new military strategy: Laac

(Reprint: *The Strategic Hamlets of Mindanao*)

The area known as Laac in the rugged, rolling hills of the northern-most region of Davao Province in the island of Mindanao has become the testing ground of a new military strategy of 'total pacification' being used by the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) against the rebel forces of the New People's Army (NPA). The name of this strategy that the AFP has given is 'grouping', but in reality it is the very same 'strategic hamlet' strategy which was developed and utilized by the armies of the United States and South Vietnam against the people of that country during the recent Indochina War.

In Laac and surrounding towns of Davao and Agusan provinces, settler families have been ordered by the military to dismantle and abandon their farmhouses in the countryside, and to move into the barrio and town centers which are in some cases as far away as ten kilometers from their farms. This hamletting has transformed this entire area into something akin to a refugee camp, with hunger and disease and fear causing suffering and even death to the residents.

Although the expressed purpose of this hamletting is to isolate and destroy the rebel NPA forces, it is the people of Laac and the surrounding towns that have become the victims. Even more ominous than the hunger and disease that daily threaten their lives, however, the residents now fear that the real purpose of hamletting strategy is to gain control of the land in the area for agribusiness and agro-forestry projects, and to coerce the people into either participating in these projects or evacuating the area. Already several thousand people have evacuated, considerably reducing the population from its 1980 level of 37,000.

It was only in 1979 that the Laac area was separated from the neighbouring municipality of Asuncion, and was declared a municipality with the name of San Vicente. The vast majority of Laac's residents are settler-farmers who came to the area over the past ten years to establish farms in the logged-over terrain. Most of the land is still classified as 'forestal', even though the logging operations have long since stopped. The area has been known as a base area for NPA forces who have been conducting propaganda and organization campaigns among the residents. There were sporadic encounters and ambushes between rebel and military forces, which led to a steadily increasing military presence in the area. Until July 1981 it was the Philippine Constabulary of the Davao Provincial Command, and 'striking force' battalions from the Region XI Command such as the 54th, 56th and 61st PC Battalions that were stationed in Laac.

Increasing militarization

A dramatic and steady buildup of military forces began in July, with the eventual stationing of three battalions in the area, made up of composite forces of the Philippine Army, Marines, Airborne and Scout Rangers. By September there were some 2,500 soldiers stationed in the area. They began a campaign of forced recruitment of local men to the Integrated Civilian Home Defense Force (ICHDF), requiring each barrio to contribute at least fifteen men for this force. Those barrios which failed to fulfill this quota were to be considered sympathetic and supporters of the NPA rebels, and would be raided by the military.

The Diocese of Tagum has compiled a lengthy documentation of arrests and tortures and even killing of Laac residents during the period of February 8, 1981 to December 1981 as the military forces hunted for the NPA rebels and supporters. Despite these cases of military abuses, Laac residents still considered these


Army soldiers much more disciplined and respectful of civilians than had been the PC soldiers that formerly patrolled the area. In some cases, abusive Army soldiers were publicly punished by their superiors.

On September 4th, a peace conference was called by the military in sitio Linumbaan of barrio Langtud, because the people of that barrio had not yet provided their quota of men to be trained as ICHDF members. Eight Airborne soldiers, and four ICHDF members attended the conference. After the conference, as the soldiers and ICHDF were leaving the sitio aboard a commandeered Ford Fiera, they were ambushed. Five Airborne soldiers, including Lt. Pajel, were killed, along with two ICHDF's.

The next day all the residents of Langtud were summoned to the poblacion of San Vicente for another peace conference which was attended by Gen. Alfredo Olano, Region XI Commander, and by Col. Teofilo Bulosan of the Davao Provincial Command. The men were ordered to report to San Vicente to the military authorities on Monday and Wednesday of each week, even though this would severely affect their ability to maintain their work on their farms. It was soon after this that many families began evacuating from Langtud and other barrios of Laac, as military operations increased and intensified.

Beginning of hamletting

In October the military ordered that all families would have to move into the centers of their sitios and construct houses there. A curfew was established from 5.00 p.m. (sunset) until 5.00 a.m. (sunrise), when all people would have to be within the sitio



Evacuated father and child in Mindanao

centers, or 'hamlets'. This, in effect, created a 'no man's land' in the countryside, with anyone caught in the area automatically considered an NPA rebel to be shot on sight.

Army commanders explained that this hamletting was necessary because 'Laac is like a beautiful lake, in which there are some bad fish. Thus it is necessary to drain all the water from the lake in order to catch these bad fish!' The life and work of the farmers were disrupted by this move into the sitios, since they did not have enough time to both construct new houses in the sitio hamlets and also still keep up their work on their farms. In most cases, however, the sitio hamlets were located within three kilometers from their farms, so that it was still possible, although difficult, to continue farming.

In November, however, a new order came from the military authorities. All the families would have to move again, this time into the barrio centers. The military ordered that all houses at farm-sites in the countryside and in the sitio centers would have to be at least partially dismantled, removing the flooring and at least one wall, and that each family would have to construct a new house in the barrio centers. There are twenty-nine barrio centers in the town of Laac, and so began a tremendous influx of families into these few hamlets. It was in November also that this hamletting strategy was expanded by the military into some barrios of the neighboring Davao towns of Asuncion, Kapalong, Montevista and Monkayo, as well as to some barrios in the towns of Agusan Province to the north.

Effects on the people

This expansion and widening of the hamletting policy has made it almost impossible for the majority of the farmers of Laac and these surrounding towns to continue to farm their fields. Since November they have been occupied almost full-time in dismantling their old houses, moving them to the barrios, foraging for wood and other building materials with which to construct new shanties in the barrio hamlets, and, at the same time, trying to take care of their farms. In some cases these barrio hamlets are located as far away as ten kilometers from their farms, and so the farmers must start walking at 5.00 in the morning, reaching their farms at the hottest time of the day, and then return walking in time to be inside the hamlet by sunset at 5.00.

Further aggravating the difficult situation of the people, the military has been requiring the people to attend meetings and rallies in the hamlet centers, and also in some cases requiring them to render service in providing wood for the barracks of the soldiers, and also in constructing these barracks. In some barrios the people are required to provide fifty pieces of roofing shingles per family for the construction of the military barracks and housing; while in other barrios there are reports that each family is re-



False surrender in Laac

quired to give between two to five pesos per month toward the support of the military forces. The farmers are suffering financially, since many of them have had to spend what little cash savings they had to purchase building materials for their houses, and to buy food as their supplies of food become exhausted. To obtain cash for their house building and for these forced contributions to the military, many farmers have had to sell whatever food supplies they had, at low prices, thus further aggravating their food shortage. Since many farmers have been unable to return to their farms to plant their fields, or to harvest their crops, the specter of famine in the near future hangs over the area.

False surrenders

On November 27th, people from the barrios surrounding Laac were required to go to the town center to register themselves. Some 6,500 people were in the town that day, and they were required to participate in a rally staged by the military forces. They were given placards containing anti-NPA slogans, and made to swear that they would not support the NPA rebels and were loyal to the government. Helicopter gunships hovered overhead, with their machine guns pointed at the people massed below.

On the following day, the national newspapers reported that 7,000 NPA rebels had 'surrendered' to the government in Laac. Similar smaller rallies have been staged in the far-flung barrios of the area.

The people appeal for help

In late November, the farmers of Laac sent an open letter of appeal for assistance to concerned fellow citizens. Sections of this letter are quoted here:

Since July 1981, PC battalions and striking forces flooded the barrios of our town. There are more than 2,500 regular troops, and hundreds of paramilitary personnel (ICHDF, etc.). First they assured us that their presence is to check the fast expanding NPA guerilla units in this province, and to protect the civilians. But, as days passed, the ever expanding number of military troopers made life more difficult for us. Checkpoints mushroomed in many of our barrios, which restricted travel. Before we could go out from our places, we have to secure safe-conduct passes from the military authorities. Jeeps were not allowed to enter some areas. This made it difficult for us to buy our necessities and to market our products. Military operations became frequent. Anybody under suspicion was brought to the barracks for tactical interrogation. Some were physically and psychologically tortured. A number have been *salvaged* (i.e. killed).

As a result of their intensified military rule, several families of farmers have fled to unknown places to save their families. Those of us who remained are opting to face the consequences of extreme poverty, epidemics (malaria and diphtheria), hunger and even death. Sometimes during peace talks fear reigns among us, because a few who were trained for two days as ICHDF's became spies, driven by their hunger of power — and for survival.

We live a life of uncertainty, fear and utter poverty. Even if we tried to tend our farms during the day, most of our time is spent in hiking. By the time we start working on our farms it is almost noontime, and the sun would be too hot for work. We are hungry, sick and miserable now. What will tomorrow bring for us?

They described the hardships of successive hamletting orders from the military, first to the sitio centers and then to the barrio hamlets. They spoke of the deadlines imposed by the military, under the threat of burning and strafing of any houses that were not dismantled and moved by the deadline. One family which remained in their house one evening was strafed to death. The military cut down their permanent banana and coffee plants, and uprooted their root crops, under the pretext that these might be used by the rebels. They concluded with these words:

We realize now that it is not the NPA's they are getting rid of. It is us innocent civilians! The military has spent more effort in destroying our own organizations, which have spearheaded our cooperative efforts to maintain peace and order, and to improve literacy and health. They are hounding farmers who have begun to assert their rights. Now we are deprived of our right to decent livelihood and shelter. With our abandoned farms, we are facing hunger. Many of us entertain the idea that it is not only the NPA they are interested in, but the land we have occupied and tilled. We are aware that big foreign corporations practically surround us. Is it remote that they want our farms for expansion for more falcatta, banana, and palm oil plantations?

On December 14th, the people of Laac sent a letter to President Ferdinand Marcos, in which they appealed that the hamletting be ended, and that the military would be withdrawn from their area. To quote from that letter:

We the people of Laac suffer from intense hardships and fear because of heavy militarization in our barrios. Many have died, many more are sick, and a big number are starving... The military issue a lot of orders; but the heaviest order was the order to move from the sitios to the barrios... We were given a deadline for moving. Precisely because of our extreme poverty, the deadline came and went, and many of us had not yet built shelters for our families. Thus the common sight of people living with unfinished roofs and no walls. Many more still lived in chapels, or crowded into shelters with other families.

We are also concentrated in a place where there is no clear source of clean water, and where the surroundings are dirty. The children are the worst hit by the diseases and epidemics. We have no money for medicines. Thus, all we can do is watch as our loved ones slowly die.

President Marcos, we humbly ask you to allow us to return to our farms and our traditional way of life. We also ask you to order the immediate withdrawal of the Army from our barrios.



Evacuated family in church, barrio Emelda, Laac

Suspicion of land take-overs

What has led the farmers of Laac to suspect that the real reason for the intensification of militarization through hamletting is the takeover of control of their lands for plantations? On the third week of December, Col. Alejandro Cruz of the 37th IB Infantry Forces, the field commander of the Laac operation, met with the farmers of barrio San Antonio (one of the remote barrios of Laac which is located near the border with the neighboring town of Monkayo to the east). Col. Cruz informed the farmers that the 900-hectare portion of their barrio will be cleared, to be planted to rubber and ipil-ipil trees. Cruz further explained that he personally will manage this plantation for the barrio, with the barrio captain serving as foreman.

All men of the barrio will have to contribute one full day's work in the plantation each week, for the clearing of the land and the planting of the trees. He said that the work was to begin on January 2, 1982; and that the clearing was to be finished within one month. Those farmers who are to be displaced by this plantation will supposedly be given some land to farm somewhere in the barrio. The workers will not be paid wages; rather they will be given food on the days that they work, and they will receive a share of the profits once the trees are harvested — some five years from now. Anyone who refuses to participate in the project will be considered supporters of the rebels.

The men will also be required to construct barracks for the soldiers, and to cut timber for this purpose. The women will provide the food for the workers. Financing for the project will come through the K.K.K. (Kilusang Kabuhayan at Kaunlaran or Movement for Progress in Livelihood of the government), as well as for other poultry and hog-raising projects of the barrio people. The farmers will supposedly be able to continue farming small plots of land in the barrio to meet their food needs. Cruz indicated that once this 900-hectare plantation was planted, it might be expanded to include other lands as well.

There are some 600 families living in barrio San Antonio. It is one of the barrios most severely affected by the hamletting, since some farms of the people are as far away as fifteen kilometers from the barrio hamlet. Some of the residents are Tribal Filipinos of the Dibabawon tribe. It was reported that in San Antonio alone, where 120 families live, eight children have died of sickness associated with the hamletting. In barrio Inacayan, closer to the town of Laac, the farmers have also been told that they will have to plant ipil-ipil and rubber trees on their land.

Also, in barrio Ampawid, the people were told that 1500 hectares would be planted to ipil-ipil trees.

It might be that the military plans to designate these tree-growing projects as 'communal tree plantations' under the government's revised Forestry Code. But the manner in which



An old woman who died during evacuation

this is being implemented amounts to forced participation by people in these tree plantation development schemes. It further increases the suspicion that such plantation development schemes may be the true reason for the hamletting strategy being imposed by the military — rather than counter-insurgency operations against the NPA.

Industrial tree planting

There are other indications that this hamletting strategy may be part of a wider government scheme to develop these remote rural areas into agribusiness plantations and tree-farming ventures. The government has announced that it plans to develop two million hectares of Industrial Tree Plantations (ITP's) in the Philippines over the next ten years; an average of two-hundred thousand hectares per year. Included under this program are ipil-ipil, falcatta, rubber and other types of trees. The primary vehicle for implementing this program will be through the granting of ITP leases for forestal lands, to companies or to individuals who are willing and able to implement this scheme.

Another vehicle for implementation is the granting of Communal Tree Farm (CTF) leases to barrio communities which undertake to develop such tree farms as income-generating projects. Since, however, almost all logged-over forestal lands in the country are already occupied by settler-farmers, the government may be searching for a means to either eject these settlers from the land, or to force them into participating in tree-planting programs.

In 1980 the government announced the granting of a 27,000 hectare ITP lease to the Aguinaldo Development Corporation (ADECOR), somewhere in Davao Province. Parts of the ADECOR timber concession are located in the towns of Laac, Asuncion and Kapalong — the very center of the current hamletting strategy of the military! At least two other corporations are already engaged in ITP projects in Mindanao. The Paper Industries Corporation of the Philippines (PICOP) has ITP's in the provinces of Surigao, Agusan and Davao for the purpose of supplying raw materials for its expanding paper plant in Bislig, Surigao del Sur. The newly established Manila-Paper Mills, Inc. (MPMI) has been granted ITP leases for some 45,000 hectares, to supply the raw materials for its planned pulp and paper plant to be located in Butuan City. MPMI has entered into sub-contracts with several logging concessioners in the Agusan provinces (North of Davao) to set up ITP's within their logged-over timber concession areas.

Another Davao-based timber concessioner, DATICOR (Davao Timber Corporation), has established a new fiberboard plant in the town of Mati, Davao Oriental, and will also need a steady supply of wood raw materials to supply this plant. Antonio Florendo, businessman and head of KBL in Mindanao, is building a cardboard carton factory within his TADECO (Tagum Development Corporation) banana plantation in Panabo, Davao del Norte, and will need a steady supply of raw materials for that plant. It is quite possible that agro-forestry projects planned for the Davao-Agusan areas will be for the purpose of supplying these expanding wood-based industries.

Palm oil plantations

Another agribusiness venture which may lie at the roots of this hamletting strategy is the establishment of palm oil plantations in the Agusan provinces. The government, through its National Development Corporation (NDC), has entered into agreements with five multi-national corporations to set up a total of 30,000 hectares of palm oil plantations. NDC will lease the land to these corporations.

As of now, only one of the five companies, Guthrie Inc., has begun operations in Agusan. Settler-farmers in the area have been resisting the takeover of their lands for Guthrie's planta-

tion. Another one of the five, Sime-Darby, has already pulled out of its palm oil venture, possibly because of the burgeoning resistance of the settler-farmers in the area. This too may be leading the government and the military to search for ways to minimize farmer resistance, and/or to force their participation in such projects. There are reports that part of the area designated by NDC for palm oil development lies within the Davao Province.

Vulnerability of settlers

Settler-farmers on forestal lands are particularly vulnerable to such land-grabbing schemes. Although many of them apply to the Bureau of Forestry (BFD) for release of their occupied lands for titling, this release and titling process is painfully slow, and requires much red-tape bureaucratic procedures that are obstacles to the successful processing of their applications. Settlers who can demonstrate that they have occupied their forestal lots since before 1975 can apply for 'forest occupant permits' which establishes their right to remain on their land under certain conditions laid down by the BFD. This too is a lengthy, bureaucratic process, and must be repeated annually, thus discouraging many settlers from following through on it. It sometimes happens that the BFD grants leases to corporations for agro-forestry projects, even though the land has already been petitioned for release by the occupant settlers.

Expansion of hamletting

High ranking military officials such as Region XI PC Commander, Gen. Alfredo Olano, have stated that the Laac area is a testing ground for the hamletting strategy. According to him if this strategy proves successful it will be implemented in other areas of Mindanao, especially in the more remote rural areas near the boundaries between provinces, where the rebel NPA forces often operate. Although the hamlets are being created in other towns of North Davao, and in some towns of Agusan del Sur and on December 22-23, and immediately afterwards mobilized a being implemented throughout an entire Municipality. (At presstime, hamletting was ordered instituted in the whole of Asuncion, the neighboring town of Laac.)

By December 1981 there were thirty-barrios of Laac. In other Davao towns, Asuncion had fifteen hamlet centers; Kapalong had five; Montevista had twelve; New Corella had three; and in Monkayo the number had rapidly expanded from three to ten within the month of December alone. There were eighty hamlet centers in all in Davao del Norte Province, with indicators pointing to an ever increasing number being created in Agusan del Sur and in Davao del Sur.

Relief efforts

Despite the tremendous suffering inflicted on the people by the hamletting strategy, neither the military nor the various government agencies have taken steps to provide the needed medical services and relief supplies to the people. The burden has fallen on concerned citizens of the private sector, including the churches, who have begun sending relief goods and medicines and medical teams to the area.

Bishop Pedro Dean of the Diocese of Tagum visited the area on December 22-23, and immediately afterward mobilized a more intensive relief effort by the Diocese. On January 4th, Bishop Dean appealed by letter to the National Secretariat of Social Action (NASSA) for assistance in responding to the plight of the people of Laac:

In the past few months the military operations in San Vicente (Laac) and neighboring places have caused terrible suffering to our people. Families were displaced, diseases were widespread, and in many instances death has taken its toll. The farmers, gathered in hamlet centers, are not yet allowed to go back permanently to

their farms. When they go to their farms, they have to be back to the centers before evening, even when their farms are seven to ten kilometers away. Shelters in the hamlet centers are small — shanties which are congested, very hot during the day and very cold at night. Water is scarce, and consequently sanitation is bad.

Dialogue

During the first week of January, Bishop Dean went to Manila and spoke personally to the Chief of the Philippine Constabulary, Gen. Fidel Ramos, about the plight of the people of Laac. Gen. Ramos advised that the Bishop consult with the government and military authorities in Davao about this. On January 11th, a dialogue was held at the TADECO residence of Antonio Florendo, with representatives of the Church, the military, and the civil government. Present at this dialogue were:

Gen. Alfredo Olano: Region XI PC Commander.

Col. Milton Tiburcio: PC Provincial Commander, Davao del Norte.

Col. Wilfredo Cruz: PC Commander, Davao City.

Col. Alejandro Cruz: Commander 37th Infantry IB (Laac).

Gov. Gregorio Dujali: Governor of Davao del Norte.

Assemblyman Rudolfo del Rosario: Davao del Norte.

Mr Antonio Florendo.

Bishop Pedro Dean: Diocese of Tagum.

Several priests and sisters.

The municipal mayors of the six Davao del Norte towns of Laac, Asuncion, Kapalong, New Corella, Monkayo and Montevista.

Judge Consolacion: Davao City Court of First Instance.

The purpose of the dialogue was to hear the complaints from the Church representatives, and to explain the rationale of the hamletting strategy. The military representatives insisted that the idea for the hamletting came not from them, but rather from the civil government. They claimed that the *Sanggunian Bayan* S.B. (or Municipal Council) of Laac had passed a resolution calling for hamletting, in order to protect the civilian population from the NPA rebels. The municipal mayors backed up this statement by the military, claiming that they had first consulted with their barangay captains and purok leaders, and that all of these had been unanimous in requesting hamletting. The military officials claimed, therefore, that they were only implementing the expressed desires of the civil government, but that they were prepared to remain in the area for up to five years if necessary, in order to protect the people from the rebel forces. As proof of the need for hamletting, the military pointed on the 'mass surrender' of more than 7,000 NPA supporters in Laac on November 27th!

The Church representatives challenged this assertion by the military, pointing out that the people were forced to move to the hamlets, under threat of burning and strafing of their houses. But the military denied that force was used, or that any deadlines for dismantling of houses had been set by them. They admitted that the people were ordered to remove the flooring and part of the walls of their houses, but they denied that any farmers had been prohibited from returning to their fields.

Rationale of hamletting strategy

Then the military explained what they referred to as the 'Rationale' for the hamletting strategy. It has four aspects:

1. 'Mutuality in Security', meaning that in the hamlets the people can both protect themselves and also work together in the 'bayanihan' (mutual help) spirit.
2. It is easier for the military to protect the people in these hamlets.

3. It is easier to get the people to protect themselves.

4. Government services can more easily be made available to the people when they are grouped together in hamlets.

The military further explained that the 'Criteria' which they use in selecting the areas for hamletting are: 1. 'critical areas'; and 2. 'the economic situation of the people'. They admitted that certain things were 'overlooked' in the implementation of the hamlets, such as the provision of adequate food and shelter, but that these are the responsibility of the local civil government.

In response to the Church representatives' description of the desperate plight of the people within the hamlets, the military said that perhaps the situation would only be temporary. They explained that the hamlet strategy was a 'model', or a 'prototype of counter-insurgency warfare', and that it might have to be modified later. The Church representatives objected to this concept, asking what right the military had to 'experiment' with the lives of the people in this way. Gen. Olano in turn objected to the use of the word 'experiment'.

He said that the military would 'reassess' the hamletting strategy as they went along, and that perhaps the strategy could be modified later. He mentioned the possibility that perhaps it would only be necessary to hamlet the people in the sitio centers, rather than in the barrio centers as they are doing now. Gen. Olano assured the Church representatives that they would be consulted in the course of the re-assessment. When asked by the Church representatives whether the people too would be consulted in the process of re-assessing the hamletting policy, Gen. Olano did not give any definite answer!

Denials

Col. Alejandro Cruz was asked by the Church representatives to explain about the 900-hectare rubber and ipil-ipil plantation, which is to be set up in barrio San Antonio. Cruz denied that he had announced to the people of San Antonio that they would be required to participate in any such project. He even went so far as to deny that he was in San Antonio at the time that he was alleged to have announced this to the people. This, despite the fact that two residents of San Antonio have sworn affidavits that he was there, and did say this.

Gen. Olano insisted that such a story is merely NPA propaganda against the military. With regard to Col. Cruz' alleged announcement that KKK funds would be utilized to finance the tree growing project in San Antonio, Gen. Olano suggested that this was probably only a misunderstanding by the people. He explained that the military have been requested by the President only to 'disseminate' information about the KKK program.

Mr Florendo took the occasion of the dialogue to deny allegations that he personally may have a role in the Laac militarization scheme, in order to advance some business interests in that area. He also denied that he has been guilty of any wrongdoing in the Paquibato area of Davao, where Tribal Filipinos and Visayan settlers have expressed apprehension that agribusiness interests are responsible for the continued violence in that area in order to gain control of the land.

Likewise, Mr Florendo denied any wrongdoing in the case of the farmers who have been ejected from the Minda Farms area of Panabo, Davao del Norte — an area recently purchased by Florendo. To illustrate his sincerity and concern for the small farmers, Mr Florendo announced that he personally had gotten President Marcos to release 2,500 hectares in the Girl Scouts-Boy Scouts Land Grant area in the Laac-Asuncion area.

Assessment:

The situation of the people who are hamletted in Laac and the surrounding towns of Davao and Agusan has deteriorated during the first two weeks of January 1982. Food supplies are dwindling.

ing, diseases have reached epidemic proportions, especially among the small children, and the cool, rainy weather has brought further suffering to the inadequately sheltered families. Fear and uncertainty grip the people, and families continue to evacuate the area, many of them with no set place to go. Government relief and medical assistance remains at a minimum level, placing a great burden on the churches and private sector which have been trying to assist the people there. It is as if a great punishment has been inflicted on the people.

In the face of this, high military officials of the region continue to deny that they are employing force against the people. They claim that they are merely responding to the plea of the civil government to 'protect' the people from the rebel forces. Despite clear indications of agribusiness and agro-forestry projects being planned for the area, the government and military officials continue to remain silent about the extent of these projects. Municipal Mayors of these towns, whether out of fear and helplessness or out of complicity in these schemes, continue to collaborate with the military and to declare that all this is being done in the interests of the small farmers.

The happenings in Laac provide further evidence of a situation in the Philippines where a government is at war against its own people. Until recently it was a war characterized mainly by intimidation, manipulation and deception practiced against the people. But the reports filtering in from all over the country of increased militarization reveal that the war against the people has escalated to a new level.

From Samar come reports of massacres perpetrated against entire barrios. From Agusan come reports of shadowy military groups of the 'Lost Command' liquidating people at will, and guarding the business interests of transnational corporations who are seizing control of the land. And now, in places like Laac and other remote areas of Davao and Agusan, the military are readily admitting they are testing a 'prototype strategy' of strategic hamletting of entire Municipalities, which will be implemented also in more and more areas of Mindanao. Despite the shallow denials being given by the military, the message is painfully clear — any amount of force will be utilized to keep the semblance of peace.



Facts and figures: the extent and the pattern of hamletting

Davao del Norte / Agusan del Sur boundary

No. of hamlets:		
Laac	35	
Asuncion	15	Trento
Kapalong	5	Sta. Josefa
Montevista	12	Veruela
New Corella	3	Loreto
Monkayo	10	
Total	80	

Affected population: 130,000 Visayan settlers, Manobo & Mandaya natives.

Effects on the people: extreme poverty, hunger, epidemics (malaria and diptheria), as of March 1982, 200 casualties.

Pattern of strategic hamletting:

First order to dismantle houses etc. & move to sitio centers: October 1981
to barrio centers: November 1981
deadline: February 1982.

Curfew: 5.00 p.m. to 5.00 a.m.

Distance to farms: 6-10 kilometers

Contributions to military: cash and kind; forced labor

Military involved: PA, Marines, Airborne, Scout Rangers, PC & ICHDF.

Mass rally held on November 27, 1981, surrender rites, involving 6,500 civilians

Increasing militarization:

between October and December 1981 23 military operations
between October 81 and February 1982 48 cases of salvaging

Government / foreign interests in the area:

Palm Oil Plantation, a joint venture of:
Guthrie Overseas Holding Ltd., Sime Darby Berhad,
Manila Paper Mills Inc., Keck Seng, Dunlop Int. Ltd. & the
National Development Company;
Communal Tree Farming (CFT);
Industrial Tree Plantations (ITP)

Davao del Sur, Kapatagan Valley

No. of hamlets:	
Digos	15
Bansalan	13
Sta. Cruz	3
Mantan-ao	5
Total	36

Affected population: approx. 63,900 Visayan settlers and Bagobo natives (7,894 families)

Effects on the people: worse than in Laac; epidemic killed 148 old men, women and children in a period of three months

Pattern of strategic hamletting:

First order to dismantle houses etc. & move to sitio centers: June 1981
to barrio centers: August 1981
deadline: February 1982.

Curfew: 7.00 p.m. to 4.00 or 5.00 a.m.

Distance to farms: 1-18 kilometers

Contributions to military: cash and kind; forced labor

Military involved: Marines, Scout Rangers

Mass rally held on November 1981, surrender rites, involving 4,000 civilians

Increasing militarization:

28 farmers massacred on September 11, 1981
torture and summary execution of 60 farmers

Government / foreign interests in the area:

copper mining in Sitio Tampurong (in Jan. 1981, engineers visited the area);

hot spring in Sitio Kapatagan (tourist attraction);

Industrial Tree Plantations

North Cotabato, Arakan Valley

Hamletting in the Municipality of Antipas and the Northern District of the Municipality of Magpet amounts to 29 hamlet centers affecting a population from 5,000 to 7,000. In some areas, farmers lost the bulk of their harvest, in others, livestock and poultry either ran away or were stolen. In barangay New Alimudian, an estimated 50 per cent increase in the incidence of malaria, flu, chicken pox and diarrhea occurred due to hamletting.

Pattern of strategic hamletting:

First order to move:

differs from sitio to sitio,

between December 1981 and March 1982

Curfew in barangay Salasang: 7.00 p.m. to 6.00 a.m.

Military involved: Airborne with Special Warfare Brigade, ICHDF

'Oath of Allegiance' to the government, involving all 100 families of New Alimudian, August 1981

Increasing militarization:

arbitrary arrests and manhandling of farmers; in Sitio Spring, there is a ratio of one armed personnel for every 24 civilians, 2 farmers were salvaged, 1 feared dead and 3 arrested after a barangay meeting to allegedly investigate the killing with robbery of a woman on May 9, 1982.

Government / foreign interests in the area:

University of Southern Mindanao (expanding cattle ranch & rubber tree plantation)

Industrial Tree Plantations (ITP)

North Cotabato Sugar Industry Inc. (NACOSIL)

Abra, Mountain Provinces

Hamletting in the municipality districts of Mataragan, Bangilo, Lacub and Malibcong (no figures available yet).

Severe food shortage; residents prohibited from gold panning and farming.

Pattern of strategic hamletting:

First order to move: October 1981

Curfew in Mataragan: 4.00 p.m. to 7.00 a.m.;

in Bangilo: 7.00 p.m. to 5.00 a.m.

Safe conduct passes

Contributions to military: rice and other food; forced to act as guides during military operations

Increasing militarization:

increasing number of arbitrary arrests; extra-legal collection of fines for alleged crimes and as extending assistance to the NPA or false information to the military amounting from P5,000.00 to P21,000.00.

Government / foreign interests in the area:

Cellophil Resources Corporation (CRC), government owned through the National Investment and Development Corporation (NIDC), Japanese and German investors.

Other Mindanao Provinces

Davao Oriental: evacuation linked to hamletting in Caragan

Bukidnon: 4 barrios hamletted in Maramag town

Zamboanga del Sur / Misamis Occidental: Kumularang: most of the town is under hamletting; Molavi and Josefina in the Malindang Mountains are under hamletting; in Molavi alone, there are 4 barrio-wide hamlets.

As of August 1982, no detailed reports from hamletted areas such as *Cagayan Valley*, *Panay* and *Samar* were available yet.

Resistance

The report which follows is indicative of the multisectoral resistance to the intensifying militarization in the Philippines. The fact-finding mission responsible for the report was organized by the Philippine Council for Human Rights, in March 1982. We reproduce excerpts here.

The province of Abra

The province of Abra is situated on a mountainous region in the northern part of the Philippine archipelago. It is a landlocked territory with a total land area of 3,975.6 square kilometers, approximately 1.3 per cent of the entire Philippines, and being inhabited by 160,000 people scattered over 22 municipalities.

The Tingguian

A good 30 per cent of the above population is comprised of Tingguian. The Tingguians are mountain-dwelling people who inhabit the hinterlands of Abra. They, however, prefer to be called 'Itneg'. Agriculture is their main livelihood. The high degree of productivity of Tingguian areas is largely due to their industries. The past is replete with incidents showing the Tingguians resistance against every attempt to subjugate them. They did their share of fighting in a national war against colonial rule — a fact which shows that they value freedom, liberty and independence.

The Cellophil Resources Corporation (CRC)

The CRC, a brainchild of Herminio Disini of the famed Herdis Group of Companies, is a government controlled corporation. In 1974 CRC was granted a concession by the government over 200,000 hectares of virgin forest land for 25 years by virtue of two timber pulpwood licences issued to it. A substantial portion of this large track of forest land is found in Abra, the launching site of the project engineered by Deputy Minister of National Defense, Carmelo Z. Barbero. (The estimated cost of the project is 1.5 billion pesos.)

CRC and the Tingguian

Two years after the grant concession, CRC started a campaign to win the hearts of the people living in the different communities to be affected by its operation. A great number of these communities are inhabited by the Tingguian tribe. To them the occupation by the CRC of their mountains and valleys and lands will mean economic, social and cultural displacement. As early as 1974 they had already anticipated the adverse effect of the entry of CRC to their homeland. Uprooting of Tingguian families and village populations, deprivation of the right to use the forest and pasturelands, military abuses, debasement of their culture and political aspirations as a people, and other violations of their fundamental and inviolable human rights — these happened; they are happening.



Monkey cage in Abra

The fact-finding mission

There were twenty-one members, more or less, of the fact-finding mission which left for Banguet, Abra on 18 March, 1982. Objective was to check on the reported hamletization by the military of various Tingguian tribes in the northern region of Abra, as well as military abuses arising therefrom. The missionaries divided themselves into four groups, one assigned to visit the Municipal district of Mataragan, the second, of Bangilo, the third, of Lacub, and the fourth of Malibcong.

The following section deals with the *Municipal District of Matargan*, one of the four areas documented in the report.

An old woman, Rosa Sibalo, narrated how 41 families from Pacgued, a nearby barrio, were compelled to evacuate to Mataragan and made to stay in the schoolhouse together with 27 other evacuees from Sitios Mataliben and Putol who had been there as early as October, 1981. Because of the mass evacuation, Pacgued became a deserted village. The residents were told to carry and take along with them their domestic animals, kitchen tools, and utensils and other provisions, leaving behind their respective houses locked. They have expressed disenchantment over their forced evacuation from Pacgued to Mataragan. If any would attempt to return to Pacgued to look after his field or crops, he would have to first secure permission from the PC soldiers who console them by saying that it is easier to protect them this way. There was a time when the military did not allow the residents to go out of the evacuation center for three days. Since they left the place there had been a lot of crop damage because they could not harvest. They further said that after their evacuation, they were not given any food aid. On the contrary, they said it was the PC soldiers who asked rice from them.

Residents are being required to guard the detachment center and during military operations they are forced to act as guides.

The evacuees from Pacgued pointed out that the killing of Martinez Masadao, barrio captain of Pacgued, triggered their forced evacuation.

The people were made to agree to and promulgate an ordinance which substantially provide the following:

1. Any person found guilty of extending assistance to the NPA or of giving false information shall be fined P5,000.00; one carabao; and rice and wine enough for the people of Bangilo, Mataragan and Malibcong.
2. Any person guilty of giving information on the NPA resulting in the death of another shall compensate the relatives of the victim in the amount of at least P16,000.00.

3. Any person found guilty of instigating and inciting subversive activities shall pay a fine of P21,000.00.

The said agreement/ordinance which the military enforces in the affected areas had allegedly been reached at between Gen. Asada and the Tingguians. The latter, however, dispute the voluntary nature and even the validity thereof.

A Mataragan resident, Manuel Balicao, narrated how he was forced to give one female cow and a carabao to the family of a barangay captain who was reportedly killed by his son.

The PC detachment has a 'monkey cage' intended for those who will destroy their orders. Valentin Bamalan was detained in this monkey cage and was forced to simulate the sounds of a cat and a dog for thirty minutes. When they brought him out of the monkey cage, he was placed under direct sunlight.

Monico Sibalo, a nine-year old child, was maltreated by elements of the PC detachment in the Mataragan by Sgt. Wilfredo Tamargo. Suspected of giving supplies to the NPA, Sibalo was taken by Sgt. Tamargo and his men to the house of a certain Dalingay where he was beaten to unconsciousness by these peace officers.

Tumbangay Dumatay, a farmer, was sent to look for a companion to guard the detachment with him. Failing to find one, he was manhandled. As a result, thereof, he coughed up blood and can't carry heavy things now.

Barrio captain, Belmonte Sibalo remembered the incident where Sgt. Tamargo got P650.00 from the barangay fund intended for the wages of the villagers who work on the trails.

When interviewed, Sgt. Tamargo said that he is the commander of the PC detachment in Mataragan composed of seven soldiers and the chief of Police of Malibcong. He claimed that they had been dispatched to the area on 3 September 1981 with specific orders from their Provincial Commander to go after subversive elements. He further declared that the people themselves actually requested for their presence. 'I did not make them evacuate but they did so out of fear,' says he. He even insinuated that the villagers have been free to return to their respective villages, of course, at their own risk, but that they would prefer staying in the evacuation centers. In effect, he contradicted everything that the residents complained of.

Finding

There is a continuing hamletization and other violations of human rights in the areas visited by the fact-finding teams.



Recommendations

In the light of the foregoing, the fact-finding mission hereby recommends to the Council that:

1. A letter be addressed to Minister Enrile, informing him of the continuing hamletization in the northern region of Abra despite his order dismantling strategic hamlets and similar areas/centers all over the country; requesting him to enforce the said order by directly commanding the military authorities in Abra to immediately comply therewith; and demanding for the immediate investigation of military personnel responsible for the violation of his aforesaid order and the systematic debasement of the Filipino people's dignity;
2. The acts of inhumanity suffered by the people of Mataragan, Bangilo, Lacub and Malibcong in the hands of some elements of the military be exposed through the different media by disseminating position papers, articles and writings in connection therewith and sponsoring symposia, cultural shows depicting the sufferings of the people as a consequence of hamletization, and mass actions; and
3. People's Courts be created and organized to hear and try cases involving hamletization and other violations of the people's human rights.

Manila, 9 April, 1982.

Editor's Note

Conditions in the hamletted areas are deteriorating rapidly. Besides the problems of food, health and sanitation, the people are daily confronted with the pervasive presence of heavily armed military, along with constant harassment and military brutality. The excerpt which follows is taken from an eye-witness's account of visits to hamletted areas in Mindanao in May, 1982. It shows a horrifying picture.

We have tried to visit people in their hamlets in Awao. We travelled already 14,000 km. to come there, and then the military-commander didn't allow us to speak to the farmers and their families. The official reason was, that we didn't have a permit from the mayor of Sta. Josepha or the governor of Agusan del Sur. We were forbidden to leave the house we came to first. So we felt like prisoners, between people who are prisoners on their own land, not even allowed to have visitors (a normal human right for detainees). On our way to Sayon (also a hamlet camp of 130 families, each family living on a piece of land of 15 x 20 meters) we met the vice-mayor of Sta. Josepha. He was on election-tour (it was a few days before the barrio-elections) and was so kind as to write a permit to visit people in Sayon. But eventually it was in Sayon even worse than in Awao. We were allowed to go into the houses and to speak with the people, but every step, every talk, every move of the visitors was followed by three (military) men, one of them with a gun. The military commander, sergeant Castro, 'gave' us these men 'to protect us'. He didn't say against whom we needed such protection. Maybe you'll understand, that we didn't feel free to talk and walk. We left the village, again followed by two men, who didn't belong to our small group.

It was the first time, that foreign visitors were not allowed to talk freely and to take pictures in this hamlet-area.



REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES
PROVINCE OF AGUSAN DEL SUR
MUNICIPALITY OF STA. JOSEFA

OFFICE OF THE MAYOR

June 22, 1982
DATE

From the desk of:

Hon. Ludovico L. Nagas
MUNICIPAL MAYOR

Dear Captain Mangilis,
The bearer of this letter are our Parish Visitors, Frater Honching + Company, who would like to pay a visit in our area particularly our clustered barangay.
Please extend utmost courtesy, due respect + cooperation to them.
Thanks.


Very truly yours,
LUDOVICO L. NAGAS
Municipal Mayor

Permit issued to Dutch visitor to visit the hamletted area

Footnotes

1. *A Past Revisited*, Constantino, p. 244.
2. *ibid*, p. 245.
3. *Vietnam - The Unheard Voices*, John Luce and John Sommer, 1969. p. 147-8.
4. *ibid*, p. 149.
5. *Liberation*, September 23, 1973.
6. *Philippine Hamlets under Marcos government*, document.
7. *ibid*.
8. *ibid*.
9. *ibid*.
10. *Militarization of Samar*, a report of the International Commission on the Militarization of Samar, Eastern Visayas, Philippines, 1979.
11. *The situation in Samar: an Update*, March, 1981.
12. *Strategic Hamlets of Mindanao*, Mindanao Documentation Committee for Refugees.
13. *Katarungan*, April-May, 1982.
14. *Nassa News*, March 1982.
15. *Hamletting in Davao del Sur: A preliminary report*, March 1982.
16. *The continuing Hamletization of Mindanao*, June 1982.
17. *Tribal Forum*, February-March, 1982.





5. Development: Whose Profit?

Militarization and counter-insurgency in tribal minority areas

The pattern of militarization is most apparent in areas where there are vast financial interests at stake. Throughout the Philippines, intense militarization goes hand in hand with economic development. This is most clearly indicated in tribal minority areas where there are great natural resources, which are currently open to exploitation under the Marcos regime. Militarization in these areas has escalated to the point where, in Mindanao, the regime is conducting an all out war against the Bangsa Moro people's struggle for self-determination.

Militarization in tribal minority areas can only be understood in the context of 'development' and 'progress'. Development in these areas is a process of cultural genocide, whereby whole tribes, their way of life, their culture and their source of livelihood will be wiped out in the interests of multinational corporations and capital. Resistance by the people to intense militarization and tactics of counter-insurgency is an act of self defense and self-determination.

The minority groups are being dispossessed by colonially formulated laws and by the recent law provisions of the Marcos regime. These laws benefit particularly foreign companies, such as fruit and logging companies, international contractors, and suppliers of the massive infrastructure projects being planned and financed by the World Bank, Asia Development Bank, and other international financiers.¹

Even though the tribal minority groups have owned and worked the land for centuries they now have no legal titles to their lands as a result of a series of laws formulated in the early century. These laws have paved the way for the largescale takeover of lands by Filipino and foreign landlords and companies.

The net result is that whole areas populated by tribal people are now fully open to exploitation. This situation is aggravated by more recent laws which favour foreign investments, (e.g. Investment Incentives Act), and by government policy to ignore its own regulations when it is convenient to do so. An example of this is the granting of 197,346.26 hectares to Cellophil in the Cordillera, even though regulations restrict concessions to 100,000 hectares.

Side by side with 'development' of the people's ancestral lands goes a policy of intense militarization. This policy is designed to protect the financial interests in the areas, by suppressing opposition by the people who have to choose between cultural annihilation and resistance.

Particularly affected by the ruthless exploitation and by intensified militarization are the tribal areas of the Cordilleras and Mindanao-Sulu. Both these regions are rich in natural resources and are therefore subject to massive exploitation by foreign firms and corporations. The following overview of the two areas illustrates the interrelated pattern of unrestricted economic development and intensified militarization.

The Cordilleras

Under the dictates of the capitalist financiers such as the World Bank and the IMF the Marcos regime has expropriated the Cordilleras as a resource base for big business interests. Consequently recent years have seen the arrival of multinational companies and a corresponding growth in government infrastructure projects in the region.

Resources and economic interests in the region

The area is rich in natural resources:

- minerals and forest in the Mountain Province
- forest in Abra (75% of the land is forest)
- tobacco and potential uranium in the Ilocos provinces
- ricefields and farms throughout the region
- waterpower through the many rivers

Studies available attest to the exploitation of these resources and to the growth of government projects to facilitate foreign capital. A brief overview shows the following 'development' projects:

Kalinga-Apayao — Chico dams, Abulug dams, Cellophil Resources Corporation (CRC) and four other big logging companies; mining companies;

Mt. Province — Chico dams, geothermal plants, mining and logging; CRC.

Abra — CRC (200,000 hectares of logging concession, covering half the province)

Ifugao — Magat dam, tourism-related infrastructure, logging.

Benguet — mining and logging corporations export processing zone, tourism projects, geothermal plants.²

Foreign investment

Foreign investment is prevalent in the large scale industries of the region. Across the various industry groups, the concentration of investment is in the mining industry, manufacturing, marketing and banking, and logging. These industries have been able to avail of various government incentives and privileges. For example, the mining firms have been the main beneficiaries of the Investment Incentives Act administered by the Board of Investments.

There are at least six mining companies engaged in the exploitation of the mineral resources in the area. These are Philex Mines, Lepanto Consolidated, Western Minolco, Benguit Corp., Baguio Gold, and Benguit Exploration. So profitable have their operations been that in 1981, these companies ranked among the leaders in the country's mining industry.³

The government regional plan calls for the continuous development of exports. The major export products of the region are copper and other minerals, tobacco, logs and cement. The main bulk consists of minerals and cement.

The effects of this development is borne by the people who profit least from these ventures. The mines and particularly the logging concessions cause severe dislocation of the people. (See chapter 4 on Hamletting in Abra, for example.) In addition, the mines emit pollutants which are poisoning the land. Indiscriminate logging, especially in Abra, is denuding huge areas of forest. This disturbs the ecological balance of the land upon which much of tribal life is reliant.

Logging concessions


The classic example of the type of logging development that has taken place under the conditions of martial law can be seen in the operations of the Cellophil Resources Corporation (CRC).

(Excerpts from 'Tribal Peoples in the Republic of the Philippines', — Anti-Slavery Society for the protection of Human Rights, September 1981).

CRC was established in 1973 as an integrated operation with three major objectives: first, to operate a vast logging concession in northern Luzon; second, to establish a pulp mill; and third, to operate in the adjacent lowlands a rayon staple fiber plant.

Those most seriously affected at present are the Tingguians of Abra province because CRC has established its first center of operations and its mill in this area. Most of the lands of the upland Tingguians are within the concession and it is these people who have led the campaign to have CRC's license revoked.

Legally, the Tingguians have a good case. CRC is operating a



concession. The company failed to comply with government regulations by not excluding the lands of the local minority groups from their concession; and the CRC concession sprawls across four 'critical watersheds' (Abulog, Chico Pasil and Abra) on which the National Power Corporation (NPC) has plans to build at least nine major dams. The Tingguian appeal, has, however, been consistently ignored and the company continues to press ahead with its plans.

Cellophil was established as a subsidiary of the Herdis Group of Companies headed by Herminio Disini, a friend of President Marcos and a relative of his wife, Imelda. Cellophil was later divested from the Herdis Group, and taken over by the Philippine government. Herdis, however, continues to act as contracted managers.

Cellophil is now a major joint venture between the Philippine government and foreign transnational corporations.

Shareholders of Cellophil Resources Corporation

	Subscribed Capital (in millions pesos)	Equity Share
Philippine Government through National Development Corporation and Government Service Insurance System	59.5	70%
Mitsubishi Rayon (Japan)	5.1	6%
Daicel (Japan)	2.6	3%
Marubeni Corporation (Japan)	2.6	3%
Bauminter Corporation (Switzerland)	15.2	18%

Source: Business Day Special Report: The Sogo-Shosha, 31 May 1978, p.11

Eighty per cent of the capital outlay for the project was raised from a syndicate of European banks consisting of Union Bank of Switzerland, Banque de l'Indochine et de Suez of France, Banque de Benelux of Belgium, and Krediet Bank NV of Netherlands.

A European industrial consortium undertook the planning and construction of both the pulp and rayon mills. The foreign contractors involved include: Spie Batignolles (France), Summa Kumagai (Japan), and the Atlantic Gulf and Pacific Company (USA). The mill's annual output is predicted to be 66,000 tonnes of pulp and will be distributed as follows: 27,720 tonnes will be exported to Western Europe and Japan; 5,280 tonnes will be sold to Philippine Tobacco Filters Corporation, a Herdis company; and 33,000 tonnes will be channeled into the company's rayon plant. From here, the Japanese corporations as part owners, will in turn, extract raw materials for their garment industry.

The people affected by Cellophil's operations have, as the basis of their present economy, irrigated terraced rice farms. Supplementary to these are mountain swiddens, pastures for their cattle, the rivers which are a major source of protein and forests for timber, fuel, honey and game. The prospect of a major logging operation cutting three thousand trees a day makes the Tinguians fear for their livelihood. Their investigations revealed that Cellophil had Tinguians lands included in its concession and that the company was determined to deny the people access to communal forests and pastures.

Once again, the rights and will of the people are disregarded. Worse, the military is presently implementing a policy of hamletting on Abra in what seems to be an attempt to protect CRC interests in the area.

The story of CRC is similar to the situation of many other tribal areas. It is not an isolated case. The infrastructure program of the government also follows a similar pattern, with the same tragic effects on the people.

Government infrastructure program: energy projects

The energy projects of the government for the region must be seen in the context of the export orientation of the government development plans. The intensive construction of energy projects is aimed not for the benefit of the native population, but rather is designed to facilitate foreign investors.

The Chico River Basin Development Project is a typical example of the type of government program now being implemented. The aim is to produce 845 million kilowatt hours of electricity at the expense of 100,000 Bontocs and Kalingas and 341,000 hectares of rice and fruit plantations. Originally funded by the World Bank, the project is the key for foreign investment to flourish in the region. Since 1975, the Bontocs and Kalingas employed all legal means to oppose the project (petitions, bodongs, rallies, etc.) only to be met with military harassment and murder, bribes, the PC and PA battalions, the Kalinga Special Forces, the CHDF, the deceptive tactics of the Panamin, KSDR, and spies.

The Abulug Dam in Apayao, funded by the World Bank and the Asian Development Bank will affect forty five barrios with 38,000 people and 9,000 hectares of agricultural lands. The dam will generate electricity for the mines and logging concessions in Cagayan, Isabella and the Montanosa.

In an open letter of the Bontocs and Kalingas for Peace and Justice written June 1980 and signed by over 10,000 people the true nature of the dams is once again revealed:

In the Philippines, only the few foreign-owned industries and corporations, and only the rich in the rural areas and the cities benefit from electrification. In Benguet, when the Ambuklao and Binga dams were constructed some 20 years ago and where many mountain people were dis-



Chico dam threatens Bugnay villagers' homeland

located, the foreign owned mines are the major users of electricity. A large part of the mountain provinces and even Benguet itself does not share in any benefits from these dams.

Militarization

(Excerpt: Cordilleras Consultative Committee, February 16, 1982)

Together with the exploitation of mineral, forest and hydro-power resources of the Cordilleras, the regime and its foreign backers saw the need to ensure the security of their investments and the need for the smooth implementation of energy and infrastructure projects to support foreign industry primarily. When the government failed to use bribery and deception in enforcing its schemes, it resorted to military power.

The military is there not to bring peace and order but to stifle the growing mass protest movement of the poor against the system that would engulf their lives and try to blot out their increasing awareness of their democratic rights.

Widespread militarization is the iron hand of blatant oppression by the regime, and fits into the pattern of national oppression which the Cordillera people have been systematically subjected to.

Recently, the regional commands of Regions I and II have been combined or centralized to form the more powerful Northern Command whose area of operations now includes Kalinga-Apayao, Ifugao, Benguet, Mt. Province, Abra, Nueva Viscaya, Ilocos Norte, Cagayan, Isabella and Batanes.

Further, the number of detachments and reinforcements of the regular AFP forces increased to the following: Kalinga-Apayao — 114th and 124th PC Companies, the 48th Infantry Battalion, PA, the 51st Engineering Battalion, thirty PA and PC detachments, local CHDF, CIS agents and the Special Kalinga Unit; Mt. Province — 192nd and 123rd PC Companies, Memears Engineering Brigade, PC-INP forces, seven detachments and CIS, ISAFP agents; Ifugao — 193rd PC coy, five detachments and CHDF; Abra — 125th PC coy, ICHDF, five Presidential Guards, and an unreported number of detachments; Benguet — 19th and 191st PC Companies and other forces to a total of 7500 troops, CIS agents and the Makabayang Task Force — a group of student agents.

Geography of Repression (December 1981 — March 1982)

Kalinga-Apayao

- threats and harassment of village elders
- indiscriminate firing
- maltreatment of civilians
- stealing from the people
- murder of a boy and an old man
- Bugnay area sprayed with bullets from a helicopter
- Bugnay residents required to secure clearance from the military in the area in order to get in or out.
- PC and army soldiers patrolling in civilian clothes, fully armed
- plans to arm mayors and local officials.

Ifugao

- sitios strafed with machine gun fire
- disappearance of a student
- three women raped
- threatening and maltreatment of civilians

Abra

- arrest and detention of at least one hundred and twenty seven Tinguians on suspicion of subversion
- forced labour of detainees
- forced signing of indiscriminating documents
- extortion of food and animals from the people
- curfew hours in several barrios
- hamletting in many areas

Benguet

- harassment and surveillance of students.

Mountain Province

- military operations in Besao, Betwagan and Sagada area
- threatening of civilians
- interrogation of civilians
- troops patrolling in civilian clothes, but fully armed
- arrests and detentions
- burning of some kaingan fields near Betwagan

Mindanao-Sulu

The situation in Mindanao-Sulu bears a resemblance to that in the Cordilleras. Mindanao for itself is considered a paradise, a land of promise comprising 102,000 square kilometers or 10.2 million hectares with a population of 10.3 million (1977). This year the population is estimated to be 12 million.

With the increasing commercialization of agricultural production for exports, the influx of multinationals (MNC) and expansion of government infrastructure projects, lands are mostly in the hands of the elite. This causes a grim reality of the life of the people. The actual conditions of extreme poverty and hopelessness become the lot of the majority.

Development

It is estimated that US and Japanese MNCs control at least 80 per cent of the regions wealth.⁴

23 US Companies engaged in:

- banana
- pineapple
- rubber plantations
- manufacturing
- oil exploration



Del Monte pineapple plantation

10 Japanese companies engaged in:

- steel
- sugar
- banana
- coconut
- chemicals

- 48 companies/industries found in Muslim areas owned by US and Filipino elite.
- 11 US banks with 46 Filipino subsidiaries.

Companies/Industries owned by Filipino elite:

- 26 Aboitiz family
- 23 Alcantara family
- 12 Ayala-Zobel families

Less than 10 companies each:

Barcelon	Herminio
Benedicto	Emilio
Enrile	Cojuangco
General Menzi	Cuenco
Rear Admiral Espaldon	Elizalde
Ozaeta	Florendo
Sarmiento	

As the figures reveal development in Mindanao benefits the MNC's and the few local elite. The effects of this on the people are familiar: landgrabbing, dislocation of the Bangsa Moro people as well as other tribal minorities, replacement of subsistence economy with an export oriented production system, severe militarization, evacuation and abandonment of land.

Agri-business

One of the most serious problems faced by the tribal minorities in Mindanao is the massive invasion of the province by the huge agri-business corporations.

Del Monte is the largest of these companies; it operates in the Philippines through its wholly-owned subsidiary, Philippine Packing Corporation (Philpak). Del Monte arrived in Bukidnon in 1926, shortly after the first Christian settlers. They planted pineapples on 10,000 hectares of the lands of the Bukidnon Manobo. In 1935, the Philippine Commonwealth passed legislation limiting the landholdings of any corporation to 1,024 hectares. If implemented, this regulation would have seriously limited Philpak's operations. The National Development Corporation (NDC) was established to ensure that this did not happen. The NDC was empowered to own land in excess of the limit

of 1,024 hectares and to lease it to other corporations, including Philpak. For this service, Philpak paid a rental to the NDC of P1.00 per annum per hectare. The native Bukidnon and Manobo tribes received no compensation for their lost lands. Even today, the rental is fixed at P10.00 (present US \$1.33) per hectare per annum, plus P0.25 (\$0.033) for each ton of raw pineapple. These favourable conditions have helped Philpak to achieve profit levels averaging more than 30 per cent per annum.

The company has further expansion plans for 14,000 hectares of the Pontian plains in Bukidnon. Native Bukidnons are again to be the victims of this expansion. With the help of Philippine Constabulary (PC) and PANAMIN troops, Philpak, today, has acquired more than half this land.⁵

Recently, hamletting has begun in Bukidnon, (see Chapter 4) demonstrating that the military are willing to go to extraordinary means to protect the financial interests in the area.

Government infrastructure program

a. 63 roads and bridges

Total cost: P1.28 billion = \$54.256m

10 portworks (excluding Zamboanga Fish Port complex) in P343 million = \$23 million

b. Power and electrification:

4 Mindanao power projects

c. 30 Corporate Farms

(G.O. 47 of Mindanao-Sulu, 1979)

26,527.5 hectares.⁶

Development is aided and abetted by the regime whose infrastructure projects respond to the demands of the foreign corporations. The government plans to build 17 hydro-electric projects in Mindanao which will threaten the lives of well over 100,000 tribal peoples. As in the Cordilleras it is the big corporations who will benefit from the dams.

The hydro-electric system on Lake Lanao and the Agus River has already provoked an escalating level of violence. Using military campaigns against the Moro National Liberation Front as an excuse, the government has harassed whole communities of Muslims opposing the dams. In the process innocent Muslims have been killed, women raped and mosques and homes burned. In retaliation, MNLF guerillas have ambushed NPC work teams and bombed several large transmission towers.

On the Agus River only two of the seven dams in the system have been built; yet the destabilization of the water level of Lake Lanao has already damaged the ecological balance of the area. One hundred and twenty-six thousand hectares of irrigated rice land have already been rendered useless. The fish feeding and breeding grounds have been destroyed. The people complain that they can hardly catch enough fish to feed their families, much less sell any for their other needs. Even the religious practices of the Maranao have been affected. Their mosques were built on the lakeshore so worshippers can make their ablutions on the doorstep of the mosque. Now they cannot do that because the waterline has receded away from the mosque. The Maranaos, whose name means 'people of the lake', are afraid that all these changes will bring about the disruption of their social and cultural cohesion.⁷

Militarization

Since the 1960s the regime has mounted an all-out attack on the islands of Mindanao and Sulu, concentrating particularly on the Bangsa Moro people. In recent years what amounts to an undeclared war has been waged against the people. The reason is obvious: the vast interests of the multi-national companies in the region must be preserved at any cost, even at the cost of the Moros' and other people's lives and cultures.

The military presence in Mindanao-Sulu demonstrates the lengths to which the government will go both to preserve the islands as a haven for foreign multinationals, and to crush the courageous resistance of the people.

1981 Data:⁸

Army — 60% is in Mindanao-Sulu
80% of the 60% is in Region 9 and 12
PC — 7,456 Provincial Command
4,620 PC Brigade Soldiers
Marines — 1/2 of total force
Phil. Coastguard — 1/3 of total force
Airforce — 6,080 forces + 200 pilots
Comp. Military police — 1,400
INP — 11,947
ICHDF — 64,000
Special Para-Mil. Forces — 35,000

The presence of the military on such a large scale has inevitably led to intensified militarization against the people. Salvagings, massacres, and strafing are common occurrences. The most recent tactic of the regime is strategic hamletting. While this is ostensibly put forward as a counter insurgency tactic it is clear that there are vast economic interests at stake. (see chapter 4 on Hamletting)

Four days of terror in Barrio Bayog

Four warplanes of the Philippine Air Force dropped 16 bombs in Dimalinao, Bayog, Zamboanga del Sur last May 25, 1982 at around 1.00 pm. The bombing lasted for about 10 minutes.

Many people were hit, three were killed while eight others were wounded including an infant of 4-months old. The barrio hall and five houses of the residents were also destroyed.

Because of this hundreds of families evacuated to the poblacion of Bayog especially when some of them were arrested and tortured by the military who are now operating in their barrios to look for the NPA.

On May 25, 1982, in order to suppress the NPA, the government sent many soldiers and four warplanes. It is estimated that 3,000-5,000 soliders launched the military operations. It was around 1.00 in the afternoon when the people of Dimalinao watched the four warplanes above them. Unexpectedly the planes swooped down and dropped bombs aimed at them, the barrio hall and their houses.

The following is the result of their 'campaign against the NPA':

Bombing casualties

a. *Teodolfo Balendres* — 42 years old, farmer, husband of Pacita, has 10 children and a resident of Dimalinao. He was one of those who were looking at the airplane. Seeing the bombs falling, he ran for safety holding his baby. The bomb blasted and he got killed.

b. *Conception Baes* — 49 years old, has 9 children, wife of Alejandro Baes and resident of Dimalinao. She was cooking inside the house when the bomb hit it.

c. *Loreta Baes* — 16 years old, daughter of Conception and Alejandro. She was with her mother inside the house when the bomb fell.

After the bombing of the four warplanes, the soldiers made their assault. While looking for the NPA, several people were arrested on May 25, 1982. Late in the afternoon, they were all released.

May 29, 1982 — Another series of arrests of farmers were made by the soldiers under Lt. Fajardo.

Many properties of the people were destroyed because of the bombing. Those that were not destroyed by the bombs, were

A documented summary of one year report on militarization in Mindanao-Sulu for the year 1981

Provinces/City	Arrests	Released	Still Detained	Longheld	Missing	Salvaged	Massacred	Bombing Victims	Evacuees
Agusan del Norte	135	120	15	3	1	19	9	-	-
Agusan del Sur	22	15	7	-	1	25	7	-	-
Bukidnon	60	31	29	-	6	15	-	-	-
Davao City	98	94	4	9	4	39	-	17	-
Davao del Norte	40	20	20	-	2	16	-	-	-
Davao del Sur	89	61	28	10	5	15	10	-	-
Lanao del Norte	12	4	8	-	-	-	15	-	-
Maguindanao	31	16	15	4	4	38	22	14	-
Misamis Occidental	31	22	9	7	2	10	18	-	213 families
Misamis Oriental	1	1	-	2	-	5	-	-	-
North Cotabato	145	126	19	2	7	16	-	-	-
South Cotabato	-	-	-	-	-	7	-	-	-
Surigao del Sur	7	1	6	-	-	-	-	-	-
Zamboanga del Sur	62	57	5	7	13	23	22	-	167 families
Zamboanga del Norte	33	30	3	7	-	-	-	-	-
TOTAL	766	508	168	51	45	228	103	31	380 families

(Source: *Mindanao; the bleeding land. An Update. Task For for Detainees.*)

either destroyed or carried away by the soldiers who made the attack after the bombing.

Because of this, 116 families evacuated to nearby areas.

Aspects of counter-insurgency

A further repressive aspect of 'development projects' is that of counter-insurgency. Many government projects designed to facilitate foreign corporations and often financed by the World Bank also function as camouflaged military counter-insurgency programs to contain the people's resistance and the growth of the revolutionary movement. In tribal minority areas the government agency which facilitates the implementation of the development of government infrastructure projects is PANAMIN (Presidential Assistance on National Minorities).

One of PANAMIN's continuous programs concerns a national security and information campaign which is aimed to counteract the subversive operations and to ensure the security of tribal areas from these subversive elements. Through its security program and in close coordination with the military, PANAMIN has maintained the loyalty of the 4.25 million non-Muslim hill tribes to the President and to the government. As a result, the cultural communities have served as a strong deterring factor to the expansion plans of the Muslim rebels and the NPA.

The importance of PANAMIN's counter insurgency role is best shown by the fact that it constitutes the largest item in PANAMIN's budget. PANAMIN's preoccupation with its security function is also reflected in the increasing dominance of military personnel in both the national and local staffs.

The first regional director for Bukidnon and Misamis Oriental in Mindanao was Oliver Madronal, a military officer with five years experience in Vietnam working in the CIA's Montagnard Program.

PANAMIN's militia forces, numbering 2225 trained and fully armed men as early as 1974, have been used primarily against tribal Filipinos. Apart from the role played by the PANAMIN CHDF in Kalinga, 20 armed T'bolis were sent to

Kalinga in 1978, and another unit of T'boli CHDF has fought against MNLF forces. In Bukidnon, the Simod CHDF was used against the July 1978 'rebellion' in Talakag to fight against fellow tribal Filipinos. In various places, PANAMIN CHDF's have been used to force recalcitrant tribal Filipinos into reservations.⁹

A PANAMIN official is quoted as saying:

We resettle the natives on reservation lands which we manage for them. From then on, any company that is interested in the land deals with us.

PANAMIN proudly claims that it has already confined two and a half million Filipinos to reservations and expects soon to include all the minority peoples of the country. This then, is the prospect facing Philippine national minorities under PANAMIN and the Marcos regime.

Along with PANAMIN, other counter-insurgency groups operate in tribal minority areas, especially in Mindanao. There, Rock Christ, a para-military religious sect, are reported to have been involved in the killing of ten people on August 10, 1981. In October 2, another eight people were massacred by the sect. 406 families fled their homes as a result of the August massacres. Members of the sect are said to regard these evacuated areas as their promised land, and feel free to occupy it. Many of the high priests are reputed to be rich landlords and farmers.

Another sect, the Four Ks, are also a counter-insurgency group, and are responsible for several killings in Mindanao.

In addition to these fanatical sects, barangay brigades operate in many areas, along with the ICHDF forces. Both of these groupings complement the efforts of the regular military forces in their counter-insurgency measures in tribal minority areas.

Resistance

The pattern of national oppression perpetrated by the regime is constantly met by the courageous resistance of the people. Their struggle for self-determination takes many forms, from legal protests to armed struggle. The Bangsa Moro Army among the

Bangsa Moro people, the the New Peoples Army throughout the rest of the Philippines have been successfully leading the armed resistance against the regime for more than ten years. Many legal groups are also engaged in the struggle for self-preservation. Legal resistance is well demonstrated in the forging of the Bodong, or peace pact among several tribes in the Cordillera. Here, we reprint a statement from a recent Bodong:

- We have come together at Betwagan, Sadanga, Mountain Province on February 13-14, 1982 for a Bodong Conference to discuss common problems affecting our lives and well-being.
- We have identified our main problem to be our impending dislocation due to so-called 'development projects' of the government and the forced entry of foreign corporations into our lands and communities.
- In order to insure the implementation of these 'projects', the government has deployed the military and spies (intelligence agents) who perpetrate killings and other atrocious acts, and who sow intrigues and disunity among our people.
- Towards resolving these problems, we have sent petitions and delegations to President Marcos and the other government agencies and instrumentalities; but all these have been futile and of no effect.
- Therefore, we pledge our unity to help each other in resolving these problems; and we further pledge to stand by and uphold the following agreements:

- That any native of the Cordillera who is a member of the Armed Forces of the Philippines or who has applied to be a member of the AFP or any of its instrumentalities, is excluded from the protection of the Bodong.
- That written notice of those excluded shall be furnished to the family of the individual concerned.
- That President Marcos is hereby informed of our resolute determination to oppose and to fight the construction of the dams as well as any intrusion into our lands by logging, mining and other 'projects' which exploit and which destroy our Cordillera resources.
- Finally, we express our solidarity with other sectors in Philippine society who are also victims of the exploitation and oppression of the same power structure which have caused the suffering of the Cordillera people.

This sentiment of solidarity is also expressed in a letter from the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF), to Archbishop Mabutias, in the Archdiocese of Davao, after the bombing attack on Davao Cathedral, on April 19, 1981. It demonstrates the united opposition to the Marcos regime.

The letter begins:

Dear Brethrens:

In a spirit of solidarity with our Christian brothers, we of the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) wish to express our most profound sympathy to all victims of the San Pedro Cathedral bombings last Easter Sunday, the 19th of April 1981. We strongly condemn the heinous act committed against the people observing the Holy Week in the House of God by unknown perpetrators completely devoid of moral or religious scruples.

We are True Believers of Allah and as God-fearing people we vehemently deny participation in or knowledge of such hideous and despicable action (direct or indirect) instituted against your most Holy Place of Worship.

The military authorities have prejudged the matter from a very fixed point of view by singling out our organization as the executor of this mindless and perverted act. This irresponsible distortion of issues is designed by the current authoritarian regime to create a bigoted religious bias against the Filipino Muslim community in a futile effort to divert the citizenry from the social, economic and political ills plaguing the country on account of the crass incompetence and mismanagement of our national affairs by the corrupt Marcos dictatorship. We would like to remind the military authorities concerned of an old proverb saying: 'When you point an accusing finger at someone, remember that three fingers are pointing back at you!'

It goes on to challenge the military authorities to answer several questions with regard to their suspicious conduct on the day of the bombing. It demands to know why the MNLF were blamed for the bombing before the investigations were even complete, and why the suspected bomber was gunned down by the Intelligence and Police operatives. The letter ends:

On behalf of the MNLF we commiserate with the Christian community for the senseless slaughter and needless physical suffering it has been subjected to. We are currently conducting our own investigation and you can be rest assured of our utmost assistance and cooperation regarding the matter. We give our solemn pledge to bring the perpetrators of this barbaric and inhuman act to justice regardless of the consequences. Inshallah!

Wassalamu alaikum warahmatullah wabarakatoh.

Your brothers in the fight for national liberation,
Committee on Information
MNLF Davao Revolutionary Committee
(sgd.) *Abdullah Hassan*
Chairman

Notes

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6. The Export of Repression: Filipinos Abroad

An estimated 2.4 million Filipinos work abroad



Filipino protesting in Britain against deportation in March 1982

The repressive situation of the Philippines extends beyond its borders, and affects even those Filipinos living and working abroad. The problems faced by the estimated 2.4 million migrants have their roots in the economic and political situation of the Philippines. The phenomenon of migration is itself a manifestation of the repressive economic policies of the regime, where thousands of Filipinos are forced to go abroad to work, and are even encouraged to do so by the Marcos regime.

There are no exact figures on the number of migrant workers, since many of them are illegal. Altogether there is an estimated 2.4 million Filipinos in 105 countries. The Rome based Commission for Filipino Migrant Workers (CFMW) gave the following breakdown in 1981:

US & Canada	1,000,000	Spain	15,000
Middle East	250,000	Germany	10,000
Great Britain	15,000	Greece	8,000
Italy	15,000	Austria	5,000
Africa	15,000		

It has become official policy to export Filipino manpower at the rate of 250,000 every year. Several government bodies like the Overseas Employment Development Board, the National Seamens Board, and the Bureau of Employment Services are in charge of the overseas employment agencies that have mushroomed since Filipinos have started to be regarded as exportable and saleable commodities.

The Marcos Government's number one dollar-earner today is exported Filipino labour. In 1981 alone, it earned US\$1.4 billion from foreign currency remittances by Filipino workers. The Philippine Labour Code requires land-based overseas workers to remit at least 30 per cent of their wages or salaries to the Philippines, while Filipino seamen are required to remit 70 per cent. US\$300 million was earned by migrants in Iraq alone in 1981, enough to pay the Philippines daily consumption of oil. The Marcos regime needs these precious currencies badly to prop up its tottering economy and to pay its mounting foreign debt. This manpower exportation benefits the regime by relieving the acute unemployment problem in the country, thereby also depriving the growing mass movement against the Marcos regime and the multinationals of potential leaders and supporters.¹

As a senior Philippine official explained to *Time* magazine on November 16, 1981: 'We are exporting our economic and political tensions. It's a lifesaver for our country. I can't imagine what the situation would be here without all those overseas jobs.'

Such thinking takes no account of the hardships endured by the migrants abroad. Leaving the Philippines in the hope of escaping the repressive policies of the regime and finding jobs, most end up in carrying the oppressiveness abroad. Besides the problems of disorientation, language, new laws and procedures of the host country many also face the problem of status as migrants. Documented cases in the UK show that many of the agencies in the Philippines often provide false information with regard to visas, provide false references to employers in the host country, mislead workers with regard to wages, usually charge exorbitant fees which sometimes include a heavily inflated price for a single-way ticket to the host country.²

The dubious practices of many of these agencies often results in the migrants having illegal status in the host country. Consequently, they can be deported any time. Thirteen Filipinos are still in a stage of 'suspended removal' from the UK. They are among the group of 50 Filipinos given notices of removal before Christmas last year by the British Home Office. A campaign for the Filipino migrant workers' right to stay resulted in 35 being granted permission to stay while 13 were refused permission and given removal dates. No reasons were given for the differing decisions which are solely the prerogative of the Home Secretary.

From March 1980 to December 1981 about 100 Filipinos were deported from the UK for failing to declare that they had children before entering Britain. Evidence from the workers shows that most were not informed about the regulation under which visas are issued only to people not known to have children under sixteen years of age.³

These are not isolated cases, nor are they confined to the UK. Similar incidences have occurred and are occurring in many European countries. The cases reflect repressiveness both at home and abroad where the import of foreign labor is no longer as vital for the economy.

This export of repression is particularly evident in the case of Filipino seamen working on foreign ships. An overview of their situation reflects how the repressive arm of the regime affects all migrant workers.



Seamen and repression

The Commission of Filipino Migrant Workers explains:

In the Philippines, a government body, the National Seamen's Board (NSB) negotiates with the shipowners or their representatives over the contracts of the seamen. The seaman has to sign the contract. The working conditions are determined by the authorities together with the shipowners' agents. The monthly salaries of most of the crew are between US\$250 and US\$455. Overtime is not paid, although it is obligatory to do overtime work according to the contract. 70 per cent of the income is sent by the ship's agent to the Philippines, where the family is paid in pesos, but always with much delay. The seaman receives 30 per cent into his hands. This is often spent on extra food, cigarettes, clean bedsheets, and warm clothing. In the contract there are heavy penalties stipulated for the slightest 'violations'. These penalties often come even to dismissal. Thus has the captain almost unlimited power over his crew, which he can force to do overtime work whenever he wishes, and he can beat them up.

For the Philippine government, the seamen are nothing but an export-commodity which must bring in dollars, with which the soaring external debt must be paid. The remittances of about 100,000 Filipino seamen comprise a most important source of dollars for the Philippine regime. The Marcos government aims to increase the number of Filipino seamen to 500,000 by 1985.

The National Seamen's Board (NSB) has signed stricter guidelines to prevent strikes staged by Filipino seamen while in foreign ports in violation of government-approved contracts.

In a resolution approved by the NSB board, the government agency adopted the following measures:

- Contracts entered into between Filipino seamen and foreign ship-owners through the latter's designated local agents and duly approved by the NSB shall be held inviolate.
- The NSB shall in all cases exert its authority and control over the parties to the employment contracts and shall not condone the violation of such contracts.
- Amendments to the NSB-approved employment contracts and/or any new contracts superceding the original contracts shall be subject to the approval of the agency and shall have a prospective effect only.

The new NSB rules are intended to prevent numerous cases of interdictions or strikes staged by Filipino seamen in foreign ports at the instigation of the International Transport Workers' Federation (ITF), an international seamen's union.

The 'Saudi Independence' strike demonstrates the effects of these regulations. The ship was owned by a Saudi Arabian shipowner, and managed by a Greek agency called 'Saudi European Lines'. The crew counts 38 men, of whom 25 were Filipinos. For ten months the ship had sailed with such a scarce food supply that the men had to catch fish and had only rice and one dried fish per person per day. Eventually, when they reached Rotterdam a dockworker who saw the condition of the crew notified the International Transport Federation (ITF). With the help of the Federation a strike was organized, and began on May 18, 1981. The basic demand was for adequate food.

The Filipino seamen on strike on the 'Saudi Independence' received a letter, written in Filipino, from the labor attaché to the Philippine embassy in The Hague, the Netherlands, Mr Manuel Cruz. Mr Cruz threateningly told the striking seamen that their strike violated the laws of the Republic of the Philippines and that they are guilty of breach of contract. He sternly warned

them to immediately return to work. His letter is dated 25 May, 1981. On the same day, the seamen also received a letter from the National Seamen's Board (NSB), signed by Oscar M. Torres, Chief, Legal Service of the NSB office in Amsterdam. Also written in Filipino, the letter stated that Mr Torres had been instructed by the Office of the President (Marcos) to intervene in the strike and was calling for a meeting of only the Filipinos (expressly excluding non-Filipinos) with him. He stated that with such a meeting excluding non-Filipinos, they could resolve the problem and 'maintain the high prestige of the Filipino seamen throughout the world'. (Note that this letter was clearly excluding the presence of ITF, Dutch dock workers and other Dutch groups that had expressed solidarity for the Filipino seamen's strike.) Mr Torres' letter is dated 31 May, 1981. The seamen got copies of the letters but refused to give a written acknowledgement of receipt of the letters. They referred the messenger to the ITF. Instead, the captain was the one who signed the receipt. This action of the NSB and labor attaché is identical to the action taken by the Philippine embassies in The Hague, in Bonn (Brillantes, labor attaché and NSB representatives), and in London (Remo Brion, labor attaché) during the strike of Filipino seamen on the 'Tropwind' at Amsterdam from November 7, 1978 to December 27, 1978. Finally at the strike, Remo Brion of the Philippine embassy in London confiscated the seamen's certificates of the striking seamen and ordered them back to the Philippines.

The seamen won some initial victories. On 19 May 1981, a Dutch court issued a ruling that the shipowner must provide food for the striking seamen. A week later, another court ruling stipulated that the strike was legal and that the seamen could not be removed from the ship.

But the seamen faced mounting difficulties. In the evening of June 1, 1981, they were given a copy of a stern order from Commodore Brillante C. Ochoco, Commandant of the Philippine Coast Guard authorizing the labor attaché at The Hague to take possession of their seamen's certificates and that these were under 'preventive suspension'. The telexed order also stated that the 25 Filipino officers and crew now have a case filed against them and this is docketed at the board of marine inquiry.

Upon being given this notice, the captain who had been keeping the seamen's certificates of the striking Filipino crew, turned over the crew's seamen's certificates to the Philippine embassy in the Netherlands.

The strike ends

Eventually, on June 12, a Rotterdam court handed down a decision ordering the crew to vacate the ship. The court judgement was given on the grounds that 'we deem the standards as they obtain according to Philippine law here as applicable', and it also authorized the owner 'to remove from the ship and set ashore along with their personal effects any of the defendants who do not answer this order, if need be with the help of the strong arm of the police and the law.'

On June 5 and a few days later the seamen sought the help of the Philippine Embassy in The Hague, but were, on those two occasions, verbally abused and warned that they would face the full consequences of their strike action in the Philippines. On June 21, the seamen were put on board a direct flight to Manila, after being issued a one way travel document.⁴

Thus ended the seamen's strike. In such a way does Marcos succeed in extending his oppressive policies abroad.

Disappearance and murder: new trends?

Recently, events indicate that Marcos is going to even greater lengths to squash opposition abroad. The intensified militariza-

tion in the Philippines is matched by a corresponding development overseas. Though Marcos' efforts abroad have tended to be subtle and insidious, recent happenings over the past years show that as opposition mounts he is willing to resort to the most extreme measures, to ensure acquiescence.

Disappearance of a Filipino seaman in Hamburg, Germany

On Friday, February 26, 1982 at about 8am, the 12 Filipino crew-members of the Greek vessel US Poseidon in dock number 8 of the Hamburg docks of Blohn & Voss stopped their work and went on strike.

Their demand was to finally receive their pay which they had not received for several months. It was only in the process of the strike that they found that their co-workers from other Third World countries on the same vessel received a regular pay of \$600/650 per month due to Greek tariffs, whereas the twelve Filipinos — due to a special contract with the Philippine agent — received only \$300 per month. So, the demand for equal pay was added.

However, neither the local International Transportation Federation (ITF) representative, nor the Philippine Consulate, nor the Greek Consulate were ready to support the seamen's demands. So, they finally approached attorney Dr Geffken for legal advice, who together with some colleagues, took up their case, trying to get from the courts a 'warrant of arrest' for the vessel, to make sure that the shipowner had to react. In fact, on Sunday, two days after the strike had started, the Philippine agent arrived in Hamburg from Manila trying to put pressure on the twelve seamen.⁵

On the following Monday the spokesman for the seamen, Leonardo Acain, failed to show up at the office of the attorney for a meeting with the attorney, with the shipowner and the agent. There were a number of rumours that he was brought by force to Manila. The shipowner secured a declaration, signed by all the seamen which waived everything they had claimed beforehand. Nothing has ever been heard of the whereabouts or the fate of the seaman.

The murder of labor unionists

In early 1982, the *New York Times* reported two murders which may be linked with the Marcos regime. 'On June 1, 1981, in Seattle, two young union reformers (Viernes and Domingo) were gunned down in the offices of Local 37, International Longshoremen's and Warehousemen's union... Both workers were Filipinos... (and) were leaders in a reformist Rank and File Committee that sought to democratize and clean up Local 37, which had become mired in corruption. The two gunmen identified by Domingo (before he died) were also Filipinos, members of Seattle's Tulisan Gang...' But the two men, Viernes and Domingo 'were also anti-Marcos activists, founding members of the Union of Democratic Filipinos (KDP) and active in the Coalition against the Marcos Dictatorship'. The Tulisan leader was tried and convicted for giving the hit men their orders; his defense counsel charged that these orders had come from Tony Baruso, who is strongly pro-Marcos and has been publicly honored by the Marcos regime.

A committee for justice for Viernes and Domingo believes that the orders for the murders may have come from Manila, 'although they concede the Local 37 was involved. They contend that their investigations found Philippine intelligence agents to have been operating in America since 1973, mostly infiltrating and harassing anti-Marcos groups.'

These two incidents bode ill for those who oppose Marcos from abroad. A significant factor in these repressive acts is that the regime has allies abroad, who benefit enormously from the

gross violation of peoples' rights. This is even further demonstrated by the attempts to ratify an Extradition Treaty between the Philippines and the US. The treaty was concluded in November 1981, and is due for ratification by the Senate. In a blatant manner and with the collusion of the Reagan administration, Marcos is hoping to quell critical voices in the US. The treaty will also benefit the US, since opposition anywhere threatens the US interests in the Philippines.

The US/RP extradition treaty

The extradition treaty will allow the Philippine government to request extradition for offenses considered criminal in the Philippines, but committed outside that country.

Article 1, section 2 states, 'With respect to an offense committed outside the territory of the Requesting State, the Requested State shall grant extradition... if... the person sought is a national of the Requesting State and the State has jurisdiction to try that person.'

Thus, anytime the Philippine government claims to have evidence that a person here has done something that is considered a crime in the Philippines, that person is subject to extradition.

Open to interpretation

An appendix to the treaty list 42 crimes covered. Some of them are clearly criminal such as murder, manslaughter and rape. Others, however, are broad enough to be subject to interpretation.

One is subject to extradition, for example, for violating customs laws or inciting a riot.

Article II adds that anything else not listed in the appendix is covered as long as it is considered an offense in both countries.

Finally, extradition can be granted not just for committing a crime, but, for 'conspiring in, attempting, or participating in the commission of an offense, or for being an accessory after the fact'.⁶

Political offences

Article 3, while supposedly excluding 'political offences' actually shifts the determination of political offences out of the judiciary to the executive, specifically to the Secretary of State.

This dangerous move strips a suspect of the constitutional guarantees of due process. Proponents of the Extradition Act argue that the shift of jurisdiction, places extradition — 'an essentially diplomatic process' — in the hands of diplomats. In reality it means that the outcome of any case will be determined by what suits US foreign policy interest.

Detention without bail

Another feature of the Extradition Act which opens wide the possibility of indiscriminate abuse of civil liberties, is the provision of 'preventive detention'. At the mere recommendation of a requesting state, any individual can be arrested and detained for up to sixty days without bail. During that time the requesting state must come up with the necessary documentation and evidence to prove 'probable cause' for extradition.⁷

This provision allows for the wholesale arrest, detention and interrogation of innocent persons on the mere suspicion and recommendation of the requesting state. The spectre of indiscriminate arrests of scores of people whose only 'crime' is to oppose repression in their home country, looms on the horizon.

First attempt at extradition

Although the US-RP Extradition Treaty specifies 42 crimes acknowledged as offences under both US and Philippine law, and supposedly excludes 'political offenses', the very first action taken by the Philippine government has been to issue warrants of

arrest for political dissidents in the US.

According to the January 5, 1982 order of the Philippine Court of First Instance, the persons are charged with violation of the Anti-Subversion Law. The court states, 'the Revised Anti-Subversion Law defines a subversive organization as one organized for the purpose of overthrowing the government of the Republic of the Philippines with the open or covert assistance of a power by force, violence, deceit or other illegal means. A person becomes liable for subversion when he knowingly, willfully or by overt acts becomes or remains a member of such a subversive organization.'

Included in the top priority section of the arrest list is Rene Cruz, for eight years the coordinator of the Coalition Against the Marcos Dictatorship (CAMD) formerly the Anti-Martial Law Coalition and currently editor of *Ang Katipunan*, the national newspaper of the Union of Democratic Filipinos. Cruz, a well known opposition figure has been in the forefront of efforts to oppose Martial Law repression and US support for the Marcos regime for the past ten years. The activities of CAMD and the editorials of the *Ang Katipunan*, though scathing in their indictment of the US-Marcos dictatorship, are legitimate political expression guaranteed by the First Amendment's freedom of association and freedom of the press.⁷

Nonetheless, the Philippine government has stated that it will begin extradition proceedings against Cruz for the crime of 'being an official and member of a subversive organization.'

Among the 40 persons accused of subversion are Benigno Aquino, Charito Planas, Raul Manglapus, Steve Psinakis, and Raul Daza. The majority of those accused are Movement for a Free Philippines (MFP) leaders and members whom the Marcos dictatorship earlier linked to a wave of bombings in Manila in 1980.

The case against the 40 was originally filed on February 24, 1981. The charges focused on alleged assassination plots, bombings, and other acts of urban terror. The government's star witness was Los Angeles businessman Victor Lovely, wounded in a Manila bombing incident, who according to the government, provided information on links between Manila bombings and US-based oppositionists.

That the Philippine government is not just after 'fire arms smugglers', 'bombers' or 'would-be presidential assassins' is evident in the charge sheet lodged before the Rizal Court of First Instance. For though as a result of Lovely's alleged testimony, the bombings are cited, the major focus of the charges is the leadership and membership of a subversive organization. And in the case against Cruz, in particular, cited as a leader of an organization which is dedicated to public education and organizing against the dictatorship, the charge is completely political in nature and bears none of vague criminal charges brought against other Marcos opponents.

Thus it is clear that under the Marcos regime, the distinction between political and criminal offenses does not exist.

The US by accepting the Philippine definition for 'criminal offenses' makes suspect any Filipino resident of the US who opposes the Marcos regime.⁸

Opposition to the extradition treaty

The treaty is drawing considerable opposition from various academic, church, human rights and civil liberty groups.

This was demonstrated by the speedy formation of the National Committee Opposed to the US-RP Extradition Treaty which issued a statement denouncing the treaty within two weeks of the State Department's release of copies of the agreement. The committee includes activist groups as well as individuals.⁸

The National Lawyers Guild passed a strongly worded resolution of condemnation at its convention in February. In

reference to the bill, the NLG resolution said the proposed revision of the US extradition procedures 'is the cutting edge of the administration's plan to make it easier for the US government to get rid of "undesirable" political activists now in this country'. In the event the Extradition Treaty is ratified, continued the resolution, the NLG 'encourages guild lawyers to assist persons who may be the subject of extradition proceedings, especially where the underlying basis of their prosecution is their political opposition to Marcos and the US foreign policy.'⁹

Another important statement of opposition came from the International Longshoremen's and Warehousemen's Union. The American Civil Liberties Union of Northern California has condemned the treaty, saying that it represents a serious danger to the civil liberties of both citizens and non-citizens alike.

Notes

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2. *On the Road to Repatriation*, Migrants Action Group, March 1981.
3. *Migrant Women Under Threat*, Migrant Action Group.
4. *Kabisig*, November-December 1981.
5. Introduction to an interview with Dr Geffken by Elenor Heller. Translation from *Imba*.
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7. Committee to Oppose the US/RP Extradition Treaty — a recent report.
8. *Philippine Liberation Courier*, December 1981.
9. *Ibid.*
10. *Ibid.*



A publication of the Commission for Filipino Migrant Workers

7. The Drift to Large Scale US Intervention

The Philippines is vital, economically and strategically to the US



President Marcos with armed forces chiefs and US advisors

The participation of US marines in military repression outside the US base areas, US war exercises, a string of visits of high ranking US officials with their foreboding statements and increased US military aid to the Marcos government are portents of the increasing danger of large scale US intervention in the Philippines. The crucial role of the US bases in the Philippines to US global and regional military strategy and the huge economic interests of US multinationals constitute the strong motivation of the US to fuel the war machine of the Marcos dictatorship against a rapidly growing armed resistance of the New People's Army and the Bangsa Moro Army. The renegotiated US-RP military bases treaty of January 1979 provides the legal justification for the US commanders to 'participate in security activities' off the bases and to 'contribute security forces' to carry them out. It likewise contains 'the assurance of unhampered United States military operations' throughout the Philippines.

US marines in military repression

In the sensitive area of Bataan, near the US bases, the Mariveles Export Processing Zone, and the Westinghouse nuclear plant, where numerous protest actions have occurred, US marines appeared on September 29, 1981 in support of Philippine marines who directly terrorized the civilian population of six towns.

From September 29, 1981 to February 3, 1982, the Philippine marines killed 12 persons, raided 12 houses (strafing one with seven people inside, causing death to five), tortured six (one of whom committed suicide), caused the disappearance of three. They have terrorized the six towns of Samal, Abucay, Hermosa, Orani, Limay, Orion, and Pilar. Elements of the US marines have been on the scene, acting as reinforcements to the Philippine marines.

The Task Force for Detainees (TFD) — Luzon has documented the participation of the US marines and the terror activities of the Philippine marines. This church-related human rights group has called for a protest campaign against the atrocities committed by the Philippine marines and the presence of US marines in support of the Philippine troops in the area.¹

US war exercises

On May 26, 1982, about three thousand US marines and Philippine troops staged a mock invasion of Dingalan town, in Aurora province, Luzon. Naval bombardment from seven US warships preceded the entry of the invaders who raked the town buildings and homes with machine-gun and rifle fire as they overpowered the contingent of Philippine Constabulary troopers who acted as 'defenders' of the town.²

This war exercise is reminiscent of the bigger war maneuver held last November 19, 1980 at Mindoro island. Then, 16 US warships disgorged 5,000 US marines in a mock landing on Mamburao, Occidental Mindoro. Several Philippine navy ships participated and a battalion of Philippine marines acted as 'defenders' of the island in this war exercise, code-named 'Valiant Blitz' and headed by no less than the US Commander of the Seventh Fleet.³

In October 1981, a unit of the US Navy's SEALs (Sea, Air and Land Services) was seen conducting military exercises at Green Beach, near the US Subic Bay Naval Base. Besides their training in underwater sabotage, parachuting, and anti-rebel tactics, their training included the learning of at least one Philippine dialect.⁴


Visits of high ranking US officials

Since June 1981, a string of visits of high ranking US officials and their assurances of full support for the Marcos regime indicate the increasing concern of the US over the Philippines.

On June 17, 1981, then Secretary of State, Alexander Haig, congratulated President Marcos for his 'wonderful victory' at the presidential election and delivered a personal message of congratulations from President Reagan.

On June 30, 1981, Vice-President George Bush attended President Marcos' inauguration as President of the New Republic and made his now (in)famous toast: 'We love your adherence to democratic principles and democratic processes, and we will not leave you in isolation.'

Springboards for Intervention



In August, 1981 Undersecretary of State, James L. Buckley visited the Philippines and the region, more or less reiterating Haig's assurances to America's Asian partners that the US would stand by them.⁵

Also in August 1981, the chairman of the US Senate Foreign Relations Subcommittee on East Asia and the Pacific, Senator S.I. Hayakawa visited the Philippines and defended US support for the Marcos government and praised the latter for its democratic development.⁶

Around the same time, the guided missile cruiser, USS Sterett arrived at Subic Bay. This is the first time that a major US warship is home ported in the Philippines.⁷

Not long after, on September 23, 1981, Deputy Defence Secretary, Frank Carlucci came and agreed with AFP Chief of Staff, Gen. Fabian Ver that internal subversion control and regional/global defence capabilities are related. They then mapped out improvements in local counter-insurgency programmes and set priorities for foreign military sales credits for the Marcos military.⁸

On April 1, 1982, Defence Secretary Caspar Weinberger came to explain the new US military strategy for Asia, declaring that the US 'had lost its post-Vietnam jitters'.⁹ The new military strategy, contained in the US Defence Department's strategic 'guidance' for the next five years, calls for a shift in planning and forces from Northeast Asia to Southeast Asia and the Indian Ocean.¹⁰

This string of visits of top ranking US officials forms the backdrop for President Marcos' scheduled official visit to Washington next September, when as US Ambassador to the Philippines, Michael Armacost stated, 'increased military assistance will come through the review' of the bases treaty. Military aid of the US has already jumped seven times to US\$140.1 million for 1982 compared to the pre-martial law average of US\$20 million. This massive US military back-up for the Marcos government is further complemented by a growing involvement of Australia and some European governments (particularly Britain, Netherlands and Italy), in logistical military support. This is evidenced in an increasing arms trade, and in military and intelligence training.¹¹

Subic and Clark crucial to US strategy

As early as 80 years ago, Gen. Arthur MacArthur, head of the colonial pacification campaign that brought 126,00 US troops into the Philippines to quell a national resistance, already saw the strategic value of the Philippines. He then told the US Congress that the Philippines constituted:

the finest group of islands in the world. Its strategic posi-

tion is unexcelled by that of any other position on the globe... It affords a means of protecting American interests which with the very least output of physical power, has the effect of a commanding position in itself to retard hostile action.¹²

Some 80 years later, on November 18, 1981, the acting deputy assistant secretary of state, Daniel O'Donohue testified before the US House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee:

Our Philippine facilities have a unique strategic advantage, because of their location, in being able to facilitate military operations in two major areas of the world [East and Southeast Asia, and the Indian Ocean/Persian Gulf region] of particular importance to us. Because of the strategically advantageous location of Clark and Subic, no alternative site or group of sites could adequately replace them.¹³

Huge US economic interests

Another strong motivation for the US to intervene against a rising revolutionary movement in the Philippines is its huge economic interests in the Philippines. 116 US multinationals in the top 1000 corporations in 1978 had assets totalling P13 billion. In addition, by December 1980, branches of major American banks had assets totalling some P34 billion. In addition to this, the US is the number one trading partner of the Philippines.

Vietnam war tactics revived

As the armed resistance of the NPA and the BMA escalated, the Marcos regime has started to apply in a massive way the old US counter-insurgency tactic of strategic hamletting, which preceded largescale US intervention in Vietnam. As of April 1982, more than 217,000 people had been herded into 169 town and barrio-wide hamlets in six provinces in Mindanao. Hamletting has also been started in Abra province in northern Luzon.

Danger of large scale intervention increases

With many thousands of US troops already stationed in the Philippines, some of whom already participating in military repression of civilians, and with strong military and economic reasons for preserving its control over the Philippines, the US drifts more and more towards large-scale intervention.

But the Filipino people and so many other peoples and progressive forces fighting US imperialism are firmly determined to stop such intervention.

Footnotes

1. *Ichthys*, Association of Major Religious Superiors of the Philippines, [AMR-SP], Feb. 19, 1982.
2. *NDP Update*, June-July 1982, p.1.
3. *Philippines Daily Express*, No. 19, 1980.
4. *Who* magazine (Manila), Oct. 3, 1981.
5. *Philippines Daily Express*, August 18, 1981.
6. *Asia Monitor*, Vol V, No. 3 — Third Quarter, 1981.
7. *Ibid.*
8. *South China Morning Post* (Hong Kong), Sept. 25, 1981.
9. *Asiaweek*, April 16, 1982.
10. *International Herald Tribune*, June 8, 1982, p.7.
11. *Les Philippines. Le reveil d'un archipel*, Charles-Henri Foubert, pp.96-97. Translation.
12. Quoted in William Manchester, *American Caesar: Douglas MacArthur* (New York: Dell, 1978) pp. 48-49, cited in Walden Bello and Elaine Elinson, *Elite Democracy or Authoritarian Rule* (San Francisco, June 1981), p.16.
13. Cited in *Nassa News*, publication of the National Secretariat for Social Action, Justice and Peace, (Manila), March 1982, p.13.

Why America won't let us go

The long-standing relation between the US and the Philippines is a topic of interest both for those who favour and oppose it. If US defense secretary Caspar Weinberger's recent visit to the country and President Marcos' projected trip to the US this year were any indications, things are going smoothly for now.

The same message was conveyed by Daniel A O'Donohue, acting deputy assistant secretary of state before the House Foreign Affairs Sub-committee last Nov. 18, 1981. O'Donohue touched on US interests, individual rights and 'extralegal killings' in the Philippines. Excerpts of O'Donohue's statement, distributed during the hearing follow:

Security Interests:

The Philippines is an important ally and host to two major US military facilities. The Mutual Defense Treaty is expressive of our continuing and close security relationship, and remains valid today.

The Military Bases Agreement governs the use of our military facilities at Clark and Subic and, as amended, it is critical to enabling us to maintain our forces in the Western Pacific, and maintain our military presence in the Indian Ocean and beyond.

The usefulness of these facilities was enhanced this year by the homeporting of the Cruiser USS Sterett at Subic... US-Philippine cooperation in the use of the facilities is excellent, points of friction have been greatly reduced and there are no major issues between us.

Economic interests:

Our economic interests in the Philippines are long-standing, widespread and mutually beneficial. Investment is approximately \$1.5 billion. In keeping with the growing prominence of the industrial sector in the Philippines, our investment has moved into the non-traditional export area of electronics and garments.

Two-way trade has reached a level of \$3.2 billion annually and we remain, despite Japanese competition, the Philippines' leading trade partner... Official development assistance has remained at about \$40 million annually. In addition, a five year Economic Support Fund program of \$200 million is being made available as part of the security assistance package agreed to in the 1978/79 base negotiations. American banks, through commercial credits and long term loans, add a major and important dimension to our participation in the Philippine economy.

The Philippine economy is experiencing serious difficulties, like so many other countries, because of high energy costs and unfavourable markets for its traditional commodity exports. High capital requirements at a time of poor exports has also created a significant debt problem. To meet this challenge, the Philippine government, with the help of the World Bank, has embarked on a major restructuring of its economy aimed at expanding production and improving exports in non-traditional manufactured products.

Political interests:

In the international arena, the Philippines has played a moderating role in many North/South issues as President Marcos did recently in Cancun. It has continued to take a firm stand in the United Nations and elsewhere against Soviet aggression and has cooperated, through its Refugee Processing Center, in helping Southeast Asia cope with the tragic human consequences of Soviet and Vietnamese policies... Overall we, the nations of the region, and the international community have viewed the Philippines as playing a constructive and moderate leadership role.

We have also taken note of the recent internal changes in the Philippines. The lifting of martial law in January was the first in a series of measures that has helped advance the normalization of the Philippine political process. As the committee is aware, the (Reagan) Administration changed its vote in the Multilateral Development Banks to 'yes' on Philippine loans in recognition of the improvements that have occurred and in expectation that



USS Coral Sea at Subic Bay

these positive trends will continue.

The Philippine government fully understands that human rights remains a fundamental element of this administration's foreign policy... We do have a continuing dialogue on human rights, we do discuss issues, and we get some positive responses. We shall continue to make our views known to the Philippine government... Ultimately of course, developments in that country will be determined by the Philippine people and its government.

In sum, our basic relationship with the Philippines is sound. It is marked by particularly good cooperation in security relations, on international issues and in the economic arena.

In political affairs, the Philippine government has adopted a new political system, and there have been differences on human rights. But the government has taken positive steps this year and our association continues to be characterized by open dialogue.

This year has in fact been marked by high level discussion between the two governments on these issues including visits to Manila by the Vice President and the Secretary of State and a visit to Washington by Prime Minister Virata. We value our bilateral relationship with the Philippines and the contribution it has made to the security of the region as a whole.

US security assistance

We provide security assistance to the Philippines in full accordance with Section 4 of the Arms Export Control Act which authorizes sales for internal security and legitimate self-defence purposes but not for police purposes.

The Armed Forces of the Philippines (Army, Navy, Air Force, and Constabulary) are the recipients of our security assistance. They are engaged in countering threats from Communist and Muslim insurgents as well as in providing for the defense of the Philippines against external attack.

'No substitute for Clark and Subic'

Bases and US interests

Our facilities at Subic Bay and Clark Air Base have long been important to us in safeguarding our strategic interests in East and Southeast Asia. They are a key element in our interlocking network of bases in the Western Pacific.

Subic and Clark have also contributed directly to our ability to build up and maintain our forces in the Indian Ocean/Persian Gulf Region. Our carrier battle groups bound for the Indian Ocean refuel and refit at Subic. Clark Air Base is our closest air link with Diego Garcia.

Our Philippine facilities have a unique strategic advantage, because of their location, in being able to facilitate military operations in two major areas of the world of particular importance to us.

President Marcos and members of his government have on a number of occasions expressed support for a continued US strategic presence in the Philippines and in Southeast Asia.

Oppositionist criticism of the US military presence has been a staple feature of Philippine politics for many years and is heard more frequently now, presumably in part because of more outspoken opposition to President Marcos.


Alternatives to Clark and Subic

Because of the strategically advantageous location of Clark and Subic, no alternative site or group of sites could adequately replace them. Moving to Guam, the Northern Marianas, or another country would place our ships and aircraft farther away by several days and hours respectively, from Southeast Asia and the Indian Ocean, where they are needed, and degrade the ability of our armed forces to carry out their mission.

The financial cost of such a move would be substantial, and funds would have to be diverted from other potential defense purposes.

Strategically, such a move on our part would raise fundamental questions among our allies and friends in Asia about our willingness to honor our commitments and remain a Pacific power.

Any move would take several years to complete. Serious operational problems at alternative sites would be likely to arise including lack of adequate space, lack of a large, trained labor force, and, for any foreign site, questions of whether we would be granted unhampered use of the facilities.



Text of letter from Secretary of State Cyrus Vance to Minister of Foreign Affairs Carlos P. Romulo, January 6, 1979

THE SECRETARY OF STATE

Washington

January 6, 1979

Dear General Romulo:

I was delighted to learn that negotiators for our two Governments have reached agreement on a comprehensive amendment to the Military Bases Agreement. I believe much significance will be attached to this amendment, which places our use of facilities in the Republic of the Philippines on a new and long-term basis that fully recognizes Philippine sovereignty over the bases. It will be symbolic in Asia, as well as in the two countries, of the importance which the United States attaches to continued close relations with the Philippines. It provides tangible assurance of the strong desire of the United States for close cooperation with its friends and allies.

I should like to reaffirm our obligation under Article IV of the Mutual Defense Treaty to act to meet the common dangers in accordance with our constitutional processes in the event of an armed attack in the Pacific area on the Republic of the Philippines. I also reaffirm our obligations under Article III of this treaty, which provides for consultations between our two governments regarding the implementation of this treaty and whenever in the opinion of either party the territorial integrity, political independence or security of either of the parties is threatened by external armed attack in the Pacific. This assures that either party will be able to consult the other on any matter which it believes falls within this article.

Article V of the Mutual Defence Treaty states that for the purposes of Article IV, an armed attack on either of the parties is deemed to include an armed attack on the metropolitan territories of either of the parties or on the island territories under its jurisdiction in the Pacific or on its armed forces, public vessels or aircraft in the Pacific. All elements of this definition are of equal validity in terms of United States commitment under the Treaty. Metropolitan territory is defined below. However, as provided in Article V, an attack on Philippine armed forces, public vessels or aircraft in the Pacific would not have to occur within the metropolitan territory of the Philippines or island territories under its jurisdiction in the Pacific in order to come within the definition of Pacific Area in Article V.

'Metropolitan territory of the Philippines' means all of the land areas and all adjacent waters subject to the sovereignty of the Republic of the Philippines, in accordance with international law, lying within the area delineated by Spain and the United States in the Treaty of Paris of December 10, 1898, and in the Treaty of Washington of November 7, 1900, and subsequently amended in the Treaty concluded by the United States and Great Britain on January 2, 1930.

At the same time, the United States will support Philippine plans and efforts to achieve military self-reliance, within the guidelines of President Carter's letter. We will support those efforts by means of our security assistance programs, including the important training component. We remain receptive to discussing new ideas or concepts that might improve the capability and self-reliance of Philippine armed forces and enhance our mutual contribution to regional peace and stability.

The provisions regarding criminal jurisdiction for United States forces in the Philippines incorporate the substance of comparable arrangements applicable to United States forces in member countries of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, and in Japan. Moreover, in those cases where official duty is at issue between the United States and Philippine Governments, United States forces have developed procedures to retain accused personnel in the Philippines for a reasonable time, and to pre-

vent their inadvertent departure, in order to provide opportunities for discussions between the two Governments relating to the jurisdictional question. I welcome the assumption by Philippine forces of responsibility for perimeter security at the bases. These new arrangements should contribute greatly to easing the problems of criminal jurisdiction.

With respect to Base lands outside the United States facilities and the surrounding areas, the United States Government is ready to reconsider the question of economic assistance and other United States Government programs for suitable projects as well as projects that might appropriately be undertaken by private enterprise. The United States Government stands ready, for example, to work with the Philippine Government to determine what could be done to help small-farmer agriculture provide more food of the type and quality which the US facilities, along with other buyers, might purchase. In addition, the United States Government is prepared to consider appropriate assistance, subject to the approval of the Congress, for improving economic and social conditions in Angeles City and Olongapo City and surrounding areas and to relate these United States efforts to Philippine Government plans for utilization of returned base land areas.

In the negotiations leading to the present amendment, a number of questions have arisen regarding the Mutual Defense Treaty and the proposal to conduct a review of the Military Bases Agreement five years after the entry into force of the present amendment. I should like to set forth the positions of the United States Government with respect to those questions as follows:

In the context of the Mutual Defense Treaty, we would define 'aggression' as external armed attack. The provisions of the Mutual Defense Treaty most relevant are Articles IV and V. Article IV provides that 'each Party recognizes that an armed attack in the Pacific area on either of the Parties would be dangerous to its own peace and safety and declares that it would act to meet the common dangers in accordance with its constitutional processes.' Article V provides that 'an armed attack' is deemed to include 'an armed attack on the metropolitan territory of either of the Parties, or on the island territories under its jurisdiction in the Pacific or on its armed forces, public vessels or aircraft in the Pacific.' An external attack on any part of the metropolitan Philippines would make the Treaty applicable and would, accordingly, obligate the United States to 'act to meet the common dangers in accordance with its constitutional processes.'

The reference in the Treaty to 'constitutional processes' serves to make clear that the Treaty could not, and was not intended to, alter those processes for either Party. In the case of the United States, the powers of the President under our Constitution as Chief Executive and Commander-in-Chief are extensive and remain unimpaired by the Treaty. It should be noted that the War Powers Resolution provides that it is not intended 'to alter the constitutional authority of the Congress or of the President, or the provisions of existing treaties.'

Mutuality in our relationship shapes the United States approach to all issues between the United States and the Philippines. The Mutual Defense Treaty is the most explicit statement of this mutuality. The Mutual Defense Treaty has force and effect independent of the Military Bases Agreement. In fact, the Mutual Defense Treaty, which entered into force four years after the Military Bases Agreement, states in its preamble that '... nothing in this present instrument shall be considered or interpreted as in any way or sense altering or diminishing any existing agreements or understandings between the United States of America and the Republic of the Philippines.' The Mutual Defence Treaty and the Military Bases Agreement have their own separate provisions for termination.

By 'review' of the Military Bases Agreement after five years, we mean a complete and thorough process which would address any outstanding issues between our Governments regarding the Military Bases Agreement, including its provisions, its duration, and the manner of its implementation, to assure that the Agreement continues to serve the mutual interests of both parties.

In closing, let me say that I deeply appreciate the vital role you have played in bring these significant talks to a successful

conclusion.

In this New Year, I look forward to a continuation of the cooperation which has so long marked relations between our two countries and our personal relationship.

Sincerely,
Cyrus Vance

His Excellency
Carlos P. Romulo,
Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Philippines,
Manila.

Text of letter from President Carter to Philippine President Marcos January 4, 1979

THE WHITE HOUSE

Washington

January 4, 1979

Dear Mr President,

I was pleased to learn that our negotiators have reached agreement on an amendment to the 1947 Military Bases Agreement.

In the light of this development, I wish to state that the Executive Branch of the United States Government will, during the next five fiscal years, make its best effort to obtain appropriations for the Philippines of the following amounts of security assistance:

Military Assistance	\$50 million
Foreign Military Sales Credits:	\$250 million
Security Supporting Assistance	\$200 million

In addition, the United States will give prompt and sympathetic consideration to requests for specific items of military equipment to be provided under these programs, and to requests for the sale of other military equipment which your government may wish to purchase through US government or commercial channels, consistent with the worldwide policies of this government with respect to the transfer of conventional arms.

In closing, let me state once again that I appreciate your personal efforts in bringing these negotiations to a successful conclusion. I believe that the amendment to which our two governments have now agreed will strengthen the security not only of the Philippines and the United States but also of the entire Western Pacific region.

Sincerely,
Jimmy Carter

His Excellency
President Ferdinand E. Marcos
Republic of the Philippines
Manila

(Source: Foreign Assistance Legislation for Fiscal Years 1980-1981 p.14)

Arms trade with the Marcos regime

Europe

(Excerpt: *Les Philippines, Le reveil d'un archipel* Charles-Henri Fourret.)

English Scorpion tanks are already in use, especially in the south, where they have been particularly effective. German BO-105 helicopters are also used. These are manufactured in the Philippines under licence, and parts are re-exported to Germany. At the air-base, in San Fernando, thirty Italian Marchetti airplanes are used in pilot training. The Philippine navy builds frigates under German and Australian licence. Generally, it is Italian firms that supply the electronics equipment. ELSAG for example, supplies the fire control system, which allows for later retrofit of sea-to-sea missiles.

According to the American magazine, *Defence Quarterly*, presentations have been recently made, of missile boats, by Britain, Italy, Korea, and Singapore. But it seems likely that the boats will be imported from an American firm, as part of 'rent' under the US Bases Treaty. These boats will most likely be Tacomas, manufactured in Washington State. The boats will carry Harpoon or Otomat missiles (joint production of Italian firm Melara and a French firm Matra), and probably a 76mm Oto Matra canon. In order to patrol the sea coast, the navy plans to acquire Italian Augusta 209 helicopters, and reconnaissance planes — either the British Aerospace 748 Coastguarder, Dutch F27Ms, or the French Falcon Guardians. Contracts have been approved for the Swiss SIG-710-3s. The bulk of military equipment, however, will be American.

In 1979, a 90-man contingent of the AFP took part in exercises with the Australian Special Air Services Regiment in Western Australia near the Learmonth-Exmouth Gulf area. This exercise code-named 'Lion's Den' included, apart from acclimatization and familiarization with Australian equipment, a wide range of special force activities.

There has been a drastic increase in Australian military assistance to the Philippines since 1979. Through her Defence Co-operation Program with the Philippines, Australia extended A\$780m in military assistance in 1979. In fiscal year 1980/81 this was upped to A\$1,161m, representing an increase of 45 per cent over the 1979 figure. AFP officers attending training courses at the Australian Staff College and the Joint Services Staff College increased to 115 in fiscal year 1980/81, up from

only 32 the year before. There are numerous indications that Australian logistical support to the AFP shall continue to mount in the coming years, including Philippine purchases of advanced military technology from the Australians.

The same may be said about military training. It is the US which provides the greater part of essential training. But there are Philippine officers in Britain, in Spain, in Germany, Australia, Indonesia, and Malaysia. On the other hand, in 1978, ten foreign students from Singapore, South Korea, and the US attended the Armed Forces of the Philippines Military Academy in Fort Bonifacio.

Australia

(Excerpt: *Who* magazine, June 30th, 1981)

Over the last few years Australia has been very discreetly stepping up its military logistical support to the Philippine government.

Australia has been training an increasing number of AFP personnel in its military schools, both in advanced counter-insurgency warfare and in the use of Australian-made technology. Apart from this, Australian forces have been engaged in joint exercises with military forces in the region. In 1975, for instance, the HMAS Swan took part in military exercises under the Seato before that bankrupt organization was dismantled. In 1978, a visiting Australian destroyer escort exercised with units of the Philippine Navy.

Australia has also directly supplied the AFP with 12 Nomad aircraft that are specifically designed for surveillance and reconnaissance work in mountainous terrain. Several Australian-made patrol craft are in active surveillance use by the Philippine Navy. A detachment of Australian advisers assists the AFP in the use of these counter-insurgency equipment.

In 1981, the Australian Department of Defence announced an arranged sale to the Philippine government of a special military training aid. This is the automatic range target system called DART which provides a computerized target giving immediate feedback on the accuracy of fire from small arms. It is manufactured by Australian Training Aids, an American subsidiary, based in Albury, New South Wales. The sale of the Dart system overseas must be approved by the Australian Departments of Defence and Foreign Affairs, as with any overseas sale of military equipment by a private company. The Australian government in so doing, officially sanctions the transfer of military technology to the Philippines in particular.

For Asia, the document means a redeployment of American forces in times of crisis away from Northeast Asia and towards the critical sea lands of Southeast Asia and the Gulf. The plan does not call for rebasing American forces stationed in times of peace in Japan, South Korea and the Philippines. But the emphasis is very much on the strengthening of Asian defences to fill the vacuum left as US forces swing west to meet crisis elsewhere.

The defence guidance provided the background to the speeches of Defence Secretary Caspar Weinberger during his Asian trip in March when he visited Tokyo, Seoul and Manila to present the new military strategy to Washington's Asian allies. Recently, officials from the state and defence departments in congressional testimony have revealed portions of the plan which provides the basis for the administration's requests to congress for defence funding over the next five years.

In what may be the most comprehensive statement on Asia by a Reagan official so far, Weinberger laid out, on March 26 in Tokyo, 'the six pillars of America's Asian policy'. The first pillar is to affirm the US' intention 'to remain a Pacific power and... within its means to do as much as necessary to ensure that the Pacific-Indian Ocean sea lanes remain open'.

Weinberger travelled the region in March reportedly to convince Asian allies that — in contrast to the doctrine of ex-US president Richard Nixon — the US will not only stay in Asia

but will expand its forces as American national rearmament proceeds. The Nixon doctrine, Reagan administration officials said, was used as a cover for the retreat of American forces from Asia in the wake of the Vietnam war. Former president Jimmy Carter's indecision on the withdrawal of American troops from South Korea reinforced the perception of the US as a declining Asian power.

Weinberger's second pillar is Japan, which the administration insists must take on by the end of this decade security responsibilities commensurate with its economic power. Washington is obviously pleased with Prime Minister Zenko Suzuki's pledge to defend the sea lanes up to a radius of 1,000 miles around the home islands. But the Pentagon is intensifying the pressure on Tokyo to raise its defence spending.

In recent congressional testimony, the Under-Secretary of Defence for Policy, Fred Ikle, said that Japan would have to increase its defence spending to 1.3 per cent of gross national product over the next six years to be able to 'deal with only small scale conflicts'. The defence guidance, however, calls upon Japan to fill much of the vacuum left if the US forces depart for the Indian Ocean and the Gulf. Japan can 'no longer procrastinate'. Ikle told the senate hearings.

South Korea, the third pillar, gains praise from the Reagan administration for maintaining defence spending at 6 per cent and recent official statements stress the need to encourage the trend towards South Korea's force modernisation with increased military sales credits.


Measured military assistance to China, the fourth pillar, will be sought in an effort to pin Soviet military forces down on China's northern border. But the political pay-offs of strategic cooperation with China have also been stressed in official statements. China, Ikle testified, 'appears to have decided that containment of Soviet expansionism and the maintenance of a global balance of power depends for the foreseeable future on the viability of the US military power and America's alliances throughout the world.'

According to Washington's thinking, Southeast Asia faces a two-fold threat of Vietnamese expansionism directed against Thailand and the Soviet naval threat to the lines of communication for US forces from the West Coast of the US through Japan, the Philippines and the Straits of Malacca, to Diego Garcia in the Indian Ocean. The use of Vietnamese military facilities has permitted the Soviet Union to establish 'a potential choking grip' on sea lanes, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defence Richard Armitage told a recent congressional hearing. Subic Bay and Clark Air Force Base in the Philippines have therefore become all that much more important to the US.

The guidance says that the US must 'foster the strength and cohesion of [Asean] counter [to] Vietnamese expansionism while developing further the capacity of member countries to support the projection of United States power from the Western Pacific to the Indian Ocean and... [the] Gulf. This is the fifth pillar. The policy does not envisage Asean becoming a formal multilateral military alliance. Instead, the US wants to promote loose and informal regional cooperation similar to that existing under the Manila Pact, which links Thailand, the US and the Philippines, Anzus, linking Australia, New Zealand and the US, or the Five-Power Defence Arrangement which involves Malaysia, Singapore, Australia, New Zealand and Britain.

'The pattern of defence cooperation in the region is that of multiple bilateral US relationships and regional arrangements in which our efforts play a supporting role,' said Armitage. In a recent speech, National Security Adviser William Clark stressed the importance of increasing security-related aid to lubricate this sort of informal alliance. The recent airlift of 155 howitzers and accelerated delivery of M48 tanks to Bangkok, together with the US-Thai military training exercise codenamed Cobra Gold '82 in southern Thailand, from May 24-June 14, convey the message of heightened military vigilance to Vietnam.

The sixth pillar, the RDF; directed towards the Gulf, is to be reformed, according to the guidance, to ensure that the US can force its way into the region and not rely, as at present, on invitation by a friendly government. It will be reinforced to include five army divisions, two marine divisions and air wings, 10 air force tactical fighter wings and two B52 wings, plus three navy aircraft carriers.



Major US bases and installations in the Philippines

- Clark Field Air Base, Pampanga.
- Fort Stotsenberg, Pampanga.
- Mariveles Military Reservation, POL, Termina and Training Area, Bataan.
- Camp John Hay Leave and Recreation Center, Baguio.
- Army Communications System with the deletion of all stations in the Port of Manila Area.
- United States Forces Cemetery No. 2, San Francisco del Monte, Rizal.
- Angeles General Depot, Pampanga.
- Leyte-Samar Naval Base including shore installations and air bases.
- Subic Bay, Northwest Shore Naval Base, Zambales Province, and the existing Naval reservation at Olongapo and the existing Baguio Naval Reservation.
- Tawi Tawi Naval Anchorage and small adjacent land areas.
- Canacao-Sangle Point Navy Base, Cavite Province.
- Bagobantay Transmitter Area, Quezon City, and associated radio receiving and control areas, Manila Area.
- Tarumpitao Point (Loran Master Transmitter Station), Palawan.
- Talampulan Island, Coast Guard No. 354 (Loran), Palawan.
- Naule Point (Loran Station), Zambales.
- Castillejos, Coast Guard No. 356, Zambales.

US policy in Southeast Asia

(Source: *Far Eastern Economic Review*, June 18, 1982)

Following the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 the United States faced the classic dilemma of a world power whose commitments outreached its resources. Washington simply could not present a credible deterrent in the face of the new Soviet threat to the Gulf's oil lifeline without downgrading deterrence elsewhere in South Korea, Europe and Southeast Asia. President Ronald Reagan came to office last year determined, he said, to find a solution to that dilemma.

Now after nearly a year of review, the Reagan administration has completed its new defence guidance intended to provide an adequate response to the Soviet challenge globally, from the extreme of strategic nuclear exchange to the so-called wars of national liberation at the low end of the conflict spectrum. It is a five-year plan covering the years 1984-88 and designed to fit into a coherent whole the sometimes disparate themes of the past year's defence policy — burden-sharing among allies; the stress on roles and missions; arms diplomacy in the Third World; the Rapid Deployment Force (RDF), and strategic cooperation with China. The classified document was leaked to *The New York Times*.

8. Resistance to Militarization: The NDF takes the lead



As the militarization in the Philippines takes on a massive and savage character on a nation-wide scale, the people's resistance has intensified in many forms and on a nation-wide scope. Moreover, international support for the people's campaigns against militarization has also been growing.

There is open resistance as well as underground resistance. There is the resistance on a mass scale by workers, peasants, students, and oppressed minorities. There is the resistance of the political prisoners. Multisectoral organizations campaigning against militarization have sprung up.

Moreover, the underground resistance steadily gains ground. The National Democratic Front (NDF) with eight member organizations, and the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) in southern Philippines continue to grow.

The open resistance

The workers

In a massive way, militant workers have opposed militarization, not only that aimed at workers themselves, but also that which victimizes other sectors of the population.

At a mass rally attended by some 52,000 workers last May 1st, the Kilusang Mayo Uno (KMU-May 1st Movement) and the Pagkakaisa ng mga Manggagawang Pilipino (PMP — Solidarity of Filipino Workers) included the following three demands among its 19 demands:

1. Stop police and military violence against strikers; justice for the murdered workers!
2. Stop militarization!
3. Free all political detainees!

Besides the march and indoor rally of the 52,000 workers in Metro Manila, 15,000 sugar workers held an outdoor rally in support of the striking workers at La Carlota sugar mill and to protest the use of military force to break their pickets.

Last June 5, in solidarity with the 200 workers of Inter-Asia Inc., and to protest the arrest of 54 strikers, about 14,000 workers (out of the total workforce of 19,000 in the Bataan Free Trade Zone) from 22 factories went on strike. President Marcos himself was forced to intervene. He enjoined the management of Inter-Asia to give in to the demands of the strikers and ordered the release of the 54 detained strikers. Despite government laws and Supreme Court decisions curtailing the workers' right to strike, the workers have militantly launched strikes to pressure for their economic demands and to demand the release of detained workers and protest against the use of military force. In 1981 they launched 257 strikes involving 76,555 workers and causing the loss of 3 million man-hours. In the first quarter of 1982 alone, strikes have caused the loss of nearly 5 million man-hours.

Peasants

Peasants have become a special target of massive militarization. They have responded with various forms of mass protest and concerted actions.

In protest against the militarization in Samar, some 5,000 peasants together with their supporters held a mass open rally in Catbalogan, Samar on September 23, 1979. In front of 600 heavily-armed soldiers and four machineguns, four peasant leaders took turns in denouncing the militarization in Samar. When soldiers approached to arrest the last peasant speaker, the crowd moved in to prevent the arrest, and the peasant speaker disappeared into the crowd.

The tenants in the ANCA farms in Isabella staged a 13-kilometer march to dramatize their demands. Peasants and fishermen in Bataan have held similar marches to protest against the Westinghouse nuclear plant, pollution and military abuses as well as the presence of US marines in the area.

Peasants have systematically documented military abuses, testified boldly at People's Tribunals conducted by human rights organizations. Several regional people's tribunals and one national people's tribunal have been held recently.

The victims of strategic hamletting have documented military abuses, issued joint public appeals for support as well as protest statements denouncing hamletting and declaring their demands.

Students

Students have been militant in demanding the lowering of tuition fees, the restoration of campus freedom, and the stopping of military interference in student gatherings and military harassment in the campus. They have launched boycotts, campus marches, and demonstrations. From July to October 1981 some 350,000 students participated in school boycotts.

Ethnic Minorities

The Igorot people and the Tingguians in the Cordillera mountains have utilized bodongs (peace pacts) to strengthen their unity and consolidate their strength to protect their land and resist military repression. After the death of their spokesman against the Chico dam, Mali-ing Dulag, they have held memorial gatherings that further strengthened their unity, denounced the murder of Mali-ing, and won greater support for their cause. Earlier on, they had used mass petitions to ventilate their grievances and win solidarity.

Political prisoners

Uncowed by torture and detention, political prisoners have proven their courage in resisting military repression. Some have launched daring escapes. Benjamin de Vera, arrested last June 1981 and severely tortured, escaped with three others last April

28. Maria Luisa Posa, three times detained and tortured, escaped with seven others last September. Six political prisoners, three men and three women, escaped from their Fort Bonifacio prison on November 1, 1974. These and others who escaped joined the underground resistance.

Political prisoners have launched numerous hunger fasts and strikes successfully winning the release of a fair number of fellow prisoners. They have boldly documented tortures inflicted on them, identifying their torturers, and smuggling out the torture accounts. Even while under isolation, Sixto Charlos, Jr. smuggled out the account of his torture. He also discovered that Milagros Lumabi and her child had been detained in isolation for over a year. His exposé led to a campaign that eventually resulted in the release of Milagros Lumabi.

Political prisoners have also issued statements not only to protest against abuses committed against them but also to express support for nation-wide causes, giving analyses of new government schemes, and sending solidarity messages to international organizations and forums.

Multisectoral resistance

The First National Conference on Human Rights, February 18, 1981 (see Chapter 1) resulted in the formation of the Philippine Council for Human Rights, composed of more than 60 human rights institutions and organizations throughout the country. It set up three commissions:

- a. Fact-finding commission, for the coordination, support and initiation of data-gathering activities on militarization.
- b. Liaison commission, for the conduct of liaison work for regional and international support;
- c. Finance commission, for the systematized financing of all PCHR activities.

On the regional level, 14 justice and peace organizations in Mindanao banded together last February to launch an anti-militarization campaign in the sub-region of Eastern Mindanao.

The Visayas Ecumenical Movement for Justice and Peace (VEMJP), a regional body of the Ecumenical Movement for Justice and Peace, held an assembly last March 23-25 in Cebu City.

Many multisectoral fact-finding missions have recently investigated cases of militarization in various areas. A recent example is the mission to investigate the murder of Bobby de La Paz. Another example is the group who went to Abra early this year to investigate and document hamletting in the area. These fact finding missions are not without risk, which shows the level of commitment involved. For example, two nuns were arrested on June 13, and charged with murder and subversion. They were on a fact finding mission in Batangas.

Organizations of Resistance Grow

As the mass actions become bigger and more militant in their resistance to militarization, organizations of resistance have grown. Some of the main organizations are listed below.

The KMU, composed of nine national federations and about a hundred independent unions has grown to about 200,000 members. It has become a part of the bigger labor alliance, PMP, increasing their numbers to hundreds of thousands more.

Support organizations for the workers have developed. Recently, the National Coalition for the Protection of Workers' Rights was formed and held a National Labor Assembly attended by several thousands. On a provincial scale, the HUGPONG, a multisectoral organization, came out in support of the La Carlota sugar mill workers.

In the course of fighting for their rights and resisting militarization, peasants have formed bigger alliances. Thus, last

December 9, some 2,000 peasants of the Alliance of Central Luzon Farmers (ACLA) held a march and rally before the Ministry of Agriculture. The tenants of ANCA, Inc. in Isabella formed the Citizens Alliance of Haciendas San Antonio and Santa Isabel.


Among the militant students' organizations on a national scale are the League of Filipino Students, Youth for National Democracy and the College Editors' Guild of the Philippines. There are many others on the regional and provincial levels.

Political prisoners conduct their mass actions in their respective detention centers — more than 80 throughout the country. The most well known are the political prisoners in Bicutan detention center in Metro Manila.

In support of the political prisoners, various organizations are active:

- KAPATID, composed of relatives of political prisoners;
- Task Force for Detainees (TFD) of the association of major religious superiors;
- Free Legal Assistance Group (FLAG) composed of lawyers;
- MABINI, also composed of lawyers;
- Protestant Lawyers' League;
- Citizens' Organization for Political Detainees (COPD), recently set up by Nini Quezon-Avancena and some others.

The Civil Liberties Union of the Philippines (CLUP) has consistently voiced out its protest against violations of civil and human rights. The Ecumenical Movement for Justice and Peace has actively campaigned against militarization for several years; it gathered documentation on militarization in five areas and had it published and issues a bi-monthly publication, *Katarungan*. The National Secretariat for Social Action, Justice and Peace (NASSA) with regional and diocesan officers, has consistently been active in anti-militarization campaigns and publishes the monthly *NASSA News* and national situationers.



Olalia addressing a May Day 1981 Rally

The underground resistance

The National Democratic Front (NDF) has steadily grown since 1972. The Revolutionary Movement of Peasants already had 800,000 members by December 1980. The Revolutionary Movement of Workers has several hundred thousand members in hundreds of factories and other establishments. The Kabataang Makabayan (KM) has over 6,000 members active in hundreds of schools. The Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP) has grown over five-fold since mid-1976 when it had several thousand members. The New People's Army (NPA) has about 10,000 fulltime guerillas and several tens of thousands of people's militia. The Christians for National Liberation (CNL) which late last year held its Second Congress, has about 1,200 members. The Makabayang Samahang Pangkalusugan (MASAPA — Nationalist Health Association) has several hundred nurses, doctors and other health personnel as members. Finally, the Kapisanan ng mga Gurong Makabayan (KAGUMA — Nationalist Teachers' Association) has several hundred teachers as members.

NDF organizations conduct information and persuasion campaigns among families and relatives of government soldiers urging them to persuade their relatives in the Marcos military to stop serving the military regime. Moreover, national, regional and local publications of the NDF organizations expose military atrocities. They, in particular, the NPA — provide protection to people's organizations. In a fair number of cases the NPA has neutralized government torturers and informers. In some areas, torturers and informers, especially the most notorious ones who have caused the death and torture of many, have been meted the death penalty, thus serving a stern warning to other torturers and informers.

Besides these activities against military repression, the NDF has an overall program to change basically the present exploitative and oppressive system — which it considers to be the root of military repression.

In southern Philippines, the Moro National Liberation Front and its Bangsa Moro Army continue to wage their armed resistance to achieve self-determination.

As of October 1980, the Bangsa Moro Army numbered about

30,000 regulars, organized in ten provincial armies. In addition, a large number of the people in the countryside are armed. They serve as a barrio defense force. National Mobile forces also exist within the BMA to aid the regular BMA forces in cases of severe military pressure. Good relations exist between the NPA and the BMA in those areas where they both operate. For example, they cooperate on tactics on occasions; they may stage an ambush together, attacking on different sides, or they may agree to retreat into each others territories, if need be.

International support

Philippine support groups in Europe, North America and Asia have launched campaigns against militarization and in support of the people's struggle in the Philippines. A high point in international support was the Permanent People's Tribunal on the Philippines last October 30-November 3, 1980, wherein the Tribunal jury condemned the Marcos dictatorship and the US for grievous crimes and recognized the NDF as legitimate representative of the Filipino people.

Various international organizations, such as the Amnesty International, the World Council of Churches, the International Commission of Jurists, the International Conference on Cultural Imperialism held in Algiers in October 1977 have come out strongly against torture and other forms of military repression. The case of Fr. Ed de la Torre and Horacio Morales has been raised in the European Parliament, and in the Irish and Italian Parliaments.

Organizations of overseas Filipinos, particularly in the US, and more recently in Europe, have launched or supported anti-militarization efforts in the Philippines as well as the overall people's struggle.

The continuing deterioration of the political and economic conditions in the Philippines has led to an increasing polarization within the country. In an effort to maintain itself in power the Marcos regime has stepped up its repressive measures against the people. In the face of such adversity the Filipino people have responded courageously and valiantly, and remain steadfast in their struggle for an independent, democratic and just society.



An NPA unit on the way

Documents and manifestos

The NDF Ten-Point Program

1. Unite all anti-imperialist and democratic forces to overthrow the US-Marcos dictatorship and work for the establishment of a coalition government based on a truly democratic system of representation.
2. Expose and oppose US imperialism as the mastermind behind the setting up of the fascist dictatorship, struggle for the nullification of all unequal treaties and arrangements with this imperialist power and call for the nationalization of all its properties in the country.
3. Fight for the establishment of all democratic rights of the people, such as freedom of speech, the press, assembly, association, movement, religious belief and the right to due process.
4. Gather all possible political and material support for the armed revolution and the underground against the US-Marcos dictatorship.
5. Support a genuine land reform program that can liberate the peasant masses from feudal and semi-feudal exploitation and raise agricultural production through cooperation.
6. Improve the people's livelihood, guarantee the right to work and protect national capital against foreign monopoly capital.
7. Promote a national, scientific and mass culture and combat imperialist, feudal and fascist culture.
8. Support the national minorities, especially those in Mindanao and the mountain provinces, in their struggle for self-determination and democracy.
9. Punish, after public trial, the ringleaders of the Marcos fascist gang for their crimes against the people and confiscate all their ill-gotten wealth.
10. Unite with all the peoples fighting imperialism and all reaction, and seek their support for the Philippine revolutionary struggle.

The CNL Program

(Our) program has two general tasks. The first, which CNL shares with the national democratic forces, is the overthrow of the US-Marcos dictatorship and the establishment of a people's coalition government. The second, which is a special responsibility of CNL, is the national democratic transformation of the Christian churches.

In line with this general program, we commit ourselves to fulfil these urgent tasks:

1. Develop a revolutionary mass movement of Christians, particularly of church people, as part of the overall revolutionary mass movement.
2. Help advance the revolutionary mass movements of peasants, workers and the petty bourgeoisie.
3. Hasten the building of the National Democratic Front (NDF).
4. Gather all possible political and material support for the advance of the armed struggle.
5. Wage a cultural struggle, especially in the religious sphere, in line with the national democratic revolution.
6. Help advance our international solidarity work.
7. Struggle for democratic reforms toward the national democratic transformation of the Christian churches.


These seven tasks are the components of a comprehensive national democratic program for the Christian churches. It is along these lines that we can arouse, mobilize and organize the greatest number of church people and Christians who identify closely with the churches.

In fulfilling these tasks, we give flesh and blood to our Christian faith. In fulfilling these tasks, we incarnate ourselves in the deepest possible way — linked to the life and death struggle of our people.

National democratic health program

Numerous health workers came together in December 1978, to form a new organization known as the Makabayang Samahang Pangkalusugan (MASAPA), or Nationalist Health Association. At the founding conference they endorsed a seven-point 'National Democratic Program for the Health Sector', thereby formalizing and systematizing the set of responsibilities which activists in the health sector had already been assuming, albeit informally, for several years. The points of the program are as follows:

1. Combat the imperialist domination of the Philippine health industry.
2. Oppose the use of health as a tool of the US-Marcos fascist dictatorship.
3. Develop health programs to strengthen the revolutionary mass movement in the urban centers and the countryside.
4. Gather the most extensive support of the health sector for the armed struggle.
5. Uphold the democratic right of health workers to organize and fight for their genuine welfare.
6. Work for reorientation of the health educational system and propagate a nationalist and democratic health consciousness.
7. Promote solidarity with all progressive health workers abroad and seek their support for the revolutionary struggle.



NPA medical centre

VEMJP holds regional assembly

A regional assembly attended by members of the Visayas Ecumenical Movement for Justice and Peace (VEMJP) was held last March 23-25 at the Holy Family retreat house in Cebu City.

The three-day assembly, called for by the regional secretariat of the two-year old confederation of human rights-oriented institution and organizations based in the Visayas sub-regions (eastern, western and central), was generally aimed at:

1. Assessing the thrust, orientation, structure and program of VEMJP in the light of the current issues spawned by the ever-deepening socio-economic and political crisis in the country;
2. Formulating a more relevant thrust, orientation, structure and program for the succeeding year with the specific aim of ensuring VEMJP's effectiveness in the pursuit of justice and defense of human rights; and,
3. Strengthening the unity among justice and peace and human rights-oriented organizations in the region.

Progress reports on justice and peace work in the sub-regions and on various developments in both the regional and national situations were presented during the assembly. The following trends were thus noted;

a. Economically, the sub-regions have intensely export-oriented economies controlled by a privileged few. This set-up, encouraged to a large extent, by the government in the implementation of supportive although anti-national development programs, has contributed much to the detriment of the toiling

masses who are now confronted, among others, by the problems of high basic commodity prices and massive unemployment. The systematic expansion of capitalist farming in the countryside has likewise resulted in the economic dislocation of poor farmers and agricultural workers. As a consequence, migration towards the cities has risen to unprecedented heights further swelling, in turn, the ranks of the urban unemployed and slum population.

b. Politically, the situation in the sub-regions reflects the national situation characterized by the heightening oppressiveness of the government on behalf of the ruling elite and the growing resistance of the people. The militarization of the countryside, for instance, goes hand in hand with the implementation of development programs. These, according to sub-regional reports, represent both the soft and hard-sell tactics now being pursued in the government's bid to crush grassroots resistance and ensure the ruling elite's stay in power. Aside from these, the government, by virtue of its control over the media, is also fostering negative and anti-nationalist values among the people to ensure their submissiveness to exploitation and oppression.

c. Sub-regional human rights groups have also noted the rise of people's resistance despite intensifying repression. This, according to them, is manifest in the development of more qualitative and quantitative forms of people's struggle, stronger and better coordination among pro-people groups and the growing sympathy for the New People's Army (NPA) in many areas.

Launch Mindanao AMCAM

At least 14 justice and peace organizations in Mindanao have banded together to launch an anti-militarization campaign in the sub-region of Eastern Mindanao.

The move, justice and peace resources said, is generally 'aimed at generating strong public opinion' against military violations of civilian rights in the sub-region'. The sources added that, at the same time, the campaign 'seeks to pressure the Marcos regime, which by command responsibility is accountable for the deeds of its armed forces, towards indemnifying the victims of militarization'.

The campaign, which is called AMCAM for short is 'envisioned to federate or unify all anti-militarization efforts in Eastern Mindanao', particularly in the provinces of Davao del Norte and Agusan del Sur where the AFP is presently applying strategic hamletting on a large scale.

A consultative meeting attended by representatives of the 14 JP organizations was held in Butuan City, Agusan del Norte, last February to initially discuss ways and means in launching the campaign. Responding organizations included LAKANG (Butuan City), Justice and Peace Agusan (JPAG), Inter-Faith Directorate (Tagum), Concerned Citizens for Human Rights (CCHR - Surigao City), the various Church-based sub-

regional Social Action Center (SACs), Human Rights Movement (Tagum), Friends of Laac (Tagum), Friends of Evacuees, Butuan City, CCJP-Tandag, Surigao del Sur, TFD Butuan-Tagum-Tandag and the Ecumenical Movement for Justice and Peace - Eastern Mindanao.

It was agreed upon during the meeting that a committee composed of prominent sectoral and/or institutional leaders should be formed 'the soonest time possible'. The committee, it was learned, will function as 'a superbody embracing and coordinating the efforts of various justice and peace institutions in Eastern Mindanao'. Specifically, the committee will perform the following tasks:

1. To carry a broader and stronger expression of people's response against militarization.
2. To coordinate all anti-militarization efforts in the sub-region.
3. To get a comprehensive view of the extent of militarization and the economic interests of multi-nationals in the sub-region, including Davao Oriental and Davao del Norte, and to relate these to Mindanao and the entire country; and
4. To generate support for victims of militarization in the sub-region.



Ingenious form of protest

Declaration of the First National Conference on Human Rights (February 17-18, 1982)

We, the various organizations, groups and individuals involved in the common struggle for justice, peace and promotion of human rights, today solemnly affirm and declare:

- That the Marcos government, despite its announced lifting of martial law on January 17, 1981 and its repeated calls to 'normalization', continues to suppress the national and democratic rights of the Filipino people with impunity.
- That the government and the military, despite the strong protests of many human rights groups and advocates, escalated its program of militarization nationwide, causing great suffering and misery among the people in various regions of the country.
- That as the trend of militarization has heightened, an alarming pattern of military abuses and atrocities has emerged such as the salvaging or summary execution of suspected activists, the hamletting of innocent and defenseless peasants in the rural areas and the open and secret massacres perpetrated against people who dared to stand up for their rights and welfare.
- That the United States government plays a direct hand in such gross violations of human rights by its unequivocal support of the Marcos government as evidenced by the increased American economic and military assistance to the regime.

We strongly denounce the Marcos regime's blatant disregard for the people's rights even as we firmly condemn the unabashed collusion of the United States government with the Marcos regime. We hold both the Marcos regime and the United States government accountable for the heinous deeds of the military forces and their other surrogates of power.

We assert and uphold as inviolate the rights of the people to live, to be free, to be human. As it has been stated, human rights, like food, are universal. Human rights, like life, are unalienable. Human rights, like body, are indivisible and whole. Whenever any government becomes destructive of these, it is the right of the people to resist and provide safeguards for their security.

We believe that human rights can only be attained in all its dimensions — economic, social, political, cultural — by militantly asserting and fighting for it. The process of our liberation begins only when we carry forward the struggle for our national and democratic rights from foreign and feudal domination and oppression. Our salvation as a people lies in our own hands.

We, therefore, call on all other human rights groups and concerned individuals here and abroad, to rise up to the challenges of the times and the people. Let us join hands for a broad, militant and sustained movement against militarization and for the protection of the basic rights of the Filipino people.

The body herein assembled, composed of 150 participants representing 70 organizations, on this 18th day of February 1982 at the communications foundation for Asia, Manila, Philippines, hereby adopts this Declaration.

Convening organizations:

- Tast Force Detainees of the Philippines (TFDP)
- Movement of Attorneys for Brotherhood, Integrity and Nationalism, Inc. (MABINI)
- Ecumenical Movement for Justice and Peace (EMPJ)
- National Priests and Religious Union (MAPRU)
- Protestant Lawyers' League (PLL)
- Makabayang Kilusan Para Isulong Ang Katarungan (MAKIISA-KA or Nationalist Movement for the Advancement of Justice)

Labour Day, May 1, 1982

'Advance the Unity of the people! — Pagkakaisa ng Manggagawang Pilipino (Solidarity of Filipino Workers)'
Kilusang Mayo Uno (May 1st Movement)

Demands during the May 1st Rally, 1982:

1. Nullify the National Assembly Act No. 130 (so-called new 'Strike Law') and the fake 'Anti-Scab and Picketing Law', and truly recognize the right to strike and all workers' rights.
2. Put an end to violent acts of the police and military against strikers; justice for the workers who have been killed.
3. Raise wages and lower the prices of prime commodities.
4. Stop dismissals and rotation; work for the unemployed.
5. Reject the scheme to restructure labor which will curtail genuine unionism.
6. Recognize the right to unionize and strike of the teachers and workers in government.
7. Implement genuine land reform.
8. Lower the prices of fertilizers, pesticides and other needs for agriculture.
9. Defend the welfare of small fishermen against the foreign and big fishing businessmen.
10. Stop demolition and provide cheap and decent homes to the urban poor.
11. Stop the phase-out and rerouting of jeepneys and guarantee the livelihood of the drivers.
12. Restore all democratic rights on the campus and eliminate imperialist control of education.
13. Respect the right of the Muslim brethren and other national minorities to self-determination.
14. Free the political prisoners.
15. Stop the construction of the nuclear plant.
16. Restore all civil and human rights to the people.
17. Stop militarization.
18. Dismantle and take away from the country the US military bases.
19. Put an end to the imperialist domination in the country.

On this Labour Day, although this cannot be considered a celebration because Philippine Labor is bleeding and wounded, it is a joy to know that the workers are not alone in pinpointing and rejecting the corruption and uselessness that prevail in society. And now more than at any other time, as more and more of us join hands in struggle, stand together united in heart and in our aspirations, advancing against the powers of reaction... in the face of this unity, what local opportunists, what foreign exploiters, will not, in the end, surrender? Upon the coming of the happy day of national independence and genuine democracy, we shall fully and in all glory celebrate Labor Day as all free and progressive workers do in the whole world.

PMP
KMU

STOP PRESS



National Democratic Front of the Philippines

PRESS RELEASE

Monsignor Norberto Hacbang, Vicar General of the Diocese of Catbalogan, Samar and Bonifacio Tupaz, co-chairman of Pagkakaisa ng mga Manggagawang Pilipino (PMP - Solidarity of Filipino Workers) were arrested September 1 on orders of President Marcos.

Arrested with Tupaz were 16 other labor leaders. All of them are now imprisoned in Camp Crame, Metro Manila.

Monsignor Hacbang, Sister Helena of the Order of Notre Dame and a church worker were apprehended in Catbalogan, Samar and put under house arrest.

On September 2, six more were arrested and their whereabouts are still unknown.

Earlier, on August 13, Marcos had ordered the arrest of Felixberto Olalia, 79, PMP co-chairman and chairman of Kilusang Mayo Uno (KMU - May First Movement). On August 18, KMU vice-chairman was also arrested. Both are now detained in Camp Crame.

Barely ten days before his his state visit to the U.S., these attacks against labor and progressive Church leaders indicate Marcos' fear of huge nation-wide demonstrations during his state visit. These demonstrations would deeply embarrass him and severely weaken his claim of popular support. These demonstrations and reports of increasing New People's Army guerrilla activity would show that Marcos is not in firm control of the situation. Marcos' bitter reaction to a recent BBC film depicting the legal and armed opposition and to Cardinal Sin's statement asking for his resignation further indicates that Marcos is losing his grip on the political situation.

The arrest of Monsignor Hacbang is designed to silence an increasingly critical segment of the Church.

The National Democratic Front (NDF) of the Philippines condemns these latest attacks against labor and progressive Church leaders. These arrests further prove the anti-labor and anti-people character of the Marcos regime. Such pre-emptive acts cannot stop the increasing political isolation of Marcos. The people's resistance in the rural and urban areas continues to grow. This systematically erodes Marcos' control.

The NDF calls on all friends and allies to demand the immediate release of the arrested labor and Church leaders, and all other political prisoners as well as indemnification for physical and moral damages suffered by the detainees.

NDF International Office
 Admiral van Goytstraat 26 Bis
 3572 XL Utrecht, Holland
 Tel (030) 719226

Luis Jalandoni
 Luis Jalandoni
 NDF International Representative
 September 5, 1982

Editorial Note: Subsequent report from the Philippines stated that MONSIGNOR NORBERTO HACBANG was not present at the Social Action Center at the time of the military raid, although a warrant of arrest had been issued against him. Dec, 82

MAP OF MILITARIZATION IN THE PHILIPPINES


KEY

- Massacres
- 🏠 Hamletting

MASSACRES: 1981-1982
 Guinaayen, Quezon: 2 killed, 21 wounded
 Daet, Camarines Norte: 4 killed, 50 wounded
 Culasi, Antique: 7 killed, 7 wounded
 Sagod, Samar: 45 killed
 Nueva Ecija: 11 killed in 3 massacres
 S. Leyte: 9 killed
 Bulacan: 5 killed
 Mindanao: 103 killed in 1981
 Zamboanga del Norte: 13 killed (1982)
 Zamboanga del Sur: 12 killed (1982)

Hamletting
 Mindanao: an estimated 250,000 people involved
 Davao del Norte/Agusan del sur: 130,000 people
 Davao del Sur, Kapatagan Valley: 63,900 people
 North Cotabato, Arakan Valley: 5,000-7,000 people
 No figures available for other Mindanao areas for Abra, Samar, Panay, or Cagayan

1977-81: 6,355 arrests
 1975-81: 268 disappearances
 1975-81: 807 Salvagings



***In the Face of Adversity* documents the intensifying militarization of the Marcos regime in the Philippines, in 1981-1982, and records the valiant struggle of the Filipino people in the face of this onslaught.**

It attempts to present the many faces of militarization, and to indicate the emerging patterns of repression during the past year. It tells of the terror of imprisonment and torture, of the increasing frequency of disappearances and salvagings, and of the more recent revival of strategic hamletting on a massive scale.

In addition, it covers the topic of Filipinos living abroad, and deals with the issue of the growing threat of large-scale US intervention in the Philippines.

Finally, *In the Face of Adversity* records the determined and courageous resistance of the people, and their heroic struggle against the escalating militarization policy of the Marcos regime.

