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
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
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southern africa in a revolutionary situation

armando entralgo





On the afternoon of September 13, 1975, Kruger, a police officer from the Mount Darwin Police Station in Rhodesia, appeared at the home of the Chiutsi brothers and presented their parents with the lifeless body of 27-year-old Erasmus, who had "hanged himself" with his shoelaces. The officer offered them \$2 and said that any protests should be directed to the Nyamahoboko military camp. The parents took the \$2 as possible evidence against Kruger. Patrick, 39, and Amos, 19, brothers in alleged contact with Zimbabwean terrorists, were released following a week of torture together with the brother who was supposed to have killed himself.

Taken from *Civil War in Rhodesia*,¹ this story is one of thousands like it. These thousands of stories are added explanation of why Zimbabwe—Rhodesia according to old geography books—is today more


¹ *Civil War in Rhodesia*, London, September 1976, published by the Rhodesian Catholic Commission for Justice and Peace.

dangerous than a mined field for the European colonists who still tread the soil.

Like any other besieged exploiting class, the colonial system has tested the methods of "compensation" in an attempt to crush the insurrection. In November 1974, for example, \$5 000 was officially offered to anyone who would make possible the capture of a veteran "terrorist" leader; \$2 500 was offered for a group leader, and so it went down to \$300 for a box of anti-personnel mines.

We could also speak of the Rhodesian version of Vietnamese "strategic hamlets" and other "feats" against the civilian population, particularly in rural areas, or to appeals to residues of tribal solidarity that might and logically still do remain among the numerous groups in Zimbabwe: the Karangas, Manyikas, Zezurus, Korekores, Barwes, Kalangas, Nambyas, Tongas, Ngunis, Suthus, Vendas, Ndaus, Hlengwes, Fengus, Mahungwes, Ndebeles. The list comes from Joshua Nkomo, President of the ANC-ZAPU, and founder of Zimbabwean nationalism, who adds:

...Our enemies continually remind us of the so-called tribal wars waged by our forefathers centuries ago ...not to help us understand our history but to make us hate those who do not belong to our tribe, hate those who belong to a tribal group that our ancestors might have fought against once upon a time over rights



to grazing lands or fishing or hunting rights.²

There are some, however, who don't think like Nkomo and precisely because of that they enjoy the favor of the Ian Smith regime. Such is the case of the black Archbishop Abel Muzorewa who prefers to emphasize his Shoma origin and counterpose it to Nkomo's Ndebele ancestry, which in Muzorewa's opinion makes him more "representative" as the ZAPU leader, since there are more Shonas —Karan-gas Zezurus, Korekores, Kalangas, Ndaus, etc.— than Ndebeles.

Men like Muzorewa not only have poor memories, but the history they cite is less complete than that written and disseminated by the white settlers themselves. Because who in Zimbabwe doesn't

clearly recall that the most outstanding characteristic of the great anti-colonial uprising of 1896-1897 was Shona-Ndebele unity: a unity that 80 years later has reappeared and serves as the national nucleus in the final battle against foreign domination which is today being waged under the banners of the Patriotic Front (ZAPU-ZANU) and the People's Army (ZIPA) of Zimbabwe?

REALPOLITIK

In December 1975, Kissinger discussed with the NATO Ministers' meeting setting up representative black regimes in Rhodesia and Namibia. He sought to brake the guerilla wing of nationalism in those countries and weaken its bonds with the anti-imperialist movement

² *The Zimbabwe Review*, Vol. 5 and 6, 1976.



around the world and particularly with the socialist community.

From one day to the next the author of Memorandum No. 39 (1969) made his debut in traditional South African British political terminology: "majority rule," "multiracial democracy," "peaceful paths," "moderate representative governments," etc. etc.

Even before him, in August of the same year, London and Pretoria had decided to push Smith toward talks with the nationalists at the Victoria Falls bridge. But Smith was still too arrogant, and although the talks got underway on December 1, 1975, they were broken off on March 5, 1976 amidst a bristling regional atmosphere: the Salisbury regime had just mounted its first large-scale attack against Mozambique on February 23, 24

and 25, hammering away with artillery and using planes and Alouette III helicopters against defenseless villages like Pafuri and Mavue; and on March 3 the FRELIMO government closed its borders which theoretically meant that two-thirds of Rhodesia's foreign trade, which had previously passed through Beira and Maputo, had to be rerouted towards South African ports.

Smith's arrogance failed the test of fire of March 27, 1976 when the South African army was forced out of Angola via Cunene with the inevitable destruction of the myth of its invincibility and the no less inevitable upsurge in the struggle for liberation throughout southern Africa, including Zimbabwe, naturally.

Washington and London then mounted an offensive on all possible fronts in search of air for their imperial-racist gendarme. Thus, that degraded species of apar-





theid which is the Ian Smith regime would have to exist logically and absolutely, at the mercy of the *realpolitik* of its godparents.

It is certain that London had not waited for the complete withdrawal of South Africa, until the very last gasp. Five days before confirmation of that debacle Callaghan announced his plan, according to agreement with NATO, to solve the Rhodesian crisis with a transition period that would prepare conditions for an African majority government. Kissinger would support the April 27th British position in his widely disseminated Lusaka speech: in it he threatened to suspend the Byrd Act on Rhodesian chrome and incidently promised \$12 500 000 to affected Mozambique. In all this demagogic orchestration, outstanding is the solo pulled by South African multimil-

lionaire Harry Oppenheimer, the region's most important bourgeois, when he called for "national (sic) unity of blacks and whites" in the southern cone of Africa.

To the exorcism of an inescapable realism, Mr. K. and the fascist Vorster met on June 23, 1976 in Bavaria, in the Federal Republic of Germany. Shortly thereafter they met again, with approximately a week's lag because June 16 was when the South African hot spot Soweto in the minerally abundant entrails of the monster had exploded.

From that point dates the most dangerous crisis of the subimperialist system of southern Africa. The slow but implacable consolidation of the revolutionary governments of Angola and Mozambique and the upsurge of ZIPA guerrilla activity in Zimbabwe and SWAPO in Namibia would now add their energies to a long series of popular uprisings with clearly political objectives within South Africa itself.

WHEN YOUR BEARD IS SMOLDERING...

From the Soweto disaster the figures, through the last day of last year, surpass all previous extremes: 360 South African Blacks dead; 1381, 927 of them less than 18 years old, sentenced to prison terms; 528 victims of corporal punishment; 2915 tried, 1632 accused of public violence, 697 arrested on suspicion and 19 arrested under the repression of terrorism law.

The statistics in the previous paragraph could be exceeded in any future confrontation because, among other reasons, the white minority is aware of just how much of an urban minority it is and will be: in Johannesburg the white population represents only 36%; in Cape Town, 34%; in Bloemfontein, 41%; in Port Elizabeth, 32%; in East London, 45% in Durban, 30%, and so on. Today some 4 200 000 whites make up 17% of the population of South Africa as compared to the 17 700 000 Blacks that account for 71% and by the year 2 000 the figures are calculated at 6 800 000 whites, 14%, as compared to 37 300 000 Blacks, 74%.

The Soweto uprising, as we know, spread rapidly to other "townships" like Alexandra, Manelodi, Nyanga, Guguletu, Langa and to the mestizo population of Manenberg, Crossroads, Buffalo Flats and other sites. Because of the forced use of Afrikaans in the schools? Because, as the Pretorians cried, "communist and African National Congress agitators have exploited a real grievance for subversive ends?" The response is broader and should include the rather unceremonious withdrawal of Vorster's troops through Cuneene, as well as the anger accumulated day by day in the stupefying atmosphere of the beer halls. One of the most oft-repeated slogans of the riots was "Less alcohol, more education."

The disturbance was introduced into the murky world of the bantus-



tans in the heart of the Natal Indian population and in other areas. To top it off: seven of the eight bantustan leaders would try to keep their distance from the official justification of the barbarous repression unleashed all around.

Some South Africans in exile, participants in the events, claim that there were various stages to the process. The first was the peaceful protest of the students followed by the savage repression and a spontaneous insurrection ending in efforts by the students to regroup. The second phase was *student-worker contact* and the demand for the release of political prisoners. The third phase, the march, individually, on Johannesburg; while the workers stayed home. This was the situation that led up to the October 15 call, pre-

mature to be sure, for a general uprising.

Any way you view it, the events that occurred were truly tremendous, sometimes unexpected and unforeseeable in their scope and magnitude. That the British press of South Africa would attack Vorster is not really very remarkable, but it is remarkable that a dean of his own Afrikaaner press would do so at the very moment in which the white opposition was joining in a united front, and proposing the "novelty" of a federation of autonomous provinces and a federal parliament elected on the basis of... an election pledge which incidentally has managed to "dazzle" that perennial conciliationist and diversionist "black-African" poet who is Senegal's president, Leopoldo Senghor.

Foreign investments continue their downward trend in comparison with 1975. Exports and port activity, too, have dropped off, while deposits abroad are rising and industrialists attempt to once again revise the Job Reservation Act. In the midst of a crisis such as the one confronting the Nationalist Party administration, it is not, of course, a mere "curiosity" nor an insignificant matter that 20 African countries continue trading with South Africa, according to some sources.

GIVE AWAY YOUR NEIGHBOR'S...

If before Soweto, there, still remained arguments for Smith's victorian subjectivism, and obstacles

of the old colonialist style to the political realism of the Washington-London-Pretoria axis, following the reaction unleashed by a million and a half inhabitants of South Western Township in Johannesburg, there was no longer time to waste or a rusty sense of honor to salvage. Whether the duo was Ford-Kissinger or Carter-Vance, the same general plan of maneuvers continued through the latter half of last year and, with slight and unimportant variations, has been carried over into the first quarter of 1977.

On September 14, 1976, Kissinger was in the southern tip of the continent and at that juncture Pretoria talked with Smith. Dear Henry had convinced Vorster of the need to convince Smith. And it would be a battered Smith, unconvinced and unconvincing, who announced on the 24th his regime's acceptance of the so-called Kissinger plan for the establishment of an African-majority government in Salisbury.

The scheme proposed by the enemy assumes one meaning in Kissinger's mouth and another in the mouth of Ivor Richard, British ambassador to the United Nations. And there seemed to be still another more recent version by Smith himself. This is the way it appears if we fall into the trap of the different texts. For example, if we reflect on the time that remains before Zimbabwe independence, according to the timetable of this or that spokesman, or consider how many agencies have to "handle" the alleged transition to majority rule, or who and what color

skin the composition of these agencies will include.

But, the basic point, as Zimbabwe nationalism knows, is that the scheme seeks to save the great economic interests of monopoly capital within the country or in the surrounding areas and dependencies of NATO and its regional gendarmes, while simulating progress toward constitution of a black government in Rhoesia (and Namibia), a government that would be headed (or beheaded?) by tribal chiefs like those of the self-appointed Zimbabwe United People's Organization (ZUPO) in Salisbury, (similar to the illiterate chiefs meeting with white liberals around the highly-publicized Herero chief Clements Kapuuu in Windhoek). Or better yet, of supposed nationalists such as Muzorewa, the man of Shona origin. All of them are very much like Kaiser Matanzima, that puppet stereotype who on October 26, 1976 proclaimed the "independence" of the Transkei bantustan with Vorster's permission and diplomatic recognition from no one.

The next step would be Richard's October 28th open debate, which would end a month and a half later as a dead issue. All who could participate in that hearing did, whether by right—Nkomo as representative of the ANC-ZAPU and Robert Mugabe for ZANU, who at that juncture formed the Patriotic Front of Zimbabwe—or as usurpers of the rights of others—as was the case of the British "arbitrator" and his "rebel government," represented by Richard and Smith, respectively. Also in attendance were a few discredited individuals who only represented themselves, people like the Reverend Sithole or Muzorewa, the man of Shona origin, who was there representing "common sense" and "moderation." In other words, a total of 6 parts. Six parts where there should be no more than two: Great Britain, the colonizing power, and insurgent nationalism. In the final analysis, Smith is no more than a byproduct of that colonialism and legally, as London liked to say in 1965, a rebel; some time ago Muzorewa ceased



to represent the African National Council (ANC) which he founded with the help of ZAPU at the suggestion of Nkomo himself in a very concrete political situation; and Shithole has been repudiated by his original organization, ZANU.

In what concrete situation could the Anglo-Yankee plan be applied?

The Rhodesian economy is no "miracle," rather it is a miracle it survives. The term miracle could be applied to South Africa, which for some time has taken a good portion of Rhodesian exports and provides around 80% of its imports: principally oil, weapons and military equipment.

Smith was proud of Rhodesia's average annual growth "under sanctions:" 7% between 1965 and 1974. But since 1975 the figure has continually dropped. In 1973 the balance of payments was favorable, but it has been unfavorable since 1974. Although the 1975 GNP nearly tripled that of 1966, the present rate of inflation is 10% or 11% (in South Africa it's 14%). In 1975, for example, \$602 600 000 was distributed among the less than 300 000 whites and \$437 200 000 among the more than 6 000 000 blacks.


The defense budget rises every year as counterpoint to the Rhodesian Front's highly touted "new deal." In 1975 it was \$102 000 000, in 1976 it rose to \$130 000 000 and the announced 1977 figure is well above all others.

The white opposition, fearful of sinking in the ship of the Rhodesian Front, complains about these expenditures, about Smith's inflex-



ibility with the nationalists and, above all, for not including them in the Geneva talks, etc. They have joined together in a new National Union Force (NUF) based on the so-called Rhodesian Party of Alan Savory and Pat Bashford's Party of the Center. Meanwhile true progressives and anti-racists within Zimbabwe's white population, figures like Garfield Todd, work alongside Nkomo and Mugabe's Patriotic Front.

Between Geneva, and the present, the prestige of the Zimbabwe revolution has grown both inside and outside Rhodesia. Important and decisive events have taken place and are taking place. The Patriotic Front has been strengthened and enjoys the support of the progressive world and especially of the "front line" African states: Angola, Mozambique, Tanzania, Zambia and Botswana, all of which, in various meetings held since January of this year, have reiterated their total material and moral support of the People's Army (ZIPA) that coordinates the basic strategy of the ZAPU and ZANU guerrillas.



The heads of these states have publicly recognized that only the Front is fighting racist troops.

Smith vacillates in his statements between threats and certain adjustments in form, like the recent campaign for the elimination of discriminatory legislation, which appears to have created a crisis within the heart of the Rhodesian Front and which has to be settled one way or the other in the next congress; and like the proposal to "pursue constitutional changes on his own," etc. At the same time, his regime increases repression, arbitrary arrests, assassinations (such as the murder of Comrade J. Z. Moyo, Vice-President of the ANC-ZAPU and head of its military department); attacks on Mozambique territory; recruitment of multinational mercenaries who today constitute a tenth of the nearly 30 000 troops in the armed forces. Backing him up, Vorster claims he will not permit the economic or military collapse of the Salisbury regime and, consequently, once again, increases arms supplies to Smith, even though propaganda tries to show just the opposite (see his statements made this past February and reprinted throughout the world).

FACTORS OF CHANGE

At this point no one doubts that the popular struggle in southern Africa is irreversible. Vital to imperialist interests, this part of the African world is also characterized by the impressive strength of the

economic and strategic mechanism the system has created in those countries, particularly in the last fifteen years.

It would be an error for reaction to ignore the first conclusion of the previous paragraph. For revolutionaries it would be dangerous to underestimate the second. Even more so when in our times the possibility of buying mercenaries and puppets has not ended. When moreover, the confrontation sharpens in the ideological field and cities, sites of more than one transnational, suddenly fill with pious commentaries and plans for the underdeveloped countries.

For victory to be assured, the struggle must continue. To continue it successfully it is clear that the principal contradiction must be detected. But at the same time it is necessary to discover all the factors that go into that contradiction and also take into account all the contradictions in action. We must move away from Kissinger's "error," from his *intention*, when at the beginning of this trip through the area last September he stated: "The race war has begun in southern Africa." As a correspondent for *Le Monde Diplomatique* pointed out last November, that is mistaking appearance for reality and trying to get others to conform to the apparent and miss the *reality*: the non-whites of Rhodesia, Namibia and above all South Africa are not waging a race war against whites. Violently kept out of all centers of power by the system, they have



moved against its local representatives in a real *war of political and social liberation*.

The growing proletarianization of the southern African cone, particularly the increased number of industrial workers in the last decade, increasingly alters the nature of the contenders and the struggle itself. In 1961, salaried workers in South African industry numbered less than a million while in the intervening 12 years the number has risen to close to two million. In this last year a million and a half agricultural workers were added to that number. The Rhodesian and even the Namibian situation, although more slowly, are moving in that direction as is logical in the sub-Sahara zone of Africa most exploited by the capitalist mode

of production. And within that context, humanly opprobrious, that proletarianized mass is discovering a new identity, an identity beyond the world of race and tribe: the social identity stamped on them by the economic conditions in which they live.

But there is more: in a world with no right to trade unionism or strikes, on what terrain can southern Africa's black workers struggle if not on political terrain? The facts themselves, and not our desires, bring us to this conclusion, the facts from Windhoek to Salisbury, from Bulawayo to Cape Town, and from Soweto to the present, notwithstanding the many facets of the struggle, the numerous hybrids and compromises of the class consciousness. Notwithstanding,





either its greater student emphasis here and there, its greater racial or tribal emphasis there or here.

It is not without foundation that Washington's plan has taken into account a four-billion dollar investment in Rhodesia alone, in a "special fund," with three objectives: to bolster the Rhodesian economy affected by the embargo and the closing of the border; to try to keep control of land, industry and basic services in the hands of the majority of the colonists; and to promote the appearance of a real African bourgeoisie to the extent possible and necessary.


A clear response to these plans and an unmistakable sign of the degree to which the struggle has deepened is the following statement by the late Jason Moyo made to an African journalist last December:

We are determined to struggle against capitalism.

That struggle is not limited to Zimbabwe. It is developing on a world scale. We are part of the international anti-imperialist, anti-capitalist movement. We are not fighting to replace a white bourgeoisie with a black bourgeoisie. Our policy has always been one of transforming the situation in Zimbabwe by means of revolution

Notes on the RHODESIAN Economy

Silvio Baró



ECONOMIC GEOGRAPHIC DESCRIPTION OF THE COUNTRY

Rhodesia —Zimbabwe for the Africans— is located in the southeastern part of the African continent. It has an area of 290 622 sq. km. and is bordered on the north by Zambia, on the northeast and east by Mozambique, on the south by the Republic of South Africa and on the southwest and west by Botswana.

According to 1971 estimates, the country's population was about 5 590 000 inhabitants giving a population density of 14.4 persons per sq. km. During the same year, the urban population was estimated at 17.7% and the rural at 82.3% of the country's total population. The sexual distribution was 50.34% men and 49.66% women.

Rhodesia is a country in which the African population comprises the vast majority (94.9%). The Europeans make up 4.5%, Asians 0.2% and other groups 0.3%. The African population has had the highest natural growth, reaching the figure of 34 per thousand, followed by the Asians with 19 per thousand and the Europeans with 18 per thousand.

The country's chief natural resources include 150 333 square miles of land containing major reserves of asbestos, chrome, gold, copper, coal, iron and tin.

Because of its landlocked geography, Rhodesia is dependent on its neighboring countries in carrying out its foreign trade. Before closing their respective borders, Zambia (January 1973) and Mozambique (March 1976) provided two important channels for Rhodesian exports which must now be sent through South Africa.

BRIEF ANALYSIS OF RHODESIA'S ECONOMY

The Rhodesian economy can be classified as a "dual economy," a term used in economic theory to refer to those countries whose economy is divided between two large sectors: "modern" and "traditional."

The "modern" sector, as is usually the case, is composed of products located in the urban areas (manufacturing industry) based on capitalist relations of production and the work force is mainly white. On the other hand, the "traditional" sector is represented by agriculture based on a combination of pre-capitalist and capitalist relations of production using mainly Africans.

Rhodesia does not escape the general characteristics of a "dual economy" in which the development of the "modern" sector takes place at the expense of the "traditional" sector. This can easily be proven by observing the tendency of the Africans' agricultural production in relation to total commercialized agricultural production. In 1955, the proportion was 23% while in 1968 it was only 10%.



Like the South African economy, the Rhodesian economy shows significant progress and structural changes in the years following the end of World War II. Thus, as Table 1 shows, the per capita GNP showed an

TABLE 1
Per Capita Gross National Product
 (in pounds sterling)

| Year | GNP | Year | GNP |
|------|------|------|------|
| 1954 | 56.8 | 1961 | 66.8 |
| 1955 | 59.3 | 1962 | 64.2 |
| 1956 | 63.5 | 1963 | 62.7 |
| 1957 | 65.5 | 1964 | 62.5 |
| 1958 | 64.8 | 1965 | 86.4 |
| 1959 | 66.1 | 1966 | 79.9 |
| 1960 | 66.8 | 1967 | 81.4 |

From 1954 to 1964, at 1954 prices
 From 1965 to 1968, at 1965 prices



ascending rhythm up to the mid-sixties, when the Rhodesian economy entered a phase of comparative stagnation, according to western specialists.

Table 2 allows a look at the important structural changes that took place in the Rhodesian economy during those years.

TABLE 2
Source of Gross National Product
(in percentages)

| Year | Agriculture | | Mining | Manufacturing Industry | Construction | Trade | Transportation and Services |
|------|-------------|------|--------|------------------------|--------------|-------|-----------------------------|
| | Eur. | Afr. | | | | | |
| 1954 | 14.1 | 8.7 | 8.6 | 14.7 | 7.8 | 13.9 | 32.3 |
| 1958 | 12.0 | 6.7 | 7.0 | 15.5 | 9.5 | 13.7 | 35.6 |
| 1962 | 14.1 | 6.8 | 5.6 | 17.1 | 4.9 | 13.9 | 37.6 |
| 1966 | 12.9 | 6.1 | 6.8 | 18.8 | 4.5 | 14.0 | 36.9 |
| 1968 | 8.9 | 6.8 | 6.1 | 19.1 | 6.1 | 13.2 | 39.8 |
| 1972 | 11.2 | 6.1 | 5.7 | 23.1 | 5.7 | 14.0 | 35.9 |

Table 2 shows how such sectors as agriculture and mining (primary sectors) have lost importance in generating the Gross National Product, and how the manufacturing industry, trade, transportation and services (secondary and tertiary sectors) have been gaining the primary places, a situation characteristic of developing economies.

The structural changes in the Rhodesian economy are clearly observable if we take the figures on employment of the African labor force in various sectors of the national economy.



Below, we will briefly discuss the march of the Rhodesian economy in recent years, selecting important aspects of it.

TABLE 3


*Employment of the African labor by sectors.
(in thousands and percentages)*

| Year | Mining | % | European Agriculture | % | uring Industry | % | Cont- struccion | % | Domestic Services | % |
|------|--------|----|-------------------------|----|-------------------|----|--------------------|----|----------------------|----|
| 1954 | 56.5 | 10 | 194.3 | 35 | 62.5 | 11 | 51.0 | 11 | 76.1 | 14 |
| 1958 | 57.1 | 9 | 230.0 | 37 | 72.4 | 12 | 64.0 | 10 | 88.0 | 14 |
| 1962 | 44.1 | 7 | 243.9 | 40 | 73.2 | 12 | 36.8 | 6 | 95.2 | 15 |
| 1968 | 48.4 | 7 | 277.3 | 41 | 85.2 | 13 | 37.9 | 6 | 102.0 | 15 |

AGRICULTURE

Agricultural production was valued at 231 700 000 Rhodesian dollars in the European sector and 80 200 000 in the African Sector, of which 55 million was a subsistence economy.

Before the Unilateral Declaration of Independence (UDI) in 1965, the most important commercial crop was tobacco, in which Rhodesia was the second world producer with 27% of world trade. Its "superproduction" led to a decline in prices which later caused farmers to cut back production. It dropped from 246 million pounds in 1965 to 200 million in 1967 and 132 million in subsequent years. In 1972, the crop recovered slightly, reaching 145 million pounds.



In spite of the fact that it is difficult to obtain reliable post UDI figures on different aspects of the Rhodesian economy, it has been possible to determine that the main commercial crop in recent years has been cotton, with a production of 325 million pounds in 1971.

Other commercial items are sugar, wheat, corn, soya, coffee and tea. In 1969, production of some of these crops included 2 300 000 metric tons of tea and 700 000 metric tons of corn.

In cattle, the most recent estimates indicate that the country has about five million head.

Rhodesian agriculture depends to a large extent on climatic conditions, which means that it is seriously affected in drought years, such as 1968 and 1973 and experiences a boom when there is abundant rain as in 1974.

MINING

This sector has advanced in production from 108.2 in 1965 to 129.6 in 1973 (1964 = 100). In 1973, production value reached 135 900 000 Rhodesian dollars.

Exports have continued in spite of sanctions, although at lower prices than those on the world market. This has been possible because countries like the United States, in violation of the economic sanctions imposed on the Rhodesian regime by the UN, have lifted the ban on imports of chrome and other strategic minerals from Rhodesia (Byrd Amendment).

Copper and nickel production developed considerably following the UDI and replaced gold and asbestos in importance.

Table 4 gives some figures on production volume in Rhodesian mining.

TABLE 4
Mining Production
(In thousands of MT)

| | 1970 | 1971 |
|---|-------|-------|
| asbestos | 80 | 80 |
| coal | 3 168 | 3 096 |
| copper | 20 | 23 |
| iron | ... | ... |
| gold (tons) | ... | ... |
| silver (tons) | 2 | 2 |
| nickel | 10 | 10 |
| chrome | 180 | 180 |
| total value (in millions of Rhodesian dollars) | 98.7 | 101.2 |

MANUFACTURING INDUSTRY

Before the UDI, the Rhodesian manufacturing industry was given over to processing natural resources. But events at that time caused a loss of confidence which led to a sharp drop in building programs which depressed this sector until about mid-1966.

At the end of 1967, a building plan was approved that caused an upsurge and production increased by 23% in 1970 and 1971.

Economic sanctions against Rhodesia forced a policy of diversification of industrial production and the replacement of imports. A flourishing in various sectors of industrial production was reported, to the extreme that the government had to impose control on exporting textiles, shoes and radios to South Africa, because of that country's complaints.

As a result of the development achieved in cotton production, the textile industry expanded greatly and was followed in importance by metallurgy: from 1965 to the present, they have shown volumen production increases of 12% and 100% respectively.

Other important Rhodesian industries are paper and pulp and meat products.

Following an initial explosive growth, the evergrowing scarcity in foreign exchange seems to be responsible for the stagnation that began to be felt in manufacturing production. On the other hand, the level of imports in manufacturing production is still around 25%.

FINANCING

A glance at Rhodesian national budget figures during the first years of the '70s, is sufficient to observe the worsening economic situation in the country, when from a surplus of 1 100 000 Rhodesian dollars in 1970, it dropped to a deficit of 0.9 million in 1971 and to 20 100 000 in 1972. In 1973, the budgetary deficit rose to 30 700 000 Rhodesian dollars.

These deficits in the Rhodesian national budget are basically due to the enormous state outlay on increasing military expenses that the government has had to make in the face of the sharpening guerrilla struggle. Also involved are the subsidies the government provides to certain sectors of the economy such as railroads and the fertilizing industry.

PRICES

The limited economic relations between Rhodesia and the rest of the world and state intervention in economic affairs seem to have contributed to the fact that the country showed only a 3% annual rate of inflation during the last years of the '60s and the beginning of the '70s. However, because of the seriousness of the economic problems affecting the capitalist world in recent years (the international monetary crisis, energy crisis, etc.) this stage in Rhodesia's economy seems to be over.

FOREIGN TRADE AND THE BALANCE OF PAYMENTS

Of course it is difficult to get a full picture of Rhodesia's foreign trade, since many of its specifics remain a secret.

Since the UDI and economic sanctions against the regime, foreign trade has changed its direction radically. It is estimated that, following the closing of the Zambia and Mozambique borders, Rhodesia's dependence on South Africa in getting out its exports is almost absolute.

If we analyze Rhodesia's foreign trade figures for 1965, we get an idea of its structure and the countries that are its chief trading partners.

Of Rhodesia's total 1965 exports, tobacco accounted for 33%, asbestos 7.6%, iron and steel 4.5%, copper 4.3%, chemicals 3.2%, meats 3.0% and sugar and molasses 2.7%.

Of total 1965 imports, transportation equipment accounted for 13.5%, non-electrical machinery 13.3%, chemical products 11.2%, textiles 10.4% and electrical machinery 4.9%.

Table 5 shows the countries that held the chief places in trade with Rhodesia in 1965.

| <i>Exports</i> | | <i>Imports</i> | |
|--------------------|------|--------------------|------|
| Zambia | 25.3 | United Kingdom | 30.4 |
| United Kingdom | 21.3 | South Africa | 22.9 |
| European countries | 16.5 | European countries | 15.2 |
| South Africa | 9.0 | United States | 6.8 |
| Japan | 5.2 | Malawi | 1.2 |
| Malawi | 5.2 | Japan | 5.5 |
| United States | 2.4 | Zambia | 3.5 |
| Congo | 1.2 | Australia | 2.2 |

According to other sources, it was estimated that in 1969, South Africa would become Rhodesia's chief trading partner by supplying her with between 80% and 85% of her imports.

Table 6 allows us to see Rhodesia's foreign trade evolution.

| | 1967 | 1968 | 1969 | 1970 | 1971 | 1972 |
|---------------|-------|--------|-------|-------|-------|-------|
| Exports | 169.7 | 167.5 | 212.5 | 247.5 | 270.8 | 328.4 |
| Imports | 187.1 | 207.0 | 199.4 | 234.9 | 282.4 | 274.2 |
| Reexports | 12.1 | 8.5 | 6.8 | 6.1 | 6.4 | 6.1 |
| Trade Balance | — 5.3 | — 31.1 | 19.6 | 18.7 | — 5.1 | 60.3 |

Taking 1964 = 100, Rhodesia's foreign trade exchange progressively deteriorated, dropping to 95.5 in 1965. The deterioration in terms of exchange sharpened in recent years due to the increased cost of imports. In 1972 they reached the figure of 82.4 and it is expected that, due to the problems that arose in the following years, they have deteriorated even further.

For an idea of Rhodesia's foreign trade structure, we must look at the latest figures available (1965).

TABLE 7
Major commercial products
(in millions of pounds sterling)

| <i>Exports</i> | 1964 | 1965 | <i>Imports</i> | 1964 | 1965 |
|----------------|-------|-------|--------------------|-------|-------|
| Total | 133,5 | 157,9 | Total | 108,2 | 119,8 |
| tobacco | 39,2 | 47,0 | transportation | 31,2 | 38,0 |
| asbestos | 10,0 | 10,8 | manufactured prod. | 28,1 | 31,1 |
| gold | 7,1 | ... | chemical prod. | 11,5 | 13,5 |
| clothing | 5,3 | 5,4 | foodstuffs | 9,7 | 0,3 |
| meat | 5,9 | 7,9 | fuel | 6,2 | 5,9 |
| sugar | 3,5 | 3,5 | raw materials | 5,5 | 4,9 |

An analysis of Rhodesian balance of payments for the first years of the '70s shows us that, except for 1971, the country's trade balance was increasingly positive and that, nevertheless, the balance in the current account was negative due to the great exodus in such areas as interest and dividends, other services, freight and insurance, etc.

At the same time, the capital account shows a higher positive balance in 1971 than in 1970, but in 1972 although it is positive, the balance is in no way comparable in quantity to the balance of the two previous years.

Table 8 shows us Rhodesia's overall balance of payments for some of the years of the '70s.

TABLE 8

Rhodesian Balance of Payments
(in millions of Rhodesian dollars)

| | 1972 | 1973 | 1974 | 1975 |
|---------------------|------|-------|-------|-------|
| Trade | 58 | 83 | 51 | 33 |
| Invisibles | — 57 | — 100 | — 146 | — 161 |
| Current Account | 1 | — 17 | — 96 | — 128 |
| Net Capital | — 2 | 52 | 63 | 101 |
| Balance of Payments | — 2 | 34 | — 33 | — 27 |

RACISM AND INEQUALITY IN RHODESIA

The measures of discrimination and social inequality that reach their highest expression in neighboring South Africa are also characteristic of Rhodesia.

An analysis of the distribution of personal income is enough to give an idea of the extreme inequality characteristic of the Rhodesian regime.

Data taken from Rhodesia sources reveals that in 1964, the white population made up 3.8% of the total population and held 49.4% of the income. In 1968 the figures were 4.8% and 56.5% respectively. Thus, wealth had been increasingly concentrated in the hands of the white minority in detriment to other sectors of the population.

The inequality is also expressed in other aspects of the country's economy. If we move on to the question of wages, we will face the following phenomenon: for performing the same work, the African worker receives an average wage that is 15 times lower than that of the white worker and reaches extremes such as that in agriculture where the difference is one to 20.

If we analyze land distribution, we will note that 5 500 000 Africans own some 17 million hectares while 270 000 whites own 15 million. This means that the white population owns 18 times more land than the African population.

The increasing inequality in Rhodesia can also be observed in socio-cultural matters. While there are 4 239 white high school graduates, Africans (who account for a population that is eight times larger) boast only 2 545, some 40% fewer.

It Isn't very risky to affirm that, of the total number of illiterates in the country (70% of the population), the vast majority are among the African population.

RHODESIA IN THE AFRICAN CONTEXT

Like South Africa, Rhodesia plays an important role in imperialist strategy in Africa. For many years, both countries, along with the former Portuguese colonies, formed a kind of containing wall against the development of the independence movement on the continent. At the same time, the two countries make up a very important area for the expansion of the main imperialist powers' transnational enterprises, as well as for economic and political penetration into nearby countries. And given the conditions that govern these states, they are an important source of raw materials (including strategic products) for the international monopolies. These countries are markets for their export products to a greater extent than any other African countries and, because of the laws in force, wage levels, etc. they represent true havens for investing capital and obtaining very high profits.

Comparing a list of transnational enterprises operating in Rhodesia with a list of those operating in South Africa, will reveal many identical names. This is due to the fact that the transnational enterprises often use their South African offices for developing economic penetration into Rhodesia and other countries in the area.

The transnational enterprises have interests in the major sectors of Rhodesia's economy. Thus mining, oil and chemicals, fertilizers and metallurgy have been invaded by these enterprises. And it is common for the investments they make in Rhodesia to come from profits obtained from their operations in South Africa. Just as England and the United States are the chief investors in South Africa, so are they in Rhodesia.

PERSPECTIVES FOR THE RHODESIAN ECONOMY

In spite of the economic sanctions the UN imposed on Rhodesia, it has been able to avoid economic collapse because of three basic factors:

- a) the transfer of the producers in the sectors affected by measures against the Rhodesian regime to other production sectors not easily identifiable as Rhodesian, that can be exported from South Africa,
- b) development of a policy of import substitution that replaces merchandise originally imported and

c) above all, the aid provided by South Africa, the United States and other countries.

This last factor is chiefly demonstrated by the fact that South Africa pays 50% of Rhodesia's military expenses while the United States imports Rhodesian chrome and other strategic materials. For example in 1975, it imported 139 464 tons of chrome which represented some 11% of its total chrome imports that year.

However, the Rhoadsian regime will confront innumerable problems that will undoubtedly influence the stagnation of its economy and the appearance of heretofore unknown problems.

The closing of the Zambia and Mozambique borders has been a major blow to the regime since, because it is landlocked, the country depends on the ports of other nations to ship its exports.

The regime now confronts the task of reorienting its entire foreign trade through South Africa —which lacks big port facilities— with a consequent increase in transportation expenses and other problems.

Certain predictions about the possible evolution of Rhodesia's balance of payments over the coming years indicates that they will retain their negative balance.

The current political situation in the country is unfavorably affecting another important source of income: tourism.



Intensification of guerrilla activity has led to a progressive loss of tourists visiting the country in recent years, dropping from 339 210 in 1972, to 243 812 in 1973, 229 570 in 1974, and down to 244 404 in 1975.

Together with the increase in guerrilla activity, there has been an increase in expenses for all kinds of repressive actions. According to Zimbabwe national liberation movement sources, military expenses for the fiscal year 1975-1976 showed a 280% increase over those for the fiscal year 1971-1972. And it is expected that the figure for 1976-1977 will be 40% higher than for the previous year.

Meanwhile, the Rhodesian economy, which had already begun to show partial symptoms of stagnation in the mid-sixties, faces a growing exodus of the white population (which provides the country's skilled labor) and this has begun to affect several sectors of the economy.

In an effort to counteract this problem, Ian Smith's regime has engaged in a propaganda barrage in the press of the capitalist world to try to attract white immigrants to the country, and has taken a series of measures to encourage their entrance.

Nevertheless, it is a well-known fact that the "Settlers '74" campaign was a resounding failure and statistics show a net increase in white emigrants which reached the figure of 5 000 in 1969, 6 300 in 1970, 9 400 in 1971, 8 800 in 1972, although in 1973 it dropped to 1 700.


An analysis of the makeup of the overall white population movement shows that the emigrants are young while the immigrants are old people returning to the country after having lived in Zambia and Malawi.

The emigration of Rhodesian white youth is due in part to the fact that South Africa's average monthly wage is higher than what Rhodesia can offer: 316 against 285 Rhodesian dollars.

In 1974, the Rhodesian economy began to find itself affected by the economic crisis in the capitalist world. During the first half of the year, inflation reached 7%, more than double the average rate the country had maintained over the previous three years.

Western economic specialists foresee a gradual increase in this rate due to the higher price of fuel, the scarcity of skilled labor, increased military expenses, higher costs of merchandise because of delays in South African ports, etc.

Meanwhile, the "energy crisis" became another phenomenon that brought with it major unfavorable effects on the Rhodesian economy, since it meant a decrease in exports to such countries as Japan, when the country had major limitations in finding substitute markets because of UN



sanctions. It also affected the oil and chemical industry and aggravated the country's precarious situation with respect to foreign exchange.

The "energy crisis" also affected tourism, the main component of which was the South African who travelled enormous distances by car to reach Rhodesia.



To all this was added the drop in the rate of growth of the country's industrial production compared to the beginning of the '70s (11% in 1969-1971, 9.3% in 1972 and 8.3% in 1973), which provides a firm basis for declaring that the Rhodesian economy has definitely entered a period of stagnation.

After analyzing the country's situation, an exacerbation of social conflict can be predicted due to the economy's inability to absorb the whole African population able to work.

Finally, and no less important, recent events in Rhodesia have created an atmosphere of mistrust among national and foreign investors who resort to violating the rigid fiscal regulations to try to withdraw their capital. In recent years there have been frequent cases of companies fined for this.

All this leads to the increasing possibility that the imperialist powers may reconsider the support they have given the Rhodesian regime up to now, and foster the assumption of power by an African government that responds to the interests of these powers and offers them the possibility of developing a new "African policy".

documents for history



Because of their importance in the development of the revolutionary struggle Zimbabwe is currently waging against colonialist and imperialist forces, Tricontinental publishes two documents released by that country's liberation movement explaining, among other things, the objectives, difficulties and achievements of the struggle.

The first is the Declaration of the African National Council made by Joshua Nkomo, president of the Zimbabwe African People's Union (ZAPU), at the 13th Organization of African Unity summit meeting, in which the revolutionary leader explains the characteristics of the struggle his people are waging.

The second refers to the incorporation into the Patriotic Front of ZAPU and ZANU (Zimbabwe African National Union) and the adoption of a common position to participate in the Geneva conference and in the evolution of the people's struggle to obtain a majority government.

*AFRICAN NATIONAL COUNCIL (ZIMBABWE) STATEMENT TO THE 13TH
OAU SUMMIT ON THE ZIMBABWE STRUGGLE AND THE PROBLEMS
FACING IT BY JOSHUA NKOMO, ANC PRESIDENT*

In Zimbabwe today the armed liberation struggle is a raging reality. The OAU should know that we conceived this course of action over ten years ago. For its promotion and prosecution we established an external administration as early as 1963. We are in it until victory.

The two crucial questions in the Zimbabwe liberation struggle today are unity and the escalation of fighting. Despite frequent interruptions by political and other complications. I must emphasize that everyone should keep in mind that my organization has never missed a moment to fight or to effect unity.



However, Your Excellencies, we have been subjected to unfair public criticisms and rebukes from some of our brothers in independent Africa. Whilst I acknowledge that criticism is healthy, I must emphasize that it must be honest, sincere and constructive. It appears that an unhealthy and dangerous tradition is developing in Africa which suggests that members of independent states are always right whilst leaders of liberation movements are always wrong. We are in the struggle together and such dogmatic attitudes can disrupt that which we seek to achieve together.

Let me mention, Your Excellencies, some of the instances:


There has been severe criticism of the Zimbabwe political leadership claiming that we have failed to forge and maintain unity in the face of a formidable enemy;

there have been allegations that some of us have connived with the enemy by carrying out negotiations with the regime;

that the Zimbabwe leaders failed to provide for the armed struggle.

Let us briefly look at the unity question. The basic document is the Zimbabwe Declaration of Unity at Lusaka, December 7, 1974, whose operative clauses are:

- 1) ZANU, ZAPU, FROLIZI and the ANC hereby agree to unite in the ANC.
- 4) The enlarged ANC Executive shall have the following functions:
 - a) To prepare for any conference for the transfer of power to the majority that might be called.
 - b) To prepare for the holding of a congress within 4 months at which (among other things)



ii) the leadership of the united people of Zimbabwe shall be elected.

7) The leaders recognize the inevitability of continued armed struggle and all other forms of struggle until the total liberation of Zimbabwe.

This document clearly acknowledges that leaders may propose a form of unity but the decisive authority is the people in congress who must ratify the unity agreement. The importance and urgency we all attached to the resolution of the issues of unity and leadership was reflected in the stipulation of the period "within four months." The unity was an absolute fusion and not an umbrella or a "front" as clearly defined by paragraph "L" of the unity agreement.

When we returned to Zimbabwe from Lusaka our duty was to implement the provisions of the Lusaka Declaration of Unity as stated above. But when some of our brothers (former ZANU leaders later joined by Bishop Muzorewa) discovered that they did not have sufficient political support to capture the vital positions in the hierarchy of the organization, they repudiated the terms of agreement and refused to go to a congress. However, since the document had been published and was now the property of the people, the organization proceeded to implement the terms of the document stated above. It is the people, and not Joshua Nkomo, who pressed forward for the congress. The congress duly met on September, 27-28, 1975; the leadership was elected, thereby fulfilling the Lusaka Declaration of Unity.


When people speak of disunity in Zimbabwe, do they realize that the Lusaka Declaration of Unity was fulfilled or do they support those who deliberately dishonored an agreement that they had solemnly entered into, for no other reason than that they were unlikely to get the positions that they wanted?

It would be hypocritical of me if I did not state frankly that some of our independent brothers, in their cruel-kindness and through their preferences for individuals, have contributed persistently to the division by encouraging those individuals either to split or opt out of solemn unity agreements.

Regarding the talks with the Rhodesian racist regime, it is important to remind you, Your Excellencies, that these talks were started in 1973, when I was in prison. After massive rejection of the 1971 Smith-Home constitutional fraud, Ian Smith entered into negotiation with Bishop Muzorewa. In 1974 our brothers the presidents of Tanzania, Zambia, Botswana and the then President of FRELIMO made contacts with the Smith regime with a view to discovering whether, after ten years of war, the Rhodesian regime was now ready to transfer power to the majority. In December, 1974, they reached a stage at which they secured our release from prison and recommended that we, the leaders of Zimbabwe, enter into talks with

the regime to discover whether the regime was ready to transfer power to the majority.

Although we expressed reservations on the value or success of such talks, we nonetheless tried following the advice of our friends. Having started the talks we continued until we proved concretely that the regime was unwilling to transfer power to the majority. In the light of the foregoing, the suggestion that there was connivance on my part was not only false but an insult.



On the question of the armed liberation struggle, I would like to bring to your notice, Your Excellencies, that my organization has never spared and will not spare any effort towards its intensification. I must say, however, that whilst going through the report of the Secretary General on Decolonization, I was shocked at the distortion as to who is involved practically in the promotion of the armed struggle in Zimbabwe as opposed to the struggle by "militant newspaper statements." Perhaps this was due to inexcusable misinformation. The imperialist slander that because we were involved in talks with the racist regime, therefore we were not for the armed struggle, was sadly reflected in this report. The report falls into this cast of propaganda by also reflecting the false labels of "external ANC" and "internal ANC." There is no such thing as external and internal ANC. There is only the ANC of the people of Zimbabwe.



What are the facts on preparation for the armed struggle? As far back as October, 1975, before we had started any talks with the Rhodesian regime, my organization's external administration had already been instructed to start negotiations with former ZANU with a view to setting up a single army to launch the armed struggle. This was duly accomplished in November, 1975, following the good offices of the Executive Secretary of the Liberation Committee (Hashim Mbita) and the offer of facilities and territory for operations by the Mozambican Government. This is how the present Zimbabwe People's Army (ZPA), which has scored so many victories against the racist regime, was formed. The so-called external ANC referred to in the Secretary General's report had no role whatsoever in the formation of ZPA and the subsequent intensified armed struggle in Zimbabwe. We have not shouted about this because we believe in action rather than in words. I must dispel at the same time the false impression which has been given much currency that ZPA was formed as a spontaneous movement in the camps without political leadership. This is not true as indicated above.

Whilst the greatest victories are being scored by Zimbabwe fighters from Mozambique, we can no longer conceal the grave problems which have set in within our military wing without detriment to the struggle itself. Intense tribalism as reflected in the Chitepo report employing military fascism and masquerading under the label of "militancy" is on the ascendency in the ranks and is promising our country nothing but chaos and anarchy. As a result ZPA is breaking down. We have paid too high a price in human losses in what we considered to be unity camps, all in an attempt to achieve unity elements that have a mania for killing fellow comrades-in-arms.



The cause of all this tragedy is the entire line-up which controls the former ZANU army. This ZANU military administration down to camp con-

trol, like its political leadership, never accepted the idea of abandoning ZANU for unity nor abandoning the mass killing mania which finally claimed the life of its leader Herbert Chitepo, as the Chitepo commission amply shows. There was no attempt to cleanse the ZANU army of the negative elements as revealed by the report on the assassination of Herbert Chitepo.

Theories of the so-called "third force" and resolutions praising the "unity of the cadres" to the exclusion of the unity of the entire people of whom they are a part, have incited some of the destructive elements in the camps to worsen rather than improve the stability in ZPA. We appeal to our friends, Your Excellencies, to avoid supporting divisive theories and resolutions.

Having said what I have said above, that is stressing our fulfillment of the Lusaka Declaration of Unity and my brief exposition of the problems in ZPA which could affect the armed struggle adversely if not acted upon immediately, I would like:

1. to appeal to the OAU, its member states individually and its relevant administrative officers to assist us in the solution of our unity problems by advising any one who claims leadership of the people of Zimbabwe to return to Zimbabwe in accordance with the demand of the Lusaka Declaration of Unity so that there, in Zimbabwe, we should together, dispel the image of disunity and thereby secure the unity of our people. If they are unable to return, their colleagues in Zimbab-





we can carry out the task. Our fundamental aim is to secure the unity of all the people of Zimbabwe and not just that of leaders or some functional body. I know that there are some people who do not understand how we go out and return to Rhodesia. It has to be understood that the immense international pressures on the Rhodesian regime which resulted in our release from long terms of imprisonment still continue to have an effect. In the circumstances, we do take the necessary risks to carry out the tasks of the struggle. Any leader worth his salt has to face these risks.

2. to suggest, on the problems facing the fighting forces, that an ad hoc committee of the OAU, which should include the front-line states, be instituted without delay to assist us to sort out the problems in ZPA,

taking into particular account the revelations in the Report of the International Commission on the Assassination of Herbert Chitepo.

Finally, Your Excellencies, may I register once again our position on the question of the channeling of assistance. We cannot agree with the recommendation that assistance should not be channeled through us, provisionally though it may be. Choice of friends and bilateral relations with other countries or organizations is our sovereign right and we cannot therefore agree even to its supposed temporary suspension.

Long Live a United Africa!

AFRICAN NATIONAL COUNCIL (ZAPU) AND ZANU STATEMENT IN DAR ES SALAAM

Our two liberation movements, as the only genuine and authentic representatives of the struggling people of Zimbabwe, which over the last decade have been and are still engaged in the promotion of the Zimbabwe armed struggle, met in Maputo (Mozambique) from the first of September to examine the current march of events in Zimbabwe and southern Africa, particularly:

- a) to analyze the situation confronting our movements as created by the current imperialist, colonialist and racist constitutional maneuver on Rhodesia.



b) to see how best to intensify the armed liberation struggle through ZIPA, the unified armed wing created by our two movements.

Upon analysis of these events, our two movements decided:

- a) in the interest of achieving a genuine Independence for our country, Zimbabwe;
- b) in order to protect the gains of our revolution and to prevent any opportunistic and reactionary development in Zimbabwe, to constitute themselves into a Patriotic Front.

As a Patriotic Front we have decided to intensify the armed liberation struggle until the achievement of victory.

Cognizant of the need of presenting a common and solid approach to national matters and being determined that our different political identities shall not be a barrier to cooperation in promoting the revolutionary process in Zimbabwe and in ensuring that such revolutionary process gains momentum, our two organizations ZANU and ANC (ZAPU), have resolved that they shall, with a singularity of purpose, adopt a common approach to all issues arising from the subject of current constitutional talks.

We have worked out all the essentials of our approaches and have decided, contingent upon fulfillment of a number of factors, to attend the forthcoming talks. We shall proceed to such talks as a joint delegation under joint leadership.

Our stand is that the theme of the conference on the independence of Zimbabwe shall be the "transfer of power" from the colonial power which is the United Kingdom Government, to the people of Zimbabwe. Such transfer must be total and immediate. We reject the Kissinger proposals as a basis for any discussion. We feel that a necessary atmosphere must be created for the conference and on this our demands are:


1. Release of all political prisoners, detainees and restrictees.
2. Abolition of protected villages.
3. Abolition of all restrictions of political activity in Zimbabwe.
4. The lifting of the state of emergency.
5. Suspension of all political trials and the release of all freedom fighters sentenced to death.
6. Unimpeded return to Zimbabwe of all members of liberation movements.

Our position on the talks is that the negotiations must be with the United Kingdom Government, the colonial power from which we seek restoration of Zimbabwe, our country. Should the racist Ian Smith or any of his colleagues attend, we can only regard him/them as an extension of the United Kingdom delegation.

The chairmanship provided by the United Kingdom Government should be at a level of ministerial authority.

origin and evolution of the struggle

Joseph Dube



On the occasion of the day of solidarity with Zimbabwe, ANC (ZAPU) representative in Havana, Joseph Dube, recently held a conference at OSPAAAL headquarters. The Zimbabwean leader gave a historical account of the resistance the Zimbabwe people have made since the beginning of colonization. Dube also spoke about the current imperialist maneuvers aimed at establishing a neocolonial government in his country.

The Zimbabwe people's struggle goes back to the 1890's when British colonization of the country began. Before that date numerous kingdoms, whose ruins still exist in the country, had flourished. During the 16th century, there was the kingdom of Munhomotapa which included part of the present territories of Mozambique, South Africa, Botswana, Zambia and Zimbabwe. This area was known as Zambezia.

When the kingdom of Munhomotapa fell, it was succeeded by that of Mambo. Then came the ruler Mziligazi, from the Zulus of South Africa. When the British arrived in 1890, Mziligazi had died and his son, Lobengula, occupied the throne and fought the colonialist aggressor forces.

Both the colonization and the imperialist military occupation of Zimbabwe were the result of the activities of a British-South African company, the British South Africa Chartered Company (BSAC), directed by Cecil Rhodes, then Prime Minister of Cape Town, owner of dia-




mond mines and a man with great political and economic influence in South Africa.

The BSAC obtained Queen Victoria's "permission" to exploit and plunder Zimbabwe, and that is how the country's oppression and colonization began.

It wasn't long, however, before the people's resistance made itself felt in various ways throughout the territory. Organized resistance was difficult at that time, since there was no clear consciousness of the struggle and the forces were widely separated. But in spite of the powerful enemy, the people resisted with bows and arrows.

In 1897 the resistance increased but so did the enemy's exploitation and aggression, particularly after British military occupation. During January, February and March of that same year, the people intensified the struggle, taking advantage of the area's geographic and climatic conditions. The guerrilla struggle in Zimbabwe—and in other parts of southern Africa, is more appropriate and significant in a specific season of the year, that is, from October to July, the rainy season. With more rain, the guerrillas have greater chance of success. That is why, on March 17, 1897, all the forces joined together to attack an enemy military post. The patriots Mashayamombe and Makwati led the operation. During the night, the fort was completely destroyed.

In later years, March 17th became the day of solidarity with Zimbabwe. It is a very important date



for us, when we discuss the past and present struggle, reeducate ourselves, analyze our individual commitment to the struggle and also analyze our failures and our achievements.

The people were militarily defeated by the powerful colonialists but the resistance continued.

The Anglo-Boer War (1890-1900) had great impact in Rhodesia. The conflict between the British and Afrikaner forces in South Africa caused white colonists to emigrate to Rhodesia as the imperialist forces concentrated throughout the whole southern part of Africa. Thus, branches of South African companies were established in Zimbabwe as well as in Zambia (known then as Northern Rhodesia). In the former British colonies the companies were usually owned by English, US and German proprietors.

By the beginning of this century, the people were more aware of what was happening in the country and in 1911 the Southern Rhodesian Native Association led by Chirimuhuta was founded. The or-



ganization's chief purpose was to demand justice from the whites in the matter of land and cattle ownership, and also to denounce land appropriation by the colonialists and expulsion of native Africans from their homelands. But this organization was not strong enough to resist the oppressors' attacks and it dissolved in 1919. That same year Jerry Sobantu formed the African Voters' League in an effort to get the vote for the Africans who had no way of expressing them-

selves. Of course it goes without saying that this organization had no success at all. Other associations also emerged as a result of mass discontent, in rural areas as well as in the villages and towns.

CONTINUATION OF THE STRUGGLE

We have developed this historical panorama in order to show that the political struggle in Zimbabwe, like the armed struggle, began many years ago. Our present battles are the continuation of the struggle our people began when the colonizers arrived.

The establishment of the African National Congress of South Africa in 1912 had great impact on the political life of the oppressed people in the area. Many people from Zimbabwe, Malawi and Zambia participated in founding this organization and, on returning to their respective countries, they also began to show their interest in forming an African Congress. Thus, there emerged in Zimbabwe the Bantu Congress, an organization that desperately tried to halt



implementation of the land Apportionment Act of 1930.

Led by the young peasant Aaron Jacha, the Bantu Congress later —after making contact with the African National Congress of South Africa and other similar organizations in Zambia and Malawi— changed its name to Southern Rhodesia African National Congress, an organization that fought for the rights of Africans dispossessed of their land.

The Natives Land Act of 1913 had stipulated 87% of the land for the white colonists and only 13% for the African majority. On the basis of this Act, the Southern Rhodesian Land Apportionment Act was drawn up. Of course land was one of the matters that most affected the Africans; in the same way work exploitation constituted a serious problem, as did human rights and racial discrimination. This organization undertook to struggle against all these problems.

The Southern Rhodesia African National Congress was led by the Rev. Samkange from 1945 to 1953 when Joshua Nkomo was elected president. At that time Joshua Nkomo was Secretary General of the powerful Southern Rhodesian Railways African Employees' Association.

Before the creation of the Zimbabwe African National Congress in 1957, there was no national organization that included the whole country; the Youth League was also an offspring of the South African Youth League. Most of its leaders were educated there which accounts for the influence that region

has, an influence that has also affected the political direction of the organization established in Zimbabwe.

In 1957 the African National Congress, which would lead the political struggle, was established. The ANC was not a revolutionary organization but rather a nationalist



organization without an adequate political position which, nevertheless, kept alive the people's political life. For example, it struggled for the right of Africans to participate in the government and also for workers' rights to wage increases, but it had no program for establishing a government of the political majority in Zimbabwe. It did not fight for an African government but its work was positive since it raised mass political consciousness. These were some characteristics of the ANC which operated so effectively between 1957 and 1959 that the regime imprisoned its leaders and declared the organization illegal.

The National Democratic Party replaced the ANC and continued the struggle against the white oppressor minority; it carried out de-

monstrations, uprisings and destroyed some property belonging to white racists, for which it was outlawed in 1961. Nkomo had been its president.

The colonialists reacted hysterically to the Africans' political activities and they, in turn, responded with greater revolutionary violence. Thus on December 17, 1961, the Zimbabwe African People's Union (ZAPU) was founded with Nkomo as president. This new organization mobilized the masses to



such an extent that, in 1962, it had nearly 20 000 activists operating throughout the country. Fires and sabotage of property owned by racists increased: farms, factories, plantations, vehicles, administrative centers and stores smoked throughout Zimbabwe. The party was too dangerous for the colonial administration, and it was outlawed in 1962. When this happened there were also the already well-known arrests of many militants.

Faced with this situation, ZAPU took measures to go underground. The internal, continental and international situation as well as the enemy's position had to be analyzed. It was difficult to struggle against a powerful white minority government, to struggle for human rights, for workers' rights, for peasants' rights.

The moment came to change all this organizational strategy and tactics and so the party agreed that ZAPU should be politically and ideologically transformed. It was radicalized and its cadres acquired greater political consciousness. The party school emerged with its Political Department, whose purpose was to guide the leaders and all cadres. This was a success and mass mobilization began with the same political orientation. This is still in process.

In 1962, armed struggle was conceived to be the only way to liberation and military training of cadres therefore began. This was done in various progressive countries. We began to struggle in 1965, before the Unilateral Declaration of Independence (UDI). We encountered political difficulties in this work,

different interpretations within the organization. The party then guided those who were on the wrong path. There were also difficulties between peasants, workers and African bourgeoisie. The party had to have a very correct program and consistently educate the people concerning all these internal forces which were not antagonistic and which had only to be regrouped in order to fight against Zimbabwe's enemy. For example, there were those in party leadership who thought that once the colonialists and imperialists were defeated they would take charge of the industry and then they would have the big houses and luxury cars. It was hard to fight against these tendencies.



There was also tribalism and regionalism, definitely reactionary. But in spite of all this, the party was successful. Some of those who held such ideas were left by the wayside (for example, the then vice-president and secretary general of ZAPU, and many others) while the revolutionary process continued. This also shows the internal revolutionary process ZAPU has passed through: the revolutionary forces were consolidated and the reactionary tendencies eliminated.

In 1967 an alliance was formed between ZAPU and the African National Congress of South Africa, for

the purpose of uniting the South African and Zimbabwe people to confront the common enemy. The enemy was more united, the South African regime stepped up its arms and troop supplies to Rhodesia. This caused military confrontations in South Africa and, in spite of difficulties, unity between the ANC and ZAPU was consolidated.

An internal crisis occurred in 1970 and the party expelled several members. ZAPU was strengthened and its leadership was placed in the hands of true revolutionaries who continued consolidating our forces.



In 1972 we approached the comrades of the Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU) with a view to unifying forces. In Dar-es-Salaam Tanzania, we agreed to form a unified military command; we had political and ideological differences but there was one thing that united all of us: we were Zimbabweans. In order to consolidate unity, we formed the Political Council of Zimbabwe on March 17, 1973. This organization was to analyze our disagreements and agreements as well as the general strategy for armed struggle. We revolutionaries had to accept certain situations in order to avoid future crisis and, besides, there had been many progressive people in ZANU and it was a matter of uniting them with ZAPU in a common front of forces against the enemy.

At the petition of the OAU, Nkomo and other leaders were freed in 1974 after 11 years of imprisonment. The OAU Lusaka Manifesto had been issued in 1969 and later approved by the UN, providing, among other things, for contacts between the racist regimes and the Africa countries in the OAU. The objective was to find a solution to southern Africa's political crisis. It should be noted that the African heads of state were not consulted on this manifesto but rather it was imposed on them as a *fait accompli*.

Later, certain African heads of state had problems understanding our position. To clarify the revolutionary position, we made agreements with all the progressive liberation movements —the MPLA, PAIGC, ANC, SWAPO and FRELIMO— concerning naming spokes-

men to represent the six liberation movements at OAU and UN international events. We had similar points of view with respect to our political position and we also had to back up the stance of the progressive countries in the OAU. Many meetings were held at which we were represented by such men as Amílcar Cabral, Mondlane, Agostinho Neto and other SWAPO, ANC and ZAPU leaders. This consolidated the forces of the revolutionary movement and was a great help in terms of exchanging experience, information and documents. Thus we became aware that there was one single enemy in southern Africa: the colonial regime supported by the international monopolies



and led by imperialist forces. We also knew the role played by the military bases in various African countries: to prevent the establishment of progressive governments.

The fall of the Portuguese colonial regime in 1974 was caused by the strength of the revolutionary movement in its colonies Mozambique, Guinea Bissau and Angola. The recent Angolan victory shows us that the revolutionary hope for the liberation of southern Africa is

very immediate and we do not doubt it.

IMPERIALISM'S MANEUVERS

Imperialist maneuvers are nothing new. Back in 1919 when the people began the struggle there was a British commission that went to Rhodesia; in 1930 another commission was set up to analyze the land problem. It was known as the Carter-Morris Commission





which promulgated the Land Apportionment Act, a document establishing our country's division between Europeans and Africans. Recently Kissinger visited South Africa to look for a "political solution" in Zimbabwe and Namibia, but the Zimbabwe liberation movement, led by comrades Nkomo and Mugabe, warned that the Kissinger proposal for a possible majority government was just propaganda to deceive the African states and the natives in those areas where the people are fighting for their liberation. From our experience with former commissions (the Tiger Commission in 1966 and the Pierce Commission in 1971) we believe that Kissinger was attempting the same maneuvers as the British who were sent in the past.


On September 19, 1976, Kissinger travelled to South Africa to meet with Vorster and Smith. In this interview he promised Smith military and economic aid. He also indicated that the United States government was prepared to pull Rhodesia out of its economic difficulties with a special development fund of two billion dollars. Of course, with this promise Smith agreed to the majority government.



According to this proposal, the Rhodesia government would be set up as follows:

- a) A State Council composed of two Africans and two Europeans with one European (the fifth) as head of the Council of State.
- b) A Council of Ministers directed by an African prime minister but with the ministries of Defense, Justice and the Police in white hands.

This would be an interim government in charge of preparing the majority government within a period of 25 months. This was the proposal accepted by Kissinger and Smith.

We made our rejections of the former US Secretary of State's proposal very clear. In the first place, we indicated that we were going to Geneva because we believed that was the result of the strength our struggle had achieved; secondly, that the imperialists proposed the Geneva Conference because of their failure in Angola. We went to Geneva to submit our proposals directly to the government of the United Kingdom, as Zimbabwe's





colonizer. The problem is between the United Kingdom and the people of Zimbabwe, and therefore we do not consider interferences either by the United States or by Smith. We wanted the British to start a process of decolonization in Zimbabwe at once and this process would be led by the Patriotic Front which proposed the following:

A Council of Ministers, headed by an African prime minister, with all ministries, including Defense, Justice and the Police headed by members of the liberation movement; there must also be a British Resident Commissioner on this Council of Ministers who would be responsible for the decolonization (for a period of only nine months) since political and economic problems could be resolved during that time; in the tenth month, we would hold general elections. The British made a new proposal: that the transition period take 15 months and that the ministries of Defense, Justice and the Police be shared between the liberation movements and the Smith regime. We clarified the Patriotic Front's position: Smith is a colonial agent of British im-

perialism and has nothing to do with us. Zimbabwe was colonized by the British and must be decolonized by them, and we also rejected the representative the British named, their UN ambassador, since we did not consider him capable of handling the decolonization process and therefore demanded a foreign affairs secretary, according to British tradition and past history. But the British insisted that they had given their ambassador ministerial status.

During the Geneva conversations, Ivor Richard's limitations became obvious. The political, legal and military committees of the Patriotic Front demonstrated beyond a doubt that Richard could not answer a whole series of questions and that he therefore had to return to London to request instructions.

We were definitely not in agreement with the British maneuvers. During this period of discussions, our struggle intensified and we informed the British that armed struggle would continue until the prime minister declared a ceasefire after the period of transitional government.

UNITED STATES POLICY FOR SOUTHERN AFRICA

The United States has desperately tried to save its interests in southern Africa and as far back as 1969, in what is known as Memorandum 39, imperialist policy for this zone was clearly outlined. The United States and England have

great economic influence in the area and their respective governments are controlled by international monopolies. For this reason, a new policy was introduced in line with US and British interests, with the objective of saving southern Africa's resources strategically and scientifically for capitalism's future development and, at the



same time, isolating and encircling the national liberation movements, especially those of Zimbabwe, Namibia, South Africa and Angola.

Taking into account the development the African liberation movements have achieved, and the advance of the independent countries, the western powers have sought to isolate and encircle progressive regimes, like that of the People's Republic of Angola, the governments of the Congo, Mozambique, Somalia, Guinea Bissau, Tanzania, Ethiopia and Benin and generally those that adopt progressive changes affecting their interests. That is why, in the previously mentioned memorandum, the United States proposed seeking a peaceful way out for southern Africa; it particularly noted that this was possible in Rhodesia and Namibia and that the United States must play an active role in apparent support of the liberation movements' struggle for independence although, actually, imperialism would support the reactionary force within the liberation movements, a policy later extended also to the independent African states. This was the attempt, as they say, "to eliminate the Soviet Union's influence in southern Africa."

FORCES TO MAINTAIN PEACE?

During the Geneva conversations, the British told us clearly that the white minority feared we would take revenge and, on the

basis of this supposition, they began to develop a diplomatic maneuver among the African countries that support the British, especially among those from the Commonwealth, concerning the need for a force to keep peace during the transition period. This force was to emerge from the Commonwealth countries, the British suggested that Canadians, Australians, Nigerians and other African countries could form a part of this "peace force" during the transition period.

When we learned of all this, we sent a strong protest to those states. Later we stated our position very clearly; and to anyone who has followed Africa's history, the situation was very clear. The idea of "forces to maintain peace" is not new in this world. We began by reminding them of the situation in the Congo in 1960, when the United Nations, serving imperialist interests, used African forces to assassinate Patrice Lumumba. We also reminded the Commonwealth countries that, in Viet Nam, after the Geneva Agreement dividing the country, there was a force to maintain peace that provided for subsequent US interventions and the war that cost the brave Vietnamese people so many lives. We also mentioned the Middle East situation with the presence of United Nations forces to maintain peace while the Arab peoples killed each other for the welfare of imperialism and Israel. In Lebanon, the reactionary Arab forces used by imperialism, are trying to wipe out the liberation movements.

There is also Cyprus, where the forces for maintaining peace, managed by the British, were used in an attempt to completely eliminate the Cypriot government.

These are historical facts, proven by various peoples, and we wish to transmit this information to other Latin-American and African countries.

THE PRESENT SITUATION IN ZIMBABWE

ZAPU and ZANU have succeeded in unifying the armed forces and creating a military organization within the Patriotic Front. Our strategy is unity, led by the Patriotic Front; this has been agreed to and approved by the Liberation Committee according to recommendations from the "front line" countries.

We have explained our position internationally; it is a temporary arrangement, it is moving and is designed to eliminate the reactionary forces in Zimbabwe.

We also charged that United States interests are using Bishop Muzorewa as a front. The US Methodist Church has great influence in our country and therefore United States representatives seek to influence the direction of the movement, but we have fought against these influences.

The situation has now changed a great deal in favor of the Patriotic Front and never before has our struggle had so much support. The people know the objectives of

the struggle and have joyfully acclaimed them.

Here we present a military run-down of our armed forces, listing the actions carried out between May and December 1976:

- Dead, 426 enemy soldiers and agents.
- Wounded, 65 enemy soldiers and police.
- Destroyed, 32 military camps.
- Destroyed, 5 railroad and 6 highway bridges.
- Destroyed, 11 locomotives, among them one that made the run from Zaire to South Africa through Zambia, carrying copper. When this one was destroyed, we sent a protest to Mobutu pointing out that he was trading with the racists and that if he didn't stop, we would continue to consider him our enemy.
- Interruption of the railroad line to South Africa, 26 times.
- Demolished, 12 installations and dams.
- 1 helicopter and 5 planes attacked and shot down.
- Raids on enemy camps, 44, with the capture of arms and war supplies.
- Ambushes, 38 carried out
- Captured, 4 enemy soldiers for purposes of interrogation.



- Captured, 5 radio stations, 56 weapons and a large amount of ammunition.
- Destroyed, 52 military vehicles.

HISTORY IS WITH US

The imperialists and racists are stepping up their aggressions in the face of the upsurge of the people's liberation movement. The invasion of Angola, the attack on Mozambique, Botswana, the invasion of Benin, counter-revolutionary activities in Ethiopia, constant aggressions against the Republic of Guinea and many other countries in the world all fall within this tactic.

The CIA is very active in Africa today and its action is designed to encircle and isolate the revolutionary movement which has made great advances, especially after the imperialist defeat in Angola. The enemy will step up his aggressive actions, but history is with us and he is fighting against history.



APPEAL FROM THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT OF OSPAAAL ON THE
DAY OF SOLIDARITY WITH THE PEOPLE OF ZIMBABWE (March 17)

Exactly 80 years ago, the heirs of Chief Lobengula tried, in bold guerrilla actions, to avenge the humiliation inflicted on their people by Cecil Rhodes and the insatiable British South Africa Company. In 1888 Rhodes had tricked the Ndebele chief into granting him "complete and exclusive rights over all metals located and contained within his kingdom" (Agreement with the agent C. D. Rudd); and two years later the infamous "Pioneer column" crossed the Limpopo and invaded what was to be officially called Southern Rhodesia from 1895 on.

Like so many parts of Africa invaded by European imperialism at the end of the 19th century, the native people of that region reacted heroically against the aggressors. Several times between 1890 and 1896, with the material and ideological resources available to them, Shonas and Ndebeles, the majority ethnic components of the great Zimbabwe culture, whose ancestors went back to the 11th century, rebelled against the Anglo-Boer expansionism that arrived from the future Union of South Africa, opening the road for the projected great British empire from the Cape to Cairo; stealing land, cattle and minerals and enslaving the African work force in old and new ways.

The most outstanding characteristic of the uprising that began in March 1896 and was put down only by using hundreds of relay rifles in October 1897, was the union of the two groups, the Shona and the Ndebele, in the struggle to expel the colonialist aggressor and recover their lost independence: a union that, 80 year later, again becomes a reality and a key to the success of the final battle against foreign domination that the Zimbabwe people, flying the flag of their Patriotic Front and as members of their Zimbabwe Independence People's Army (ZIPA) are fighting.

When the South African army was expelled from Angola via Cunene on March 27, 1976, the myth of its invincibility inevitably died and the struggle for national and social liberation increased throughout southern Africa. The Rhodesia of the "rebel" white colonialism moved into the headlines at the end of February when Ian Smith, for the first time on a broad scale, attacked the People's Republic of Mozambique, frightened by the upsurge in the Zimbabwe insurrectional struggle and by FRELIMO's attitude of solidarity which led its government to close the borders between the two countries on March 3.

The Pretoria-Salisbury axis and its somewhat perplexed "godfathers" in London and Washington mounted an offensive on all possible fronts,

with the final objective of seeking to contain the revolutionaries and find a breathing space for the imperial-racist gendarme. That degraded type of apartheid represented by the Smith regime, with its imports and exports now totally dependent on the port of Durban in South Africa, was absolutely at the mercy of imperialist realpolitik needs, already demagogically announced by the area's most important bourgeois, the multimillionaire Harry Oppenheimer.

That realpolitik is what brought the then Secretary of State Kissinger and the racist Vorster together in the FRG in June, 1976, and forced Kissinger to travel to the tense area in September, in order "to convince" Vorster of the need "to convince" Smith in September. And it was a battered and unconvincing Smith who, at the end of that month, announced his acceptance of the so-called Kissinger plan for a majority African government in Salisbury. The Yankee scheme, later britannicized by Ivor Richard, sought to save the big economic interests of the considerable monopoly capital there is today in NATO—or in the surrounding area and dependencies—by simulating the "step by step" move toward establishment of African governments in Rhodesia and Namibia, headed by tribal chiefs like Clements Kapuu in Windhoek; like those in the so-called Zimbabwe United Peoples Organization (ZUPO) or bishops like Abel Muzorewa, in Salisbury. All of them approximate the stereotype of the puppet Kaiser Matanzima, of the "independent" Transkei bantustan.

In order to pass the buck and gain more time, Washington, London and Pretoria sponsored a debate in Geneva in October and November which came to a dead end and in the course of which each actor played his role supremely, to the irritation of real Zimbabwe nationalism forced to share its terrain with simple puppets of imperialism.

However, between Geneva and the present, the Zimbabwe people's revolution has increased its influence on real things happening inside and outside what is called Rhodesia. There have been and are important and decisive events taking place. The leaders Joshua Nkomo of ZAPU and Robert Mugabe of ZANU have established the Patriotic Front of Zimbabwe, which is constantly reinforced and enjoys the support of progressive humanity, particularly in the so-called "front line" (of battle) countries: Angola, Mozambique, Tanzania, Zambia and Botswana, which have reiterated their total material and moral support for the Zimbabwe Independence People's Army (ZIPA) that is coordinating basic strategy for the ZAPU and ZANU guerrillas.

In his statements, Smith wavers between threats and a bestial "diplomacy." The change from Ford to James Carter and its sequel, from Kissinger to Cyrus Vance, appears to indicate certain changes in words, such as the recent campaign for "elimination of discriminatory legislation," or that of "proceeding toward constitutional changes by appropriate paths"—with the tribal chiefs and/or Muzorewa. At the same time, Smith in-

creased repression and the defense budget, arbitrary arrests, murders—such as Comrade J. Z. Moyo's; aggressions against Mozambican territory and also, at times, against Zambia and Botswana; and the recruitment of mercenaries from various places, who today make up a tenth of the approximately 30 000 troops in the armed forces. Behind him, Vorster has assured that he won't allow the Salisbury regime to collapse either economically or militarily, and consequently has again increased arms supplies to Smith, in spite of his propaganda seeking to convince the world of the opposite.

Objectively, the struggle in southern Africa and particularly in Zimbabwe, has reached the point of irreversible impetus. The enemy's material strength is still great, almost as great as his discredit in world opinion, which is why "the struggle continues," according to the well-known slogan of the Angolan patriots. But there is more than one reason to affirm with optimism that "victory is certain."

The Executive Secretariat of OSPAAAL reiterates its full support and solidarity with the Zimbabwe fighters, as well as with those of Namibia and South Africa, who fight for national and social liberation, against racism and imperialism; and appeals to all its member organizations, and to democratic movements and progressive governments, particularly those of Africa, to intensify their multilateral aid to the Patriotic Front and the Zimbabwe Independence People's Army.

Executive Secretariat of OSPAAAL

Havana, March 16, 1977

"THIS GREAT HUMANITY HAS SAID, ENOUGH! AND HAS BEGUN TO MOVE"

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ZIMBABWE

