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# MERIP REPORTS

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
## RESISTANCE IN PALESTINE



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# Middle East Research & Information Project

**IN THIS ISSUE:** In the last year, and particularly since the October War, the Palestinian resistance movement has been engaged in a wide-ranging and intense debate over the question of a transitional program, including the possibility of a Palestinian political entity or mini-state. MERIP has asked its friend Qais Salim to reflect upon this debate in the context of an analysis of the history of the Palestinian resistance movement. Qais delineates six crucial and recurrent themes which have faced the Palestinian liberation struggle for the last half century. He shows how the successes and failures of the movement can be traced to the responses of the leadership to these six fundamental issues in each phase of the struggle. In the last section he summarizes the current debate.

As a service to our readers we have prepared an introductory "Reading Guide" to the Middle East in which we present those books and periodicals we feel are essential to understanding past developments and current struggles. This is not a full-scale bibliography, but a selected list necessary for anti-imperialist study of the area. We would like to thank the many friends who have suggested items to be included.

In "Current Events" we examine the political impact of the oil embargo, stressing that its chief impact was upon inter-Arab politics rather than upon oil supplies to the US. The resurgence of private enterprise and foreign investment in Egypt, and the political crisis in Israel are also covered.

The "Book Review" offers a discussion of the "Great Berrigan Debate."

**Special Notice:** For the academic year 1974-75, members of the MERIP staff in Cambridge will be conducting a project on "Current Realities of the Middle East" at the Cambridge-Goddard Graduate School. Students in the project will receive an M.A. degree. For information, write MERIP, P. O. Box 48, Cambridge, Mass. 02138.

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MERIP *Reports* is a collective effort of the MERIP staff. Each issue deals with aspects of the political economy of the Middle East, with the role of the United States in the area, and with the class and national struggles of the people. We welcome comments and suggestions from our readers, and are also interested in hearing from anyone who is currently engaged in (or would like to do) similar work.

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# RESISTANCE AND NATIONAL SELF-DETERMINATION IN PALESTINE

By Oais Salim

## Introduction

The Palestinian people have been waging a concerted struggle for self-determination since the end of World War I. Unlike other nations in the Middle East, they had to contend not only with European (British) occupation but also with the Zionist designs on Palestine.

Born as a result of anti-semitism and the rise of national movements in Europe, the Zionist movement envisioned the establishment of a Jewish state in Palestine that would seek to gather in it all the Jews of the world and grant them citizenship in that state. It was this premise that united all the factions of the Zionist movement, left and right on the political spectrum.

The exclusivist nature of the proposed state necessitated the creation of social and economic institutions that would closely unite the Jewish immigrants in Palestine, pitting them against the developing national movement of the Arab Palestinians. Yet the contradiction was a real one: if the dream of an exclusivist Jewish state were to come true it would require the subordination or expulsion of these indigenous people. This conflict dictated the alliances that the Zionist movement would have to pursue. An alliance of Jewish immigrants and Palestinian Arabs in a common struggle against imperialism and occupation could not come about. Rather, Zionism would need an alliance with the imperialist powers, first Britain and later the US, to ensure support and protection against the Arab majority.

The relative success achieved by the Zionist movement and the defeats suffered by the Palestinian national movement over the last half century have been largely a function of the inability of the Palestinian national leadership to correctly understand this analysis and the other fundamental problems facing it. This resulted in the absence of proper programs of struggle and of mobilization — a fact related also, of course, to the class background of that leadership.

The experience of over 50 years of struggle clearly indicates that the fundamental issues facing the movement have been and still are: the role of the Palestinian people in the process of liberation; the need for national unity; the issue of what alliances should be made; the relationship of the movement with imperialism; the question of transitional programs; and the relationship with the Hebraic people.

In this article we shall examine how the leaderships of the Palestinian movement at different phases of the struggle understood these issues. This type of study is particularly important at this time when a debate over future direction is going on within the Palestinian movement. Therefore, it is also important that we apply this historical analysis to the current situation.

The policies of imperialism, and of the Israeli ruling class and the reactionary Arab forces, have been widely discussed elsewhere and will not be treated in depth in this article. Suffice it to say that these forces will continue, as they have done in the past, to do their utmost to defeat and liquidate the Palestinian national liberation movement.

## The Palestinian National Movement Prior to 1948

The social structure of Palestinian society at the beginning of World War I was predominantly feudal with a substantial sector of small land-owners. Political institutions were dominated by the feudal families and by the traditional religious leadership. These forces would control the Palestinian community until the 1948 disaster. During this period, however, and particularly between 1936 and 1948, there began to develop a new comprador bourgeoisie, growing largely from demands generated by the British occupation and by the Zionist immigration.

Historically, Palestinian society had been based on agricultural production. The large, feudal-based land-owning families included the Abdul Hadi, Hussaini, Tajji, Shawwa, Ghesiani, Khudra and Fahoum. Among them they owned more than four million acres of land, about half the cultivated land of the country. Small land-owners controlled most of the rest and the majority of the population consisted of peasant sharecroppers.

The Zionist movement's policy of purchasing land and of establishing exclusively Jewish agricultural settlements antagonized and threatened the interests of small land-owners and of the impoverished peasants. These people rose in a succession of revolts during the whole period of the British Mandate, the most important of these uprisings being in 1929.

On the other hand, the expansion of commerce and transport facilities during the British occupation opened the door to the rise of trading families like the Nashashibi and the Khalidi. These families owned some land originally, but for various reasons moved to urban areas and based themselves primarily on capital accumulation as a result of their commercial activities.

Given the expansion of the cities, an increasing immigration of poor peasants took place into the urban centers to form a new class grouping, the migrant workers, who played an important political role in the resistance to occupation and Zionist immigration between 1936 and 1948, especially in the 1936 general strike. As a result of their new productive activities (in oil refineries, in the ports, etc.) and of their departure from the more traditional village structures, these workers had a higher level of political consciousness. This was strengthened by their direct contact with the institutions of Zionism and

of the British occupation, the deprivation of jobs in Jewish establishments, and the lack of job security in general.

The Palestinian political leadership was, at first, not hostile to the British occupation. The feudal-based leadership did not begin to fight against Zionism until it became apparent that the Zionist land acquisition and political institutions threatened their holdings as much as they did the small land-owners' possessions. The commercial-based families vacillated in their posture toward the British and Zionists up to the end of World War II. After all, these forces had helped them attain their prosperity. The post-1945 drive toward creation of the state of Israel, of course, drastically changed this relationship.

The political platform of the Palestinian leadership reflected this diversity of interests. Their conscious analyses of the major issues of that struggle clearly demonstrated this. To the upper-class leadership, the masses of the Palestinian peasants and urban workers would serve as a means of pressuring the British, rather than as a force for social change. Actually, this leadership was the staunchest defender of the existing tribal and feudal relations and it combatted with vigor any independent initiative of the peasants and developing working class.

All this is clearly indicated by the leadership's position on the Izzil-Deen Al-Kasam revolt of 1935. The agitation of Al-Kasam among workers and peasants to organize the struggle against the British and the Zionists materialized in an uprising that paved the way for the larger general strike of the following year. But the traditional leadership refused to adopt his call for a revolution, refused to attend his funeral when he was killed by the British and quickly moved into negotiations with the British High Commissioner to exchange a promise to quiet the situation for a limit on Jewish immigration.

The Palestinian leadership at that time made an arbitrary distinction between British imperialism and Zionism, seeing the latter as the main enemy. It conceived the possibility of achieving self-determination by accommodating British policy. The best-known example of this strategy was the leadership's call for the abandonment of the general strike by the beginning of 1939, upon the issuance of the British White Paper.

The same attitude towards imperialism dictated the policy on the question of alliances and the policy toward the Jewish inhabitants of Palestine. Failing to see that the main issue was the struggle against British occupation, the leadership failed to put forward a program that could have brought the Jewish inhabitants and the Palestinian Arabs together to fight against the British occupation, to undermine the appeal of political Zionism and to establish a democratic Palestine. Alliances were sought with other feudal regimes in the Arab world that were also connected with British imperialism. At home, though, this policy opened up a split since the interests of the predominantly feudal and the predominantly commercial factions of the upper class were not the same, although neither objected to ties with the British occupation.<sup>1</sup>

## The Rise of the Contemporary Palestinian Liberation Movement

The 1948 disaster and the establishment of the state of Israel had profound effects on Palestinian society. More than half of the Palestinian people were uprooted from their lands and forced to live in refugee camps. In these camps, the refugees were by and large deprived of participation in any production. They lived a life of forced idleness on the fringes of Syria, Jordan, Lebanon and the Gaza Strip. The Zionist movement encouraged or forced this emigration and prevented by force the return of the refugees. Deprived of most of their possessions, disheartened by the 1948 defeat, the Palestinians tended to become a passive factor in the struggle against imperialism and Zionism. The alienation of the refugees from the forces of production and their non-integration into the local societies were due in great measure to the backwardness of the forces of production in those countries. The ruling classes of these states were also either feudal or allied with feudal and Beduin tribal leadership (Jordan).

The leadership of the national movement of the Palestinian people was either eliminated by the 1948 defeat or transformed to become part of the ruling classes of the neighboring countries. The remnants of the small leadership that remained in the West Bank voted to merge territorially with the ruling class in Jordan (the Ariha conference of 1949). This act was a move to curtail the influence of the more progressive Palestinian forces who at the time were grouping in the Gaza Strip and were trying to arrange a national conference. The merger of the West Bank with the Emirate of Transjordan established the Hashimite Kingdom of Jordan under King Abdullah.

The situation in the Gaza strip was relatively different. That area was administered by Egypt although not absorbed into that country. The high population density there (much greater than in the West Bank), the 1952 Nasserist revolution in Egypt, the area's limited economic resources, and the brief period under Israeli occupation at the end of 1956 were all important contributing factors to the rise of a new Palestinian leadership there in the latter part of the 1950s.

Perhaps the most important consequence of the 1948 defeat was the disappearance of an independent Palestinian national expression and the complete involvement of the Palestinian struggle in the national struggle of the Arab peoples in the neighboring states. It is important to remember that the old land-owning class, and the Palestinian upper class in general, had not been decimated by a process of social revolution and the rise of new classes in Palestinian society. Rather, it was destroyed by the victory of the Zionist movement. Thus the new leadership was not a result of the development and struggle of internal forces within Palestinian society but of an elite which succeeded precisely to the extent that it removed itself from that society. These bankers, traders, professionals, and bureaucrats achieved their positions by integrating themselves into the classes of the states bordering Palestine and consequently had little interest in waging a struggle that might be contrary to the needs of those classes.

This frame of reference applied even to the more radical, democratic and revolutionary forces among the Palestinians. They demonstrated their convictions by participating in the Arab liberation struggle in general, in the various movements like Nasserism, the Arab National Movement, and the Baath Party. It was this participation, although in the absence of a Palestinian liberation movement, which gave these Palestinian forces their anti-imperialist orientation. For throughout that period the Arab national liberation movement in various countries was waging a concerted struggle to end imperialist domination and transform these societies.

The participation of Palestinians in these progressive movements along with the aforementioned developments in the Gaza Strip (especially the effect of the brief period of Israeli occupation during the Sinai War of 1956), the rising Palestinian migration in search of employment to oil-producing areas of the Gulf, the success of the Algerian revolution in 1962, and the stagnation of the general Arab anti-imperialist movement by the mid-1960s, were all important factors behind the rise of the contemporary Palestinian national liberation movement.

Leadership in this new movement was clearly anti-imperialist and was strongly determined to give the Palestinian people a central role in liberating themselves and their land. However, it must be noted that the meaning and the implications of being anti-imperialist have been subjects of debate and controversy among the Palestinian groups. These positions have been a result of class and political differences among groups and factions which have also manifested themselves in debates over the proper tactics for the struggle, the role to be played by the Palestinian people and the mobilization of the people for that role.<sup>2</sup>

Before discussing the nature of these debates it is also necessary to discuss the roles played by the different Arab regimes, particularly Syria and Jordan, in the development of the contemporary movement with its strategy of armed struggle. By the mid-1960s a radical progressive, anti-imperialist regime was in power in Syria. This government extended base and training facilities to the Palestinian movement, enabling it to carry out armed raids inside Israel. It further aided the new movement in terms of recruitment and training. This development has been cited as one reason for the rising Israeli apprehension and the conflict which paved the way to the June 1967 war.<sup>3</sup>

The Jordanian monarchy on the other hand pursued a policy of suppressing the revolutionary and democratic movement of the East Jordanian and the Palestinian peoples. Its policy of depriving the West Bank inhabitants of the means necessary to defend themselves, its economic policy from 1948 to 1967, and the repression of the left helped, in turn, to prevent an effective resistance to Israeli occupation from developing immediately following the June 1967 war. Within the West Bank, the Jordanian government had restrained the growth of productive forces and had consciously forced investors to put money into the East Bank rather than the West Bank. This led to the migration of young West Bank workers and peasants to other parts of the Arab world to find work.<sup>4</sup>

In general the lack of continuity between the pre-1948 and post-1948 Palestinian movements led to the loss of the revolutionary experience accumulated during the former period. The new movement had to start over again on questions of organization and ideology. There was a strong tendency to duplicate the experiences gained during the participation of the Palestinians in the Arab progressive movements in the 1950s, a tendency that was sometimes detrimental.

### The Resistance Movement: 1965-1970

On January 1, 1965 Fateh launched its first operation inside Israel from Syria. Ironically, but significantly, the first martyr of this new stage fell not to Israeli bullets but to Jordanian fire on his way back after the raid. By then Fateh had been organizing for over five years toward the launching of an armed struggle against the Israeli state.

In 1964, sensing the rising consciousness and demands of the Palestinians, Egyptian President Gamal Abdul-Nasser sponsored, along with other Arab states, the creation of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) as a means of representing the aspirations of the Palestinian people. This was at first defined as an expression of Palestinian aspirations within the context of the official (Nasserist) framework.

The movement grew at a slow rate until June 1967. During that same period other organizations began to reorient their strategy in the direction of armed struggle. The defeat of the Arab armies of Syria, Jordan and Egypt in the June War left all the land of Palestine, as well as the Egyptian Sinai and the Syrian Golan, under Israeli occupation. The defeat of the Jordanian army, the main instrument of repression for the monarchy, and the occupation of the West Bank left King Hussein's regime in a very shaky state. The existence of a relative power vacuum opened the way for the young movement to establish guerrilla and political bases inside Jordan.

These bases provided the major starting point for resistance to the occupation. But the real turning point for the movement's growth came at the Battle of Karameh (March 21, 1968). Palestinian forces stood their ground and inflicted heavy losses on an Israeli punitive expedition on the East Bank. The courage and ability of the Palestinian troops stood in sharp contrast to the failure of the better-armed official armies the previous year. New volunteers flocked to the movement.

Thus, after the pessimism following June 1967, the Palestinian liberation movement became something of a vanguard for the anti-imperialist forces in the Arab world. The rise of the movement led to an across-the-board critique of existing social, political and cultural institutions.

Ties between the resistance groups and people in the refugee camps were strengthened not only by these military actions but also by concrete programs of social services, particularly medical facilities. People were mobilized as guerrillas, militia members or activists in mass organizations, although there was some tendency to over-emphasize the role of the guerrillas exclusively.

On the ideological level two developments had important implications: the growth of a Marxist-Leninist left and the formulation of the democratic solution to the conflict in Palestine. The former development raised many important tactical and strategic issues, facing the movement. The latter development began to resolve, for the first time, the relationship to the Hebraic people and pointed the way to an eventual common struggle between the Arab Palestinian and Jewish Hebraic exploited classes to achieve the overthrow of Zionist institutions with the goal of a democratic, secular state.

### From September 1970 to the October War

The movement, however, was not without fault. The reactionary Hussain regime, with US support, capitalized on the movement's errors to launch a bloody campaign of terror in September 1970, killing or injuring up to 20,000 people by shelling refugee camps. The fighting was stopped after Nasser's intervention, and an agreement regulating relations between the resistance and the Amman government was signed in Cairo. Hussain, taking advantage of the disarray in the movement, broke the Cairo agreement and completely ousted the movement by July 1971.<sup>5</sup>

During this period there were discussions in the movement about the stand to be taken toward the Cairo agreements, the issue of the militia and the question of guerrilla warfare in Jordan. As the balance of power shifted gradually in favor of the Jordanian regime, further highlighting the movement's failures, strategic questions were also taken up: the need to evaluate the experience in Jordan and to rebuild underground groups there.<sup>6</sup>

One of the most important factors contributing to alienation of the East Jordanian people was the exclusive Palestinian character of the movement. The dominant tendency in the period preceding the September clash tended to create Palestinian unions and to emphasize the military side of the struggle with Israel, to the exclusion of mobilizing East Jordanian peasants, workers and intellectuals. Wide sectors of these classes came to see the movement as a threat to them — a factor exploited by Hussain to divide the people. The lack of unity within the Palestinian movement also made it more difficult to resist the monarchy's offensive.

Another issue was the arming of the militia. The Palestinian militia had been set up in early 1970 by the resistance to encourage people in the camps to organize self-defense. The Hussain regime knew that the strength of this militia, especially in Amman, would make it difficult to defeat the Palestinians. The government, then, used outside mediation and the tendency of some within the leadership to compromise on this issue to disarm the people. This helped lead to the destruction of the resistance in Jordan, a task made easier by the naivete of elements in the movement regarding the nature of the Hashimite regime and the link between imperialism and the conservative Arab governments.

The proper evaluation of this experience proved to be important later in the struggle against the Lebanese regime — which tried to have its own victory over the resistance in May 1973.

Following the expulsion of the last Palestinian units from Jordan in July 1971 an extensive struggle developed within the movement over charting a new political course. This was a task made more difficult by reversals suffered by the progressive forces in the Arab world.<sup>7</sup> The debate culminated in the adoption of general guidelines in the political platform of the ninth National Council meeting in early 1972, which called for the formation of a united Palestinian-Jordanian front to overthrow Hussain. Other important positions reached included:

- 1) Acceptance of the PLO as the umbrella organization for all the guerrilla groups and the acceptance by all groups of the political platform, although steps toward greater unity within the PLO were limited.
- 2) The termination of attacks between groups, although not limiting political debate. Since the October War, though, there has been a high level of hostile and polemical exchanges.
- 3) Cooperation among groups in local activities including coordination of militia units in various camps in Lebanon and joint political forums.

The tactical debate concentrated on two issues: "external operations" and "terrorism." The former referred to actions conducted outside Palestine (aerial hijackings, etc.). Most groups rejected this tactic on the grounds that it diverted attention from the main tasks of mobilizing and organizing the Palestinian people and, by early 1972, all groups had officially rejected such actions. Some clandestine groups, often rumored to be extensions of known organizations, did carry out some external operations and acts of "terror," although these have declined somewhat in proportion to the rise in strength of the movement.

In mid-1973 political debate accelerated again, particularly as a result of the escalation of operations against Israel (which led to the Israeli raid on Beirut in April and the murder of three Palestinian leaders), and of the strength shown by the resistance in Lebanon in May 1973. During the May attack the Lebanese army tried and failed to control the Palestinian camps and to change in its favor the 1969 Cairo agreement which regulated the government's relationship to the resistance. The success of the Palestinians in defeating this move can be traced partly to their alliance with the Lebanese left which had supported the resistance and weakened the aggressive resolve of the government.

Another important development was the publication of a transitional program by the Democratic Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (DPFLP) calling for achievement of transitional goals. It was a new concept: a detailed delineation of tasks to be carried out over a period to gradually shift the balance in favor of the revolutionary movement and make possible attainment of the ultimate goal.<sup>8</sup> After a heated discussion most groups opposed this plan, arguing that it would implicitly compromise the ultimate goal of liberation.<sup>9</sup> This, and other on-going discussions, were briefly interrupted—and re-structured—by the October War.

## The Aftermath of the October War

Faced with the realities created by the October War, US policy-makers realized that without a settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict regional stability could not be maintained. The war demonstrated that US support for Israeli expansionist policy had become both expensive and detrimental to US interests in the Arab countries. Political conflict within Israel and that country's economic and human losses also posed major challenges to the previous policy. Economic losses from the war cost Israel an amount double the annual budget and helped lead to the fall of the Meir government, dictating a search for a new policy even at the expense of some sort of settlement.

Egypt's policy of seeking a negotiated settlement is also now given new impetus by the re-evaluation of US and Israeli policy. Since Nasser's last days the Egyptian government has always considered the US as the key to a settlement as evidenced by the 1970 acceptance of the Rogers proposals, the 1972 expulsion of Soviet advisors to meet openly stated US demands, the strengthening of ties with Saudi Arabia, Sadat's attitude toward Kissinger as a "miracle maker" and the country's new economic policy aimed at removing constraints on penetration of foreign, mainly US, capital.<sup>10</sup>

The Syrian attitude, in contrast to that held before the war, would accept a negotiated settlement, though recognizing the importance of a unified Arab policy and a Soviet role in balancing out the US intentions for the region. The Syrians have so far made a number of conciliatory moves toward the US which have not, however, violated Syria's principles on a settlement.<sup>11</sup>

The Jordanian reactionary regime sought for a long time a negotiated settlement with Israel, at first unilateral and now, its position weakened by its non-participation in the October War, aimed at convincing the US of the need for a Jordanian-Israeli agreement.

It is therefore clear that all governments involved in the conflict, including the USSR, foresee the need for a negotiated settlement, as do Western Europe and Japan. Contrary to the belief that is widespread among some circles, there exists no blueprint for this settlement, since each side has its own interpretation of what the settlement should be.

The US, seeking a settlement to strengthen its own position, has been following a multi-level policy aimed at securing maximum gains for Israel, at penetrating the Arab states, and at liquidating the revolutionary movement. Consequently, by sending Kissinger to the Middle East to secure bilateral agreements (shuttle diplomacy), it aims at excluding the USSR and dividing the Arab states. But the US also seeks to prevent a renewal of the war. In a recent interview, Under-Secretary of State Joseph Sisco pointed out that "the October War actually changed the tangible reality in the area. I think there is a general agreement on both sides that any future war will by necessity be costly and a war of annihilation."<sup>12</sup> On the territorial question the US has avoided specifying particular borders, leaving that to future negotiations. The US concedes that some Israeli withdrawal

will have to take place but accepts the Israeli interpretation of what this means—that Israel would not have to leave all of the occupied territories.

The US position on the Palestinians has undergone several changes since the 1967 war. Initially it was merely defined as a problem of refugees. Later, in the Brezhnev-Nixon communique, the US accepted the term "the Palestinian people's rights." The position has been that Palestinians should seek a solution within the Jordanian framework. Recently, the policy has undergone a slight shift toward accepting the necessity of some Palestinian representation, but with the requirement that this is to be achieved with the consent of and in collaboration with Jordan.<sup>12</sup> The US has not yet recognized the PLO as the sole representative of the Palestinian people, nor has it accepted any reference to "the legitimate national rights of the Palestinian people."

Israel's position maintains that no settlement can be achieved without recognition of Israel, the opening of the borders to trade, and an end to Palestinian claims. Israel steadfastly refuses to recognize the existence of the Palestinian people and insists that they should express their interests through the Jordanian delegation. On territory, they envision possible withdrawal from most of Sinai (if this is coupled with demilitarization and Israeli control over Sharm El-Shaikh and a connecting corridor). Israel wishes to hold onto the Golan Heights but might pull back from the approaches on the Syrian side as far as the city of Qunaitra. Their position on the West Bank and the Gaza Strip has not yet been well defined. But the leadership insists that "there is no place for an independent Palestinian political entity on our borders."<sup>13</sup>

The Jordanian view favors Israeli withdrawal from most of the territories and a bilateral agreement. The government has consistently rejected the PLO's claim to represent the Palestinians. Before the war, Hussain declared his intention of forming a united Hashimite kingdom in the event of Israeli withdrawal from the West Bank, but this position has since been modified. After the war, the government moved swiftly to re-establish contact with the West Bank notables and to resume payment of salaries to civil servants on the West Bank, a practice that had been halted in early 1972. Emissaries were sent with various proposals of conciliation to the PLO, inviting it to participate in Jordan's efforts to regain the West Bank and promising to hold a plebiscite in order to determine the future of the territories after they reverted to Jordanian authority. The regime also expressed willingness to recognize the PLO as representing Palestinians living outside Jordan and Palestine.

While Egypt has indicated a willingness to participate in bilateral agreements, it prefers a settlement supported by other Arab states and supports complete Israeli withdrawal and the establishment of a Palestinian state. The Egyptians have already informed UN Secretary-General Kurt Waldheim that they have no desire to administer the Gaza Strip in the future. They have further indicated their intention of recognizing Israel, reopening the Canal even before a complete settlement.

The Syrian government foresees a settlement involving total Israeli withdrawal and recognition of the legitimate national

rights of the Palestinian people. It further demands that Israel express its intention of complete withdrawal from Golan before disengagement and is both critical and apprehensive about Egyptian policy.<sup>11</sup>

The USSR supports a settlement based on complete withdrawal from the occupied territories, recognition of Palestinian national rights and a rejection of the US bilateral strategy through a return to the Geneva Conference framework. Soviet-PLO relations have steadily grown more cordial since 1971 and, shortly before the war, Soviet leaders encouraged the PLO to formulate a position that is attainable given the present relation of forces in the area, a position which, in turn, the Soviets would support in future negotiations.

The heightened resistance in the occupied territories is a new factor in the equation. This resistance is now being led by the United National Front in the occupied territories. The Front, formed in August 1973, includes the underground organization of various resistance groups as well as the Jordanian Communist Party and a wide spectrum of patriotic elements. The National Front recognizes the PLO as the sole representative of the Palestinian people and has put forth a program of action directed against occupation. This resistance has been encouraged by the belief that a settlement involving the future of these areas will possibly be implemented. Another factor is the price inflation in the area while available jobs are declining due to cut-backs in investment within Israel.

### The PLO and the Dialogue Within

In spite of the fact that the PLO knew about the war plans 10 days before the conflict began, the impact of political decisions taken by the PLO regarding the conduct of the war were marginal. The conduct of the war remained mainly under Egyptian control. The resistance recognized, though, that it had no chance but to participate fully in the coming war. If it had not done so the PLO would have lost any claim to represent the Palestinians. After the war it did in fact move to consolidate this position, dispatching delegations to Moscow, the Algiers Arab Summit Conference and the Lahore Islamic Conference to receive recognition as the sole representative of the Palestinian people, although this was resisted by the conservative Arab states. Saudi Arabia, for example, promised to abide by the claim only if the PLO liquidated its leftist elements. Jordan dissented from the Algiers decision but, not wanting to further jeopardize its conciliation efforts with the PLO, went along with the decision at Lahore.

Although the decision to seek recognition for the PLO did not face any opposition within the organization, this does not imply that the views of the factions within the PLO were unified. The recognition move was received with varying enthusiasm by the different groups. The differing attitudes were linked to divergent conceptions of what future strategy should be. Prior to the war the DPFLP published a series of articles in its organ *Al-Hurriyah* calling upon the resistance to formulate a transitional program for the struggle.<sup>8</sup> The DPFLP argued that it is impossible to conceive of the liber-

ation of Palestine and the establishment of a democratic state as a one-stage process. Rather the process of liberation could only be achieved by propounding the necessary program for each stage. Its program was a product of the fourth plenary session of the central committee held in February 1973. The program declared that "the goal 'of total liberation' is transformed into an abstract goal if it is not linked with transitional slogans that express the direct interests of the patriotic classes in this struggle against the enemy, for only such slogans are capable of mobilizing the widest sectors of these classes and organizing them by clarifying their immediate tasks in a given period. Ultimately these tasks pave the way to total liberation."<sup>14</sup>

The promulgation of the DPFLP program provoked a dialogue among all factions of the resistance on the validity of transitional programs and on the tasks facing the movement. "The requirements of the present period are not the raising of realistic slogans and transitional programs. . .but the escalation of the struggle everywhere, mainly in Jordan and the occupied territories," wrote the Fateh-dominated PLO organ *Filistin Al-Thawra*.<sup>15</sup> This position reflected a tendency within Fateh. The Fateh leadership, however, never issued an official position. Post-October War developments clearly indicate that the leadership within Fateh supports the concept of transitional programs, as expressed by Abu Iyad, a ranking member of Fateh's revolutionary council: "Transitional programs? I would say that all of us as a revolutionary movement have not properly educated our cadres on the true meaning of transitional programs."<sup>16</sup>

Prior to the October War, *Al-Hadaf*, the official organ of the PFLP, launched an editorial attack on the idea of transitional programs, describing it as a collaborationist position. "Any revolution at times of hardships. . . is faced with revisionist, defeatist proposals of a treasonous nature."<sup>17</sup> The *Al-Hadaf* editorials asserted that transitional programs are not admissible in a revolutionary struggle. Similar views were echoed by the weekly *Ila Al-Ammam*, the official organ of the PFLP-General Command.

Faced with the prospect of a negotiated settlement after the October War, the dialogue within the resistance movement intensified. The PLO in response had to define its program clearly. The on-going dialogue has been revolving around four central issues: the validity of the concept of the transitional program within the Palestinian struggle; the objective of establishing national authority; the struggle to achieve universal recognition of the PLO as the sole representative of the Palestinian people, and the position on the Geneva Conference.

Ten days after the war, an emergency session of the expanded central committee of the DPFLP was convened to evaluate the new conditions created by the October War and to adapt its pre-October transitional program to the new situation. The outline of the new program is: (1) to struggle to achieve universal recognition of the PLO as the sole representative of the Palestinian people, (2) to struggle for the establishment of an independent national authority in territory liberated from Israeli occupation, (3) to secure the non-

recognition of Israel by all Palestinian or Arab factions, (4) to fight against any bilateral negotiations, (5) to mobilize all Arab democratic and revolutionary forces around the above-mentioned points, and (6) to strengthen ties with the socialist camp and all democratic and revolutionary forces the world over.

"The results of the patriotic October War raise the issue of securing immediate national rights and defending the basic interests of the Palestinian people. The imperialists, Zionists and reactionary forces are attempting to liquidate these rights. They seek to fabricate suspect elements as representative of the Palestinian people in order to steal away its right of self-determination," the communique of the central committee said. This development, if successful, "will for many years to come liquidate the patriotic movement of our people and abort its struggle for. . . the creation of a democratic state on all of Palestine." Preserving the right of the Palestinian people to struggle toward that goal "imposes on us an important and urgent task of achieving universal recognition of the PLO as the sole representative of our oppressed people."<sup>18</sup> This requires that "we should struggle to erase Israeli occupation from all Arab territories occupied in 1967. This position is an extraction from and an enhancement of our general strategic position of liberating all of Palestine. Further, we should struggle to enable the Palestinian people living in territories liberated from Israeli occupation to exercise their right of self-determination and to establish their independent national authority."<sup>19</sup> Nayef Hawatmeh in a speech on December 6, 1973 emphasized that "we shall not allow any Palestinian territory to be returned to King Hussein or to be annexed by Israel." He declared that "the seizing of this authority [independent national authority] can be accomplished by the militancy of our position and the continuation of our armed, political and popular struggle."<sup>20</sup>

Regarding the position of the DPFLP on the Geneva Conference, Nayef Hawatmeh stated that "the position. . . will be determined in light of future developments. If the direction of events develops in favor of capitulationist and annihilationist proposals [i.e. in favor of US-Israeli-Hashimite proposals] then we will be opposed to the Geneva Conference by necessity. Moreover, until now, neither the PLO nor the Palestinian Revolution is invited to attend. We are waging a struggle over who will decide the future of the Palestinian people and the occupied territories."<sup>21</sup>

In response to the new situation, Fateh leadership called upon all their cadres to evaluate the alternatives for the movement. Simultaneously, *Filistin al-Thawra* took a strong position against "transitional programs." By December the leadership began to give indications of adopting a new position. In an interview in the Lebanese weekly *Al-Balagh*, Abu Iyad stated that "the only means available to unleash and organize the potentials of the Arab nation [*umma*] is protracted people's war. . . For, as the October War demonstrated, the nature of these [Arab] regimes allows them only to conduct a limited war. As for us, the Palestinian movement, faced with the consequences of the October War, we have to realistically estimate our strength and realize to what extent we can influence events." He went on in the same interview

to say, "with the settlement, we are being faced with a new situation. This new reality demands that we find realistic solutions that might register immediate gains without compromising our historic rights."<sup>22</sup>

And late in December *Filistin al-Thawra* began to reflect the new position. By late January, it stated in an editorial on the transitional program that "our people should exercise full national authority and establish independent national existence on any Palestinian land, whether seized or liberated from occupation."<sup>23</sup> The same editorial strongly affirmed that the PLO has to continue its struggle in order to translate the Algiers Conference's recognition of its sole representation of the Palestinian people into a universal reality. Similar views were expressed by Yasser Arafat, the chairman of the central committee of the PLO, in several interviews and in the talk he gave in March during his visit to Kuwait.

Fateh has not yet stated any position on the Geneva Conference. However, Abu Iyad expressed the view that it is important that the Palestinian resistance first achieve a common program before taking any position on that conference: "In the event that we do arrive at a program, the question of determining a militant revolutionary stand will cease to be whether we do or whether we don't attend Geneva. Militant revolutionary positions are then determined by an adherence to this program."<sup>24</sup>

The Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) took the stand that the Palestinian resistance movement should immediately declare its opposition to the Geneva Conference as a central issue facing the Palestinian struggle in its new phase. George Habash in the symposium printed in *Shou'on Filistinia* asserted that the "danger of a settlement at this stage far exceeds that of any previous stage since June, 1967."<sup>25</sup> He proceeded to state that a correct evaluation of this new stage implies taking a clear stand on the Geneva Conference. "What should be the title of our program in the coming stage? The Geneva Conference. Consequently, we are faced with a very specific problem, not merely a theoretical question hanging above our heads nor an abstract question derived from our revolutionary education. It is a question that must be given an answer based on our precise and concrete study of this stage, the title of which is the Geneva Conference."<sup>26</sup> In the same interview he went on to state that "Egypt, in particular, is encouraging us [the Palestinian resistance] to attend. . . because they want the resistance to bear the consequences of sitting with the Zionist enemy, thus justifying their [Egyptian] position."<sup>27</sup> As an alternative, the program of the PFLP for the new stage set forth the following: "(1) the PLO should make its opposition to the present capitulation plan, which is based on UN Resolution 242, crystal clear, (2) that this position or rejection should serve as a new basis from which the Palestinian case is restated from its roots once again. Moreover, that the PLO reaffirm its legitimate right to struggle for self-determination. Through this struggle, one can already perceive that the solution and the goal will come in the form of a democratic Palestinian state."<sup>28</sup>

The PFLP rejects the call for a national authority on the Palestinian territories evacuated by Israel, on the ground that this authority will not be truly independent since it will be the outcome of the Geneva Conference.<sup>29</sup>

The PFLP-General Command similarly envisions the opposition to the Geneva Conference as the central issue of the struggle at the current stage. It also vehemently opposes the establishment of a national authority.<sup>30</sup> Saika supports the call for a national authority and propounds a wait-and-see policy toward the Geneva Conference.<sup>31</sup> While the Arab Liberation Front does not oppose a Palestinian state in the West Bank and Gaza if it comes as a result of a plebiscite conducted by a credible power, it strongly opposes any attempts by the PLO to struggle for such a state. It also envisions the central issue of the struggle as opposition to the Geneva Conference.<sup>32</sup>

These debates among the resistance factions have evolved into two distinct tendencies, one that represents the majority within the PLO (Fateh, DPFLP, Saika and independents) and one that represents the minority (PFLP, ALF and PFLP-General Command). Those that represent the tendency of the majority have drafted a working paper<sup>33</sup> to be presented to the Palestinian National Council (PNC) scheduled for this coming June. Those representing the minority position are reported to be preparing a counter-working paper to be presented at the same conference. The position that will be adopted by the PNC will become the official position of the PLO.

## Notes

<sup>1</sup>For 1929 revolution see A. Schleschter, "Jewish Land Colonization and the 1929 Revolution in Palestine," DEERASAT ARABIAH (ARAB STUDIES), Aug. 1970. For the pre-1948 struggle see N. Aloush, "Arab Resistance in Palestine, 1917-1948," (Beirut, PLO Research Center), May 1967 and "The Historical Development of the Palestinian Struggle," DPFLP, 1969. For the Kasam revolt and general strike see Adel Ganem, "The Revolution of Sheikh Iz-Al-Din Al-Kasam," SHOU'ON FILISTINIA (PALESTINIAN AFFAIRS), Jan. 1972 and Ghassan Kanafani, "The 1936-1939 Revolution," PAL. AFF., Jan. 1972 and Ibrahim Al-Sheikh Khalil, "Letter from an Old Comrade," PAL. AFF., March 1972.

<sup>2</sup>Hani Al-Hassan, "Fateh between Theory and Practice: The Theoretical Framework," PAL. AFF., March 1972.

<sup>3</sup>Maxime Rodinson, ISRAEL AND THE ARABS.

<sup>4</sup>"The Hashimite Regime and Palestinian National Rights," AL-HURRIYAH, nos. 653-6, 658.

<sup>5</sup>For the role of the Jordanian regime see Belal Al-Hassan, "The September Events," PAL. AFF., March 1971 and Khalil Al-Hindi, "Jordanian Mobilization," PAL. AFF., September 1971.

<sup>6</sup>Belal Al-Hassan, Munir Shafiq, Adnan Badir and Adel Amin, "Discussion of the Plans of the Fedayeen Organizations in Confronting the September Battle," PAL. AFF., Appendix, May 1972. Also, debate between Naji Aloush and Thabit abu Lail in AR. STUD., Feb. 1971 and June 1971, and DPFLP, "The September Campaign," (Beirut, Dar Al-Talia) Feb. 1971.

<sup>7</sup>The coup in Syria in Nov. 1970, the counter-revolutionary coup in Sudan in 1971, the ascendancy of Sadat in Egypt in Oct. 1970, the liquidation of the Nasserist left (spring, 1971) and the new arrangements in the Arabian Gulf (1971).

<sup>8</sup>Articles on the Palestinian state, AL-HUR., nos. 626-9 (July 1973) and articles by a Palestinian leftist in AL-HUR., nos. 634-9.

<sup>9</sup>AL-HADAF, nos. 214, 217; FILISTIN AL-THAWRA, nos. 53, 57; AL-RAYAH, no. 453; ILA AL-AMMAM, nos. 417, 422; AL-SHARARA, no. 14.

<sup>10</sup>The Egyptian position is depicted in numerous interviews given by Sadat to the American press and media.

<sup>11</sup>Hafez Al-Assad, interview, ASSAYAD, March 15, 1974.

<sup>12</sup>Joseph Sisco in TV interview published by AN-NAHAR, April 18, 1974.

<sup>13</sup>Meir statement to the Knesset in presenting the new government, Labor Party Platform for elections, article 10.

<sup>14</sup>Palestinian Leftist, AL-HUR., no. 634, Aug. 27, 1973.

<sup>15</sup>FILISTIN AL-THAWRA, no. 57, Aug. 22, 1973.

<sup>16</sup>Symposium published by PAL. AFF., no. 30, Feb. 1974.

<sup>17</sup>AL-HADAF, editorial, no. 214, Aug. 11, 1973.

<sup>18</sup>Communique of the Cen. Comm., AL-HUR., no. 645, Nov. 12, 1973.

<sup>19</sup>Nayef Hawatmeh, Symposium, PAL. AFF., p. 9.

<sup>20</sup>Nayef Hawatmeh, speech at Beirut Arab Univ., Dec. 6, 1973, AL-HUR., no. 650.

<sup>21</sup>Hawatmeh, Symposium, PAL. AFF., p. 10.

<sup>22</sup>Interview, AL-BALAGH, no. 103, Dec. 24, 1973.

<sup>23</sup>FILISTIN AL-THAWRA, editorial, no. 77, Jan. 29, 1974.

<sup>24</sup>Abu Iyad, Symposium, PAL. AFF., p. 27.

<sup>25</sup>Habash, Symposium, *Ibid.*, p. 18.

<sup>26</sup>*Ibid.*, p. 19.

<sup>27</sup>*Ibid.*, p. 23.

<sup>28</sup>PFLP Bulletin, no. 8.

<sup>29</sup>*Ibid.*, and Symposium, PAL. AFF., pp. 23-4.

<sup>30</sup>Interview with Ahmad Jibril, leader of PFLP-General Command, in ILA AL-AMMAM, Jan. 15, 1974.

<sup>31</sup>Juhair Muhsen, interview, AL-BALAGH, no. 104, Dec. 31, 1973 and in Symposium, PAL. AFF.

<sup>32</sup>Abdul Wahab Al-Kayali, Sec.-Gen. ALF, interview, ASSAYAD, no. 1528, Dec. 27, 1973.

<sup>33</sup>MERIP Reports, Current Events, no. 27, p. 25.

# MERIP

## READING

## GUIDE

### Learning About the Middle East: A General Orientation

This guide is not intended as a substitute for a complete bibliography about the Middle East — several such general bibliographies exist, and should be consulted for more specific resources. Nor does this qualify as a study-guide, which would include guidance on methods of research. It is intended quite simply as an introductory reading list, appropriate for use by individuals, study groups, or courses, and has been prepared from an anti-imperialist perspective. Its aim is to introduce readers to sources of information and analysis about US and world capitalist involvement in the Middle East and the national and class forces which either encourage or resist imperialist penetration.

Much of the research on the Middle East has been conducted by scholars who have rather well-defined orientations, although some scholars combine more than one trend. The earliest type is the Orientalist or Arabist, who loves or is fascinated by traditional Arab culture, who has a hard time dealing with modern political concepts and struggles, but who can provide much helpful information. The second orientation is that of the imperialist, who studies the Middle East and its peoples in order to facilitate their domination. A subset of the preceding group is made up of scholars with Zionist orientations. Works falling into these categories should be treated very carefully. A third orientation is that of the “academic” social scientists — overweight methodological baggage usually leaves them running along behind. A fourth orientation is that of the “pop” writers, who often slip into racist caricature when dealing with Arabs. The fifth orientation is that of the official propaganda lines as presented by governments, which in some cases appear disguised as “scholarly” research.

Very few scholars who approach the history or political economy of the Middle East start from the viewpoint of anti-imperialism or use the methodology of historical materialism. But many of the scholars have made valuable contributions towards an understanding of the forces of oppression and liberation. As a result we have included much that is not anti-imperialist or Marxist, but that helps in developing such an understanding of the region, its people, and the struggles for revolutionary change.

On the other hand, we point out that much current “radical” or “leftist” literature, especially in periodicals and newspapers, is written by authors who have little or no acquaintance with the peoples of the Middle East or their cultures,

and who do little more than apply abstract “Marxist” formulae to the Middle East — such literature should be read with considerable caution.

The reading guide was prepared for English speaking people and thus we have limited it mainly to works in English, leaving out the literature produced by Middle Eastern peoples in their own languages.

Any attempt at categorizing books within sections is to some degree artificial, but we have tried to find logical breaks and distinctions. We have, however, put all the books that specifically deal with Palestine in one section, although we feel strongly that the Palestine problem cannot be understood outside the context of the national and class struggles against imperialism taking place throughout the Middle East, and indeed throughout the world.

Certain topics that might be expected to appear in this guide have not been included — thus, Turkey and the Sudan are not found here, nor is Pakistan. For Pakistan, we refer readers to the bibliography on Pakistan that appeared in *MERIP Reports No. 16*. On the other areas, we hope in the months ahead to provide additional annotations on sources of information as these topics are treated in issues of the *Reports*.

### I. GENERAL HISTORICAL, ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL BACKGROUND

On this subject there are numerous general books from all types of writers. We have selected a small number of books that can aid readers to get an overall insight into the history, culture and politics of Arabs and Jews. The first three books are excellent general resources; the remainder are essential for a complete understanding.

Lewis, Bernard. *The Arabs in History*. New York: Harper and Row, 1960. 198 p. Harper Torchbook.

A concise summation of Western understanding of the Arab peoples until the 16th century, in the categories of mainstream Western academia. Sections on early history, especially on lower class revolutionary movements, are most thorough. Bibliography contains a full listing of basic Western sources up to 1960.

Gibb, H. A. R. *Mohammedanism*. 2nd ed. London: Oxford University Press, 1968. 208 p. (2nd ed. first pub. 1953.)

An historical survey of the development of Islamic civilization viewed here mainly as a religious community. Although this study provides little sense of the material conditions of Islamic civilization, it is a useful reference for the specifically religious understanding of that culture which is still an important component of Middle Eastern society.

Watt, W. Montgomery. *Islam and the Integration of Society*. Evanston: Northwestern Univ., 1961. 293 p.

An investigation of some of the economic, social and political conditions of the origins and development of Islam and Muslim society by a non-Marxist. It provides useful data for a materialist approach to the history of Islamic society.

Lutsky, Vladimir Borisovich. *Modern History of the Arab Countries*. Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1969. 421 p.

A coherent and systematic outline of Arab history from the 16th century to World War I, emphasizing the analysis of Arab societies' modes of production and class structures within the context of the capitalist and later imperialist systems.

El-Kodsy, Ahmad. "Nationalism and Class Struggles in the Arab World" in Ahmad El-Kodsy and Eli Lobel, *The Arab World and Israel*. New York: Monthly Review, 1970. pp. 1-62. Paper.

Looks at the hegemonic role of the merchant class in Arab societies, refuting the idea that they were "feudal." An important and fresh contribution to both Arab history and Marxist historiography.

Rodinson, Maxime. *Islam et capitalisme*. Paris: Seuil, 1966. 302 p. [in French]. Available in English as *Islam and Capitalism* from Pantheon in July 1974.

A socio-historical study by the great French Marxist Arabist of the relation between Islam and the means and systems of production in the Arab world. Scholarly, but with a polemical intent directed against those who too easily equate Islam with any particular economic system.

Leon, Abram. *The Jewish Question: A Marxist Interpretation*. New York: Pathfinder, 1970. 270 p. Paper.

Written during World War II by a Belgian Trotskyist, the only Marxist history of the Jews. Although a little schematic, its research and theoretical insights are excellent, and serve as a valuable antidote to Zionist perceptions of Jewish history.

Warriner, Doreen. *Land and Poverty in the Middle East*. London: Oxford Univ., 1948. 149 p.

An excellent examination of the social structure, in particular the system of land tenure, in the Fertile Crescent and Egypt, with 30 pages on Palestine. Cf. also her *Land Reform and Development in the Middle East*, London: Oxford Univ., 1957. 197 p.

## II. IMPERIALISM AND NATIONALISM: THE EARLY PERIOD

This section is divided into three parts. The first deals with the development of Arab nationalist theory in the period before World War II, the second with Arab national political struggles, and the third with imperialist political and economic domination of the area.

### A. Arab Nationalist Theory

Hourani, Albert. *Arabic Thought in the Liberal Age: 1798-1939*. London: Oxford Univ., 1962. 403 p.

A study of Arab political and social thought in its efforts to deal with the ideas, institutions and power of Europe from the time of Napoleon's invasion of Egypt until World War II. The book is a valuable scholarly reference for the roots of present Arab nationalist theory.

Karpat, Kemal, ed. *Political and Social Thought in the Middle East*. New York: Praeger, 1968. 397 p. Paper.

A collection of selections from Middle Eastern writers, mostly Arab, and mostly about the origins and growth of Arab nationalism on an intellectual plane. Rather specialized.

Abdel-Malek, Anouar, ed. *La Pensee politique arabe contemporaine*. Paris: Seuil, 1970. 378 p. [in French].

Excellent anthology of contemporary Arab political thought, with over 50 selections, mainly Egyptian. Interesting introduction by the editor, an Egyptian Marxist.

Laroui, Abdallah. *L'Ideologie arabe contemporaine*. Paris: Maspero, 1967. [in French].

By a Moroccan historian, interesting description of the ambivalent attitude of Arab intellectuals towards Western thought. Classifies Arab ideology as clerical (traditional and religious), liberal and technophile.

### B. Arab National Political Struggle

Antonius, George. *The Arab Awakening*. New York: Putnam, 1965. 471 p. Capricorn paper.

The classic study of the rise of Arab nationalism since the mid-19th century through 1940. Its emphasis on the importance of the minority religious communities and the consequent secular thrust of Arab nationalism has been challenged by Zeine.

Zeine, Zeine N. *The Emergence of Arab Nationalism, with a Background Study of Arab-Turkish Relations in the Near East*. Beirut: Khayat's, 1966. 205 p.

Emphasizes the strong role of Islam as a factor in Arab nationalism, and the consequent weaknesses of secularization in the recent past and present.

Kirk, George E. *A Short History of the Middle East*. London: Methuen, 1964. 340 p. Paper.

A pro-Western account, with special emphasis on the growth of imperialism and nationalism. In Appendix, see "The 'Arab Awakening' Reconsidered" for summary of the recent criticism of Antonius.

### C. Imperialism

Issawi, Charles, ed. *The Economic History of the Middle East: A Book of Readings*. Chicago: Univ. of Chicago, 1966. 543 p.

Good collection of articles containing much useful data, which could be the basis for a materialist interpretation of Middle East history. Many of the entries are translated from other languages, including Arabic, and some, e.g. Smilianskaya, are of exceptional worth.

Landes, David S. *Bankers and Pashas: International Finance and Economic Imperialism in Egypt*. New York: Harper, 1958. 354 p. Harper Torchbook.

Based on correspondence between a French banker and the private banker of the ruler of Egypt between 1858 and 1868, a remarkable study of the growth of banking in Europe, and the takeover of the finances of Egypt.

Kliemann, Aaron. *The Foundations of British Policy in the Arab World*. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Univ., 1970. 322 p.

Detailed examination of British imperial policy in the years following World War I, focusing on the contradictions within and popular threats against the division and subjugation of the Arab territories, especially Palestine and Iraq.

Monroe, Elizabeth. *Britain's Moment in the Middle East: 1914-1956*. London: Chatto and Windus, 1963. 254 p.

A useful account of the decline of British power in the Middle East, from a British viewpoint, and with a reluctant, let's-make-the-best-of-it tone.

### III. ZIONISM

Zionist literature is very extensive—we have omitted many works, including those by many Zionist historians, ideologues and activists, as well as anti-Zionist works that are not generally leftist. For deeper study, however, we would recommend biographies, autobiographies and other writings of Zionist leaders. This section presents A) various interpretations of Jewish history, B) the history and ideology of Zionism, C) the development of Zionism in America, and D) a variety of critiques of Zionism.

#### A. Jewish History

Leon, Abram. *The Jewish Question: A Marxist Interpretation*. See annotation above in I.

Baron, Salo W. *A Social and Religious History of the Jews*. New York: Columbia Univ., 1937. 3 vols. 2nd ed., rev. and enlarged, 1952 on, 15 vols. to date.

The major source in English on Jewish history. Obviously a reference work, but readable and reliable. Zionist but not propagandist. Baron's essay in Leo Schwarz, ed., *Great Ages and Ideas of the Jewish People*, is a useful summary of the 18th and 19th century period.

Arendt, Hannah. *Antisemitism*. New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1965. 136 p. Harper Torchbook.

Part of her monumental study of totalitarianism, clearly distinguishes between traditional "Jew-hatred" and the political antisemitism of the late 19th century. Political antisemitism is shown as directly related to the specific political, economic and social struggles between liberalism and reaction.

#### B. History and Ideology of Zionism

Laqueur, Walter. *A History of Zionism*. New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1972. 640 p.

A discussion of the European background of Zionism since the French Revolution, of the origins and development of the Zionist movement up to 1947, and of the establishment of Israel. The book is sympathetic to Zionism, but is a valuable reference source for an understanding of that movement in its first five decades.

Hertzberg, Arthur, ed. *The Zionist Idea*. New York: Atheneum, 1970. 638 p. Paper.

A collection of the most important historical documents: religious, revisionist, maximalist and socialist-Zionist together in one reference volume. Hertzberg's annotations present concise pictures of the personalities involved. Required reading for serious students of the history of Zionism.

#### C. Zionism in America

*MERIP Reports no. 29*, "Zionism and American Jews," by Sharon Rose, June 1974.

Silverberg, Robert. *If I Forget Thee, O Jerusalem: American Jews and the State of Israel*. New York: Morrow, 1970, 620 p. Paper.

Zionist version of the history of the struggle for Palestine. The book throws light on the political struggle within the Zionist movement. A good reference on who was who, and why.

Halperin, Samuel. *The Political World of American Zionism*. Detroit: Wayne State Univ., 1961. 431 p.

Contains much historical material. Good insight into the machinations of various factions.

Halpern, Ben. *The American Jew: A Zionist Analysis*. New York: Herzl Foundation, 1956. 174 p.

A sophisticated historical and ideological treatment of the difference between Europe and America, urging the necessity of Zionism for American Jews.

#### D. Critiques of Zionism

Deutscher, Isaac. *The Non-Jewish Jew and Other Essays*. London: Oxford Univ., 1968. 164 p. Hill and Wang paper.

Nine essays, gathered posthumously, by the noted non-Zionist Jew and biographer of Stalin and Trotsky, including "Who is a Jew?" "The Russian Revolution and the Jewish Problem," and several on Israel.

Selzer, Michael. *The Aryanization of the Jewish State*. New York: D. White, 1967. 126 p.

Argues that the origin of Zionism in Eastern Europe was the self-hatred of Jews who believed themselves to be primitive, alien Orientals in the midst of the white, Christian, modern, Western world. The Jewish state, Selzer maintains, is the manifestation of the Zionist desire to become Aryan. Zionists can now be superior to the Oriental in *their* midst: the Sephardic Jews and Palestinian Arabs. Well-drawn picture of the life of the Arab Jews.

Selzer, Michael, ed. *Zionism Reconsidered: the Rejection of Jewish Normalcy*. New York: Macmillan, 1970. 259 p. Macmillan paper.

Collection of essays—from the Lebuvitzer rebbe to Philip Roth—various forms of cynicism about Zionism. Best one is Hannah Arendt's "Zionism Reconsidered," written in 1945 but still compelling today. Arendt is the author of *Antisemitism* (see III. A. above) and *Eichmann in Jerusalem*.

Bober, Arie, ed. *The Other Israel: the Radical Case Against Zionism*. Garden City, N. Y.: Doubleday, 1972. 264 p. Anchor paper.

A collection of anti-Zionist analytical articles on the history, ideology, economic development and class structure of Israel and Zionism, by members of the Israeli Socialist Organization (*Matzpen*). The I.S.O. contends that peace in the Middle East is impossible unless Israel and the Arab states are integrated in a socialist, united Middle East.

#### IV.A. PALESTINE BEFORE 1948

Few periods in history have provoked more propagandistic works than this one. We have provided a very selective listing of books that we consider an adequate introduction to the pre-1948 developments. This section deals with A) essays on specific historical problems and reference works, B) general historical accounts, and C) cultural and political developments among Palestinian Arabs and Jews.

##### A. Specific Problems and Reference

Abu-Lughod, Ibrahim, ed. *The Transformation of Palestine*. Evanston: Northwestern Univ., 1971. 521 p.

Collection of scholarly essays about transformation of Palestine into Israel, and the transformation of the struggle for Palestine into an inter-state Arab-Israeli conflict. The authors are not radicals, but the book is essential because of its unique perspective. Part II, focusing on land and people, has three essays of exceptional quality. The editor's introduction to each essay is extremely valuable.

John, Robert and Sami Hadawi. *The Palestine Diary*. Two vols.: 1914-1945 and 1945-1948. Beirut: Palestine Research Center, 1970. 421 and 428 p. (Two more volumes in preparation.)

A thoroughly-documented account of the Palestine question, presented chronologically. This publication is the most readable presentation of the documentation, but it has pro-British sympathies at times. Best used as a reference source on specific events.

Khalidi, Walid, ed. *From Haven to Conquest: Readings in Zionism and the Palestine Problem until 1948*. Beirut: Institute for Palestine Studies, 1971. 914 p.

A wide-ranging collection of written materials on Zionism and Palestine from 1897 to 1948. Much of the material is selected from Zionist and imperialist sources. The purpose of the collection is to illustrate the process by which Zionism has sought to wrest control of Palestine from the Arabs.

Laqueur, Walter, ed. *The Israel-Arab Reader*. New York: Citadel, 1969. 371 p. (Rev. ed.) Bantam paper.

Excellent resource book, with World War I correspondence, British White Papers during Mandate, Erskine Childers' "The Other Exodus," and several contemporary essays including I. F. Stone on the 1967 War.

##### B. General Historical Accounts

Hurewitz, Jacob C. *The Struggle for Palestine*. New York: Norton, 1950. 404 p.

An invaluable, highly detailed account of the political struggle in Palestine, focusing on 1938-1947. Hurewitz is not pro-Zionist in this account, but there is the clear bias of "law'n'order" in which the Palestinians, because they were forced to resort to armed struggle, come off to some extent as the villains.

Waines, David. *The Unholy War: Israel and Palestine, 1897-1971*. Wilmette, Ill.: Medina Univ. International, 1971. 208 p.

An historical sociological account of the Arab-Zionist conflict, emphasizing the British Mandate period. Noteworthy contributions are the analysis of the ways in which the British encouraged the Zionist development of autonomous institutions and the presentation of how the Arab-Palestinian response to Zionism took the form of a national liberation struggle.

Taylor, Alan R. *Prelude to Israel: An Analysis of Zionist Diplomacy, 1897-1947*. New York: Philosophical Library, 1959. 136 p.

A critical study of the nature of Zionism, concentrating on the diplomatic activities of its leaders, and giving little attention to developments in Palestine.

Stevens, Richard M. *American Zionism and United States Foreign Policy, 1942-1947*. Beirut: Institute for Palestine Studies, 1970. 236 p.

Comprehensive factual study of the Zionist switch from British to US support, detailing the campaign to convert the American Jewish community and American political leaders to all-out support for making Palestine a Jewish state.

##### C. Palestinian and Jewish Developments

Abu-Ghazaleh, Adnan Mohammed. *Arab Cultural Nationalism in Palestine during the British Mandate*. Beirut: Institute for Palestine Studies, 1973. 114 p. Paper.

Study of selected, representative authors and the themes of their writings from the 1830s to 1948, showing not only the growth and expression of nationalism, but the high degree of cultural development of the Palestinian people in that period.

Porath, Yehoshua. *The Palestinian National Movement: A Study of its Emergence, 1918-1929*. London: Frank Cass, 1972.

Traces origins and emergence of the Palestinian national movement against the background of British policy and Zionist colonization. Author on the faculty of Hebrew University, Asian and African Studies.

Elon, Amos. *The Israelis: Founders and Sons*. New York: Bantam, 1971. 469 p. Paper.

A version of the early Zionist colonization of Palestine that stresses "counter-cultural" and student movement aspects of the colonizers in an apparent attempt to make the

Zionist movement acceptable to young leftists of the present. The book contains much interesting material about the early settlers, but the rest is of little value.

Rodinson, Maxime. *Israel: A Colonial-Settler State?* New York: Pathfinder, 1973. 125 p. Paper.

Originally published in Jean-Paul Sartre's *Les Temps Modernes* collection in 1967. The description of Israel's colonial background and policies was very important in turning the French "New Left" against Zionism after the 1967 War. Seems a little dated now.

Hattis, Susan Lee. *The Bi-National Idea in Palestine during Mandatory Times.* Tel Aviv: Shikmona, 1970. 355 p.

An extensive and thorough treatment of the subject, but limited by the author's failure to place the idea of binationalism in its political context.

Lobel, Eli. "Palestine and the Jews," in Ahmad El-Kodsy and Eli Lobel, *The Arab World and Israel.* New York: Monthly Review, 1970. pp. 63-137. Paper.

The best brief anti-Zionist Marxist study of the relation between Zionism and the Palestinian people.

#### IV.B. PALESTINE AFTER 1948

The literature on this subject is again extensive, and much of it propagandistic—we have selected the soundest material available. This section deals with A) the Arab-Israeli conflict on a general level, B) the Palestinian people and their resistance struggle, C) the Arabs in Israel and D) Israeli social, economic, political, and military developments.

##### A. The Arab-Israeli Conflict

*MERIP Reports no. 22*, "The October War," by John Galvani, Peter Johnson and Rene Theberge, November 1973.

"Roots of the October War," by John Galvani, Peter Johnson and Rene Theberge. *Socialist Revolution*, no. 17, Sept.-Oct. 1973. A revision and enlargement of *MERIP Reports no. 22*.

Rodinson, Maxime. *Israel and the Arabs.* Middlesex, Eng.: Penguin, 1970. 250 p. Paper.

A broad outline of the Palestine and Arab-Israeli conflicts, concentrating on the period from 1948 through the 1967 War. The author analyzes the conflicts themselves, using historical facts mainly as illustrations, and discusses Arab nationalism and Zionism extensively. Rodinson has considerable personal knowledge of leftist forces in the Middle East, and is able to give a better insight into the left than other authors.

Khoury, Fred J. *The Arab-Israeli Dilemma.* Syracuse: Syracuse Univ., 1968. 436 p. Paper.

The best of the scholarly treatments of the conflict, focusing on the role of the United Nations while factually and fairly recounting the elements of the Arab-Israeli conflict up until 1968. Ends with a rather mushy approach to how peace might come.

Childers, Erskine B. *The Road to Suez: A Study of Western-Arab Relations.* London: MacGibbon and Kee, 1962. 416 p.

Probably the best available account of the 1956 Suez crisis and war, placing them in the context of the larger politics of Arab-European relations. Includes interesting chapters on the Western image of the Arabs, and on Arab-Western relations during the Cold War period, and an account of the 1956 Sinai war.

Schleifer, Abdullah. *The Fall of Jerusalem.* New York: Monthly Review, 1972. 247 p. Paper

A fine combination of almost lyrical prose and intelligent journalism placing the 1967 war in the context of Arab and Palestinian resistance to Western and Israeli attempts at dominating the Arab world, by an American Jewish convert to Islam who lived in Jerusalem in 1967.

Gendzier, Irene L., ed. *A Middle East Reader.* New York: Pegasus, 1969. 477 p. Paper.

Interesting and well-balanced collection of historical and contemporary essays on the Palestine problem and the Arab-Israeli conflict.

##### B. The Palestinian People and Resistance

*MERIP Reports no. 28*, "Resistance and Self-Determination in Palestine," by Qais Salim, May 1974.

Turki, Fawaz. *The Disinherited: Journal of a Palestinian Exile.* New York: Monthly Review, 1972. 156 p. Paper.

A poignant description of the life of an extremely literate Palestinian refugee undergoing exile and oppression in the Arab host country. The book lacks a full political understanding that could serve as a base for effective action.

Dodd, Peter and Halim Barakat. *River Without Bridges.* Beirut: Institute of Palestine Studies, 1969. 68 p. Paper.

Interesting sociological study of Palestinian refugees of 1967 war, and why they left the territories occupied by Israel.

Kadi, Leila S. *Basic Political Documents of the Armed Palestinian Resistance Movement.* Beirut: Palestine Research Center, 1969. 254 p. Paper.

Good historical background as introduction, with substantial and important documents of Fateh, DPFLP and PFLP, including interviews with leaders.

Stetler, Russell, ed. *Palestine: The Arab-Israeli Conflict.* San Francisco: Ramparts, 1972. With photographs by Jeffrey Blankfort. 297 p. Paper.

Collection of essays, programs of the various resistance organizations, interviews, and the remarkable "Diary of a Resistance Fighter," written during September 1970.

*Palestine Lives: Interviews with Leaders of the Resistance.* Beirut: Palestine Research Center, 1973. Paper.

An insightful look into the evolution of the Palestinian Resistance as seen by leaders of the five major organizations. Questions addressed range from the relationship of the movement with the Palestinian and Jordanian masses to the role of the left in the movement.

Sharabi, Hisham. *Palestine Guerrillas: Their Credibility and Effectiveness*. Beirut: Institute for Palestine Studies, 1970. 64 p. Paper.

Still one of the best evaluations of the strengths and weaknesses of the Palestinian resistance before September 1970. Can be read as over optimistic, but objectively pinpoints the political-military conditions necessary for the movement to thrive. When these conditions disappeared (e.g., the active Suez Front), Sharabi's analysis foresaw the problem that would come quite accurately.

Chaliand, Gerald. *The Palestinian Resistance*. London: Penguin, 1972. 190 p. Paper. First published in French in 1970.

Based largely on interviews with members of the Palestinian resistance, one of the best sympathetic treatments of the movement "from the inside." Rather dated now.

Quandt, William B., Fuad Jabber and Ann Mosely Lesch. *The Politics of Palestinian Nationalism*. A RAND Corporation Research Study. Berkeley: Univ. of California, 1973. 234 p. Paper.

The best factual treatment of the Palestinian resistance, the history of the Palestine problem, and the role of the Palestine problem in inter-Arab politics. Quandt has been an advisor to Henry Kissinger, and his orientation and methodology prevent him from real sympathy with Palestinian aspirations. Lesch's piece on the Mandate period is helpful.

Cooley, John K. *Green March, Black September: The Story of the Palestinian Arabs*. London: Frank Cass, 1973.

Sympathetic account of the Palestinians as a *people*: brief history, language, art, "notables" (or "success stories"), emphasis on their revolution, its strengths, weaknesses and future. Semi-journalistic, but well researched with much insight and many interesting little on-the-spot tidbits. By a veteran Middle East correspondent who is objective, but a little "Palestino-phile."

### C. The Arabs in Israel

*MERIP Reports no. 17*, "Notes from Inside Israel," by B. T. Ross, May 1973.

Jiryis, Sabri. *The Arabs in Israel*. Beirut: Institute for Palestine Studies, 1969. 180 p. Paper.

An account of the Arab people remaining in Israel after 1948 up to the abolition of the Israeli Military Governate within Israel itself in 1966. The author, an Israeli Arab lawyer, presents the authoritative description of the legal repression of Palestinian-Israelis by the Zionist government of Israel.

Jiryis, Sabri. *Democratic Freedoms in Israel*. Beirut: Institute for Palestine Studies, 1972. 109 p. Paper.

A study of democratic freedoms in Israel that proves that Israel cannot be described as truly democratic, especially in its treatment of Arab citizens but also in its treatment of Jewish citizens. The author demonstrates that opposition to the Zionist concept of Israel, rather than pure racism, provokes repression of democratic freedoms.

Peretz, Don. *Israel and the Palestine Arabs*. Washington: Middle East Institute, 1958. 264 p.

Good general study, with excellent documentation of the contribution of confiscated Palestinian property to the economy of Israel.

Ben-Porath, Yoram. *The Arab Labor Force in Israel*. Jerusalem: Falk Institute, 1966. 96 p.

Most data gathered in early 1960s. Statistical information on the size and distribution of the Arab population and labor force in Israel, with comparative data on Jews. Discussion of discrimination against Arabs and use of Arab manpower. Conclusion is liberal/progressive and optimistic about closing the gap between Jews and non-Jews.

### D. Israeli Developments

*MERIP Reports no. 24*, "Israeli Economic Policy in the Occupied Areas," by Sheila Ryan, January 1974.

Bober, Arie, ed. *The Other Israel: The Radical Case Against Zionism*. See annotation above in III.D.

Eisenstadt, S. N. *The Absorption of Immigrants: A Comparative Study Based Mainly on the Jewish Community in Palestine and the State of Israel*. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1954. 275 p.

Useful statistical data included on the early history of Israel; should be read in conjunction with more recent materials. Focus on disadvantaged status of Oriental Jews.

Zahlan, Antoine. *Science and Higher Education in Israel*. Beirut: Institute for Palestine Studies, 1970. 153 p.

Statistics and analysis showing "key role universities and research play in the metabolism of the modern state." Relationship of Israeli military and its needs to scientific research, an important aspect distinguishing Israel from underdeveloped countries.

Halevi, Nadav and Ruth Klinov-Malul. *The Economic Development of Israel*. New York: Praeger, 1968. 321 p.

A general survey of Israel's economy from 1948-1965, concentrating on immigration, capital impact, and rapid growth. With 96 tables, an indispensable research tool.

Kanovsky, Eliyahu. *The Economic Impact of the Six-Day War*. New York: Praeger, 1970. 451 p.

The first major study of the economic effects of the 1967 War on Israel, the occupied territories, Jordan and Egypt. The book has sections on the pre-war economies, the war's immediate economic implications, and the post-war situation.

Brecher, Michael. *The Foreign Policy System of Israel*. New Haven: Yale Univ., 1972. 693 p.

About half of this large book is spent explaining Brecher's schematic apparatus of subsets and systems by which he purports to analyze a country's foreign policy, with Israel as a case study. This nonsense should be overlooked, because the rest of the book is crammed with useful facts, occasional insights and illuminating quotes, not just about Israel's foreign policy, but about Israeli political society, institutions and personalities.

Allon, Yigal. *Shield of David: The Story of Israel's Armed Forces*. New York: Random House, 1970. 272 p.

Full of pictures, a chatty sketch of the history of Zionist armed forces by an Israeli cabinet minister.

Handel, Michael I. *Israel's Political-Military Doctrine*. Cambridge: Harvard Univ. C.F.I.A., 1973. 73 p. Paper.

Written before the October War of 1973, future pre-occupations are about counter-terrorist activities and morale of the Israeli Defense Forces. Contains thorough historical account of the development of the military doctrine and its suffusion with political considerations.

## V. MIDDLE EAST COUNTRIES

This section includes books about contemporary political developments throughout the Middle East, and studies on specific countries. Most of the general works that are available are poor, and many countries have been inadequately treated. Considerable attention has been devoted to Egypt, Lebanon and North Africa, less to Iraq and Syria, and almost none to the other countries. For the areas with little coverage, there are always the *Area Handbooks* prepared by American University "to be useful to military and other personnel who need a compilation of basic facts." For contemporary developments in most of the countries it is necessary to consult periodical literature (see section below). In this section we have tried to select only books which are useful, omitting distorted and misleading material.

### A. General Works

Khadduri, Majid. *Political Trends in the Arab World*. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins, 1970. 298 p. Paper, 2nd ed.

A study of the main currents of contemporary Arab thought and an assessment of its relation to political movements. The author sees contemporary Arab political movements as attempting to develop systems capable of superseding the traditional Islamic system.

Be'eri, Eliezer. *Army Officers in Arab Politics and Society*. New York: Praeger, 1969. 514 p.

Interesting and well-documented treatment of the role of army officers, with attention to the implications of the petty bourgeois class position of the officer corps.

Said, Edward and Fuad Suleiman, ed. *The Arabs Today: Alternatives for Tomorrow*. Columbus, Ohio: Forum Associates, 1973. 142 p.

Collection of critical, scholarly essays presented at the Arab-American University Graduates' Convention in October 1971, all but one by Arabs, most more or less leftist. The present state of Arab language, science, society, economy, politics and revolution; why and what are the challenges.

Rodinson, Maxime. *Marxisme et Monde Musulman*. Paris: Seuil, 1972. 691 p. [in French].

Excellent collection of recent essays focusing on specific problems of the relations among Marxism, Arabism, Islam, capitalism and socialism. Highly specialized but a major contribution to development of Marxist thinking and action in the Middle East.

Agwami, M.S. *Communism in the Arab East*. New York: Asia Publishing House, 1969. 259 p.

A valuable, objective treatment of communist party activities in Arab countries, discussing their problems, achievements and defeats. Especially useful source for developments in Iraq under Qassem.

Hanna, Sami and George H. Gardner. *Arab Socialism: A Documentary Survey*. Leiden: Brill, 1969. 417 p.

Contains some important documents, including the constitution of the Baath Party and the Egyptian National Charter. The essays are liberal and not very useful.

### B. Egypt

*MERIP Reports no. 17*, "Retreat of the Revolution in Egypt," by Peter Johnson, May 1973.

Riad, Hassan. *L'Egypte Nasserienne*. Paris: Minuit, 1964. 249 p. [in French]

By far the best Marxist analysis of Egypt, and particularly of the development of the Egyptian bourgeoisie, by an Egyptian Marxist. Four chapters based on much data lead to a conclusion that the Egyptian petty bourgeoisie gradually transformed itself into a state bourgeoisie.

Abdel-Malek, Anouar. *Egypt: Military Society, the Army Regime, the Left and Social Change under Nasser*. New York: Vintage, 1968. 459 p. Paper.

By the eminent exiled Egyptian Marxist sociologist, a devastating critique of the "socialism without socialists" which was to occur without class conflict.

Hussein, Mahmud. *Class Conflict in Egypt, 1945-1970*. New York: Monthly Review, 1969. 379 p.

A highly ideological account of the rise of the "state bourgeoisie" under Nasser, unfortunately more often based on anecdotes than economic data, by a left-wing Egyptian Marxist. His basic ideology that the masses make history influences his understanding of events.

Mahfouz, Afaf el-Koshari. *Socialisme et Pouvoir en Egypte*. Paris: Librairie Generale de Droit et de Jurisprudence, 1972. 287 p. [in French]

A thorough and well-organized account of the developments of Nasserist ideology, the struggles among various tendencies, focusing on the early 1960s, from a left-Nasserist point of view.

Issawi, Charles. *Egypt in Revolution: An Economic Analysis*. London: Oxford Univ., 1963. 343 p.

A thorough and generally sympathetic study by the foremost academic expert on the Egyptian economy.

O'Brien, Patrick. *The Revolution in Egypt's Economic System: From Private Enterprise to Socialism, 1952-1965*. London: Oxford Univ., 1966. 354 p.

Excellent treatment of the political framework within which economic change has taken place. Sees the development of a "centralized market economy" determined by events more than by ideology. Useful statistical material.

Saab, Gabriel S. *The Egyptian Agrarian Reform: 1952-1962*. London: Oxford Univ., 1967. 236 p.

Well documented scholarly account.

Heikal, Mohamed. *Nasser: The Cairo Documents*. New York: Doubleday, 1973. 360 p.

Chatty and generally superficial accounts of Nasser's encounters with eleven important world figures, from John Foster Dulles to Che Guevara, by the Egyptian editor who often served as Nasser's spokesperson.

Copeland, Miles. *The Game of Nations: The Amoral Politics of Power*. London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1969. 272 p.

Remarkable account by an ex-CIA agent of US machinations in the Middle East and particularly in Egypt. Good for facts, better for insight into mentality of CIA.

Lacouture, Jean. *Nasser: A Biography*. New York: Knopf, 1973. 399 p.

The most readable and sympathetic of the several biographies which have appeared since Nasser's death.

### C. Syria

*MERIP Reports no. 25*, "Syria and the Baath Party," by John Galvani, February 1974.

Seale, Patrick. *The Struggle for Syria*. London: Oxford Univ., 1965. 344 p.

A history of Syrian politics from the end of World War II to the union with Egypt in 1958. Seale insists upon the centrality of developments in Syria as the key to understanding Arab politics at this critical period.

Rabinovich, Itamar. *Syria under the Baath: 1963-1966*. Jerusalem: Israel Universities, 1972. 276 p.

Emphasizes the role of military officers in this first period of full Baath Party rule in Syria. Based mainly on written Arabic documents and radio broadcasts, the book tends to be somewhat narrow in its total concentration on the highest echelons of the Baath, but it is useful in conjunction with Petran and Seale.

Petran, Tabitha. *Syria*. London: Ernest Benn and New York: Praeger, 1972. 284 p.

Although a general survey of Syria is included, the book concentrates mainly on recent history. Petran's antipathy to Gamal Abdul Nasser distorts her judgments on many crucial points, but more information is given on the Baath, on popular movements, and on the significance of Palestine than is available in other sources in English.

### D. Iraq

*MERIP Reports no. 12*, "The Baathi Revolution in Iraq," by John Galvani, October 1972, out of print.

Khadduri, Majid. *Republican Iraq*. London: Oxford Univ., 1969. 318 p.

The "authoritative," if unexciting, account of what happened in the first decade after the 1958 revolution. Khadduri's lack of sympathy for more leftist trends can prove irritating.

Dann, Uriel. *Iraq under Qassem*. New York: Praeger, 1970. 405 p.

A good study of Iraq from the end of the pro-British monarchy in 1958 to the coup that overthrew the government of Qassem in 1963. A generally adequate interpretation of political events, but deliberately eschews treatment of economic and social developments.

### E. Lebanon

*MERIP Reports no. 19*, "Student Protests and the Coming Crisis in Lebanon," by Samih Farsoun, August 1973.

Meo, Leila M. T. *Lebanon: Improbable Nation, A Study in Political Development*. Bloomington: Indiana Univ., 1965. 246 p.

A study in the development of the Lebanese political system, ending with the late 1950s and including an account of the 1958 civil upheaval and of Lebanon's relation to the West, especially the United States, in the Eisenhower era.

Suleiman, Michael W. *Political Parties in Lebanon: The Challenge of a Fragmented Political Culture*. Ithaca: Cornell Univ., 1967. 326 p.

An empirical study of contemporary Lebanese parties, classified by their ideological stances; and a rendition of their history, organization, platforms and current role.

Hudson, Michael C. *The Precarious Republic: Political Modernization in Lebanon*. New York: Random House, 1968. 364 p.

A study in political development in terms of current modernization theory of American academia. Includes section on political actors both inside and outside the formal establishment and analysis of formal governmental institutions.

### F. Jordan

*MERIP Reports no. 7*, "The US and Jordan: The Thrice-Rescued Throne," by Sheila Ryan and Joe Stork, February 1972.

Aruri, Naseer. *Jordan: A Study in Political Development, 1921-1965*. The Hague: Nijhoff, 1972. 206 p.

A very critical account of the Hashemite regime and its monopolization of the instruments of violence, by a Palestinian scholar.

Vatikiotis, P. J. *Politics and the Military in Jordan: A Study of the Arab Legion, 1921-1957*. New York: Praeger, 1967. 166 p.

Thorough documentation of the role of the Legion in creating and maintaining the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan.

### G. Saudi Arabia, the Peninsula and the Gulf

*MERIP Reports no. 15*, "Socialist Revolution in Arabia, A Report from the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen," by Joe Stork, March 1973.

*MERIP Reports no. 26*, "Saudi Arabia: Bullish on America," by the MERIP staff, March 1974.

*MERIP Reports no. 6*, "The Liberation of Dhofar," by Fawwaz Trabulsi, January 1972, out of print.

US House of Representatives, Committee on Foreign Affairs, Subcommittee on Near East and South Asia. *New Perspectives in the Persian Gulf*. Washington: 1973.

Goldmine of information about countries of the area with figures on US economic and military aid. Official testimony lays out US perceptions of developments.

Holden, David. *Farewell to Arabia*. New York: Walker, 1966. 266 p.

A readable account of the changes in the Peninsula in the 1960s, unsympathetic to revolutionary developments but useful as background to the present.

Bujra, Abdalla S. *The Politics of Stratification*. Oxford: Clarendon, 1971. 201 p.

First-rate presentation and analysis of changes in a traditional tribal and land-based system under pressure from "modern" capitalist elements. Based on experiences of a social anthropologist in the Hadramaut.

Wenner, Manfred. *Modern Yemen: 1918-1966*. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins, 1967. 257 p.

An academic but readable account of Yemen through 1967, with historical and sociological analysis.

O'Ballance, Edgar. *The War in the Yemen*. Hamden, Conn.: Archon, 1971. 218 p.

A detailed treatment, not without an anti-revolutionary bias, but a vast improvement over Dana Adams Schmidt's *Yemen: The Unknown War*. Schmidt's book is useful only for its insights into the mind of a right-wing journalist as an amateur political agent.

## H. Iran

*MERIP Reports no. 18*, "Iran: Ten Years After the White Revolution," by Rene Theberge, June 1973.

Nirumand, Bahman. *Iran: The New Imperialism in Action*. New York: Monthly Review, 1969. 196 p. Paper.

A good general history of the nationalist and anti-imperialist struggle in Iran from 1945 through the 1960s. Decent on the American penetration of Iran, foreign aid and oil. Deals briefly with the White Revolution and land reform. National democratic perspective.

Bill, James A. *The Politics of Iran: Groups, Classes and Modernization*. Columbus, Ohio: Merrill, 1972. 174 p.

A non-Marxist class study of the Iranian power structure. Looks at power relationships and change in terms of maintaining balance of tension between classes and points of power. An elite theory of political change.

Zabih, Sepehr. *The Communist Movement in Iran*. Berkeley: Univ. of California, 1966. 279 p.

A detailed study of the Communist movement in Iran since the early 20th century. Does not see the Communist movement in the context of Iran's political economy. No class analysis.

Zonis, Marvin. *The Political Elite of Iran*. Princeton: Princeton Univ., 1971. 389 p.

A study of the Iranian political elite, their origins, education, attitudes. Not critical of the repressive base of the existing system, but useful for information.

## I. Libya

*MERIP Reports no. 27*, "Imperialism and Revolution in Libya," by Carole Collins, April 1974.

Wright, John. *Libya*. New York: Praeger, 1969. 304 p.

General history of Libya, best on the Italian period, very uncritical of Idris and the oil companies.

## J. Algeria, Morocco, Tunisia

Amin, Samir. *The Maghreb in the Modern World*. Middlesex, Eng.: Penguin, 1970. 256 p. Paper.

Concise but comprehensive, this is the best introduction to the political economy of the Maghreb, treating all three countries. Expresses socialist concern for "putting politics in command" and development of self-reliance.

Laroui, Abdallah. *L'Histoire du Maghreb: Un Essai de Synthèse*. Paris: Maspero, 1970. 390 p. [in French]

A remarkable anti-colonial study by a Moroccan, carrying the history up to the 1930s.

Clegg, Ian. *Workers' Self-Management in Algeria*. New York: Monthly Review, 1971. 249 p. Paper.

Both a history of modern Algeria and a theoretical analysis of the revolutionary import of workers' management and of centralized versus decentralized decision-making. Concludes that workers' self-management was not revolutionary in Algeria because it lacked both a political framework and supportive institutions.

Ottaway, David and Marina Ottaway. *Algeria: The Politics of a Socialist Revolution*. Berkeley: Univ. of California, 1970. 322 p.

A detailed historical approach to the development of the Algerian revolution, the Ben Bella regime, the origins of the coup of 1965, and the early years of the Boumedienne regime.

Waterbury, John. *The Commander of the Faithful*. New York: Columbia Univ., 1970. 367 p.

Banned in Morocco. An analytical study of the modern Moroccan system emphasizing the control and manipulation of the Moroccan elite by the King, which inhibits social change.

Ayache, Albert. *Le Maroc: Bilan d'une colonisation*. Paris: Editions Sociales, 1956. 367 p. [in French.]

A Marxist analysis of Moroccan history focusing on economic exploitation. One of the rare books which talks about the growth of American imperialism in Morocco.

## VI. US POLICY, THE OIL INDUSTRY, AND THE MILITARY

This section has three parts, dealing with US policy in the Middle East region, the political economy of oil, and military strategy. Many of the books overlap in some areas with each other and with those in the previous section. Most of the books in the first part are apologies for US interests. Unfortunately, a comprehensive anti-imperialist treatment of US policy in the Middle East has yet to be written. Any dissenting views expressed in the available literature are concerned with specific policy re-orientations within the structure of imperialism. The oil part is more evenly balanced, and the books on military strategy encompass both straightforward anti-communist "containment" views and radical critiques. For this whole section, specialized periodical literature is the most important source for much of the necessary information.

### A. US Policy

*MERIP Reports no. 23*, "US Policy and the October War," by Barry Rubin, December 1973.

*Foreign Relations of the United States*. Washington: Government Printing Office. (Currently available through 1947.)

This standard documentary reference is invaluable for the period covered. Provides most of the diplomatic cables and inter-Department memoranda on policy questions, grouped by countries and by topic (e.g., petroleum interests). In the recent volumes, for example, there are hundreds of pages on Iran and Palestine.

*US Policy in the Middle East, Sept. 1956-June 1957: Documents*. Washington: Government Printing Office, 1957.

Compilation of the State Department's Historical Office on the Suez Crisis.

Campbell, John. *Defense of the Middle East*. New York: Harper, 1958. 392 p.

Written under the sponsorship of the Council on Foreign Relations, through which the corporate elite channel their foreign policy recommendations, a good account of how the US perceived and dealt with the political threats of Arab nationalism in the 50's. Much of the writing is abstract and general to the point of pablum, but it will have to serve as a key reference until the diplomatic records of the period are finally made public some decade in the future.

Safran, Nadav. *The United States and Israel*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1963. 341p.

Mostly about Israel, clear pro-Zionist and pro-imperialist orientation, by an ex-colleague and advisor of Kissinger.

Lenczowski, George, ed. *United States Interests in the Middle East*. Washington: American Enterprise Institute, 1968. 129 p. Paper.

Cold War imperialist analysis of US economic, political and strategic interests in the Middle East in the wake of the 1967 War. The final section presents the authors' estimates of the various alternatives they see for US policy in the region.

Badeau, John. *An American Approach to the Arab World*. New York: Harper and Row, 1968. 209 p. Paper.

The author has decades of experience in the Middle East as an educator and was Kennedy's Ambassador to Egypt. This essay advocates essentially a liberal policy attempting to accommodate the aspirations of Arab nationalism.

### B. Middle East Oil

*MERIP Reports nos. 20 and 21*, "Middle East Oil and the Energy Crisis," by Joe Stork, Part I: Sept. 1973; Part II: Oct. 1973.

Tanzer, Michael. *The Political Economy of Oil and the Underdeveloped Countries*. Boston: Beacon, 1970. 435 p. Paper.

Not about the Middle East, but unquestionably the best book available for understanding the structure, strategy and power of the international oil industry.

Stocking, George. *Middle East Oil*. Nashville: Vanderbilt Univ., 1970. 485 p.

The best book available on Middle East oil, by a respected economist with well-known anti-monopoly sentiments. A wealth of information, with good analysis of specific incidents or controversies, but lacking an overall focus.

Mosley, Leonard. *Power Play: Oil in the Middle East*. New York: Random, 1972.

Slick and sometimes superficial, quick reading. Less solid than Stocking, some information, but expect very little by way of decent analysis.

Adelman, M. A. *The World Petroleum Market*. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Univ., 1972.

An invaluable source of information, data, perceptions and insights. Many of Adelman's assertions and conclusions can be challenged, but the statistics, especially European market price data necessary for understanding the contradictions at work in the world oil industry in the Sixties, cannot be found in any other one place.

O'Connor, Harvey. *The Empire of Oil*. New York: Monthly Review, 1955. 372 p. *World Crisis in Oil*. New York: Monthly Review, 1962. 433 p. Paper.

In the best left muckraking tradition. Wealth of information, but both books are too long and not much analysis comes through. *Empire* focuses on domestic industry, *Crisis* on the international.

Ridgeway, James. *The Last Play*. New York: Dutton, 1973. 446 p.

Focus on the domestic machinations of the oil industry, particularly on the acquisition of coal and other competing energy sources. Basic financial and corporate data is laid out company by company, including financial institutions.

Congressional hearings are a rich source of information on the oil industry. Check under the following committees and sub-committees: House and Senate Interior, House and Senate Foreign Affairs and Foreign Relations, House Small Business, Senate Anti-trust and Monopoly Subcommittee of Judiciary, and Joint Atomic Energy Committee.

## C. Military and Strategic

*MERIP Reports no. 30*, "Military Strategy and the Political Economy of Arms in the Middle East," by Chris Paine, August 1974.

Klare, Michael T. *War Without End: American Planning for the Next Vietnams*. New York: Knopf, 1972. 464 p. Vintage paper.

By far the most comprehensive study of US military strategy from a radical perspective. Deals successively with the shift from deterrence to counterinsurgency under Kennedy, the defense research establishment, "rapid deployment strategy," "electronic battlefield," "mercenaryization," and the Kissinger doctrine. Of special relevance to the Middle East is the chapter entitled "Strategic Mobility and Intervention"—the "Doctrine of Rapid Deployment"—which deals with the C-5A strategic airlift (as during the October War) and the "instant air base" concept, the military expression of the "low profile" Nixon Doctrine.

Safran, Nadav. *From War to War: The Arab-Israeli Confrontation, 1948-1967*. New York: Pegasus, 1969. 464 p. Paper.

An analysis of the use of "coercion" in the Arab-Israeli conflict by a Harvard Zionist academic. Concentrates on the US-Soviet role, neglects the Palestinians; much detail on military expenditures, US and Soviet cooperation seen as the determining factor in any settlement. "Well worth the attention of the military reader," says *Military Review*.

Hurewitz, J. C. *Middle East Politics: The Military Dimension*. New York: Praeger, 1969. 553 p.

A study by a prominent "official" academic of the military as an agent for "modernization" in the Middle East. Published for the Council on Foreign Relations, it contains much useful information despite the obvious pro-US slant.

Hurewitz, J. C. ed. *Soviet-American Rivalry in the Middle East*. New York: Praeger, 1969. 250 p. Paper.

Prepared by the Academy of Political Science, Columbia University; sixteen essays by "official" academics covering: "The Struggle for Military Supremacy," "Economic Competition," "The Cultural Contest," "The Quest for Stability."

Insight Team of the *Sunday Times* (London). *Insight on the Middle East War*. London: Andre Deutsch, 1974. 230 p. Paper.

An admirably objective day-to-day account of the October War, concentrating largely on the military aspect, but with some attention paid to the diplomatic maneuvering. Interesting appendix compares Arab and Israeli weaponry.

*The Military Balance*. London: International Institute for Strategic Studies.

An inventory of the military forces and equipment of most nations.

*The Arms Trade with the Third World*. Stockholm: Stockholm International Peace Research Institute.

Details all major arms transfers to the Third World since 1946.

*The US Military Apparatus: A Handbook*. New York: North American Congress on Latin America.

Contains information on US military commitments in the Middle East, military and arms sales, and weapons systems.

## VII. PERIODICALS

The following selection of periodicals and newspapers concentrates on materials available in the US. Inclusion in the list has been based either on usefulness of the publication for information and/or analysis of the Middle East, or because of the necessity to express cautions about the interpretations given in some sources that are commonly available.

Key: a., annual; q., quarterly; m., monthly; bi-w., bi-weekly; w., weekly; d., daily.

### A. General Business Periodicals and Newspapers

The most useful sources in this category are: *Fortune*, m.; *Forbes*, w.; *Business Week*, w.; *Journal of Commerce*, d.; *Wall Street Journal*, d. These publications give regular coverage of financial and economic developments relating to the Middle East, from the point of view of the corporate elite.

### B. Middle East Economics

More analytic and specialized coverage of economic developments in the area from a capitalist perspective is provided by: *The Quarterly Economic Review(s)*, published by the Economist Intelligence Unit, London, separately for virtually every country of the Middle East; *Overseas Business Report(s)*, for each country in the region by the US Dept. of Commerce; *Foreign Economic Trends*, a., a summary business analysis for each country from US embassies; *Middle East & African Economist*, m., a compilation of economic information; *Middle East Economic Digest*, London, a general summary and analysis. For a leftist perspective, a new publication from Paris, *Economiste du Tiers Monde*, bi-m., is recommended.

### C. Oil

For monitoring the oil industry, consult: *Platt's Oilgram*, w., mainly domestic; *Middle East Economic Survey*, from companies' point of view; *Arab Oil and Gas*, more nationalistic; *Petroleum Intelligence Weekly*.

### D. Conventional News Summaries

Several publications are devoted to summaries and analyses of Middle East News. *Middle East Record*, Israel, is a comprehensive compilation of documents, accounts from the Arab press and radio, and other sources, on all major developments in the area. Publication of this invaluable source takes several years; the 1968 volume appeared in 1973. For more current coverage: *Arab World Daily* and *Arab World Weekly*, published by *An-Nahar*, Beirut; *Arab Report & Record*, bi-w., London; *Middle East Monitor*, bi-w.; *Mid-*

*dle East Journal*, q., summary at end of each issue; *Swasia* (S.W. Asia & North Africa), includes section of translations from the Hebrew and Arab press; *Palestine Digest*, m., reprints mainly from the US press; *Viewpoint*, m., Jerusalem, an excellent source of translations and commentary from the entire spectrum of the Israeli press; *Daily News Bulletin*, a US Zionist publication from the Jewish Telegraphic Agency. *Arab World Weekly* contains interesting longer pieces of analysis. *Arab Report & Record*, *Middle East Monitor* and *Viewpoint* are important sources.

### E. Conventional Journalism

Caution must be exercised in reading the Western press on the Middle East. The wire services are particularly erratic, but many of the reporters for individual newspapers and radio/television networks are equally unreliable. The best coverage and analysis among those available in the US is provided by *Le Monde*, d., Paris (in French). The best US coverage is in *The Christian Science Monitor*, John Cooley's articles only. Other useful newspapers: *New York Times*, but be careful of Juan de Onis; *Washington Post*, especially Jim Hoagland; *The Times* (London); *The Guardian* (London); *The Jerusalem Post*; *L'Orient-Le Jour* and *The Daily Star*, Beirut; *Kayhan* (Iranian government, overseas weekly), a propaganda sheet. The monthly *Le Monde Diplomatique*, Paris (in French), often includes very good leftist articles on the Middle East.

For news periodicals of the same type: *Aramco World*, m., and *Middle East International*, m., London. The latter frequently has useful articles, but tends to be pro-imperialist.

### F. Leftist News Sources

General anti-imperialist news services that give some coverage of the Middle East, though rarely very extensive, are: *Tricontinental News Service* (TNS); *Intercontinental Press*; and *Liberation News Service* (LNS). *Israeleft* is a news service published by anti-Zionist Jews in Israel. The People's Democratic Republic of Yemen publishes a news summary in English, called *Sawt al-Thawra*. Many of the liberation fronts and organizations put out bulletins, newspapers or other publications in English, of varying interest and value. For details on these publications, write to MERIP. Unfortunately, most leftist Middle East publications have no English edition.

### G. Leftist Periodicals and Newspapers

The most useful leftist material on the Middle East, aside from books, is in periodical literature. For analysis and information in the US, *MERIP Reports*, m., is clearly the most complete. *Resistance in the Middle East*, q., provides translations from non-English European sources, but has a Trotskyist orientation. *The Gulf Solidarity Bulletin*, London, irregular, is a major source of information on liberation struggles in the Gulf and Peninsula. In French, *Afrique-Asie*, bi.-w., and *Jeune Afrique*, bi.-w., are often good sources of information and analysis. *Israel & Palestine*, m., provides news analysis especially of Israel, but has its own somewhat unusual perspective. *Al-Jabha*, Paris (in French) is a publication that

is well informed on Yemen and Dhofar.

Among general leftist periodicals, the best analytical material on the Middle East has appeared in *Monthly Review*; *New Left Review*, London; and *Socialist Revolution*. The articles in *Liberation* and *Ramparts* have been of uneven quality. The only left newspaper that attempts regular analysis of the Middle East is *The Guardian*, w., although unfortunately in recent months it has left this task to Wilfred Burchett.

### H. Academic Journals

In this category there are two sources that stand out as important for basic information and research, though the analysis varies from article to article. *The Journal of Palestine Studies*, q., Beirut, concentrates on the Palestine question exclusively, and has excellent documents and news summaries. *The Middle East Journal*, q., has long been the prime source for publication of research articles from US academics. Material appears in many other journals, but these are best found through periodical indices.

## VIII. BOOKS IN PREPARATION

The books listed in this section are studies by leftist writers that we feel promise to be of interest. In several cases they will represent the first serious leftist study of the country in question. In other cases they promise to add new and important material to what has already been published. We have listed the works alphabetically and without comment, since we have not been able to see the final content.

Batuta, John. A study based on ten years' research on Iraq.

Chomsky, Noam. A collection of his essays on Israel, that have appeared in *Liberation*, *Ramparts* and elsewhere. With an introduction by Irene Gendzier.

Davis, Uri, Martin Blatt and Paul Kleinbaum. On draft resistance in Israel from 1948 to 1972. To be published by Longman's, England, fall 1974.

First, Ruth. On Libya. To be published by Penguin, October 1974.

Halliday, Fred. On Saudi Arabia. Penguin, spring 1974 and in the US by Random House.

Hussein, Mahmoud. On the October War. To be published by Seuil, spring 1974 [in French].

Ryan, Sheila and George Cavalletto. On the Palestinians.

Stork, Joe. (MERIP). *Middle East Oil and the Energy Crisis*, a revision and expansion of *MERIP Reports nos. 20 and 21*. To be published by Monthly Review Press, fall 1974.

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## CURRENT EVENTS

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### A POLITICAL EVALUATION OF THE ARAB OIL EMBARGO

On March 18 the Arab oil producing states announced the formal end of the embargo that had been placed on the export of Arab oil to the United States just five months earlier. Crude oil production cutbacks were similarly rescinded. The demands raised by the Arab producers last October—mainly the total evacuation by Israel of the territories occupied in 1967 and 1973—have not been met. In the Middle East, the question of whether Secretary of State Kissinger's success in securing a disengagement between Israeli and Egyptian forces represents a "revolution" in U.S. policy, thus justifying the end of the embargo, has split the Arab states along familiar radical-reactionary lines. In the United States, gasoline and other petroleum products are available again, at markups of 30% (gasoline) and 55% (home heating oil). The major oil companies operating in the Middle East (and elsewhere) are turning profits of more than \$1 per barrel, tripling the rate of the last few years.

The embargo deserves to be analyzed on a political and an economic level. The role of the embargo in supporting or promoting the OPEC price hikes of October and January must be treated in more detail than can be provided here. It is perhaps enough to note that the overall economic effects of the oil embargo include a sharp increase in the revenues of the oil companies as well as the producing countries, and a temporary strengthening of the U.S. economic position with regard to the rest of the capitalist world. The principal economic effect of the embargo has not been to harm the economies of the western countries, but to provide a crisis atmosphere of relatively short duration in which long-term policies have been set which share the common feature of sharply higher prices for energy resources. As usual, these effects hit hardest low-income persons and groups domestically, and the non-oil producing countries of Asia, Africa and Latin America internationally. (See the report of industry-financed Conference Board Energy Information Center as reported in *Journal of Commerce*, 31 January 1974.)

Most of the published figures purporting to demonstrate the effectiveness of the oil embargo are contradictory and self-serving. Before the embargo, when the Administration was interested in minimizing the potential threat of the embargo in the face of the U.S. decision to supply Israel with \$2.2 billion in military assistance, it was pointed out that the Arab producers supplied only 6% of U.S. crude imports. A month later, when the effectiveness of the embargo had to be asserted in order to deflect criticism of the companies for shortages and dislocations, the percentage was upped to account for imports of refined products from Caribbean and European refineries dependent on Arab oil. Between early October and late November various statements by Interior Department and State Department spokesmen assessed US imports from the Middle East as ranging from 1.2 million

barrels per day to 3 million b/d. These wild and ever-growing estimates certainly helped create the panic buying and price hikes in the months since. (See the articles from the *Philadelphia Inquirer* reprinted in *Congressional Record*, 30 January 1974, pp. S 774-88.)

Reliable statistics include the following: U.S. crude imports for 1973 were averaging, before the embargo, about 5.6 million b/d, of which 1.2 million b/d were from Arab countries, and half of that from Saudi Arabia. The U.S. was importing another ½ million b/d in products, refined from Arab crude supplies. Thus Arab supplies accounted for about 27% of U.S. oil imports and about 10% of total U.S. consumption, which is running about 17 million b/d. The Arab cutoff on U.S. military oil needs in Europe and Asia, which would have to be made up from domestic sources, would add to the total impact, but these figures, even estimates, are hard to come by. Assuming a totally effective embargo, then U.S. oil supplies would be reduced by about 10%. In fact, however, through January at least, it was widely reported that at least 700,000 b/d from Arab sources was "leaking" into this country (*Journal of Commerce*, Jan. 31, 1974) and into Caribbean and other refineries whose products are destined for the U.S.

The embargo on the United States (plus Holland, Portugal, South Africa and Rhodesia) was accompanied by a general cutback in Arab crude production which at its height in December amounted to about 25% of September levels, or close to 4 million b/d. The effects of this cutback on the United States were offset by the increased production of non-Arab sources like Iran, Nigeria and Indonesia, and even one Arab producer, Iraq. Indonesian imports into the U.S., for example, increased by more than 3 million barrels per month, and U.S. companies purchased most of the oil auctioned off by Iran and Nigeria in December (amounting to about 43 million barrels in the case of Iran).

Production increases elsewhere did not come close to offsetting the drop in Arab production, but much of the increase did apparently find its way into the United States, resulting in a net "shortfall" of less than 1 million b/d. This was further offset by the fact that despite all the nationalization and participation agreements of the last year, the bulk of international oil trade is still in the hands of U.S. multinational companies. As a result, oil from Arab countries that would have gone to the United States was routed to non-embargoed countries of Europe and Japan, and oil from other sources, like Iran and Nigeria, was transferred to the United States. The net result was to offset most of the burden of the embargo from the United States to those other consuming countries. Great Britain, which was to be fully supplied with Arab oil, found its imports drop by 19% in November from the previous month, with imports from Iran and Nigeria down 35% (*Platt's Oilgram*, 17 January 1974). Similarly, Japan's imports from Arab countries declined by 25% in December, rather than the expected 10%. Japanese imports from Iran were also down

sharply (*U.S.-Japan Trade Council Newsletter*, 18 December 1973 and *Petroleum Intelligence Weekly*, 18 March 1974). U.S. imports dropped off in January and most sharply in mid-February. The initial decline can be attributed to the effect of the 25% production cutbacks of November and December. There is evidence that the February decline can be attributed to an embargo by the oil companies.

When the Shah of Iran suggested in a CBS interview that more oil than ever was getting into the US, energy "czar" William Simon accused him of "inexcusable and reckless remarks." Actually, the Shah had said much the same thing almost two months earlier, while relaxing in St. Moritz. Simon's response then was to have the Commerce Department quietly classify all information regarding the origin of crude imports (*Platt's Oilgram*, Jan. 2 and 7, 1974), and to publicly assert that the embargo was "fully effective." After this first tiff in memory between a Shah and a "czar," the American Petroleum Institute told the *Journal of Commerce* that the "Shah's remarks may have had some validity a few weeks ago, when there was substantial leakage. Lately, though, we've seen a dramatic drop in our imports which indicates that the embargo has become very tight." (Feb. 26, 1974)

According to a Sunoco executive, leakage at that time was running as much as 2 million b/d (*NYT*, Feb. 22, 1974). While that estimate seems exaggerated, it is clear that the "dramatic drop in our imports" was related to a shared policy of the major companies to stop importing crude oil which they would have to share with small independent refiners under the allocation system mandated by Congress. While Simon was proclaiming the effectiveness of the embargo, the companies were openly suggesting that as much as one million b/d were available if the allocation rules were revised (*NYT* and *Journal of Commerce*, Feb. 22, 1974). Crude imports over the embargo period were up 11% from the previous winter, and on March 1, US stocks of crude and refined products were 7.8% higher than the previous year (*NYT*, March 27, 1974). Gasoline shortages evaporated in March, although the embargo was still officially on. Perhaps some explanation lies in the fact that companies like Chevron (Standard of California) were raking in an extra *half-million dollars per day* thanks to the price hikes (*NYT*, April 12, 1974).

More exact figures on "leakage" are available now that the Commerce Department has declassified the crude import data over the embargo period. Libya, which was blamed in the media for most of the leakage, did export 4.8 million barrels in November and 1.2 million barrels in December to the US, but none after that. Imports from Saudi Arabia, however, were much higher, amounting to 18 million barrels in November and 7 million barrels in December. Moreover, Saudi oil continued to flow in, albeit at a sharply reduced rate, in January (257,187 barrels) and February (552,212 barrels). Tunisia, Algeria, Kuwait and the United Arab Emirates were responsible for small shipments during the embargo. The figures released do not clarify the extent to which oil imported from Europe came from Arab sources; it is fair to presume that most of it did. Refined products, also not accounted for in the Commerce Department figures, also added to the oil flow into this country. Imports of crude and refined products over the embargo period averaged 5 million barrels a day, down from 6 million in September. This one million b/d shortfall is much closer to our original estimate than to the 2.7

million b/d figure bandied about by Simon and the international companies (*Wall Street Journal*, April 9, 1974).

It is not too surprising that in the face of the facts the giant companies like Exxon and Socal continue to assert that they were not responsible for any leakage. One would be shocked to find them telling the truth for a change. More astounding is the recent virtuoso performance by Simon, now promoted to Treasury Secretary, in asserting that "not one drop" of crude was leaked from Saudi Arabia, even though imports from that country were only half the normal rate during the embargo. Using the conjurer's tricks he learned while becoming a multimillionaire Wall Street investment banker, Simon has tried to convince us that it took up to four months for Saudi oil to reach US ports, a trip that normally takes four to six weeks. Small wonder that Simon's assistant administrator Eric Zausner, when pressed by the *Journal of Commerce* for a "clarification," admitted that "I've had a rough time sorting out these numbers myself." (April 10, 1974)

The most significant consequences of the Arab embargo were not related to the US economy but to the struggle for political hegemony in the Middle East. Saudi Arabia's political credibility was at stake with the outbreak of the October War: Faisal had to take charge of the moves to use the "oil weapon" or face the popular wrath of the Arab world for failure to do so. Twice before, in 1948 and 1967, pressures to use the "oil weapon" were resisted or sidestepped by Saudi Arabia (in 1956 there was a brief embargo of supplies to Britain and France). The week-long embargo of 1967 was turned around at the Khartoum conference that August with a Saudi-sponsored resolution that "nothing should be done to impair the financial capability of the Arab oil producing states to back the united Arab effort, and that the responsibility for deciding on appropriate measures should be left to the producing countries themselves . . ." (*Middle East Economic Survey*, September 1, 1967). The promise of large financial subsidies to the war-wrecked Egyptian economy bought Nasser's acquiescence to this "moderate and realistic" approach.

What Nasser submitted to, Sadat sought out. For more than a year preceding the October War, Sadat moved internally to transform Egypt into a private-enterprise economy open to Saudi and other capital investments and allied with the United States rather than the Soviet Union internationally. The "oil weapon" was one instrument to achieve this. Before the war, it seemed sufficient for Faisal to merely *talk* about not raising production. Once the war broke out, Faisal had to put up or shut up.

As it was, the Arab oil ministers did not meet until October 17, more than ten days after the war started. At that meeting the oil ministers agreed to initiate across-the-board cuts of 5% per month on production until Israel had withdrawn from the occupied territories. Faisal blocked stronger proposals for an embargo of the US and, of course, refused to follow the Iraqi example of nationalizing American oil interests. Only the next day, after evidence of President Nixon's intent to sponsor \$2.2 billion in military aid to Israel was irrefutable, did Saudi Arabia consent to an embargo. Faisal certainly intended to pressure the US into taking a more "pro-Arab" stand, but he was also compelled to participate in the embargo or face

a loss of power in the Arab world, and perhaps even his throne. At the end of October, Saudi Oil Minister Yamani told a visiting delegation of US Congressmen that "King Faisal has done his best in the last two weeks to represent American interests. . . We did not want the embargo. We hope that we can do something, but there must be something that we can show as change. . ." ("United States Oil Shortage and the Arab-Israel Conflict," *Report of a Study Mission to the House Foreign Affairs Committee*, Dec. 20, 1973, p. 51).

The Arab oil ministers met again on November 4 and decreed a 25% cutback. A further cut of 5% for December was waived as a "gesture" towards Japan and the European community in response to their "balanced" statements. A decision of December 8 to apply an additional 5% cutback in January was rescinded on December 24 and replaced with a decision to *increase* production by 10%, resulting in a net reduction of 15% from pre-war levels. This brought total Arab production to 18 million b/d, equal to the 1973 average but less than the September average. Increased production from Iraq brought the total reduction to only 12.5% (*Arab Oil and Gas*, Jan. 1, 1974). This increase in production, coupled with the decrease in demand and increased production by non-Arab sources, created a rough equilibrium of supply and demand at very high prices. Throughout December and January the intention of Saudi Arabia to lift all restrictions soon was well publicized by Minister Yamani during his trip to the US. Such a decision was evidently planned, under Saudi and Egyptian initiative, for the February 14 meeting that was sabotaged by President Nixon's State of the Union remarks on the subject.

The embargo was finally ended over the determined opposition of Syria and Libya, with Algeria insisting that the lifting was only temporary. Criticism of the decision has been strong among leftist and nationalist forces in the Arab world: by neutralizing the Egyptian front and now the oil weapon, Kissinger, with the help of Sadat and Faisal, has created a situation in which Israel is no longer on the defensive. At the meeting where the embargo was lifted Saudi Arabia and Egypt specifically vetoed a proposal to make the lifting only temporary. According to the *New York Times'* account: "On the major issues of the embargo and oil prices decided here, Saudi Arabia virtually imposed conditions that were closely in line with American desires, with considerable risk to the unity of the Arab countries and the world's major oil-producing nations." (March 20, 1974) Saudi production is now 8.5 million b/d, above the pre-embargo level, and Aramco has been given clearance to expand capacity to 11.5 million b/d by next year.

Saudi-American interests have been further cemented by recent official agreements to expand economic, political and military ties "in ways that will enhance stability in the Middle East." The initial concrete focus of the agreements is on internal security: Prince Fahd, Faisal's brother and the head of a delegation coming soon to Washington for talks with Kissinger and Nixon, is Minister of Interior as well as head of the Economic Affairs Committee. The latest agreement has been a US commitment to re-equip and train the National Guard, responsible for the security of Faisal and the Royal House and also stationed around the oil production facilities. At least 5,000 guardsmen have been guarding Aramco fields since

1967. The *Washington Post* (April 6, 1974) reports that two large fires at Aramco's Ras Tanura refinery last year were caused by Palestinian sabotage. Only by beefing up his security forces will Faisal feel confident of refusing to participate in any future embargo. The new program will expand the National Guard by at least two battalions.

The new agreement comes on the heels of an earlier announcement that the US would provide \$750 million worth of equipment and training for an expanded Saudi navy. A Defense Department team is due in late April to study the Saudi Air Force's weapons requirements for the next five years. The Saudis have recently contracted to buy 200 F-5 fighters, and want to get the A-7 Corsair (an improved version of the A-4 Skyhawk) and the F-14 Tomcat. A \$200 million contract was recently concluded with Raytheon for the modernization of the Saudi Hawk anti-aircraft system.

These new arms deals represent, among other things, a displacement of the British, for whom Saudi Arabia has been the largest arms customer. US sources say that official US military advisers will not increase in number much beyond the present 200. However, there will be a large influx of former military men now working as trainers and advisers for US arms firms like Northrop, Raytheon, Bendix and Lockheed. (*Washington Post*, April 6, 1974).

The situation just a month after the end of the embargo finds US-Saudi ties stronger than ever, and Saudi strength in the Arab world at an all time high. Both countries are gearing up for the time, perhaps soon, when the contradictions will prevent Faisal from playing both sides of the fence.

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## FALL OF THE HOUSE THAT NASSER BUILT

After two decades of "Arab socialism," foreign businessmen are once again descending on Egypt. Since the October War, President Anwar al-Sadat has undertaken a series of measures aimed at attracting foreign capital and encouraging private investment. The new measures, which include provisions for the setting up of duty free zones where foreign companies will be able to utilize cheap Egyptian labor in order to produce for export, and the opening of banking and insurance — previously nationalized — to private capital, represent a significant victory for the coalition of state managers and private capitalists who openly began to push for such policies after Israel's victory in the 1967 war.

Sadat's initiatives in foreign policy are part of the long range plans of Egypt's public/private bourgeoisie to develop the country through foreign private investment, primarily Western and Saudi. "The seed money," writes *Business Week*, "for an economic upsurge has been pouring into Egypt by the billions of dollars in the form of subsidies from Saudi Arabia and the other Persian Gulf states for Egypt's war effort and reconstruction. Japan and European countries, anxious to cultivate good relations with the Arab world, are offering big development loans. Now private investors — Arabs,

Europeans, Americans, and Japanese – also are eyeing Egypt as potentially the biggest market in the Arab world.” In a February interview, the Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Finance, Economy & Foreign Trade, Abdul Aziz Hegazi, stated in reference to the nationalization of foreign holdings under Nasser, “We have to give ironclad guarantees that this sort of thing will not happen again. Without them, people will not come back and I do not really blame them. . . We need foreign money and technology to develop, and we will get it as best we can.”

The immediate origin of the current liberalization measures was a meeting last summer that Sadat is reported to have held with a delegation of Arab businessmen, who told him they were interested in investing in Egypt, “but only if Sadat toned down the country’s socialism and gave guarantees that investments would not be nationalized and that they would be able to repatriate their profits.”

The *Business Week* report continued:

Some signs of liberalization are already appearing. Egypt has offered tax incentives and established a “parallel” financial market with preferential rates for foreign exchange transactions. Repatriation of profits is becoming easier. Says an executive of pharmaceutical maker Pfizer, Inc., which has had a plant in Cairo with Egyptian private partners, since 1962: “Although we have made money always, we just sent our first dividend back to the home office.”

Both David Rockefeller, Chairman of the Chase Manhattan Bank, and Robert McNamara, President of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, have visited Cairo in recent months for talks with Sadat: Chase Manhattan plans to lend Egypt \$80 million for the construction of the Suez-Mediterranean (SUMED) pipeline; McNamara offered aid for canal clearance and reconstruction in the canal zone. The Chase has also recently announced plans to open a representative office and full-service branches in Egypt, the first direct US banking representation in Egypt since 1956.

The US government’s Export-Import (Exim) Bank announced in January that it had extended a direct loan and guarantees totaling \$100 million for the construction of the SUMED pipeline – it was the bank’s first loan to Egypt in over ten years. Kuwait, Libya, and Japan are reportedly providing a total of \$1.5 billion for Egyptian development projects.

The Egyptian International Bank for Trade and Development, set up last year by Egyptians to promote investments, has formed a holding company with participation from Kuwait and Abu Dhabi for real estate and tourist ventures in Egypt. Projects costing around \$100 million include three new Sheraton hotels, a Hilton, and possibly a Holiday Inn and a Marriott motor inn.

Sadat has ambitious plans to make Cairo an international center. The new official policy is that organizations should be encouraged to make their headquarters in Cairo, communications abroad should be facilitated through telex and telephone development, and the world press and broadcasting services should be encouraged to have offices in Cairo. Other aspects of the policy include fewer restrictions on foreign correspondents, duty-free zones for tourists, the development of Cairo

as an international center for students, and increased importation of foreign books, newspapers, and periodicals. *Al-Ahram* announced on March 1 that British and French teachers, expelled by Nasser during the Suez crisis of 1956, would be welcome to return to Egypt.

Taking advantage of the loosening of curbs on the freedom of the press, right-wing critics have stepped up their attacks on Nasser: Saud Fakhri Abdul-Nour, writing in *Al-Ahram* on March 9, said the seizure of property which affected some 15,000 people during the Nasser era, was a “barbarian act belonging to the Middle Ages and a weapon of material and moral terrorism.” Abdul-Nour was replying to those who opposed compensation and the return of property on the grounds that it would be a return to capitalism and a burden on the budget. That, he said, was the “logic of thieves and gangsters.” Portraits of Nasser at Arab Socialist Union headquarters and elsewhere have been replaced with double-sized portraits of President Sadat.

Long range plans, under the jurisdiction of the Egyptian Free Zone Authority, include the establishment of duty-free zones near Alexandria, Port Said, Suez City, and Cairo. According to Hegazi, the newly constituted authority may create such zones for individual companies almost anywhere. General Tire and Rubber and Union Carbide are already investigating the possibility of setting up operations in such zones; the agency says it is discussing \$500 million worth of projects with foreign investors, including a big refinery in Alexandria that would be built by an Italian consortium.

According to *Business Week*, most of the American businessmen passing through Cairo in recent months have been representatives of construction firms trying to nail down a share of the estimated \$7 billion which will be spent on rebuilding war-devastated cities such as Suez and Ismailia, and on developing a unified industrial and agricultural plan for the entire canal region.

In addition to such projects as clearing the canal and rebuilding war-damaged cities, the Egyptian economic managers plan heavy agribusiness investments both at home and in nearby Sudan.

Despite the vast sums of money flowing into Egypt, the country is still mired in a desperate economic situation. Food is short and inflation rampant. The population is growing rapidly and the amount of arable land has not kept pace. The Sadat regime is negotiating with the UN to receive \$70 million in food, and the Nixon Administration has included \$250 million for Egypt in its foreign aid requests, primarily for repairing war damage and rebuilding trade with the US.

The direction of economic development is not difficult to predict. As Sadat’s new policy unfolds, it will almost certainly favor the resurgent Egyptian bourgeoisie, who are the President’s principal supporters. There is also every likelihood that conservative Arab oil money, seeking a quick return, will gravitate towards luxury real estate and tourism, creating a host of menial servant jobs in order to solve, in Sadat’s phrase, “the pressing problem of the masses.”

## POST-GOLDA POLITICS IN ISRAEL

The Israeli Labor Party's nomination of Yitzhak Rabin to form a new government appears to be a last ditch effort by the discredited party leadership to maintain control of the Israeli political bureaucracy. Ex-Chief of Staff Rabin is a political neophyte within the in-grown ranks of the Labor Party, having only recently been appointed to the Cabinet after a five-year stint as Israeli ambassador to the United States.

Rabin's first task will be inside the Labor Party, where the fall-out from the October War has torn the factions apart. Defense Minister Dayan's hawkish Rafi faction has been flirting with the right-wing Likud coalition since after the elections, attempting to keep Dayan in his crucially important post. The more dovish elements within the party have been sniping at Dayan. The Gush faction in the center, held together by Golda Meir and the power-brokers of the bureaucracy, held on to Dayan in the face of popular and party pressure to remove him, in an attempt to keep the whole house of cards from falling down.

Despite propaganda about Israeli democracy, the country has always been ruled by a top-down party apparatus set up before the State of Israel was even created. The party lists in Israel's at-large elections have been decided in private by a small group of party leaders, and the voters have been simply presented with the slate. This method of choosing candidates became particularly scandalous after the postponement of elections following the October War. In face of popular pressure to open the list, the Labor Party went right ahead with the same list and platform prepared in the summer. That party arrogance took its toll. The Labor Party lost votes; Golda Meir took almost two months to form a government after the December elections; and on April 10, little more than a month later, Golda Meir resigned and the government fell.

The arrogant underestimation of Arab military potential and the over-riding of post-war popular opinion have led sectors of the usually docile Israeli electorate to react. The focus of protest has been Moshe Dayan, whom people saw as bearing the major responsibility for the October setbacks. With the election list frozen Dayan maintained his high post after the vote. Opposition to him within the party structure was handled by a series of deft compromises, but popular opinion rallied behind the protest originated by an Army reservist, Motti Ashkenazi, an October War hero. During the winter thousands came into the streets to demand Dayan's ouster. Meir and Dayan ignored the protests.

Meir's calm was finally broken by the response to the interim report prepared by a judicial commission appointed to look into the state of military preparedness before the October War. The Agranat Commission, which did not look into any political or diplomatic failures, came out in early April with a report highly critical of Israel's Chief of Staff, David Elazar, and other top military and intelligence personnel. Elazar resigned immediately, but since the report pointed indirectly to political mistakes at a higher level, it served as a focus for the mounting anti-Dayan sentiment. Just before a scheduled

vote of confidence called for by the Likud, Meir and her cabinet resigned, knowing they would lose the vote, and hoping to keep the options open for the Labor Party. A vote of "no-confidence" would probably have led quickly to elections, and the Labor Party is afraid of the advances which would accrue to the Likud, which already holds 39 Knesset seats.

The right-wing coalition of the Likud added 7 seats to its Knesset contingent in the December elections. It commands increasing support among Israel's population because it represents an alternative to the status quo of Labor Party rule. Paradoxically, although it certainly represents the interests of the growing sector of private capital in Israel, it received many votes from the poorest sections of the large cities, outpacing the Labor Party. Many of these poor are Sephardim, or Oriental Jews, who vote for the opposition because they have not been getting what they need from the incumbents.

The Gush faction and the left in the Labor Party will probably resist any move toward a coalition with the Likud as a way towards getting a Knesset majority to support a new government, because they fear loss of their political hegemony. To make up the majority, they will probably seek an alliance, as did Golda Meir in February, with the National Religious Party (NRP), whose leaders seek to tighten Orthodox religious control over Israeli life. The NRP seeks to obtain a ruling that only Jews who meet the Orthodox definition of "who is a Jew" can become citizens of Israel. For the establishment Zionists who want to keep the doors of immigration open to as many "Jews" as possible, the NRP's definition is anathema. In fact, many Jews from the Soviet Union may be discouraged from immigrating because of uncertainty about mixed marriages, or conversions, which might disqualify them from citizenship under the NRP definition.

Real political pressure against the religious laws comes from the United States, where most Jews are not Orthodox, but either Conservative or Reform. While forming a cabinet in the winter, Golda Meir resisted the NRP's demands until a delaying compromise was worked out.

An interesting and unique element in Israeli politics, usually overlooked by commentators, is the relation of the Zionist parties in Israel to "world Jewry," or rather to Jewish factions outside Israel. The close ties that are maintained, particularly with American Jewry, affect the policies of the parties inside Israel. The top-down methods of Israeli politics has made this particularly easy.

Even before the October War Israel was facing serious economic and diplomatic problems, and the Palestine resistance movement was gaining new strength, especially in Lebanon. The War made all these things worse for the Zionist rulers.

Economically the war was tremendously costly, not only in terms of personnel and material, but also because of the slowdown in production. Post-war inflation has doubled the price of many necessities, and new war taxes and cutbacks of government subsidies have hurt everyone. Israeli exports are becoming less competitive on the world market even though the government subsidizes export industries.

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## BOOK REVIEW

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*LIBERATION*, Volume 18, No. 6, February 1974.

*The New Anti-Semitism*, by Arnold Forster and Benjamin R. Epstein, copyright by Anti-Defamation League of the B'nai B'rith. New York: Mc-Graw-Hill, 1974. 354 p. \$2.95.

This is not so much a review of a magazine and a book, as it is an attempt to grapple with a significant phenomenon. This reviewer is hard-pressed to remember when a single speech has sent as strong shock waves through American intellectual circles as the October 19, 1974 remarks of Father Daniel Berrigan before the annual meeting of the Association of Arab-American University Graduates, in Washington, D.C.

It would be difficult to catalog the major publications of the left, right, and center which have felt obliged to print responses to Berrigan's strongly-worded attack on Israeli and Arab policies. *The New York Times*, *New York Post*, *Village Voice*, *Washington Post*, *Baltimore Sun*, *Ramparts*, *WIN Magazine*, *Commonweal*, *American Report*, and *Commentary* (to name only those we have seen) have each printed one or more articles of varying degrees of insight, and we should say at the outset that *LIBERATION* has done a service to progressive people by publishing in one issue the controversial speech itself, along with four reasoned commentaries. Especially significant for its implications for the political left is the piece by David Dellinger, "Bringing It All Back Home." We think, it is not necessary in this context to make distinctions or to argue over whether (or which) "movement(s)" is (are) dead or being reborn—suffice it that we agree that intelligent spokespeople for left ideas still have something to say to each other. Finally someone has touched the heart of the matter; it was not Berrigan, however, but Dellinger provoked by Berrigan or by the storm of vituperation hurled from all quarters, most seriously, by some who in other times have considered themselves his comrades.

To many who have tried to raise the issue of the Middle East for serious discussion amongst leftists, it has been clear that the inability to deal with the struggle for Palestine has been the main impediment preventing wide discussion of and opposition to US political, military, and economic policies in the Middle East as a whole. Over and over we have heard prospective discussion nipped in the bud with the assertion that the Middle East is not like Southeast Asia or Latin America, and that any attempt to deal with it as such would be mistaken, or at least divisive of the united front against the war in Southeast Asia. For too long the simplistic statement that Israel is not South Vietnam has been allowed to obscure exactly what Israel's role is in the Middle East.

For a brief time during the late 1960's when the Palestinian resistance movement first became widely known, segments of the "movement" in the United States romantically identified with the "heroic guerrillas." The ephemeral and non-analytical nature of this identification has subsequently be-

come clear. But even those groups which have tried to raise serious discussion can be dismissed by such as the Anti-Defamation League as the "totalitarian Radical Left."

The "totalitarian Radical Left" is a catch-all category which includes the Communist Party, the Young Workers' Liberation League, the Socialist Workers Party, the Young Socialist Alliance, the Workers World Party, Youth Against War and Fascism, the Progressive Labor Party, Students for a Democratic Society, the Workers League, the Spartacus League, and the Middle East Research and Information Project (pp. 8, 125f). It was apparently defined in 1971 and not updated since then, judging from the fact that the authors of *The New Anti-Semitism* mention no later MERIP publications or activities. According to Forster and Epstein, this grouping is not taken seriously by any upstanding Americans, but is, nonetheless, extremely dangerous.

A Daniel Berrigan cannot be so easily dismissed, which is precisely why all the fuss has developed around his speech. To large numbers of Americans, Daniel Berrigan is a hero; his anti-Zionist remarks are particularly threatening to Zionists. Thus they must be quickly branded "anti-Semitism," so that no one but the lunatic fringe will consider them worthy of further discussion. This approach is the basis of Forster and Epstein's work, and indeed, that of most of Berrigan's critics: whatever is anti-Zionist is by definition anti-Semitic. It is a familiar message, one which Zionists have successfully preached for more than seventy-five years.

Statements and propaganda manifestos calling for the destruction or dissolution of Israel, or equating Israeli defense with Arab assault, are seen by Jews as attacks against themselves and world Jewry and, along with other activities supporting those sworn to destroy Israel, are perceived as the ultimate anti-Semitism.

Of course one can be unsympathetic to or oppose Israel's position on specific issues without being anti-Jewish. But many of the anti-Israel statements from non-Jewish sources, often the most respectable, carry an undeniable anti-Jewish message....

... Just as Israel's survival depends in substantial measure on support from Jews in the United States and elsewhere, Jews in the Diaspora have come to feel that their own security and the only hope for their survival as a people, in a world from which anti-Semitism has never disappeared, depends in large measure on the survival of Israel. (p. 17, emphasis added)

By that the authors mean the survival of Israel as an exclusively Jewish state. "Israeli defense" is defined *inter alia* as anything that is anti-Arab.

As Paul Loeb bitterly suggests in his short *LIBERATION* piece entitled, "Grand Illusion: American Jews and Israel," the above statement may well be an objective description of the state of mind of the self-conscious organized Jewish community (although neither the above nor Loeb's descriptions can be applied accurately to all Jews in the United States, as

can no such generalizations be applied to all the members of any ethnic group). It cannot, however, be taken seriously by critical thinkers as an objective description of reality. As Noam Chomsky says in his *LIBERATION* article, "Daniel in the Lion's Den: Berrigan and His Critics,"

Apologists for state power are always quick to identify opposition and resistance to state policy as an attack on the society and its people. In the case at hand, support for policies of the Israeli State may or may not be 'support for Israel' in any reasonable sense of this notion, and criticism of these policies must also be analyzed on its merits, free from propagandistic effusions. (p. 18)

It would not, of course, have mattered much what Berrigan actually said; any criticism of Israeli policy and actions, and the actions of American Jewish organizations, from as prestigious a source is enough to bring down the wrath of the liberal Jewish establishment along with that of otherwise progressive people who insist on taking the line of Israeli or Zionist exceptionalism (i.e., all nationalism, especially American Black nationalism, is bad, except Jewish nationalism)(see, for example, page 10 of *The New Anti-Semitism*). But, while we defend Berrigan's integrity and motivation, and agree with his critiques of Israeli government policies and actions, we cannot accept his metaphysical worldview. His understanding of resistance to destructive power as a special obligation upon religious communities compelling those communities to resist whatever the cost has been rejected as overbearing by Christian communities. His application of this conception to the Jewish people is particularly offensive. By solely understanding Jews as a religious community, he overlooks distinctions within the community, especially those of class. This kind of approach has always been a major factor in racism. Berrigan's use of the term "criminal Jewish community" in describing Israel illustrates this danger. Furthermore, Berrigan's style and tone have made his critics' task considerably easier than it need be (as, unfortunately, have the statements of many other anti-Zionists).

Paul Cowan has called Berrigan "arrogant," and a "moral imperialist." (*Village Voice*, Jan. 31, pp. 22f). After both listening to the speech and reading it several times since then, we have similar criticism of Berrigan's absolutist moral tone. Of course, as Uri Davis (the Israeli pacifist who has spent time in Israeli jails for the same or similar "crimes" as Berrigan has been imprisoned for here) has pointed out in a letter to Cowan, we all, as "sons and daughters of the Western empire," are susceptible to moralizing on a global scale. Yet one ought to enter the verbal battle better armed with the facts. Berrigan's speech is sprinkled with statements which are incorrect because they are general and simplistic in the extreme.

For instance, can anyone who has studied the subject seriously agree with Berrigan when he lumps Egypt, the "Sheikhdoms," Jordan, and Syria together and accuses them equally of "contempt for their own poor, a contempt that would be called legendary if it were not horrifyingly modern?" Or, again, who, one wonders, are the "wandering Jews" who have become the "settler Jews," the "slave masters" who have "created slaves?" The bitter and broken survivors of Dachau and Buchenwald who, literally, had no other place to go? The impoverished Arab Jews of North Africa and Yemen? One does not *have* to be a Marxist to understand about classes!

One can (no, must) understand—without in any way agreeing with them—*why* Rabbi Arthur Hertzberg or Rabbi Balfour Brickner, or Nat Hentoff can accuse Berrigan of anti-Semitism, and why Paul Cowan can accuse him of arrogance. That is precisely what Dellinger "brings back home" when he begins to formulate an answer to the issue posed by way of introduction by the editors of *LIBERATION*: "why there is such a widely observed taboo against criticism of Israel; why this is such a sensitive point in the American psyche, Jewish and non-Jewish alike, both in the movement for social change and outside it."

The answer, in our view, is anti-Semitism, clear and palpable: not the Anti-Defamation League's variety, but the real stuff: Jew-baiting, and physical persecution of Jews, *as Jews*. Anti-Semitism *does* exist, here today, as *well* as in our collective consciousness about the recent past—though the memory of the six million would, in and of itself, be sufficient to explain the paranoia and oversensitivity of American Jewish spokespeople, and their hysterical condemnation of Berrigan. Forster and Epstein present *some* of the documentation of anti-Semitism in the United States, though it is confused by, and made insignificant in comparison with their documentation of anti-Zionism. The confusion has been compounded by the fact that, although the book contains material on right-wing anti-Semitism, as well as anti-Semitic statements from leftists, subsequent press reports of the book and the authors' nationwide speaking tours which have followed, have concentrated heavily on their references to the *anti-Zionism* of the left.

It is, however, more than simple grief that keeps Americans, Jews and non-Jews alike, silent on the subject of the Middle East and the fate of the Palestinian people: it is guilt—guilt about the complicity in the death of the six million and the failure to rescue the survivors. David Dellinger puts it eloquently:

...it is worth noting that the political seriousness and personal commitment with which the Berrigans set out to help save the Vietnamese were of the order of political seriousness and personal commitment that *would have been required* to save the Jews....The non-Jewish left, for all its humanitarian or revolutionary rhetoric, equally failed to rise to the imperatives of the historic situation. It is not for us, in our own failure to rise to the imperative of our situation, to condemn either the Jews or the left of the thirties for these failings, but we should realize the heritage of self-defensiveness it has bequeathed to those who survived the holocaust.

It has long been recognized that a young child whose parents die suffers from feeling that the absent parent 'deserted' her or him. In a comparable phenomenon, survivors of the holocaust often feel that they somehow 'deserted' the victims. This is perhaps most true of Jews but certainly applies in varying degrees to non-Jews with political, religious or humanitarian commitments to human solidarity. How can I justify being alive when my relatives suffered and died? Or, in the case of non-Jews, am I, underneath, some sort of anti-Semite, since I survived, and perhaps acquiesced in, the murder of six million members of a race from whose persecution I was exempted? (p. 28, emphasis is Dellinger's)

Documented historical evidence proves that the United States government itself was complicit in the deaths of at least half of the six million, but that fact tends to reinforce, rather than alleviate the psychological pressures to which Dellinger refers. In the minds of American Jews (and others), Israel provides a vicarious victory over oppression, an expiation of guilt, costing nothing more than a tax-deductible contribution to the United Jewish Appeal. Paul Loeb says,

Israel is kicking ass in the Sinai! No longer a race of sissy intellectuals, the Jews can dish it out as well, and the bombs over Sinai become more flowers that Israel has made bloom in the desert. (p. 31)

Allen Ginsberg, in his stream-of-consciousness "Thoughts and Recurrent Musings on Israeli Arguments," is kinder:

Having established a secular state, Jews are prey to the same power politics of all states, and subject to the materialism and arrogance of power of modern states, and dehumanization caused by Nationalism, and also subject to the traditional criticisms thereof. Yet I among others was afraid to criticize lest I be accused of genocide. The recent episode of war was seen by some of my family as "Victory or Buchenwald." Was this a true appraisal? I didn't think so. (p. 14)

Loeb points out, however, that the real cost of Zionism to American Jews is far greater than the monetary support of Israel. Zionism has cost American Jews their *own* identity; they have been forced to deny their own oppression *here*:

Whatever its reality, Israel has become for American Jews a projection point for needs denied by American society. Zionism, in the sense of an uncritical identification with the militaristic Jewish state, is an intersection between our basic needs and our situation, transforming natural desires for community, for a sense of historical being, and for identification with people of a common culture, into a situation where we project the possibility of acting in (and for) our own lives onto a safely removed other. It has also allowed American Jews to ignore their own domination by separating daily life and ideals: we relegate our most human values to vicarious identification with a betrayed dream. (p. 31)

While this statement is unnecessarily sweeping and melodramatic—where have non-Jewish oppressed Americans relegated *their* most human values?—it has the ring of truth. While it has become almost a cliché to point to the large numbers of Jewish Americans who *are* engaged in confronting their own domination (in unity with others in our struggling movement), we believe that there is a direct correlation between such engagement and disinterest or hostility towards Zionism. That is, to the extent that American Jews are engaged in active struggle *here*, they will lose their need for, and begin to see the contradictions in, the vicarious other.

Paul Cowan challenged Daniel Berrigan to suggest what a young soldier in a *kibbutz* on the Israeli border should *do* about the issues raised in his speech; unfortunately, Berrigan had no answer. At the risk of being accused of moral imperialism, we suggest what we consider to be the obvious one: *resist!* Organize and support movements to oppose the Israeli government on a class basis, and support the national and civil rights of the Palestinians. We know many Israelis are doing just that: under conditions that are far less favorable than those under which the left movement(s) here strive for correct practice.

And what should we do *here* with regard to the specific question of the Middle East? Our answer is: struggle against all forms of oppression, including that unique brand of white, Western racism, anti-Semitism. To do otherwise is to fall into the Zionist trap: to deny that anti-Semitism exists is to deny reality and to permit the Zionists a free hand in defining what anti-Semitism is. Not to criticize those (even our comrades—no, especially our comrades) who in their fervent anti-Zionism, neglect to specifically draw those distinctions, is, objectively, to serve the Zionist cause, and to serve anti-Semitism. We regret that Berrigan did not address that issue, and we are glad that Dellinger touched on it.

Even more so, however, we regret that this controversy has tended to revolve around Daniel Berrigan's character, instead of more quickly focusing on the issues he raised. Some of the blame for that aspect of the phenomenon must go to Berrigan himself, but, as Dellinger implores, let us go on to "raise the debate to a new level of seriousness, with full attention given to the urgent questions he has placed on the agenda."

*LIBERATION* magazine has made a significant contribution toward that end.

--Sharon Rose--

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(Continued from page 27.)

In the international community the Arab oil embargo left Israel with the United States as its only firm ally. Israel lost important positions staked out earlier in Africa, as all the members of the O.A.U. severed diplomatic relations.

Among the dispirited Palestinian communities in the occupied territories the October war and official Arab support for the P.L.O. sparked a considerable show of support for the Resistance. Guerrilla activities, moreover, have stepped up in the occupied territories and Israel, and the Israeli military government has recently had to beef up the Palestinian police force with its own soldiers.

On the military front Syria has been continuing pressure on the Golan since mid-March, insisting on regaining most of the territory occupied in 1967 and all that taken by Israel in 1973.

At this crucial time, the Labor Party split almost evenly between Rabin and Shimon Peres, leader of the right-wing and hard-line Rafi faction. With the problem of reconciling the hard-line pressures from inside the Israeli political structure with US pressures for flexibility in negotiations, Rabin will need all the friendship he has in the US. In March 1971 Nixon publicly praised Rabin in the warmest terms, jokingly offering him a post in his administration. Rabin encouraged American Jewish voters to vote for Nixon in 1972.

The general crisis makes it almost impossible for Rabin to hammer out a workable coalition. New elections are a distinct possibility, and they could easily bring yet another setback to the Labor Party establishment which has controlled Israel since its beginning.

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