


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


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A CAULDRON UNDER PRESSURE

JACQUES-FRANÇOIS BONALDI

The colonial world is a Manichean world. It is not enough for the settler to delimit physically, that is to say with the help of the army and the police force, the place of the native. As if to show the totalitarian character of colonial exploitation the settler paints the native as a sort of quintessence of evil. . . . The native is a being hemmed in; apartheid is simply one form of the division into compartments of the colonial world.¹

The analysis Fanon makes of the psychological structure of the colonial world can be very useful in examining this phenomenon, at first glance aberrant, as it exists in South Africa. The preceding quote perfectly describes the two most visible aspects of the colony: on the one hand, the physical limitations imposed on the native ("being hemmed in") and on the other hand, the theoretical justification made (the native as the quintessence of evil) which is racism. Now these are precisely the two most notorious characteristics of apartheid: nowhere else are the laws restricting freedom (physical, economic, moral, intellectual) of blacks so coercive and nowhere else has the theoretical scaffolding designed to justify this privation of freedom been so cruelly established in untouchable dogma as by South African whites. It seems superfluous to go into this question of apartheid's secondary symptoms, denounced for some time.

We said: at first glance aberrant. And, indeed, the case of South Africa scandalizes us. Why? It seems irrational that still, in this last quarter

¹ Frantz Fanon; *The Wretched of the Earth*, Grove Press, Inc. New York, 1963, pp. 33, 41.

of the 20th century, a society based on the most antiquated colonialism can exist, when colonial societies have been torn down everywhere, washed away by the current of history and the struggle of oppressed peoples.

But it is worth taking a second look before making a final judgment. Is the society imposed by the Anglo-Boers in South Africa as aberrant as it seems?

In the first place, we must point out that the word "colony" cannot be applied without an adjustment to South African reality. The first profound difference is the lack of an overseas metropolis, if we start from the point of view of the whites; or from their settlement in the colonial territory itself, if we start from the point of view of the exploited peoples of South Africa, the blacks, mestizos and Asians. In short, the colonial metropolis has been established within the geographic borders of the colonized country. And this geographic notion is applied to the letter: the Anglo-Boers have, in fact, reproduced within South Africa, the metropolis-colony colonial relationship by dividing the country into two perfectly impenetrable zones: 87% of South African territory belongs to the whites and in that territory blacks lack every kind of right (except the right to be savagely exploited) while the other 13% (which the whites call the homelands or Bantustans) are reserved for the blacks, whose freedom of action is also restricted there. (In this case too, the meaning of the word is literal: it is actually a matter of genuine reservations).

The second difference from a classic colony is the way the "colonists" became established. In terms of population, South Africa is the major colony of all time. Even in Algeria, the number of colonists never reached such a high proportion. According to figures from the last census (June, 1974), the population was the following: 4 160 000 whites, 17 745 000 Africans, 2 306 000 mestizos and 709 000 Asians. In other words, approximately one white for every four blacks.

If we take these differences from the classic colony into account, the analysis of the economic and political situation of blacks shows, with ample evidence, that the latter live in a completely colonial situation. We will not elaborate on this point. Denunciations from all parts of the world reveal the exploitation that apartheid seeks to justify theoretically. It would seem more interesting to try to understand the reasons for these political-economic structures established by the white minority and to see whether apartheid is really as aberrant as it is supposed to be.

The white political superstructure

Existing differences within this white minority find their political expression in the play of the parties. The white population developed from two basic currents: the Dutch colonists who came to South Africa beginning in 1652 and the British colonists beginning in 1820. At present,

the proportion is about 60% Boers or Afrikaners and 40% British. According to the 1970 census, out of a total of 3 800 000 whites, the Afrikaners total 2 300 000 and the British 1 500 000. We can sum up the history of relations between these two groups as an attempt on the part of the British to impose a bourgeois democracy in the purest of parliamentary styles (without equal rights for blacks, of course) based on a classic capitalist development, opposed to the ideological and racist rigidity of the Afrikaners, who favored an agrarian society and total racial "purity" or apartheid, until the latter, lacking economic power compared to the English capitalists, succeeded in 1948 in gaining a parliamentary majority and political power and, convinced of the inevitability of capitalist development, began to compete with British economic power and progressively build an economic empire challenging the English. The binding factor in this reorganization was the Nationalist Party which represents the purity of the Afrikaner tradition. It is apartheid's most ferocious partisan and this is what has permitted it to take over the Parliament. The last elections in 1975 strengthened this political power still further. Out of the 171 seats in the Chamber of Deputies, the Nationalist Party won 123. The conservative farmers and the petit bourgeois of Transvaal and Orange provinces represent its social base and for them the inhabitants of the Cape province are dangerous liberals.

We noted earlier that the economic power of the Afrikaners progressed in relation to the almost total domination the British had secured. According to Jim Hoagland,² in 1939 the Afrikaners (50% of the white population) only controlled 10% of trade, 1% of mining and 1% of industry. In 1968, they controlled 20% of the mines, 44% of government posts, or twice as many as in 1948, accounted for 44% of the national income and held 80% of the country's farms. But this economic progress, this increasing entry into the world of capitalism, did not occur without creating tensions among the Afrikaners. Many of them view with disapproval this insertion into capitalism of a society they believe ought to continue to be puritanical and agrarian. They are called *verkrampies* or "introverted," and are grouped around the *Herstigie* (reconstituted or purified) National Party (HNP) founded by Albert Hertzog. To a certain degree, this is the extreme right wing of the Afrikaners (if that term has any meaning in a society that is completely extreme right wing): it rejects television as a liberal conspiracy, refuses to give a black any work that can be done by a white and considers racial purity more important than economic progress. The HNP has the support of a majority of the ministers of the Dutch Reformed Church, of those most fearful of black competition and of the secret *Broederbond* society. Although, because of its nature, it is difficult to obtain precise information on this society, public opinion considers that the Bond, whose structures are parallel to

² Jim Hoagland: *South Africa: Civilization in Conflict*, London, 1973. George Allen & Unwin Ltd., pp. 31, 33.

those of the government and parties, is a body destined to strengthen the discipline of the Afrikaner community. Its head is Piet Meyer, president of the South African Broadcasting Corporation, and three-fourths of the Afrikaander deputies and senators, the prime minister and his cabinet, are members of it.

The other Afrikaner "current" is that of the *verligtes* (the "enlightened") or the businessmen who seek an alliance with the English to fight the black danger. Their theory is based on the need to accelerate economic expansion in order to concede sufficient participation in the feast to the blacks so they won't make revolution. Anton Rupert, director of the Rembrandt Corporation tobacco company (250 factories in 60 countries) perfectly states the general position of the *verligtes*: "If they don't eat, we won't sleep."³

But we don't believe, or we shouldn't be so naive as to believe that these "currents" separating the Afrikaners add anything new to the judgement of the racist society that they themselves established. Although capitalist development among the Afrikaners causes a division between the "orthodox" and the "liberals" the two groups are in complete agreement on continuing to leave things more or less as they are now. Vorster's proclaimed "dialogue" is, in part, precisely an attempt to respond to this capitalist development that is occurring in the Afrikaners tribe.

As for the English, they have definitively discredited their old liberal traditions and their fickle "emancipators" of the beginning of the century, have adapted to the racism of the Afrikaners and earn money by supporting apartheid. The United Party is their voice in Parliament or rather the voice of the industrialists and mine owners; it is the official opposition and, as such, enters into the game to give the racist regime an appearance of bourgeois democracy. By offering no other alternative except a relaxation of apartheid in the economic area, the United Party obtained only 37 seats during the elections of March, 1975. So little effect does it have that its inaction has caused a division in its ranks: its right wing demands fusion with the Nationalist Party and its "liberal" wing has broken away. In February, 1975, four United Party parliamentarians abandoned it to found the Reformist Party which, in May of 1975, merged with the Progressive Party. The latter, formed in 1959 from another division in the United Party, has had one sole member of Parliament up to now, a woman, and its concern is to grant blacks the right to vote in order to avoid an explosion. The new Reformist-Progressive Party has 11 posts in the Chamber and its members include the magnate Harry Oppenheimer, president of the Anglo American Corporation. Its platform advocates a decentralization of power which would mean creating self-governing states on a geographic rather than a racial basis.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 36.

In short, it is clear that the English "opposition" criticizes apartheid not because of the inhumanity of the system but because it is aware that the racist obstacle of the Afrikaners runs the risk of an explosion. Moreover, when things are going badly as was the case with the Angola adventure, Afrikaners and their English opposition close ranks. One example will suffice: Prime Minister Vorster declared on February 19: "South Africans must remain more united than ever, and so it is necessary to make an effort in which everyone must participate." At about the same time, Helen Suzman of the Progressive Party, was urging the dismantling of apartheid in order to gain the support of the black population against external aggression and internal terrorism.⁴

And this unanimity concerning the status quo comes not only from the parties. The white trade unions, as part of the power structure, are also deeply racist. As proof, we quote the words of Arrie Paulus, Secretary General of the Miners' Union (white): "...all gold mines fall (!) within our white homeland. A Bantu can rise up to be prime minister in his homeland. But I can't go there and become prime minister. So why must he rise here in South Africa, in my homeland, to the status of a white miner?"⁵

The economic infrastructure of domination

But to allow oneself to be blinded by apartheid or the visceral racism of the whites would be to view matters from a false point of view. Racism in itself is simply the justifying expression of economic domination. Its sole objective is to permit a relentless, and *legal*, exploitation of black, mestizo and Asian workers. It is precisely in this area that apartheid totally loses its aberrant character. Instead we are in the presence of an extreme rationalization of the rules of the capitalist game (see the quote from Lenin). The South African system is not a deviation of capitalism but rather its culminating point. In South Africa, the "incoherencies" of the capitalist system appear as an immediately perceptible whole which is not the case with the western developed capitalist regimes.

What are the economic bases of apartheid? This "system" can be summed up in the word *control*:

- control of the black work force;
- control of jobs;
- control of wages;
- control of black organizations.

⁴ See *Le Monde*, February 1-2, 1976.

⁵ Interview reprinted in *Sechaba*, (official organ of the African National Congress of South Africa), vol. 9 no. 10, October, 1975.

Compared to feudalism, capitalism was a step of universal historical importance along the road of "liberty," "equality," "democracy" and "civilization." But with all that, capitalism was and continues to be a system of *wage slavery*, the enslavement of millions of workers, laborers and peasants by an insignificant minority of slave masters, land owners and modern capitalists. Bourgeois democracy has changed the form of that economic slavery compared to feudalism and has created a singularly brilliant cover for it, but it has not changed nor can it change its content. Capitalism and bourgeois democracy are wage slavery.

Lenin, *Answers to the questions of a United States journalist*, July 20, 1919.

Control of the black work force is handled basically through legislation and regulations concerning movement and migrations. Theoretically, the blacks are supposed to live in the Bantustans but, since the white economy depends 70% on the black work force and all economic activities are concentrated in the white zone, it is imperative that the blacks come to work in that zone as "immigrants." In other words, apartheid facilitates the careful selection of blacks and employment in the white zone only of the workers indispensable to the functioning of the economy. This also entails preventing the black cities (or ghettos) located on the periphery of the white cities — in which the blacks have no right to live — from becoming filled with unemployed who could cause disturbances. To this end the system of contracting is perfectly organized: no white contractor can directly hire a black but must go through a bureau that depends on the government, and no work contract can exceed a year, which insures a permanent rotation of the work force and, therefore, prevents raising consciousness and forming action groups among blacks. One of the basic sectors of the South African economy is mining. Work in the mines is based on an emigrant work force. According to the Ministry of Bantu Administration and Development, in July of 1975, the mines had 225 225 black South African workers and 416 745 black foreign workers (from Mozambique, Zimbabwe, Lesotho, Swaziland, Botswana, etc.).⁶ In 1973, 80% of black miners were foreigners.

Job control is also perfectly organized. There is a list of jobs automatically reserved for whites and a white will be contracted before a black, even though the latter may be better qualified. Since the economic "miracle" has favored the creation of new jobs and the white work force is not sufficient, the racists find themselves obliged to contract blacks. (This scarcity also permits the whites to demand increased wages.) But white ideology based on racism (do everything possible so the black is considered and considers himself inferior) would in no case consider equal pay for equal work. When a black replaces a white in his work

⁶ *Southern Africa*, September, 1975, p. 15.

post, the category of the work is changed to a lower level of skill and thus the wages of the black will be very much lower than what the white was previously earning.

The term wage control must not be envisioned as a legal mechanism, through which the government will determine a wage freeze. Rather it is an economic and political structure that permits black wages to be maintained at subsistence levels and which must be related to the fourth point, control of organizations. Blacks have no right to organize in trade unions. The only advantage the racist regime has allowed them in this area is the existence of certain work committees that operate solely in one factory or work center and whose leadership is made up half of black workers and half of management. These committees are not considered to be organizations through which black workers can raise demands but rather consultative bodies. In other words, black workers have no legal vehicle for stating their demands. If the work contract is broken it is considered a crime warranting imprisonment. In contrast, whites do have legal trade unions. Thus not only has the difference between white and black wages not decreased, it has continuously increased. For example: in manufacturing and wholesale trade, the difference between black and white wages is 1 to 5.8; in construction and transportation, 1 to 6.5; in the mines, 1 to 20.3 (in 1966 it was 1 to 17.6).

In 1960, the real purchasing power of the black miner was less than in 1911. In the mines, blacks make up 86% of the work force and receive only 29% of the wages; in industry the proportion is 69%/23.5%; in construction, 52.5%/34%. In overall terms, blacks, who represent 70% of the population, receive only 20% of the income.

Of course this wage policy satisfies foreign investors to a great extent. In line with "dialogue" and an "opening," the government mass media have launched an insidious campaign in the international press. Thus *The New York Times Magazine* for February 22, 1976, published, "Why so many invest in South Africa," and the answer given by Jan Marais, a South African magnate and president of the South African Foundation, sponsor of that governmental advertising campaign: "Do you know that... foreign investors earn their highest or among their highest and most constant returns in the world in this country?" Of course the South African magnate is careful not to mention that these profits are obtained thanks to the starvation wages the blacks earn. Moreover, foreign investors know this and take advantage of it. We take as one sole example the minimum wage paid blacks in January, 1974, in the automotive industry⁷ (the PDL or Poverty Datum Line; the MEL or Minimum Effective

⁷ Yoko Kitazawa, "From Tokyo to Johannesburg, a Study of Japan's Growing Economic Links with the Republic of South Africa," February, 1975, mimeographed, published by the World Council of Churches and the Interfaith Center on Corporate Responsibility, New York, p. 20.

Level, both calculated by the Johannesburg Chamber of Commerce, for a black family of six).

Company	Location	Hourly Minimum Wage	PDL	MEL	Monthly Salary
Ford/GM	Pto. Elizabeth	56 cents.	\$78.58	\$117.87	\$110.80
Citröen/VW	"	47 "	"	"	—
Toyota	Durban	38 "	78.13	117.19	76.95
Chrysler	Pretoria	35 "	75.44	113.16	—
Peugeot	"	32 "	"	"	—
Datsun-Nissan	"	25 "	"	"	49.45

How long?

Viewed in this way, it becomes very clear that the racist system established in South Africa is in no way an aberration, a deviation, but quite the opposite, an extremely structured system, almost without flaws, whose sole objective is the exploitation of the black work force. It is the maximum rationalization of the capitalist system of exploitation. The system functions at all levels through a classic categorization raised to its maximum.

We were saying: "almost without flaws." That is inexact. In the long run, the economic system based on apartheid is untenable. The white economy will depend more and more on a black work force without that work force receiving the benefits of this contribution. Moreover, economic progress implies an ever more qualified work force; but nothing is done to qualify blacks professionally for fear of depriving whites of their jobs. This rejection has to have, as a short-or long-range consequence, a semi-paralysis of economic growth. According to data presented by the Laboratory of Human Sciences of the Chamber of Mines, South Africa will need 3 700 000 skilled workers in 1980. Whites will be able to provide only 1 700 000 of this total. Of the 2 000 000 blacks indispensable for filling this vacuum, 320 000 will have to be trained as managers, administrators and technicians. But at the beginning of the '70s, African, mestizo and Asian university graduates together numbered less than 10 000. This same Laboratory estimates that, in 1980, 33% of African workers will receive no education, 47% will have grammar school education, 20% high school and only 1% will reach a higher level.

South African society, like every society in which exploitation exists, is completely aberrant. It is a blocked society, enclosed in totally inadequate economic, political and ideological structures. The few rectifications on a minor and even ridiculous scale that the racists have introduced into apartheid, will in no way change this reality. At present the racists have no mechanism at hand for unblocking this prehistoric society. It is too late. A professor at Stellenbosch University, Sadie, published a perspective population balance which can be considered as a warning to his white colleagues who have lived so long with the sweet illusion that the "God-chosen" South African whites could remain aloof from the jolts shaking the contemporary world. The rate of growth for the white, black, mestizo and Asian population means that, in the year 2020, whites will be only 11.3% of the South African population (even with immigration) as against 16.7% in 1974.⁸

	2000	2020
Whites	6 890 000	9 204 000
Asians	1 215 000	1 617 000
Mestizos	4 890 000	7 720 000
Blacks	37 293 000	62 789 000
TOTAL	50 228 000	81 339 000


Without counting immigration (which is amply calculated) the whites will only come to 5 726 000 in the year 2000 and 7 039 000 in the year 2020.

But although it is impossible to guarantee that the South African racist regime is paying attention to Professor Sadie's warning, in contrast we are certain that the blacks and exploited masses will not wait patiently until the year 2000 or 2020 to "unblock" this outmoded society. If the Angolan people have dealt a demolishing blow from outside, the mortal blow — this time definitive — will be dealt by the oppressed masses of South Africa from inside. The end is inevitable and perfectly predictable.

⁸ Quoted by Anthony Lewis in "South Africa: The End Is Inevitable But Not Predictable," *The New York Times Magazine*, September 21, 1975.

WHAT INDEPENDENCE FOR THE TRANSKEI BANTUSTAN?

ARMANDO ENTRALGO



If things go well for its sponsors, the South African Bantustan of the Transkei will become an independent state on October 26 of this year. And its independence will be the first granted under the policy of "separate racial development" (apartheid) which has been in legal existence in South Africa for a quarter century.

Last October 2, when Chief Kaizer Matanzima announced the future independence of the Transkei, *Le Monde* counted eight and the *International Herald Tribune* counted 10 Bantustans within the Republic of South Africa. So undefined is the geography of the "Bantustan homelands" that large circulation newspapers can disagree on the number.

The official list, Pretoria's of course, includes nine Bantustans, "corresponding to nine different groups of peoples": Zulu, Xhosa Transkei, Xhosa Ciskei, Basotho, Tswana, Northern Sotho, Venda, Shangaan (and Tsonga) and Swazi. Apart from the fact that all are Bantu and by pure logic not so different, a simple reading of the official list is enough to reveal certain incongruencies: the Xhosa, one sole group, are divided into two "homelands," the Transkei and the Ciskei; the same is true of the Sotho, divided into Northern Sotho and Basotho; the Tsonga group has been associated with the Shangaan within one single Bantustan, etc.

It is not our purpose to amend the Vorster government's plan nor to waste time searching for more consistency in the homeland group correlation; but it so happens that even apartheid's minor propaganda texts are capable of irritating the most aseptic journalism.

There was a most interesting coincidence between the announcement made by Matanzima and the advance of South African troops inside Angolan territory. In his tactical movements, Vorster evidenced more rigor than in the case of the Bantustan "marriage" with tribal groups: evidently it suited the aggressors against the Angolan people to have an announcement that might divert attention and even — among the innocent — chalk up a point to apartheid's credit.

However, Matanzima is the only Bantustan Prime Minister who has so far asked Pretoria for independence. And although Vorster argues that this is because of the fact that the Transkei is "the most self-sufficient" of the new Bantustans, the reason is to be found elsewhere: 83% of the territory's budget is subsidized by the Republic of South Africa.

The reason could be that Pretoria feels sufficiently sure of Matanzima's loyalty and not so sure of that of other Bantustan chiefs. Some of them, timidly, have manifested their doubts about the system and about the viability of "independence." For example L. M. Mangope, Prime Minister of the Tswana Bantustan, which only exists on paper; L. Sebe, Prime Minister of the Ciskei, which only exists on paper; and above all the head of the Zulus Bantustan, Gatsha Buthelezi.

In August of 1975, Buthelezi declared:



I am South African and I want access to everything the whites have access to in this country. No consequential African wants the Bantustans. What I want is neither Mr. Vorster's multinational state nor the multiracial state of his political adversaries in the United Party, but an integrated Republic of South Africa without any racial criteria.

Last March 21, 16th anniversary of the Sharpeville massacre, Buthelezi urged the ascent to power of the black majority in South Africa. He warned that the South African government is committing a serious error if it believes it can disdain black public opinion and try instead to use it as cannon fodder; he denounced the racist regime's policy of "pacification"; and he affirmed that "blacks have already lost respect for the white South African army." "Whites in South Africa had better understand in the light of events in southern Africa and before it is too late, that the country must progress toward majority rule."

Evidently impressed and pressured by events in Angola, the well-known traditionalist-evolutionist Buthelezi exclaimed:

"History will triumph against apartheid's system of racial discrimination because history is made by majorities and not by minorities."

Shaka reincarnated in Buthelezi? Fireworks? Although deeds continue to be more important than millions of beautiful words, it is not intelligent to ignore these declarations which are indications of debacle, at their worst.

Chief of a Transkei without industry, with insufficient agricultural resources, without communications, without even an inventory of mineral resources, Matanzima does not dare use Buthelezi's language. In August of last year he told the French journalist Philippe Decraene:

"We want to have our independence like Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland..." A word to the wise is sufficient.

Movable borders

A half hour's flight northeast from East London and some 300 kilometers southwest of Durban, lies the increasingly poor Transkei. Its 17 000 km², scarcely 3.2% of South Africa's total territory, are bordered on the west by Cape province, on the north by Lesotho, on the east by Natal province and on the south by the Indian Ocean.

The name Transkei comes from the Kei River, its southwestern border. Of the nearly three million human beings who are part of its area — 13% of the South African population in 1976 — approximately a million live as temporary migratory workers on farms, in mines and industrial centers located outside the boundaries the racist regime has determined for the Transkei. In the middle of the last decade, there were 16 000 all-powerful whites in the midst of a crushing African majority of Xhosas (the most numerous), Pondos, Fingos, Griquas, Tembus, etc.

Along with the Zulus, Swazis and Ndebeles, the Xhosas belong to the Ngoni or Nguni ethno-linguistic trunk, one of the four Bantu trunks existing in South Africa. The other three are the Sotho, the Venda and the Tsonga.

The capital of the Transkei is Umtata, with some 20 000 inhabitants, founded in 1860 by European colonists mixed up in the quarrel in which Chief Nquiliso, of the Pondos, opposed Chief Gangelizwe, of the Tembus. The 26 districts into which the Transkei Bantustan is administratively divided are controlled from Umtata.

Having come to South Africa during one of the numerous Bantu waves, the Xhosas were somewhere near the Fish River when they ran into the Boer colonists in 1752. This is the history that the white bosses of South Africa recite to show that "they encountered" the first Bantu a century after their ancestors had reached the extreme south of the African continent.

The various Xhosa clans lived and still live in villages of huts which the Boers called kraal — what amounts to a corral. In each kraal lives the head of the extended family with his wife or wives, his unmarried sons and his married sons with their wives and children. The Xhosa clan structure is patriarchal, the children belong to the father's clan, which may be composed of several thousand members who do not inter-marry. The clans are associated in the tribe, headed by the tribal chief. The ancestors, whose power aids or ruins mortals, are worshipped and sacrifices are offered to them. "The head of the kraal," writes Alan Paton in *South Africa*, 1964, "sacrifices an ox or a goat at the entrance to the corral; he calls to his ancestors by name and implores their benediction. Part of the meat is roasted in their honor and the rest is eaten by the members of the kraal."

Cattle play a highly important socio-religious role among the Xhosas precisely because of their obvious economic function. For example, the dowry (*lobolo*) is paid in cattle to the father of the bride-to-be as a symbol of "a contract between two related groups." (Paton, *op. cit.*) The corral is

the scene of important religious ceremonies. The importance of cattle explains in part the resistance the Xhosas have put up against the reduction of pasture lands in the reservations which the racists have always tried to impose.

Boer expansion on the Cape in the mid-eighteenth century caused clashes with the Xhosas in the eastern part of the colony. It was not, properly speaking, a process of conquest, but rather of plunder and enslavement: in 1780 the Boers made raids against the African population in the Gamtoos; in two months of 1781, the Boers robbed 5300 head of cattle from the natives; although an agreement on "borders" was reached between the Boers and the Xhosas in 1789, the Boers killed almost a hundred Xhosas and stole 180 women and children and 13 800 head of cattle in three raids carried out in 1793. (From A. Lerumo, *Fifty Fighting Years*, 1971.)

In 1806, Great Britain obtained the Cape colony and accepted the Fish River as the "border" between the European colonists and the Xhosas. Five years later, using crude pretexts, the first of the eight "Cafre Wars" against the Xhosas began. Cafre, from the Arab Kaffir, which means infidel or non-believer, was the name the Europeans gave to all the Bantu groups of South Africa.

Between 1811 and 1812, Chief Ndlambe and his 20 000 followers were pushed back beyond the Fish, during the first war. After the first Boer revolt (1815) Great Britain intensified the process of conquest and domination. The second and third wars occurred in 1818 and 1819 respectively; in 1820, 4000 British colonists converted Xhosa land into the "Grahams-town district"; the zone between the Fish and the Keiskamma was declared neutral... until the colonists partially occupied it in 1824. In 1834-35 a fourth war occurred and in 1847 the "border" had reached the Kei River. But Great Britain did not stop there; from 1850 to 1853 we have the fifth Cafre War; in 1857, German veterans of the British Foreign Legion settled in what would be called King William's Town; and a sixth war in 1858 succeeded in moving the border up to the Bashee River. Nor did the conquest stop there, because a seventh war, from 1877-78 "fixed" the border at the Mthatha River. A new war was still to come, the eighth and last Cafre War, in 1879. Fifteen years later, the British annexed the Pondo land between the Mthatha and the Mtamvuna.

From that time on, 1894, British policy in the area tended toward indirect forms of domination which permitted keeping certain tribes from possible collaboration with the Boers. In 1895, because of the sharpening Anglo-Boer conflict, London accepted a type of protectorate over what today is more or less the Transkei and recognized the "jurisdiction," under British control, of a body of head tribal chiefs, subordinates and village chiefs, called Bunga, the native name of the General Council of the United Transkei Territories, to which Pondoland was returned in 1931.

To this Bunga were added white magistrates and elected representatives — the typical “parliament” of the British-style protectorate over the course of the 20th century, once the Anglo-Boer agreement was achieved and white rule emerged for the Union of South Africa, a zone of influence for British monopoly capital.

According to many chronicles, the inhabitants of the Transkei were prosperous people in the 17th-19th centuries, with a great deal of cattle, much commercial activity and good construction. What remained of that prosperity at the end of the 19th century, after the Boer and English “bombardments” against the life, geography and economy of the Xhōsas and other groups in the eastern Cape? Only the Bunga “native authority” without any real authority; migratory Xhosa workers in the gold mines of Witwatersrand — it was Cecil Rhodes who introduced the money tax on the reservations in order to force the inhabitants to leave them for the mines and farms of the whites — and the deep moral crisis of a people violently confronted with a foreign and exploiting system.

Already by 1850, writes Basil Davidson in *The Africans* (1969), the Xhosas had sought supernatural explanations for the great disaster. “Like other African groups gradually overcome by superior fire power and military organization (of the Europeans)... they had looked to their ancestors: the reply was lack of devotion... Evil had triumphed because they had neglected the service of Good.” A prolonged drought, cattle disease and European military pressure set the stage for “prophets” like Mhlakaza (according to Davidson) or Nongquase (according to Eric Rosenthal), God’s “intermediaries” whose “visions” of real ancestors demanded a supreme sacrifice for the expiation of sins: hunt witches, kill cattle, destroy the stored corn, stop agricultural work. Divine recompense would come with new reserves of grain, of cattle; the restoration of the power of the ancestors, and the expulsion of the Europeans whose goods the Xhosas could then enjoy. The “Day of Judgment” was announced for February 18, 1857. The people, desperate, prepared for the sacrifice: between 150 000 and 200 000 head of cattle were killed, and in six months the “British Kaffraria” dropped from 104 721 to 37 229 native inhabitants.

Historically, it would be senseless to speak of savagery and superstition. Although the results were disastrous, those people, who were going into their sixth war of resistance against the invasion of British free trade industrialism, acted — and defended themselves culturally — against the unknown. Their weak and archaic material and ideological “armament” in no way minimizes the historical logic of the Xhosas’ behavior.

The colony “discovers” tribal virtues

Although we find important differences between the respective colonial histories of the Boers and the British in South Africa, there is no doubt that the two shared the stereotype that correlated black skin color with “inherent” cultural differences and inferiority.

As David Welsh points out in *The Cultural Dimension of Apartheid*, 1972, “chieftanship was seen (by the Europeans) as a focal point around which disaffection might unite. But equally likely was the possibility that attempts to abolish traditional institutions would cause revolts.” The policy of the British colonists would therefore alternate between “adaptation” of tribal structures and “detrribalization.” The Transvaal and Orange colonists, on the other hand, were more inflexible in their ideas about racial inequality and their repudiation of African institutions.

The growing demand for an African work force and the numerous revolts against the occupiers were convincing the conquerors that the division of the African population into tribes could prevent their “combination” in a great rebellion. The whites would continue to be politically dominant, but the Africans would be given “a measure of local self-government in reserves.” (Maurice Evans, *Black and White in Southeast Africa*, London, 1911.)

For this, it was indispensable to deal with tribal governing structures and adapt them to the economic and political necessities of the European colonists. The famous Native Land Act of 1913 was the starting point for institutionalizing the policy of racial segregation. The African reservations envisioned by that law would have two main functions in the racial policy: first, to serve as a reserve labor force, and second, to serve as a perennial excuse for denying civil rights to Africans in the rest of the country. The development of the Africans “on their own bases,” the segregationists believed, justified the refusal of any demand for equality: a “different” people, writes Welsh (*op. cit.*) cannot hope to be equal.

During the '20s, segregation assumed more concrete forms, in answer to the rapid growth of the urban African population, which threatened the racial order of the “white” cities. That black proletariat and the first joint strike actions by white and black workers served to convince Anglo-Boer bourgeois power of the even greater need to avoid “the disintegration of traditionalism.” In Heaton Nicholls’ words, “we have a large educated class of Africans [all the detrribalized] but what use are they to the rising Bantu races?” The out was to shore up “the tribal system.”

The Native Trust and Land Act of 1936 established the bases for the “separate development” project which the Nationalist Party would impose by blood and fire when it took over the government after World War II: the whites would continue to receive the benefit of the African work force in 86.3% of South Africa, the “white country,” but would at the same time disqualify the Africans as possible equals within a common society, justifying their attitude by the hypocritical concern for the preservation (petrification) of tribal traditions on the reservations, the other 13.7% of the country.

This produced the paradox whereby, at the time the so-called indirect administration — the British “invention” — began to withdraw from Africa under the pressure of rising African nationalism, the Stridjom-Verwoerd government insisted on applying it to the South African situa-

tion and, in 1951, decreed the Bantu Authorities Act, that particular codification of irreality that uses tribalism as a strait jacket to prevent the development of the African population.

Under the pretext of restoring "natural native democracy," the Bantu Educational Act of 1953 emphasized the divisions among Africans to prevent a supra-tribal solidarity. In 1959, the Promotion of Bantu Self-Government Act listed eight "national units" or Bantustans. Overnight eight Bantu colonies "blossomed" within South Africa — a formally independent country and a member of the UN — and moved toward self-government.

The Urban Bantu Councils Act of 1961 determined the "regrouping" of Africans in urban centers "along ethnic lines" and their juridical link with the "native authorities" of the eight Bantustans: overnight the African in the industrial cities became a foreigner living outside his "homeland" (the reservation). And the Bantu Homelands Citizenship Act of 1970 created "double citizenship" for Africans: citizens of their "homelands" (the Bantustans) and citizens of the RSA according to international law.

In short: during the '50s South Africa had metamorphosed into a "multinational state"; from racial segregation to "separate racial development"; and from reservations into "Bantu homelands," which theoretically could achieve self-government and independence, and form a South African Commonwealth with the "white nation." Maximum extension of those "homelands": the very same limitations as in 1936!

Pilot project in the Transkei

Basically, the economy of the Bantustans is a poor subsistence agricultural economy, incapable of providing what its people need in terms of food and money. A conservative work such as *The Peoples and Policies of South Africa*, written by Leo Marquard in 1962, gave a figure of 50% to 60% of the adult male population of the "homelands" working outside those territories. South African propaganda itself admitted in 1975 that 40% of Transkei adults were absent. Today as yesterday, the first export product from a Bantustan is its work force.

The field is a panorama of restricted arid soil, a great deal of cattle on a small amount of land, poor seeds, almost no fences, extensive droughts. Some 94% of the population live on communal lands and 6% on private lots, particularly among the Xhosas of the Transkei and Ciskei, Marquard wrote in 1962. In 1975, South African propaganda speaks of the need "to conquer traditionalism," "the old forms of subsistence agriculture" and "tribal life styles and work"; and it "denounces" the Bantu man who works in the mines, in industry or in the offices — without specifying under what conditions — in or near the urban centers of the "developed sector," while women, children and old people remain on

the reservations to take care of "usually small harvests of corn and the cattle."

In a word, the reservations or Bantustans are nothing more than vast rural slums.

Hendrik Verwoerd, Vorster's predecessor, suggested that there was no need to invest in the reservations, that it would be enough for the white farmers to sell their lands to the Africans or to the "native authorities," and for the white industrialists to create "border industries," those renowned industrial belts near the Bantustans which would allegedly assimilate the workers of the "homelands."

According to Cosmas Desmond (*The Discarded People*, 1971), between 1971 and 1976 investments in the Bantustan were designed to create some 25 000 new jobs as opposed to a real annual need of between 40 000 and 50 000 new jobs. According to official South African sources, in fiscal 1974-75, the Xhosa Development Corporation was only able to create 1000 new jobs for the Xhosas. Eleven years after its establishment, that Corporation has a nominal 700 whites and 6000 Africans between the Transkei and Ciskei, the latter a Bantustan of 17 separate pieces of land.

Desmond makes an evaluation of the Transkei during its first years of "self-government":

Waves of unemployed outside the contracting bureaus; more than half the average corn harvest affected; 20% of the cattle dead in 1967; 40 000 small children dead of malnutrition in 1967; an epidemic of tuberculosis affecting a fifth of the population in 1968, etc. etc. etc. And one wonders: how can the traditional culture of the Bantu be preserved — if that was the aim — in these "slums" inhabited by the old, the sick, women and children, unemployed youth; deprived of land and cattle and forced to submit to Pretoria's authority in all aspects of life?

The Transkei was the "pilot project" because it was the best of all the reservations and did not need "consolidation" — the others were and are nothing more than disperse and fragmented administrative units; with the experience of the protectorate or indirect government since 1895.

The Bunga became the Transkei Territorial Authority in May of 1957. Law 48 of 1963 on self-government, which went into effect in 1964, registered some 880 425 electors inside and outside the Transkei "along ethnic lines." In conjunction with the Transkei Constitution Act, a Legislative Assembly of 109 members was created, 64 of them tribal chiefs and the other 45 elected; and this Assembly in turn elected a Cabinet, with a Head Minister (Kaizer Matanzima) and five Ministers: Justice, Education, Interior, Agriculture and Forestal Resources, Roads and Public Works.

Neither the Assembly nor the Cabinet was to have anything to do with the following matters: military questions and the movement of South African troops, control of arms manufacturing, international relations and agreements, police, radio and mail, national roads, railroads,

ports and aviation, immigration, supreme court of justice, money, finances, public loans, customs. Yes they could have an anthem, an orange, white and blue flag, and use Xhosa as an official language... in addition. Their laws would only become such with the approval of the President of South Africa.

What can this Bunga, converted into self-government, be and offer and this Chief who has become Chief Minister and is named Kaizer Matanzima? Like almost all systems of indirect administration, the Bunga was and is composed of "satellites" of white bourgeois power.

Chief Kaizer Matanzima, leader of the so-called Transkei National Independence Party, was born in 1915 and since 1943 has headed the group of Tembus Emigrants. He studied at Lovedale and the University College of Fort Hare, from which he holds a degree in Law. In 1956 he was a member of the committee created by Pretoria to "integrate" the Bantu authorities into a Transkei General Council. In 1962 he became President of the Transkei Territorial Authority. In 1963, Pretoria promoted him to head the self-government. There is no other biography to present on him.

His legal opponent is the so-called Transkei Democratic Party, which appeared in 1964 under the leadership of Chief Victor Poto of the western Ponds, born in 1898, Methodist; educated at the Buntingville Institution, Clarkebury, Healdtown, and also at Fort Hare; member of the Pondoland General Council and of the Native Representative Council. He must have a longer biography with his 78 years, but we don't know it.

Widespread rebellion against the "native authorities" of the Transkei erupted in 1960-61. For more than ten years, the territory was in a state of emergency, beginning in December of 1960. The police and the army, enjoying unlimited power, assassinated with impunity and filled the prisons. The anti-apartheid party, which was able to win the first elections by a big majority, was "drowned" in the Transkei Assembly by the majority of chiefs designated by the racist government.

The Bantustans were established at the beginning of the '60s to try to silence critics throughout the world and simulate "decolonization" South African style, while the innocent blood shed at Sharpeville on March 21 of the "African Year," was still fresh. Transkei "self-government" was the pilot experiment. Now the Xhosa Bantustan whose "independence" Matanzima has just announced for October of this year, is supposed to wipe out the South African regime's trail of defeat in the People's Republic of Angola.

"Behind the Autonomous Government," Nelson Mandela wrote of the Bantustans in 1959, "there is a fierce program of pillage, of political persecution and of police terror. It is the last desperate game of a hated and determined fascist autocracy which, fortunately, must soon make its exit from the stage of history."

THE WESTERN STAKE IN APARTHEID

JANE McMANUS

When the Lovett's immigrated to Johannesburg from London in 1970, they happily accepted their new-found working class leisure (provided by the first full-time maid they had ever been able to afford) but were somewhat at a loss as to how to use it in the absence of Britain's favorite leisure pastime: TV. However, like most of the other all-white "New South Africans" — some 83 000 arrivals between 1968 and 1970, 44% from the United Kingdom — the Lovett's were too busy enjoying their relative prosperity (white workers earn from 10 to 20 times more than blacks, depending on the economic sector) to worry about such a minor and, as it turned out, temporary inconvenience.

In January of this year, South Africa officially opened single channel TV programming for a million white owners of previously purchased TV sets. The country's late incorporation into the TV era was not wholly due, as the government pretends, either to opposition from the entrenched press trust or to fears that TV programming might affect South Africa's "customs and traditions," in other words apartheid. When the time came, it was easy enough for the South African Radio and Television Office

(SABC) to price TV advertising out of the range of press advertisers and TV sets out of the range of African families, while controlling programming as well.

Of military-civilian interest

Between 1970 and 1976, South African technicians were sent to the United States and Europe for a four-year training course in the most advanced western TV systems, and South Africa began to strengthen its military-economic relations with Europe and the US. After careful evaluation, the West German PAL color TV system was selected while French technology was chosen for studios and transmission stations. The French firm Telespace was asked to install a satellite communications station near Pretoria for relay operations with Europe and America. Most important of all, as Agence France Presse reported from Johannesburg, January 3, 1976, "the adaptation of industry to the television era will give South Africa autonomy in electronic material, an essential element for national defense."

Consumer TV, then, is one of the by-products of a strategic decision made by the South African government in 1970 to modernize and autonomize its military-industrial complex over a 10-year period (implementation was accelerated following the fall of the fascist Portuguese government in 1974) with as much involvement and commitment as possible from friends abroad — friends destined to play an even more significant role in South Africa's future than white immigrants like the Lovett's, so ardently courted to fill the country's growing need for skilled workers and supervisors, police and military personnel.

At most, TV is a relevant component of South Africa's "communication system for the next century," estimated to involve an investment of \$13 thousand million. There is also Project Advokaat, the vast inter-continental system at Silvermine, near Simonstown naval base, with computers, radar and communications equipment providing reconnaissance information on air and naval traffic from South America to Bangladesh and over the entire African continent. Work on Project Advokaat began in 1970 with the involvement of United States, British, Danish, Dutch, French and West German enterprises. But the FRG's Siemens and AEG/Telefunken have bragged in full-page advertisements that their South African subsidiaries supply most of that country's electronic equipment. The West German Defense Ministry facilitated NATO codification for Project Advokaat, effectively linking it into the imperialist military system — in defiance of United Nations restrictions but consistent with a secret military pact signed in Bonn in 1961 between the defense ministers of the FRG and the RSA.

This government-to-government cooperation in military affairs has also included atomic development: the FRG's anxiety to lay its hands

on the strategic resources so abundant in South Africa and South Africa's eagerness for advanced technology have complemented each other perfectly. As early as 1967, the *South African Digest*, official government organ, expressed special gratitude to the West German government "for training South African nuclear scientists and nuclear technicians in West Germany." In April of 1971, the chairman of the South African Atomic Energy Board (AEB), Abraham Johannes Andries Roux, placed South Africa, "in a position to produce its own atomic weapons." In August, 1973, the *London Times* reported, "South Africa Perfects Method of Producing Concentrated Uranium for Weapons." In November of 1975, the South African government issued its own version of its atomic advances in a 32-page advertising section inserted in the November 10, 1975, issue of *Business Week* and entitled "Dynamic South Africa":

South Africa has invented its own jet nozzle enrichment process which will be used at a \$1 billion plant due for completion in the Eighties. [Pelindaba, near Pretoria] It will produce 2400 tons of uranium oxide at a cost expected to be 30% less than the gaseous diffusion and centrifugal separation processes....

The venture is aimed at creating a capacity to market South Africa's huge uranium reserves in refined forms as well as making a meaningful contribution to worldwide scientific and technological development.

Since "the Republic's nuclear experts intend preserving process secrecy," there is no mention here of the similarity reported elsewhere between the South African process and one used in West Germany, nor of the fact that there are some 23 FRG monopolies concerned with atomic research and development that have subsidiaries or capital investments in South Africa. There is no mention either of the involvement of the French nuclear firm SODETAG, nor of the US Atomic Energy Commission, Allis Chalmers and eight other US enterprises; nor of the role of the US-French consortium Framatome. And quite naturally, the aggressive military potential this process gives the racist regime is completely ignored.

In absolute terms, France has been the chief supplier of armaments to South Africa since 1964, when the British Labour Party imposed an embargo (carefully allowing for fulfillment of existing contracts). The first Panhard vehicles were supplied in 1961 and were followed by sales of helicopters, missiles, aircraft and other war matériel. Direct armaments sales between 1970 and 1974 totalled some 2000 million francs.

More recently, however, France has been moving toward the low profile method of licensing arms manufacturing in South Africa rather than making sales from France. It was within that context that French President Valery Giscard d'Estaing announced a ban on arms sales from France to South Africa. The ban applied to land and air armaments and failed to mention French equipment made in South Africa under French license — such as Mirage fighter bombers, Panhard armored vehicles and Cactus (Crotale) surface-to-air missiles. Exempted from the ban were the Daphne-class submarines, three of which have already been delivered to the South African Navy, and two 12 000 ton Agosta-class submarines scheduled for delivery in November, 1978, at a cost of some \$70 million each. South African Defense Minister Pieter W. Botha has since reported to the Legislative Assembly that the Arms Development and Production Corporation (ARMSCOR) has advanced the country to the point where the international arms embargo is "neutralized."

Meanwhile, South Africa's defense budget has jumped from 72 million rands in 1962-63 after Sharpeville, to 948 million rands or \$1.09 billion in 1975-76 and \$1.552 billion for 1976-77 — some 25 times the educational budget for black children. That sum is openly destined for counterinsurgency within the country and the prevention or suspension of armed conflict anywhere on the continent south of the equator, according to the post-Angola amendment to the Defense Act approved by the South African Parliament.

During the aggression against Angola, South Africa was able to reinforce its military strength with US anti-tank bazookas, F-14 Tomcat fighters and other United States weaponry through an agreement made between the Shah of Iran and Richard Helms, US ambassador to Iran and former head of the CIA, reported by the Iran Free Press Agency. Designed to circumvent the US congressional embargo on arms to Angola, it involved the shipment of arms to Iran, allegedly for that country's defense. But when they reached the Iranian port of Bonder Shahpour, they were re-exported to South Africa by the Arya Ship Company, in which the royal family is the principal stockholder. The device is not new for the Shah: during the Viet Nam war, he purchased 45 Phantoms from the US which were subsequently used in South Viet Nam. The Shah has personal investments in South African mines, banks and other enterprises and his country supplies South Africa with most of its crude oil which is then refined by US subsidiaries such as Gulf and Caltex. In return, South Africa ships cement, bricks and steel piping to Iran, as well as uranium for a nuclear power station France is building there.

Still another US client has helped strengthen the South African military machine: briefing in counterinsurgency techniques and modern warfare have been provided through regular visits to South Africa by high-level Israeli military officers, according to a statement made by General Meir Amit, former head of Israeli information services and currently

president of the giant state-owned Koor Industries. Israel also supplies arms to South Africa according to a recent report in the London *Times* which speculated on the existence of a secret military agreement between the two countries. During the October, 1973, Israeli war against the Arab peoples, South Africa sent funds, weapons and volunteers, and hundreds of South African youth were flown to Israel to replace mobilized Israelis on the kibbutzim. Commercial relations between the two countries have blossomed as well: in 1973 Israeli exports to South Africa rose from \$9 million to \$12 million while South African exports to Israel soared from \$11.6 million to \$32 million.

... Or civilian-military interest

Such bluntly repressive and aggressive policies have encouraged the western powers to use transnational subsidiaries rather than direct governmental channels to mask military-industrial support of the apartheid regime. Great Britain and the United States have been particularly adept at this, often changing the names of their South African branches to avoid adverse publicity at home. (For a full study of this phenomenon, see *The South African Connection* by Ruth First, Jonathan Steele, Christabel Gurney, published by Penguin African Library, 1972, from which much of the data in the following section is taken.)

The US gave official sanction to the procedure in 1970 when the Nixon administration selected "option two," advocating broader relations with both white and black Africa, out of five possible treatments of African countries offered in the secret Kissinger memorandum, NSSM 39. This "flexible line" neither encouraged nor discouraged private investments in South Africa (though US consulates in Capetown, Johannesburg and Durban at all times maintained commercial facilities to aid private investors), but did advocate sales of non-lethal equipment having double civilian and military use, as well as increased exchanges between the two countries.

Thus Beechcraft has sold South Africa light aircraft which could be used by amateur pilots or for military reconnaissance and training; Bell has supplied helicopters suitable for border patrol; International Business Machines (IBM) rented three computers to the South African defense department, one to the Department of Prisons, one to the Atomic Energy Board and two to the Department of the Interior; ITT has supplied equipment and expertise in communications; General Electric has helped modernize transportation; Polaroid has provided the photograph identity card system by which the government enforces the infamous "pass laws." In the face of propaganda adversely affecting its liberal image in the US, Polaroid initiated an "anti-apartheid" hiring and training program for blacks, but the company has not yet managed to move any blacks into

supervisory positions. In fact, such gestures are as futile as the attempt to distinguish between civilian and military purposes in a society which is in a state of war.

The automotive industry is an example. Chrysler has invested huge sums in a modern automobile plant in the Silverton industrial center near Pretoria, certain that profits will more than recompense its investments since it can draw on the cheap work force available at the African location within walking distance of its plant. Ford and General Motors have had assembly plants in South Africa since the '20s and GM now exports its locally-designed "Ranger" to the European market. GM says it doesn't discriminate in wages "except for a difference in starting rates" — which for blacks are half what they are for "coloured" and a third what they are for whites. GM claims it has made a major contribution to the growth and development of South Africa, which is indisputable. The three automotive giants produced 60% of South Africa's cars in 1971 (Volkswagen and Toyota have since diminished that share). Today their "contribution" is to the civilian sector of that country's racist economic structure. As the class war sharpens, they can easily be transformed into direct producers of military vehicles and armaments.

In 1971, the Reserve Bank reported a total of 7800 million rands in foreign investments, loans and credits to South Africa. Britain's one-hundred year involvement has been crucial to that country's development and the prosperity of its white minority, an involvement that has increased spectacularly as the empire's commitments elsewhere have shrunk. Strong protests by minority sectors of the population have in no way halted the flow of goods and investments from Britain to South Africa and the corresponding return in profits which average about 12% or nearly double the returns on investments in Canada. Britain has been South Africa's number one trading partner until recently outdistanced by West Germany, and its largest foreign capital investor. British firms account for 58% of all foreign investment in South Africa. Not only British corporations but British churches — much of whose income is derived from stock exchange investments — have buried their crisis of conscience over the evils of apartheid under a cross of gold.

While mining has historically been the mainstay of the South African economy and the highest source of profits for British investors, there has been increasing investment in industry since the end of World War II, a trend that all the western powers have followed. British investors have pragmatically raked in the profits and left the problems to local managers, or have formed joint ventures in which they often retain minority holdings.

In the United States, a sizeable and vocal black opposition to apartheid has perhaps helped elevate the moral consciousness of the churches

which, in any case, are not as dependent on South African investments as their British counterparts. Of total US investments abroad, less than 2% are in South Africa, although the United States is South Africa's third largest trading partner and second largest foreign capital investor. Dollar investments represent some 15% of all foreign investments in that country and are largely in key sectors. US profits from its South African investments were running 16.3% in 1970 as compared to 11% in all other areas, according to the US Department of Commerce.

US churches have campaigned actively to cut off loans to South Africa, with some minor success. But the big European-American Banking Corporation (EABC) — New York based and jointly owned by Midland and five other major European banks — which has arranged \$210 millions in loans to South Africa involving 40 banks in the US, Canada, Europe and Japan, remains unmoved.

Foreign banking institutions have played a notable role in raising funds for apartheid. Barclays and the Standard Bank of London dominate the South African scene. Chase Manhattan has few branches but a 15% interest in Standard, while First National City is somewhat more visible. Both have played an especially helpful role in South Africa: even immediately after the Sharpeville massacre when capital was fleeing the country, they led a consortium of 10 American banks that provided the South African government with a \$40 million revolving fund. The western-dominated World Bank has also played a consistently important role in financing South Africa's economic development; and recently the Ford Administration has indicated that it is considering resumption of direct loans to South Africa by the Export-Import Bank which have been banned for the past 12 years.

Transnational banking is now facilitating capital exports from South Africa for investment in other countries, as well as internal investment in projects geared to the specialized needs of South Africa's trading partners.

For example, in 1971 the government began its most ambitious construction project to build a 500-mile electrified railway from Sishen Iron Ore mines in the Northern Cape to the coast and to build a new harbor at Saldanha Bay north of Cape Town particularly to facilitate iron and steel shipments to Japan. Japan is also interested in energy substitutes for oil and has signed long-term commercial contracts for the purchase of South African coal. Japan takes 12% of South Africa's exports, including goods traditionally manufactured in Japan such as transistors and light consumer goods which the RSA can produce more cheaply with its underpaid black work force.

Meanwhile, South African state organizations, with technology and capital from the Anglo American Corporation, are launching a project to

develop oil from coal on a commercial basis over the next decade. "Coal-com" as the project is called, is expected to produce 2.7 million tons of combustible petroleum a year once it is in operation, and represents South Africa's long-range response to the energy crisis. Oil is almost the only important resource South Africa lacks.

In a climate of security

While it is clear from all the foregoing that South Africa has at no time lacked friends in the West, it is true that some of its best friends haven't always wanted to be seen in apartheid's company. But the rush of recent history has shaken imperialism's grip and narrowed its options. The Nixon administration's "flexible line" toward white and black Africa was aimed at shoring up the status quo in Africa to cover its defeat in Indo-China. South Africa is crucial to this policy, a rich and powerful country strategically located, technologically advanced, with western roots and, yes, prepared for social change: such at least is the image South Africa is trying to establish through a massive propaganda campaign beamed at the West.

First there were the visits to the United States to reaffirm South Africa's strategic and military importance, such as Admiral Hugo Biermann's "private" visit to Washington in April, 1974, engineered by the theoretician of South African expansionism, Eschel Rhoodie, now Information Secretary. Rhoodie, whose book *The Third Africa* advocates the US-Latin-American model of "unequal exchange" between South Africa and the rest of the continent, also arranged Vorster's visits to the Ivory Coast and Liberia, in the interests of "African detente," or South African economic expansionism.

South Africa's Department of Information has had its reverse "guest program," based on "how and to what extent the prospective guests can contribute towards refuting misrepresentations of South Africa and promoting a good general image of the country abroad..." as Information Minister Dr. Cornelius Mulder noted in the department's 1973 annual report. The program has been aimed especially at US Congressmen but, since they are prohibited by law from accepting gifts from foreign governments, the tab is picked up by Pretoria's ubiquitous businessman Werner Ackermann, or by the University of Pretoria's Institute of Strategic Studies, a private think-tank. The South African Foundation, established by businessmen to improve the country's image abroad, runs a similar program in close cooperation with the Information Department. The Washington, D. C. director of the Foundation defined the purpose of these guest programs as follows:

A majority of the people who have gone invariably come back more knowledgeable than they were when they went, and with a much more sympathetic understanding of the country — even those who have been critical. People who do know about South Africa — who have been there — have a very different attitude than those who have had no contact. (Africa Report, September-October, 1975).

The 1975-76 budget for the Ministry of Information was over 10 million rands, about a third higher than the previous year. And in March of 1975, an expensive foreign propaganda campaign was launched in prestigious publications, chiefly in the US and the UK, suggesting the possibility of Simonstown as a NATO base, of Pretoria as the site of the next Olympics, and of Johannesburg as headquarters for the UN Economic Commission for Africa.

A statement from Premier Minister John Vorster, "What South Africa stands for," opens the government's 32-page advertising section in the issue of *Business Week* mentioned earlier:

We believe every nation should find its own destiny in the enduring best interests of all its people — without unwarranted interference from others. At the same time, we look for cooperation and peaceful coexistence as the only reasonable basis for an acceptable world... In this light, we have no hesitation in trying to assist other nations, particularly in Southern Africa and elsewhere on the Continent, where we can. It is not "foreign aid" in the old sense that interests us, but "mutual self-help," if I may call it that. People who must live and work side by side are no less strong in joint action because they maintain their identities.

Among the nuggets on South African resources, production, development and stability that entice the investor to "get to where the gold is," the section contains an article on the "phenomenal advance of the black labor force." Here it is argued that, while South Africa is the industrial giant of Africa, it cannot be compared to the "fully industrialized countries," and that it is equally "unfair and unrealistic" to expect the "recently nomadic" black population "to have developed the occupational patterns of an advanced industrial society in so short a time." There have been advances in occupational and educational opportunities: student enrollment at the *three* black universities has risen from 481 in 1960 to 4500 at present — out of a population of 18 million blacks; and there will be more, since the demand for skilled and professional workers

is outstripping supply and "the authorities are making a concerted effort to meet this demand by training blacks."

It is true that South Africa's Economic Development Program for 1974-1979 envisions the necessity for providing 30 000 specialized black workers to fill the gap in white immigration, or 5000 blacks a year — within the framework of governmental policy.

Within that framework, the Pretoria municipal government decided to employ African tractor drivers, which it did by first moving the white drivers — who had been earning between 230 and 298 rands a month — to better jobs. It then hired the black drivers at 83 rands a month.

An example of "improved salaries for blacks" is in mining, according to the government. Here wages of black workers have almost doubled since 1974. But they are still 20 times less than wages for whites and so low that the vast majority of South African miners have to be "contracted" from poorer neighboring African countries.

In response to the need to train African workers for skilled jobs, the government has established training centers, such as the one opened in April 1975 at Bloemfontein, with a capacity for 140. Seven Africans have so far been enrolled there in a course for soldering assistants.

In 1974, Hilgard Muller, Minister of Foreign Relations, told the Parliament that the government had decided to train "citizens of the Transkei, Coloured and Indians" for diplomatic and propaganda service in certain diplomatic posts abroad. The *Rand Daily Mail* for August 13, 1975, reported that five Transkei natives are being trained for diplomatic service and that four of them will be assigned to South African embassies in Washington, London, Paris and Bonn.

Mr. Harry Oppenheimer, chairman of the Anglo American Corporation, founder of the opposition Progressive Party, and an "opponent of racial discrimination" should be pleased. At long last the government has taken to heart a statement he made six years ago: "We are in the position that we can maintain this system and allow the whole structure to float upwards so that everybody benefits." (*The South African Connection*, p. 66).

But for all its buoyancy, the statement has even less validity today than it had in 1970. Inflation has hit South Africa, the price of gold has dropped, the gap between white and black wages has widened, repression has intensified. But the struggle of South African blacks has also moved to new levels, with full liberation as its goal. There is no doubt that Angola has been a watershed which has permanently altered the situation throughout southern Africa.

Obviously aware of the rapidly changing climate, the South African Foundation placed a 10-page advertising insert in *The New York Times Magazine* of February 22, 1976, reassuringly titled. "Why so many invest in SOUTH AFRICA," in which Foundation President Dr. Jan S. Marais addresses himself to these changes:

As regards Angola, my view is that whatever the outcome of the present power struggle, it will focus attention on two major issues — firstly the need for South Africa to move even faster and to adapt more rapidly in order to ensure the success of both internal and external detente; and secondly, the value for the great Western powers, especially the USA, to make sure of a solid foothold in Africa, especially Southern Africa. And what is a better and more congenial foothold than South Africa?

The question may indeed be under debate in more than one western capital. South Africa's basic job, when all is said and done, is to keep southern Africa safe for investment.

SOME FOREIGN COMPANIES AND BANKS THAT OPERATE IN THE RSA

British. 630 in total, principally Barclays Bank, Bowater, British American Tobacco, British Leyland, British Petroleum, British Steel, Burmah Oil, Courtaulds, Decca, Dunlop, DeBeers, Fisons, Imperial Chemical Industries, Lonrho, Metal Box, Oppenheimer, Pilkington, Shell, Tate and Lyle, Tube Investments, Vickers, Rio Tinto-Zinc.

United States. 494 in total, principally American Cyanamid, Ampex, Amco, Atlantic Richfield, Avco, Boeing, Burlington, Celanese, Chrysler, Du Pont, General Motors, Kodak, Firestone, Esso, General Electric, Gulf Oil, Honeywell, IBM, ITT, Litton Industries, Polaroid, Thompson Remco, Union Carbide, Ford, Xerox.

West German. 132 in total, principally BASF, DEMAG, Farbenfabriken Bayer, Henkel, Klöckner, Lurgi, Reinische, Stahlwerke, Siemens, Salzgitter, Phoenix-Rheinrohr, BOMAG.

French. 85 in total, principally Alstom, Crédit Lyonnais, Creusat, Michelin, Pechiney-St. Gobain, Rhone-Poulenc, Renault, Peugeot, Thomson-Houston, Ugin-Kuhlmann.

Australian. 37 in total, principally Australian Finance and Securities, Comalco, Jasco, Nylex, Repco, Sydney Wool, Vulcan.

Swedish. 59 in total, principally Alfa-Laval, ASEA, Ericsson, Electrolux, SKF, Wallbergs.

Dutch. 57 in total, principally AKZO, Phillips, Unilever, Robeco.

There are also Belgian, Italian, Swiss, Canadian, New Zealand and Japanese firms with capital investments in the RSA economy. The chief foreign bank is Barclays.

New Times 36/75

SOUTH AFRICA

IN IMPERIALIST NAVAL STRATEGY

IVONNE PASTOR PARRA



Of particular significance in United States political-military world strategy is control of the seas that cover two-thirds of the world's surface.

This offensive oceanic strategic concept, known as "blue waters," developed by the Pentagon, includes control of the oceans by the United States Navy.

According to the Yankee high military command, naval forces will play a decisive role in any future military confrontation since they will be able to carry out the most diverse operations, from nuclear or local warfare to simply showing the stars and stripes "for reasons of prestige."

This means that control of the seas by US naval units will allow Washington to dispatch and disembark military troops anywhere the United States claims its interests are endangered.

Control of the SOUTH ATLANTIC AND INDIAN OCEANS by the US Navy falls within this new strategic perspective of the Pentagon.

South Atlantic

The South Atlantic, with Africa on one side, Brazil and Argentina on the other, is considered by the Yankee Defense Department and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) as a maritime zone to be guarded by their units and those of their allies in the area.

Since 1960, the Pentagon's strategic plans have included the establishment of a military-political bloc called SATO for the South Atlantic. Operationally, the new bloc is an extension of NATO. SATO is to cover the entire African continent south of the equator. To the west, it will move

more and more within the network of NATO's African interests and activities in Brazil, Argentina and the intermediary seas.

Its influence is also beginning to move eastward, from Mozambique into the Indian Ocean, touching Madagascar and Mauritius Island and extending to Diego García Island in the Indian Ocean.

The editor of the yearbook, *Jane's Fighting Ships*, Raymond Blackman, suggested that SATO be created arguing the urgent need to correct the error of setting NATO's limits at the Tropic of Cancer and excluding naval operations in the southern hemisphere.

When the Suez Canal was closed because of the Israeli-Arab conflict of June, 1967, the South Atlantic became the West's vital path for oil shipments from the Middle East through the Indian Ocean and around the Cape Route.

Only three maritime routes were left open: the Panama Canal; Cape Horn-Straits of Magellan and the Cape of Good Hope in South Africa, the shortest.

Before the Suez was closed, 8000 ships a year passed the Cape of Good Hope. During the first months after the closing, traffic increased to 10 000 and is now stabilized at 24 000 ships a year.

The vital element in this traffic is oil, which is basic to the NATO countries that depend substantially on supplies from the Arab Gulf.

Pentagon theoreticians have pointed out the importance of the Cape Route in the sense that, in case of war, oil from the Arab Gulf may be unavailable to the West, and maintaining this route will permit shipments of raw materials from the Far East.

Indian Ocean

The Indian Ocean, third largest of the world's oceans, is approximately the same size as the Asian and African continents together. On the west, Cape Agulhas separates it from the Atlantic Ocean and its waters run to the Australian coasts and the Maylayan Peninsula where it meets the Pacific Ocean.

The Indian Ocean differs from the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans in that it is almost completely surrounded by land, bordered on the north by the Asian continent and by Africa to the west. The Indian Ocean shelf is rich in minerals and marine nutriment.

A third of the world's population lives at the edges of the 38 million square miles of the Indian Ocean, which is an important historical trunk-line connecting Asia, Africa and the Arab world, and has now become another location for the Pentagon's offensive maneuvers.

Three maritime routes cross the Indian Ocean, connecting the Cape of Good Hope, the Suez Canal and the Straits of Malacca. But above all the Indian Ocean is the transportation route for oil from the Arab Gulf east to Japan and west around the Cape of Good Hope to Europe.

Rocco M. Paone, professor of foreign affairs at the US Naval Academy at Annapolis, according to the US analyst Michael Klare, has termed the Indian Ocean the "heartland of the world" and provides this inventory of its resources: The western portion of the Indian Ocean heartland includes much of the untapped mineral, agricultural, and forest resources of some of the most fertile regions of Africa. . . . Along the northwestern border is concentrated about 60% of the world's oil reserves. The northern portion of this heartland includes the manpower resources of India and, on its eastern and southeastern areas are located the enormous riches of the East Indies and the rapidly developing continent of Australia.

Paone suggests that whoever controls the Indian Ocean region "controls the new heartland of the world and can be dominant in world policy."

Following Washington's strategic failure in Indochina, US naval expansion in the Indian Ocean represents its decision to present, under new conditions, a military threat to the Soviet Union and the national liberation movements in South Asia, the Middle East and South and East Africa.

According to the Pentagon experts, strategy in the Indian Ocean must take into account straits of vital military importance: Ormuz, at the entrance to the Arab Gulf; Rab el Mandeb, at the extreme north of the Red Sea; Malacca, with its dominating position for Singapore and Indonesia, and the strait of Mozambique on the eastern coast of Africa and the Cape of Good Hope in Africa.

Within its expansionist plans, the United States contemplates an alliance of Iran, Saudi Arabia, Bahrein and the Sultanate of Oman which will serve to safeguard the semi-feudal Gulf regimes and represent a front against any attempt to affect Washington's interests in the zone.

The governments of Saudi Arabia and Iran will be used by the United States to control the Arab Gulf region politically, economically and militarily, since it is considered vital to Washington in terms of energy. It is estimated that within the next five years, 30% of US internal oil needs will be supplied from that area.

Iran's first significant military step in the Persian Gulf took place on November 30, 1971, when its armed forces assumed control of three islands that dominate the western entrance to the Ormuz Straits: Big and Little Tunbs and Abu Musa.

Teheran immediately proceeded to construct air and naval bases on the two islands, thus reinforcing its hegemony in the Gulf and providing support points for the United States Seventh Fleet, which expanded its operations from the Pacific to the Indian Ocean.

In an interview in the US magazine *Newsweek* in 1974, the Shah of Iran, Mohammed Reza Pahlevi, explained his military expansion:

Not only do we have national responsibilities but we also have a universal role as guardians and protectors of 60% of the world's oil reserves. The Nixon doctrine says that Washington will help those who help themselves and this is what we are doing.

In order to fulfill the naval-island strategy which demands United States superiority at sea and the maintenance of off-shore military strongpoints, the Pentagon plans to convert the Island of Diego García, which is part of the Chagos Archipelago (formerly known as the Petroleum Islands) into a huge atomic air and naval base in the Indian Ocean, a clear example of United States interference in that zone.

It also forms part of the physiognomy of a new imperialist aggression designed to halt the liberation movements in Southeast Asia, the Indian Ocean, the Arab Gulf and East Africa.

The Anglo-US military plan, which proposes to convert the atoll into a liaison base between the Sixth Fleet operating in the Mediterranean and the Seventh Fleet in the Pacific has caused protests in the United States and in the countries located along the Indian basin.

The tiny island of Diego García is located 1600 kilometers southwest of the extreme southern tip of India and 1200 miles southeast of the Arab peninsula.

Washington's establishment of an atomic base on Diego García holds a decisive role in the Pentagon's offensive military plans.

Diego García forms a part of the great design of electronic bases and installations starting with Guam, in the Pacific, passing through Australia (North West Cape) to eastern Africa. The network, located a thousand kilometers away from United States coasts, is openly used as a platform for submarines carrying strategic missiles and for collecting military information transmitted by espionage satellites.

United States military presence in the Indian Ocean is also supported by bases scattered through the Pacific. From the Indian Ocean, these include, in particular, Sattahip (Thailand) and Subic Bay (the Yankee station used as an operations base for the air and naval forces that bombed Viet Nam), in the Philippines.

The Pentagon's plans are aimed at converting the Indian Ocean into a liaison link-up for all this elaborate naval strategy.

South Africa in imperialist strategy

Located at the union of two great oceans (the Atlantic and the Indian) South Africa represents a vital ploy in elaborating and implementing United States expansionist maritime strategy in the southern hemisphere.

In 1958, the US magazine *World Affairs* had already analyzed Africa's importance within NATO's plans and described this continent as a strategic location for establishing military bases "from which counter-attacks could be launched, especially if Western Europe should remain neutralized in case of a military conflict."

NATO's plans from 1960 on, proposed the inclusion of the then-Portuguese colonies of Angola and Mozambique, one on the Atlantic and the other on the Indian Ocean, as well as Rhodesia (Zimbabwe).

From the naval point of view, South Africa, with a 1900 mile coastline, is ready to provide adequate logistics support. It has a naval base at Simonstown, near Cape Town and its excellent port system offers other facilities in Durban, East London, Port Elizabeth, and the Cape. The first three are on the Indian Ocean and the other on the Atlantic.

Recently, the South African government has made plans to develop deep-water ports in Saldanha Bay on the Atlantic for shipping iron, and in Richards Bay on the Indian Ocean, for docking the big oil tankers that will supply the Transvaal industrial region.

Because it is the southernmost country on the continent, South Africa is considered by Pentagon strategists to be "a second Gibraltar," or the "gateway" to the Indian and South Atlantic Oceans.

South Africa controls the maritime routes leaving the Arab Gulf's oil-rich lands to cross the Indian Ocean, that round the extreme southern tip of Africa along the Cape route, and continue from there to the United States and Western Europe.

Maritime traffic around the southern tip of Africa has increased enormously, and represents the majority of traffic in the southern hemisphere.

Even though the Suez Canal has been opened to navigation again, the Cape Route (the shortest) continues to be used by the super oil tankers that are too big to use the canal, yet represent in volume the most efficient and cheapest form of transportation.

Shipment in a 70 000 ton oil tanker, maximum displacement possible in the Suez Canal, is 40% more expensive than shipment in the 200 000 ton supertankers that follow the Cape route.

South Africa has been increasingly used in recent years as a listening and control point for movements by ships supposedly hostile to western interests in the Indian and South Atlantic oceans.

The agreement on the Simonstown base made in 1955 with Great Britain, a NATO member country, represented the only public military agreement compromising South Africa. But the cooperation included in that agreement has now extended to other powers that are part of the western military alliance. (Pretoria receives sophisticated weaponry from France and the Federal Republic of Germany in particular, both of them NATO members.)

At the same time, South Africa has access to secret NATO codes and has acquired modern military communications equipment at a cost of \$21 million in a number of NATO member countries.

This equipment was mounted in a communications complex located on the outskirts of Silvermine, near Cape Town, which is capable of diagraming an operational area that runs from the Antarctic to North Africa and from South America to Bangladesh. The information is then sent to military centers in the United States and Great Britain, in a matter of seconds.

In the US Defense Department's plans, the South Africa-South Atlantic-Indian Ocean and Middle East play a vital role in the growing alliance between the racist regime of South Africa headed by Balthazar Vorster, and world imperialism, a union which strengthens the apartheid system and also allows its policies to influence imperialism's aggressive plans in that region.

This meshes with South African military theory and the South African militarists' philosophy of "defense," whose function is to prevent or suppress "internal disorder," i. e. the South African liberation movement, to attack the source of problems in the black states in order "to counteract the threat of war," and to control the maritime routes in the Indian and South Atlantic Ocean in favor of imperialism.

In 1969 the US government, during the Nixon administration, committed itself to preserving the balance of power in South Africa.

That is, support for the white minority racist regimes in Rhodesia and South Africa and for the colonial war effort the Portuguese fascist regime waged in Angola and Mozambique.

The colonial wars unleashed by the Salazar fascist regime in Angola, Mozambique and Guinea Bissau, far from consolidating its positions "overseas," contributed to the formation of national liberation movements authentically patriotic and solidly organized which were able to stand up to the Portuguese armed forces supplied with modern matériel by NATO.

After the military *golpe* of 1974 that overthrew the fascist government of Portugal, South Africa has sought support and security in Washington.

The US newspaper *The Christian Science Monitor* revealed in May 1974, that the Chief of Staff of the South African armed forces, Admiral Hugo Biermann, was in the United States on an allegedly "private" trip.

During his stay, the newspaper noted, Biermann met with the then head of the US Joint Chiefs of Staff, Admiral Thomas Moorer.

It is thought, said the *Christian Science Monitor*, that the South African regime is anxious to interest Washington in joint maneuvers, under the pretext of halting the danger to Rhodesia that it sees proceeding from Mozambique and Angola.

Not long ago much publicity was given to the admission by the NATO high command that its supreme commander for the Atlantic has received secret instructions to study possible military operations in southern Africa.

NATO deems it important to study possible operations in the area. This is shown by the growing backing that members of that alliance give to the idea of joining with South Africa "to defend the Cape of Good Hope route."

The alleged Soviet naval threat in the area serves as a pretext for the Pentagon to increase military collaboration with the racist regime of Pretoria.

A White House secret document detailing policy for South Africa, approved by the President of the United States, in February of 1970, establishes the lines of US policy, which can be summarized as follows:

Political stability and a simultaneous brake on "communist influences" in the southern cone of Africa; continued use of air and naval installations in South Africa and the then Portuguese colonies of Angola and Mozambique in support of the US naval presence in the Indian Ocean and other activities; easy access to South Africa's raw materials, especially uranium, and concern for the ordered sale of its gold.

Military reinforcement of South Africa and its "informal" alliance with NATO represent a grave threat to the peace and stability of the African continent.

This is clear and has been demonstrated with the war of aggression unleashed against the Angolan people by the racist regime of Pretoria, together with mercenaries from the United States and NATO member countries.

Pretoria acts as a bastion of reaction and counter-revolution in Africa, in the same way that Israel is used by imperialism in the Middle East as a launching pad for aggression against the Arab peoples.

RHODESIA: RACISM BLOCKED

GERARDO CESAR

The European colonists of ZIMBABWE (Rhodesia) live in a tense calm due to two events that mark the beginning of the end of racism in the southern cone of Africa.

Unable to prove the "invincibility" of its army in Angola, South Africa has retreated to its borders, increased its military budget by 40% and is trying to save its so-called policy of "dialogue" with Africa, an inspiration of South African and transnational economic interests to neocolonize the continent.

With the recent decision by the government of Mozambique to seal off its borders with Rhodesia and close the railway that carried 70% of the "rebel" colony's foreign trade, Rhodesian racism is in crisis.

The Rhodesian colonists observed with consternation that, after the South African calamity in Angola, the racist minority of Pretoria redoubled its efforts to save "the essential" of Anglo-Boer interests, not only in Zimbabwe but throughout the area.

In reinforcing the sanctions against Rhodesia imposed in 1968 by the UN Security Council, the Mozambique government accelerated the liquidation of Rhodesia racism which now depends exclusively on overloaded South African ports.

The same racism

United by a cultural and historical heritage based on racial supremacy, Rhodesia and South Africa developed close ties over a century, ties that Pretoria might disregard if it sees its political interests and economic perspectives on the continent endangered.

The more so if one takes into account the fact that the strongest tendency in the official Nationalist Party of South Africa, the *verligtes* (realists), is that of placing greater importance on South African interests, according to the current political and economic dynamic, rather than on the cultural and historical heritage of the Boers as defended by the *verkrampes* (ultraconservatives) of that political organization.

Throughout the history of European penetration in Zimbabwe, these tendencies have been present in one form or another and although South

African apartheid does not exist as such in Rhodesia, British paternalism has been nourished by the Afrikaner doctrine.

The juridical systems of both countries are based on European supremacy over the African, a strict separation between the races and a relentless exploitation of the majority by the minority.

"We do not seek to impose apartheid in Rhodesia," said the self-proclaimed Prime Minister Ian Smith. Therefore, he added, we don't plan to divide the country into a white state and two Bantustans — one for the Shona ethnic group and the other for the Matabeles (Ndebeles).

A British law of 1930 on the distribution of land in Rhodesia institutionalized the division of arable areas "by races" for the alleged purpose of "protecting the Africans from total expulsion." The law did nothing more than apply to Rhodesia the policy of "reservations" originated in South Africa.

Agricultural work for the Africans was determined by the Agrarian Law of 1951, theoretically aimed at establishing private property and improving productivity in that sector, but in practice forcing the native population to emigrate to the industrial zones where they were crowded into slums (*townships*).

The laws in force in Rhodesia meant surrendering 17 million hectares to the five and a half million Africans and 15 million hectares to the 270 000 Europeans. The natives had no right to own land in the European sector nor to live there.

The white minority, of course, owned the richest lands in the country. "The law that established the rights of the European farmers in the *higveld* (the high plateau with the best lands in Rhodesia) will not be abrogated," the racist regime reiterated recently.

The law of "Land Distribution" was approved according to the recommendations of the so-called Norris Carter Commission of 1925 which, in a rush of British paternalism, anticipated the protests of the Zimbabwe people.

However desirable the coexistence of the two races may be, with equal rights as far as land ownership is concerned, we are convinced that, in practice, probably for generations to come, such a policy is not valid for the interests of either, and that until the native advances along the roads of civilization it is better that the points of contact between the two groups remain few...

There is a coincidence between South African and Rhodesian wage policies and discriminatory treatment toward the African who seeks any kind of job skill.

In Rhodesian agriculture, the average monthly wage for an African is \$18 while that for a European is more than \$400. The same is true in industry where the proportion is \$70 to \$550 and the native is subjected to the so-called Law of Industrial Conciliation which denies him the right to specialize and to organize in trade unions.

Almost a century

The conquest of ZIMBABWE, called Rhodesia by its colonizers, was begun 88 years ago, under the classic disguise of a civilizing mission, by an astute British adventurer (Cecil Rhodes) who used false promises to gain major concessions from the Ndebele tribal chief Lobengula.

In 1889, the territory, 300 000 km² to the north of the Boers Republic (presently South Africa), became a possession of the private British South Africa Company (BSAC), created by Rhodes and invested with broad powers by the British crown. That year the Zimbabwe people began a long war against the Anglo-Boer invaders.

The struggle recurred in 1893, and three years later the Ndebeles shepherds in the south and the Shona farmers in the north who had been thrown off their land and forced to work in the mines and on the plantations of the colonists, tenaciously resisted the measures taken by the colonizers to convert them into a cheap work force.

Founder of the British colonial empire in Africa, which he sought to extend from Cape Town to Cairo, Rhodes imposed the law of "master and slave" in 1891 which still rules for more than 300 000 Zimbabwean agricultural workers.

The power the crown had granted to the British South Africa Company expired, and the minority found itself forced to choose between becoming a British colony with internal autonomy or joining South Africa as the fifth province.

In 1923 the autonomous colony of Southern Rhodesia was formed with territorial power in the hands of a parliament elected by the white minority. The new state emerged with the negative vote of the Afrikaner colonists (17% of the European population of Rhodesia) who wanted a pure and simple annexation to South Africa and imposition of "bilingualism" (English and Afrikaans).

In spite of the fact that the constitution of 1923 stipulated that Southern Rhodesia would not direct its foreign affairs, Great Britain slowly granted it more freedom to make commercial treaties with neighboring territories, especially South Africa.

A second frustration for South Africa in terms of annexing a fifth province occurred in 1953 when the British crown decided to apply a policy in the region that it used in other colonies, and established the Federation of Central Africa composed of Northern Rhodesia (today Zambia), Nyasaland (Malawi) and Southern Rhodesia.

Great Britain failed in its attempts to federate antagonistic elements that had previously been used for colonial equilibrium and was forced to dissolve the Federation ten years later.

Southern Rhodesia returned to its status of an autonomous but non-sovereign territory and Great Britain continued to dominate its foreign policy, meanwhile extending the powers of internal autonomy that the European minority already enjoyed.

Independence of a minority

South Africa reanimated its annexationist dreams when, in 1964, Prime Minister Ian Smith began the colony's "independence" process by naming Clifford Dupont as Minister of Foreign Relations, thus assuming control of Rhodesia's foreign affairs.

The measure, interpreted by London as a provocation, was followed by stronger commercial ties with South Africa and the appointment, in July 1965, of Rhodesia's first diplomatic representative to Pretoria.

Diplomatic relations between South Africa and Rhodesia were never established but the former has been the chief political and economic support of the white minority in the latter.

South African investments in Rhodesia and the strategic value that country holds for South Africa were determining factors in the backing for Smith when the Rhodesian minority unilaterally declared independence on November 11, 1965.

Both regimes acted with the certainty that Great Britain would never use force against its rebel colonists.

Lord Caradon, British representative to the UN, publicly acknowledged South African interference in Rhodesian internal affairs, but discarded the possibility of a confrontation with Pretoria, alleging that "both states stand to lose if a clash occurs."

The British diplomat reiterated that position when on November 7, 1968, the UN General Assembly demanded that London use force to put an end to Ian Smith's illegal regime.

Encouraged by the weak British position, South Africa sent Rhodesia 5000 "police" troops at the end of the '60s when the guerrilla struggle in that territory augmented substantially.

The dispatch of forces to Rhodesia represented a highly special interpretation of the Anglo-South African military alliance signed in 1955 in Simonstown, South African naval base.

When Great Britain requested and obtained UN economic sanctions against Rhodesia, which included a total embargo on the colony's foreign trade, it was to be expected that the traditional allies of that regime would evade the Security Council agreement.

South Africa, Portugal and the United States, as was anticipated, ignored the sanctions and permitted the survival of the Rhodesian white minority.

On the basis of "national security," the United States Congress approved an amendment to its 1971 military budget authorizing the firm Union Carbide to import chrome and nickel mined by its Rhodesian branch.

Friends of Rhodesian racism facilitated an increase in the export of minerals (chiefly from the ports of the Portuguese colony of Mozambique) with the consequent increase in foreign exchange that entered to shore up the Salisbury regime.

Minerals, Rhodesia's chief export, were placed on the international market through discreet South African maneuvers and with the consent of the capitalist powers.

A hostage of "dialogue"

The fall of the Portuguese colonial empire was the beginning of a regressive balance for the Rhodesian European minority, accelerated by South Africa's defeat in Angola and the foreign trade blockade against Rhodesia from Mozambican ports.

The new situation would subject South Africa to abrupt changes in its own internal political and economic structure and delay its plans for "dialogue" with independent Africa, begun during this decade.

"We want to live in peace with the independent states of the continent," South African Prime Minister B.J. Vorster has reiterated in his eagerness to open new markets and make substantial investments in Africa for the thirsty national and transnational economic interests.

At the start of South Africa's policy of "dialogue" with Africa — a truly neocolonial offensive inspired in national and international economic centers — Vorster hinted at a "liberalization" of his racist policy (which he has not yet carried out).

"Discrimination based solely on skin color," said Pik Botha, Pretoria's representative in the UN, "is indefensible. We will do everything possible to abandon discrimination based on race and color."

In search of credibility, the Pretoria regime withdrew its troops from Rhodesia and pressured that country's government to liberate the Zimbabwe nationalist leaders at the same time it announced its agreement to government by the African majority.

Events in Angola confronted South Africa with realities that seriously endanger the basis of the system of "separate development."

Two hundred kilometers of borders with Rhodesia are not the same for South Africa when the isolating barriers of the Portuguese colonial empire's borders have fallen.

While the creators of apartheid try to save their own skins, the abandoned Rhodesian European minority is divided between those who are prepared to accept a liberated Zimbabwe and those who refuse.

At a time when the United Nations is reinforcing the blockade against Rhodesia, the Smith regime holds more than 200 000 Africans in "villages under protection" (replicas of the "strategic hamlets" constructed by the United States in Viet Nam) in the face of an announced unified military command of the guerrillas who are prepared to impose a genuine majority government in ZIMBABWE.

TELL ME YOUR NAME AND I'LL TELL YOU WHERE AND HOW YOU LIVE IN NAMIBIA

ARMANDO ENTRALGO

Namibia is current today because of Angola and South Africa. The latter used it as a bridge to attack the former. The Anglo-Boer racist regime crossed through its colony in the southwest and attacked the Angolan revolutionaries from the south.

Namibia is becoming fashionable in the "Christian West." Its problems are discussed by people who come out of their lethargy to learn about SWAPO, about an Irish official of the UN, about strategic minerals, tribes and legal statutes.

Does the importance of an underdeveloped territory depend, for the so-called average man, on the emergence of an internal crisis or its proximity to a nerve zone at war? Because Namibia is not the only case: how many average men knew anything more about Lebanon than its famous cedars when the conflict between the fascists of the Kataeb and the Lebanese left exploded?

While he interprets Namibia, the petit bourgeois localizes tribes and apathetically dusts off that other marginal world, which immediately begins to assault him with "rare" and "exotic" names, of Ovambos, Okavangos, Makilolos, Namas, Damaras, Hereros, bastard Rehobothos, Tswanas, who live in the homelands and exist on a subsistence economy. A fine task for our petit bourgeois!

Other names are juxtaposed against the former on the map of Namibia: Charter Consolidated Ltd., Consolidated Gold Fields Ltd., Rio Tinto-Zinc Corporation Ltd., Selection Trust Ltd., Southwest Africa Company Ltd., Falconbridge Nickel Mines Ltd., Anglo American Corporation Ltd., and many others.

So many that one might think the only thing there that isn't "Ltd." is precisely the field of the Ltd.

And that, according to the Royal Academy of the Spanish Language, is exotic, or rather foreign, strange, shocking, extravagant in Namibia, whose wretched subsistence economy could not have given birth to those monstrous transnationals alone, since the Germans seized it in 1884 and then the South Africans in 1915.

The surprise of the petit bourgeois is understandable in the face of the "exoticism" of a name like Damara and Okavango, and at the same

time, his familiarity with the list of consolidated-ltd. which is half-way between his pleasures and, let us say, number 5 or any other number by Chanel, Sony, Olivetti, Aspro, Simca, Rothman, Ronson, etc., etc. We already know that there are still many lands and many brains to decolonize.

There is no space in our bulletin for a discussion of what is rare and what isn't; and now even the slowest in the capitalist world and its "periphery" accept the reality of Namibia, certain things, let us say, about the life of the principal contenders: the transnationals (the century of initials?) and the natives.

And if the petit bourgeois decides to finish his Cointreau, snuff out his Peter Stuyvesant and tighten his belt, he can learn where and how a "Ltd." and a tribe live in Namibia.

1. The "Police Zone"

Some 80 000 whites — 60% of them South African *Afrikaners* and the rest Germans, etc., live comfortably on 80% of Namibia's land. That is, on some 659 437 km², which divided among the 80 000 whites, provides an average of more than 8000 km² per white. And 8000 km² is sufficient "living space" for anyone, white or not.

If, in addition, that 80% of Namibia is "limited area" or "police zone," in order to prevent a Damara or a Nama or a Herero or an Ovambo from appearing there whenever he feels like it; and considering that within it is concentrated — and exploited — almost all the mining and agricultural wealth of the country, it is not very risky to assume that those 80 000 whites live comfortably.

Access to the sea? They have it, since the South African government, ever foresighted, has reserved the entire coast line of the country, legally called "lands of the government" and rich in fish, after dividing the continental area between homelands for the Africans and police zone for the Europeans.

Roger Murray says in his *Namibian Economy* (Upsala, 1974) that at the end of 1972 there were 14 foreign mining companies and organizations directly or indirectly established in Namibia; nine of them were also active in prospecting basic minerals, oil and uranium. A total of 34 foreign companies are active in prospecting.

Of the companies firmly established in production, two of them — Consolidated Diamond Mines of South West Africa (CDM) and the Tsumeb Corporation Ltd. (TCL) account for 90% of the territory's total mineral production.

In addition to diamonds, the most important minerals are cadmium, copper, iron, lead, lithium, manganese, sulphur, tin, vanadium, tungsten, zinc and small amounts of silver, tantalum, bismuth and semi-precious stones. Meanwhile, uranium production is due to begin this year in Rossing and reach its maximum production in 1980.

According to data from *The Economist* (November 29, 1975), the diamond deposits in Oranjemund are the largest in the world. Annual produc-

tion has been stabilized at 1.6 million carats, controlled by CDM, owned by the De Beers enterprise which it provides with most of its profits: \$96 million in 1974.

The Economist also reports that the major producer of copper and tin in Namibia is the Tsumeb Corporation which operates three mines and accounts for 80% of the total production of basic metals. Tsumeb is owned by American Metal Climax (AMAX) and Newmont Mining, both United States firms; Selection Trust, British; and Union Corporation, South African, among others. Its profits in 1974 were \$17 million.

The Rossing uranium mine is the chief mining project, costing a total of \$300 million. In 1977, Rossing will be the world's major uranium producer. Oxide production is due to begin in the middle of this year and will quickly reach the 5000 tons annually which, over the next five years, will be sold chiefly to the Atomic Energy Commission of Great Britain. Rossing is owned by Rio Tinto-Zinc (54%), the Industrial Development Corporation of South Africa, French Total, and Urangesellschaft of the German Federal Republic.

In terms of nationalities, the foreign enterprises in basic metals and diamonds operating in Namibia in 1973, could be grouped as follows:

Great Britain: Charter Consolidated Ltd., Consolidated Gold Fields Ltd., Rio Tinto-Zinc Corporation Ltd., Selection Trust Ltd., and South West African Company Ltd.

United States: AMAX, Newmont Mining Corporation Ltd., Nord Resources Corporation Ltd., Tsumeb Corporation Ltd., Zapata Norness Inc., Falconbridge Nickel Mines Ltd.

South Africa: Anglo American Corporation Ltd., CDM, Diamond Mining and Utility Company Ltd., Federale Volksbeleggings Beperk, Industrial Development Corporation of South Africa, Industrial Diamonds of South Africa Ltd., Iron and Steel Corporation of South Africa, Johannesburg Consolidated Investment Ltd., Marine Products Ltd., Union Corporation Ltd.

German Federal Republic: Metallgesellschaft AG, Ohithaver Gruppe, Otavi Minen und Eisenbahn Gesellschaft, Urangesellschaft AG.

It is extremely important to take into account the well-known characteristic of the multi-nationality of the transnationals when specifying the nationality of the enterprise. Otherwise to use a sports term, one can "go out" with a high ball.

2. The "homelands"

In 1964, the Odendall project recommended that ten homelands be created, in something like the Namibian version of the South African Bantustans. These native "homelands," which were to have limited autonomy and eventually independence, were to correspond to the territory



of origin of the different ethnic groups, with a homeland for each. (The South Africans are very "rigorous" when it's a question of avoiding miscegenation: the development must be separate, not only between them and the Africans but also between one and another African ethnic groups.)

But as the existing "native reservations" did not correspond to the projected homelands, it was necessary to begin to move people here and there, and try to impose a little order — another South African obsession — by relocating or "repatriating" almost 200 000 Namibians who do not live in their homelands.

The total area of the ten homelands is 39% of Namibia, according to Odendaal estimates. Aside from the shameless theft of the remaining 61%, and even though the plans really haven't been carried out, they ignored problems such as the desert soil and drought in the south-central regions, or the unhealthy conditions in the northeast. Especially the homelands located in the eastern Kalahari include extensive areas without a vegetal covering or underground water sources, with growth that has little phosphorous and is poor for raising cattle; and where, naturally, the Africans never would have settled on their own initiative.

The biggest of the homelands, Ovambo, has no water in half its area; Kaokoveld, in 70% and Okavango in 90% of their respective areas. The homeland of the Damaras is almost wholly desert. Even the most con-

servative know that the "homelands" destined for the Tawanas, Namas, Kaokos and Okavangos will never be economically viable, as Murray (*op. cit.*) points out. Truly arable land exists in only 50% of Ovambo, 30% of Kaoko, 30% of Okavango. But this does not imply error and oversight on the part of the planners: from such precarious homelands will continue to come, as has been the case up to now, the great mass of migratory workers for the plantations, mines and factories of the whites.

A 1970 census, cited by Murray, indicates that each white has an average of 65 times more land than an African. In Ovambo, 40% of the population has to live in 7% of the total area. Thus an Ovambo has an average of 9.6 hectares of land compared to the 1625 hectares per capita for the white population of Namibia.

If the criteria of viable agricultural lands applied, we would conclude that the entire area assigned to the ten homelands could sustain a population of only some 77 000 persons. Which implies leaving 88% of the total number of Namibian Africans outside.

The option has always been — as the South Africans themselves have admitted since 1961 — between hunger and migratory work under "contract."

For the past ten years, the South African government has given no precise information on how its plans are going. It was learned in 1972 that it had three homelands "functioning," in Ovambo, Kavango and Eastern Caprivi. And in 1973, that the two former had received the "blessing" of "self-government." Under pretext of having to bring water to Ovambo, the South African regime in 1969 made an agreement with Portugal and several transnational enterprises for construction of the Calueque dam on the Cunene river. (Remember that it was "to protect it" that South Africa invaded Angola last year.)

It can be stated that these homelands exist under worse conditions, if that's possible, than the Bantustans of South Africa:

- a) Any investment in them must come from official South African sources.
- b) Not even the establishment of "industrial belts" around these homelands has been planned as was done with the bantustans.
- c) Mineral deposits — if discovered — must be transferred to the Pretoria government and it is that government — and not the self-government of the homeland — that decides when and how to exploit them, through the intercession of the so-called Bantu Mining Corporation.

The Namibian African workers, some 87 000, are concentrated in the white Police Zone: in its mines, and industries and on its plantations. In 1973, 48% of them were "contracted" from the north, the majority of them Ovambos and Okavangos and also Angolans; to a lesser degree, Hereros and Damaras.

The "contracted" work between six and 12 months, without any company since they cannot bring their families, not even their wives. Those



born in the area reserved for whites earn slightly more than the “contracted.” Both are subjected to the famous pass laws characteristic of South African apartheid. Their living conditions may even be worse than those of the black workers of South Africa.

If Namibia is a colony of South Africa, and its homelands provide the reserve work force for production in the area limited to whites, we might perhaps establish the following scale of exploitation — from least exploited to most exploited — for the entire African population under the control of the Pretoria regime:

- a) Migratory workers “contracted” within South Africa itself.
- b) Migratory workers “contracted” in the Namibian homelands to produce in the Police Zone.
- c) Migratory workers “contracted” outside Namibia and South Africa: Angola, Botswana, Malawi, Mozambique; or in the formally independent “islands” within the apartheid Republic, such as Lesotho, classic mono-exporter of a work force.

3. After a century of exploitation

How much did Namibia cost capitalism in the last century?

In April, 1883, a certain Luderitz, trader from Bremen, bought the Bay

of *Angra Pekueña* and the adjacent area from a tribal chief for 80 pounds sterling and 200 old rifles. Four months later, the very same German pocketed the entire coastal area between the mouth of the Orange and 26° south latitude, this time for 500 pounds sterling and 60 rifles.

The answer to the question posed above: 580 pounds sterling and 260 old rifles.

Bismarck, who had spent more than a decade awaiting the opportune moment to deal British capitalism in southern Africa a sharp blow, turned Luderitz’s booty into a German protectorate in April, 1884. In December of that year, the respective German and British zones of influence in the southwest were staked out.

Apart from issuing an order for the extermination of the Hereros in 1904 — and almost achieving it — the Germans did little during the 30 years of their stay in “German Southwest Africa.”

The South African General Botha, first of a “stripe” that has not stopped reproducing itself, was in charge of expelling the Germans in the name of the Entente, in 1915. In recompense, Great Britain saw to it that the League of Nations legalized the occupation of Namibia by South Africa on December 17, 1920, in the form of a Type C Mandate.

Like every mandatory power, the Anglo-Boer Union was to administer the territory with a view to preparing it for self-determination, adapting their own laws to Namibia’s conditions and reporting to the League annually.

Of course Pretoria limited itself to purely and simply annexing the former German Southwest Africa, which from that time on was a key factor for South Africa economically and militarily. A highly productive annexation for the South African economy, Namibia was to “specialize” in exporting minerals and, under the domination of foreign capital, exploitation of the African manual worker intensified.

Between 1946 and 1966, South African governments refused to recognize supervision by the UN, heir of the League and its mandates, now called trust territories. It was then that the General Assembly decided to revoke South Africa’s mandate, declared its presence in Namibia illegal, and created a Council to administer the territory until independence. In 1971, the International Court of Justice reaffirmed the illegal nature of the occupation and of all capital investment by UN member nations in Namibia. After five years, the fact is that South Africa and the “Ltd.” are still there.

Vorster has used every conceivable dilatory tactic: proclamation of “self-government” in certain homelands, declaration of independence “within a period of ten years,” utilization of intertribal differences and those of the allied traditional chiefs, etc.

After the change in Portugal in April of 1974, and above all as Angola’s independence approached last year, South Africa’s real intentions were to become clearer. Rapidly, the Vorster government pushed aside the litany of progressive self-determination of the homelands, strengthened its mili-

tary troops in Namibia, and invaded the south of Angola, arguing that it had to protect the Cunene dam and protect itself from the actions that the Southwest African People's Organization (SWAPO) was preparing in Angolan territory "against the security of the Republic of South Africa."

Internally, the African population of Namibia has organized its nationalist response to the regime over the past 15 years. The Namibian workers, objectively, represent the spinal column of the nationalist reply.

The economic structure and the legislation in force produce a great mass of unskilled workers, confined to the lowest level of the socio-economic scale. Neither mining nor fishing — as Murray and Jo Morris point out (*The Black Workers in Namibia*, Upsala, 1974) — which are directed toward the export trade, need skilled workers; rather, it is precisely that pauperized army of "contracted" whose work extracts the basic minerals and precious stones for foreign markets.

As we have seen, the homelands almost automatically provide that legion of "contracted" who are blocked by the labor laws from every attempt to achieve, in any way, the equivalent status of the white.

At the end of the '50s and beginning of the '60s, popular protests against racist attitudes and practices and working conditions began to mount. Even some of the traditional chiefs decided to send letters to the UN Trusteeship Council. When the Odendaal plan began to operate, the "resettlement" of Africans in the homelands caused greater ire among the masses. In those critical years, SWAPO began armed struggle for national independence, and has engaged in important actions since 1966, especially in eastern Caprivi and in Ovambo.

The climax came with the general strike of 1971 in protest against working conditions, wages and the general political climate. Some 20 000 workers went on strike for abolition of the "contract" work system.

Began on December 13, 1971, in the Katutura "ghetto" on the outskirts of Windhoek, the strike quickly spread to all parts of the country, paralyzing all important activities for a month.

Katutura, which in the Herero language means "we have no permanent resting place," could not be treated as an isolated case by Namibia's bosses. Since it exploded, Vorster's administrators, the 80 000 whites and the "Ltd." are afraid of even their own shadow.

And after the events in Angola, between November, 1975, and March, 1976, the fear is pure panic. Sam Nujome, President of SWAP, had this to say about the effect:

The victory of the Angolan people against South African regular troops, mercenaries, fascists and reactionaries in the FNLA and UNITA, is our victory. The independence of Angola, won under the leadership of a true revolutionary vanguard, has a definitive influence on Namibia's destiny.

THE NEIGHBORS ON THE OTHER SIDE OF THE ATLANTIC

DANIELA SANCHEZ

It is not by chance that, in 1948, apartheid officially became state policy, the Inter-American Defense System was created, Palestine was partitioned and the state of Israel was established and, only a year later, the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance (TIAR) was signed. That year NATO also emerged. All are part of United States strategy following World War II. Because, if South Africa has existed all these years and still exists, it is due to the support of the western powers, especially the United States. But the world is no longer that of 1948. In Africa, the people have conquered colonialism and discarded neocolonialism. In Asia, a small and heroic nation defeated imperialism. In Latin America, Cuba liberated itself from the imperialist yoke, also defeated the aggressions and embarked on the socialist road. In the face of the impetuous development of the anti-imperialist movement on the Latin-American continent, imperialism fostered *golpes de estado* and placed dictatorships in power. The United States relies more and more on the maintenance of reactionary governments that play the role of gendarmes on each continent and, in turn, act as dikes to contain the world anti-imperialist movement. South Africa plays that role in Africa, and Brazil in Latin America. US Secretary of State Henry Kissinger openly reaffirmed the role imperialism has assigned to Brazil during his last trip through Latin-American countries.

For all these reasons, the relationships between the racist regime of apartheid and the fascist and reactionary Latin-American dictatorships can only be understood by starting with their participation in imperialist global strategy, particularly as it concerns the South Atlantic.

In turn, the South African regime has a special interest in strengthening both diplomatic and commercial relations with its counterparts on the other side of the Atlantic. South Africa, with considerable industrial development — at the cost of its native population of course — needs markets for its products and, at the same time, seeks political and diplomatic support in the face of growing international isolation.

Latin America's importance to South Africa has been stated explicitly by several of that country's officials. H. Muller, Minister of Foreign Relations, pointed out that Latin America has an enormous economic potential and rich natural resources, including oil. Moreover, "it plays a very important role in the United Nations." And John B. Vorster was even clearer; interviewed by the Uruguayan newspaper *El Día* during his trip to Uruguay in August of last year, he declared: "It is only the Atlantic that separates us. If we put that aside, we can consider ourselves neighbors and as such we have much in common." But in reality the Atlantic is an additional point in the community of interests, as we said at the beginning, and as the *Financial Mail* for November 22, 1974 noted, the strategic importance of Latin America as the western flank of the southern Atlantic represents a further consideration in the calculations of the government of South Africa.

South Africa has made efforts to penetrate the Latin-American sub-continent, a fact reflected in the intensification of official and non-official contacts which began particularly in 1966, with a very widely publicized visit of the South African Minister of Foreign Relations and the Secretary of Commerce and Industries to Argentina, Brazil, Uruguay and Paraguay. Months later, a Brazilian trade mission visited South Africa. The visits increased after 1973, and in 1974, several South African technical missions were sent to Brazil.

In January of 1975, a South African mission visited Paraguay and Uruguay for the purpose of "greater cooperation and the future development of trade as well as strengthening relations in other fields."

The highest level contact achieved by South Africa's policy of "dialogue" was the visit to that country of the Paraguayan dictator Alfredo Stroessner, in April 1974, and the visit of John Balthazar Vorster to Paraguay and Uruguay in August, 1975. This represented the first visit by a South African prime minister to Latin America. The visits were described by the racist regime as an important step in South Africa's efforts to establish its presence in Latin America and led to several economic and cultural agreements between Paraguay and South Africa.

In spite of all the recommendations of international organizations, especially those of the United Nations General Assembly, diplomatic ties are stronger since Stroessner's visit to South Africa. South Africa and Paraguay exchanged ambassadors after the visit. At the same time, relations with Brazil were raised from the status of consulate to that of embassy and the Bolivian regime named its first representative to South Africa. And in September of 1974, the South African Minister of Foreign Relations declared that his country had opened an embassy in Chile.

In 1975 it was Uruguay's turn to establish an embassy in South Africa, with a commercial attaché.

From gendarme to gendarme

Brazil, which has close ties with the dictatorships of the southern cone of Latin America, and desires for expansion and domination, is the chief associate of the racist regime on the Latin-American continent. Economic sources put it in first place in terms of trade between South Africa and Latin-American dictatorial regimes.

For the first time in Latin America, offices of the South African Barclay's bank were established in Brazil in 1971.

The establishment of direct communications between the two countries represents an important element in promoting other kinds of economic relations. In 1969, South African Airways (SAA) and Varig (Brazilian airlines) established the first service between Rio de Janeiro and Johannesburg. The service was extended in 1972.

Economic relations with Brazilian "subimperialism" increased from \$3.5 million to \$13.2 million and imports from \$16.9 million to \$36.4 million between 1969 and 1973. The tendency continued up to 1974 with an increase in exports that reached \$20.3 million and in imports amounting to \$46 million. In 1973, trade with Brazil represented 41% of South Africa's total trade with Latin America.

The racist apartheid regime has lately been concerned about contributing to Brazil's "development" especially in mining. Heading South African investments in the Brazilian mining industry is the Anglo American Corporation. In 1973, Anglo American established a local subsidiary, Anglo American of Brazil (AMBRAS) and announced that it had created two companies, in association with Industria e Comercio Mineiro S.A. of Brazil and United States Bethlehem Steel, in order to prospect for precious and basic metals in the country.

In March, 1975, the President of Anglo American, H. F. Oppenheimer, revealed after visiting Brazil and meeting with Geisel, that AMBRAS has acquired a 49% interest in Brazil's oldest mining company, Mineração Morro Velho, S.A. Of the ten tons of gold produced in Brazil, Morro Velho produces 5.2 tons. According to the Brazilian publication *Opinião*, October 31, 1975, the South African company plans to reinvest its profits in other areas of mining, among which one project devoted to diamond exploitation in Minas Gerais and Mato Grosso is already underway.

Gold Fields Consolidated, also South African, held conversations at the end of last year with the Brazilian Ministry of Mines and Energy. After the meeting, formation of two enterprises with 100% South African capital was announced, Terra Serviços Geológicos and Gold Fields do Brasil Participações. Gold Fields also proposes to launch uranium prospecting. As a curious note, we might add that this enterprise, in its report to the stock holders, "justifies" its investment in Brazil by claiming a drop in productivity in South Africa due to "the black work force." That

is, after having relentlessly exploited the South African black workers, Gold Fields in moving to exploit Brazilian workers.

Collaboration between the racist regime of South Africa and the Brazilian dictatorial regime is also developing in the highly dangerous field of continental security: African Explosives and Chemical Industries of South Africa announced that it was investing five million rands in the manufacture of explosives in Brazil and that it planned to extend the initial investment in the near future. This will mean better armaments for the Brazilian regime to repress the people. The gendarmes help each other mutually.

Still more, an agreement was recently signed between the two regimes for supplying South African uranium to Brazilian atomic plants, but going through the United States. Companies of the three countries signed an agreement on this matter during the first week in April in South Africa. The uranium extracted from South Africa will be enriched in the United States and used in Brazil. A transnational holy alliance.

The Chilean fascist junta and apartheid

In a confidential memorandum from the Chilean Foreign Ministry dated December 9, 1974, we find a classification of countries as seen by the junta which divides them into: friendly countries; unmitigated adversaries; redeemable adversaries; and finally the group of indifferent or neutral countries. In a separate paragraph on friendly countries, we read "...with certainty Israel and South Africa, but we must be careful not to show publicly our ties with this last country because of its level of international isolation." Even the Chilean fascists had their "prurience" in relation to the racists! Of course between then and now there have been many changes and now Pinochet publicly states his solidarity with his apartheid counterparts and loudly proclaims his offer to send Chilean mercenaries to help his friends.

But there is enough information to confirm the fact that since the bloody *golpe de estado* of September 11, 1974, relations between Chile and South Africa have augmented notably. The *Financial Mail* of August 8, 1975, reported that relations between the two countries were "warming up." Total trade with Chile increased from a million dollars to \$7.5 million between 1969 and 1973, and doubled between 1973 and 1974, reaching \$15.2 million.

The same *Financial Mail* article stated that Ovenstone Investment, a South African company nationalized by the Allende government, was considering returning to Chile. Moreover, Shaft Sinkers, manufacturers of mining equipment, offered to make a study on the possibilities for mining gold in the country. Other interests examined the possibility of launching an enterprise for fertilizers. It was also revealed that a mission from the South African Industrial Development Corporation (South African Cor-

poration for Industrial Development) and the Credit Guarantee Insurance Corporation had visited Chile for the purpose of examining the possibility of extending export credits.

The South African government was so interested in Chilean mining that it was considering the possibility of transferring its mining adviser, stationed in Buenos Aires, to Santiago.

The deep community of interests that exists between the two governments — joined by all the levels of violence and repression they exercise against the people — was the basis for Pinochet's statement mentioned earlier. Thus, in March of this year, Novosti press agency commentator Yuri Gvozdev denounced the intention of the Chilean regime to send mercenaries to Africa to aid the South Africans. According to the information revealed, they were mercenaries trained at Yankee military bases in the Panama Canal Zone who were to maintain positions in Southern Angola and in Namibia. The South African press, according to the commentator, denied these agreements between Pinochet and Vorster. But the *New Nigerian* newspaper issued an appeal to the Organization of African Unity (OAU) to do everything possible to prevent the Chilean mercenaries from landing in Africa. The decision to send mercenaries to Africa was made in exchange for important loans from the South African regime to its Chilean counterpart, with the consent of their Yankee bosses of course. The Pretoria-Santiago alliance could become the embryo of a broader South Atlantic union, closely linked to NATO and under the aegis of the Pentagon.

Meanwhile, the president of the UN Special Committee against Apartheid, Jeanne Martin Cisse, declared on March 18 that the UN "deplores the opening of a Chilean General Consulate in South Africa. That step by the Chilean government represents a violation of the General Assembly resolutions urging economic, political and diplomatic isolation of the Pretoria regime," and she added that the Special Committee will spare no efforts in denouncing the strengthening of those relations.

Continuing its violations of UN General Assembly recommendations, in July, 1975, in the National Stadium (red with the blood of Chilean patriots assassinated there) Chile faced the South African tennis team, in the American zone finals for the Davis Cup.

Stroessner also cooperates

Until very recently, relations between Paraguay and South Africa had been minimal, but when Stroessner visited the country of apartheid in 1974, two agreements were signed between the countries. One concerned cultural exchanges and scientific and technological cooperation and the other economic cooperation and investments. According to the latter, South Africa would consider specific economic development proposals presented by the Paraguayan government for obtaining help in financing economic development projects in the country through loans to the

Paraguayan government, and the promotion of investments by private South African investors in Paraguayan projects of common interest.

To concretize these agreements, according to statements made by the Paraguayan Minister of Commerce and Industry, it was announced that South Africa would prospect for oil, natural gas, bauxite and iron in Paraguay and that it was considering the possibility of collaborating with Paraguayan companies to establish cellulose, paper and sugar factories. For its part, Paraguay would export precious woods, tobacco, frozen meats, soy beans, and vegetable oils to South Africa.

A South African mission that visited Paraguay in 1975, held conversations with Stroessner and specified the details of the agreements. Later, the Paraguayan Minister of Commerce and Industry revealed that South Africa would grant Paraguay a loan of 33 million rands for purchases in agriculture, mining, communications and construction.

The mission also signed agreements to build two plants for producing sugar and to invest an estimated five million rands in the gigantic Paraguay-Brazil-Argentina Itaipú hydroelectric project.

Paraguay is also interested in South African machinery and equipment for building schools. And during Vorster's visit to Paraguay in August, 1975, agreements were signed for loans amounting to four million rands to be used in agricultural projects, housing and banking cooperatives and a million rands for the purchase of agricultural equipment.

South Africa and Bolivia

Since the beginning of the '60s, South African interests have tried to enter the Bolivian mining industry. In 1970 Shaft Sinkers won a contract of three million rands to place chimneys in the Coro Coro tin mine. This mining center, located south of La Paz, is controlled by the Bolivian government through its Mining Corporation (COMIBOL). The project did not materialize until 1974, with financing from the Industrial Development Corporation of South Africa.

In 1973, General Rogelio Miranda, director of COMIBOL, visited South Africa to discuss contracts that included supplying experts and machinery for the mining industry.

A beneficial visit

Although relations between the South African regime and Uruguay have existed for some time, they increased notably following the establishment of a Uruguayan embassy in South Africa in 1975 and still more after Balthazar Vorster's visit to Uruguay in August of last year.

Vorster's visit was very "beneficial" for Bordaberry. Immediately thereafter, the possibility of South African investments in Uruguay was announced. The staggering economic crisis faced by the Uruguayan government is sufficiently well-known: the freezing plants are filled with

meat that can't be sold, the cattle could not be slaughtered last year, as planned, which means there is no space for this industry to develop normally, the cattle raisers are ruined and there is unemployment in the processing industry. This situation increases the inflationary spiral the people suffer, without any doubt, or at least those people who remain in that country where emigration is an endemic evil. Thus it is understandable why Bordaberry grabbed onto South Africa as an immediate way out.

On the other hand, although Vorster denied that one of the purposes of his trip to Paraguay and Uruguay was to obtain support in the United Nations, considering such charges as an aberration, even the South African press insistently linked the trip to the next United Nations General Assembly.

The overall interests of both regimes are clear if the form in which the Uruguayan papers reported the visit is analyzed. In this respect, the following paragraph from *El País* of August 14, 1975, may clarify whatever doubt might remain:

From his office, Vorster has promoted good relations between the African and English-speaking sectors, with a special effort to establish peaceful coexistence among the diverse racial groups in South Africa, and promote the development of each national group independently in order to allow each to retain its respective identity (!)

Without comment, we know what apartheid is. A long time ago we stopped believing in elves and fairies. The epithets this "explanation" of apartheid by the Uruguayan regime calls forth are unprintable.

What we can say is that the objectives of the two regimes are complementary. South Africa will invest a multimillion sum in Portland-type cement production. The South African Reserve Bank deposited \$20 million in Uruguay. Relations have intensified. Uruguayan industrialists participated in the South African industrial fair in an effort to place their products. Missions and delegations from the two countries travel back and forth continuously. There is also the possibility that Bordaberry may visit South Africa.

As a corollary we could say that, actually, the reactionary governments of the Latin-American continent and the apartheid regime, as Vorster said, have "much in common." History seems to move backwards, at least a century, when we reach the Chile of Pinochet and the South Africa of Vorster. They are world-renowned for their crimes and repression. They have been repudiated internationally. The only votes South Africa receives from the underdeveloped countries in the United Nations are precisely those of the fascist and reactionary governments of Latin America.

And much more "in common," the same godfather: United States imperialism.


ZIONISM AND APARTHEID A SINISTER ALLIANCE

RODOLFO CASALS

More than similitude, there is a full identification between Zionism and apartheid, converging reactionary ideologies; between Israel and South Africa, bastions of the same brutal racism and principal bulwarks of imperialism and reaction in Africa and the Middle East.

The creation of those two racist states, in Arab Palestine and in the southern cone of Africa, have very similar historical roots. And just as the appearance of the political theory of Zionism and the increased immigration of European colonists to the south of Africa coincide at the end of the 19th century, so the official establishment of Zionism and apartheid clasp hands again in 1948 with the emergence of Israel and the proclamation of the laws of "separate development" in South Africa.

The methods and philosophy of apartheid and Zionism are presented in the form of a macabre ideological-political elaboration — sustenance of the racist state — that tries at all cost to perpetuate its existence through terror and discrimination. The theory of racial supremacy has always permeated Zionism and apartheid in such a way that racism not



only becomes the essence of Israeli and South African official ideology but also a fundamental instrument for its execution.

In practice Zionism and apartheid are based on the most refined Nazi methods. Both draw up discriminatory laws, deprive the oppressed pop-

ulations of the basic means of livelihood, confiscate their goods and lands, treating them as second class citizens and committing the most horrible massacres.

South African and Israeli politicians and generals have demonstrated that they are good disciples of Hitler. Their opinions and deeds reveal many concomitant aspects of the aggressive and expansionist policy practiced yesterday by the Nazis and carried out today by Israel and South Africa. As long ago as 1942, the current South African Prime Minister Balthazar Vorster confessed his sympathies for Nazi Germany: "For us," he said, "it is a question of a nationalism allied to the Christian nationalism of South Africa." Israel, which exploited the horrors of Nazism in its own favor, also knew how to apply the teaching:

Nazism is based on an exclusive fanatical nationalism and on the loyalty of Germans outside Germany to Nazism: Zionism is based on an exclusive nationalism, racial discrimination and the loyalty of the Jews outside Israel to Zionism and Israel,

Sami Hadawi wrote in his book *Bitter Harvest*. Arnold Tonybee, in turn, points out in *A Study of History* that, "instead of avoiding the evils the Nazis committed against them, the Jews imitated the lesson they had learned while living with the Nazis." Tel Aviv and Pretoria official policy is unequivocal: the Arab and Africans (like the Jews in Nazi Germany) are class B citizens and are listed as such on their respective identity cards.

The attitude of Israeli ruling circles toward the Arab population is surprisingly similar to the racist policy of the South African regime against the non-white population, just as the Israeli colonization of the occupied Arab territories is remarkably akin to Pretoria's monster, the so-called Bantustans.

Anyone visiting Israel or South Africa can verify the inhuman living conditions of Arabs and Africans. Repressive laws deprive these peoples of their basic liberties, legalize a system of terror and unlimited arbitrary actions and represent a serious threat to the life and liberty of the individual. Both the "Law of Emergency" in Israel and the "Law for Safeguarding Order" in South Africa legalize the most inhuman measures of oppression against the Arab and African populations by means of lengthy detentions without due process, torturing of political prisoners, assassination, deportation and collective punishments of entire villages.

The second-class citizenship of the Arab in Israel and the African in South Africa is reflected in every aspect of life, in the limitation of the right to work, study, health care, in wage differentials, in subjection to

the most brutal restrictions which prohibit them from moving without permission. Arabs matriculating at the Hebrew University, the Syrian press noted recently, are rare, and in South Africa, blacks are prohibited by law from access to the country's eight white universities. To which we might add: Are there any real differences between the Sharpeville and Deir Yassin massacres, between the jail on Robbens Island and the Israeli prisons of the "tiger cage" model used by Yankee troops in Viet Nam?

The parallel between South Africa and Israel is also evident not only in the illegal occupation of territory — Namibia in the case of the former, Golan, Transjordan, Gaza and part of Sinai in the case of the latter — but also in the policy of confiscation, expropriation and annexation of Arab or African lands. The Israeli law on the "Confiscation of the Goods of Absentees" and the South African law on "Distribution of Lands" establish that 80% of Arab Palestine belongs to the Zionists and 87% of African lands are in the hands of the racists (20% of the population). In *Bantustans of South Africa*, Barbara Rogers confirms that

the overwhelming majority of the African population is forcibly moved to sterile regions of the country, where they are condemned to a semi-starvation existence, while racist propaganda presents these Bantustans as something just short of independent state groupings.

In *Israel and the Palestinian Arabs*, Don Peretz points out that

the Arabs of these regions live under a series of legal restrictions. Their movements, their entrances and departures, even inside the zones of security, are controlled by the military. Legal residents can be expelled and their property confiscated. Entire towns can be displaced from one region to another.

Moshe Dayan, one of the main Zionist chiefs, was even more categorical when he stated in June of 1970: "Our objective is an Israel with a Jewish majority and a small Arab minority."

The point to which Israel's racism and neocolonial policy are identified with South African and Rhodesian discriminatory norms is a well-known and widely condemned matter. The UN Declaration on the Elimination of all Forms of Racial Discrimination, of November 20, 1963; the International Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Racial Discrimination, of December 2, 1965; the resolution of the UN General Assembly of November 2, 1973, which established the Decade of Struggle against Racism and Racial Discrimination; and the International Convention on the Repression and Punishment of the Crime of Apartheid, are part of the long process of political struggle against racism in the forms of apartheid, Zionism and others equally discriminatory, a process which

culminated recently in the United Nations Resolution of October 15, 1975, declaring Zionism to be a form of racism and racial discrimination. Nevertheless, in the highest international organization as well, Israel and South Africa ignore the resolutions and, in the face of growing world condemnation, mutually support each other and join a common front with the backing of the imperialist powers, chiefly the United States. Vorster's recent visit to Israel was designed to consolidate this mutual support.

Viewing the problem from another angle, an important role in imperialist plans against the Third World countries and the Non-Aligned Movement has been given precisely to the regimes of Tel Aviv and Pretoria, whose governments have proclaimed themselves the shock troops of anti-communism in the Middle East and Africa, labelling as "communist" all that aspires to be free of imperialism, Zionism and racism. Not long ago *The New York Times* wrote, and not without joy, that both regimes "are the western vanguard for the containment of communism."

Both Zionist and apartheid policy, from the point of view of their strategic interests in Africa and the Middle East, are directed toward halting the nationalist forces, extending their spheres of influence through economic penetration and other means with the aid of United States capital, pressuring neighboring countries to legalize the practice of Zionism and apartheid by diplomatic recognition from certain states, in order to exploit their human and material resources through economic, political and military oppression. Parallel to this, in imperialism's criminal plans against the progressive nations of Africa and the Middle East — the most recent example of which is the defeated aggression against the People's Republic of Angola — Israel and South Africa are precisely the instruments used to try to achieve a political upset in the Arab and African countries with a marked revolutionary orientation.

The World Conference for Women's International Year held in Mexico City last year proclaimed

Peace and international cooperation demand the achievement of national liberation and independence, elimination of colonialism and neocolonialism, of foreign occupation, of Zionism, of apartheid and of racial discrimination in all its forms, as well as recognition of the dignity of the peoples and their right to free determination.

In Angola in 1976 and in Golan and Sinai in 1973, the myth of the invincibility of apartheid and Zionism was destroyed. The people in the southern cone of Africa and the occupied Arab territories are learning the lessons of history and will step up their struggles with the certainty that the common enemy will be defeated.



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