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<font size=3><a href="http://www.counterpunch.org/" eudora="autourl">
http://www.counterpunch.org/<br><br>
</a></font><font face="Verdana" size=2 color="#990000">March 27-29,
2009<br><br>
</font><h1><font face="Times New Roman, Times" size=4><b>A Historical
Roadmap for Liberating the Cuban Five <br><br>
<br>
</i></font><font face="Times New Roman, Times" size=5 color="#990000">
Gesture For Gesture
</b></font></h1><font face="Times New Roman, Times" size=4>By JOSÉ
PERTIERRA <br><br>
</font><font face="Verdana" size=6 color="#990000">R</font>
<font face="Verdana" size=2>ecent declarations by President Raúl Castro
reveal a willingness to engage the United States in negotiations that, if
successful, could mean the return of the Cuban Five. Responding to
reporters´ questions last December, Raúl revealed a willingness to free
some prisoners currently held in Cuba in response to a gesture from the
United States to free the Cuban Five. <i>Gesto a gesto</i>, he
called it: gesture for gesture.<a name="_ednref1"></a>1<br><br>
Gibbon said that the only way to judge the future is by the past.
And history gives us the lantern that illuminates a possible political
solution to one of the thorniest issues that still mars relations between
the United States and Cuba: prisoners. <br><br>
</font><font face="Verdana" size=2 color="#990000"><b>HISTORICAL
PRECEDENT<br><br>
</b></font><font face="Verdana" size=2>There is historical precedent for
a mutual release of prisoners on the basis of unilateral, but
reciprocated, gestures. It is little known, but thanks to US
government-declassified documents, we can now learn about the delicate
negotiations that led to a mutual release of important prisoners thirty
years ago.<br><br>
In September of 1979, the United States unilaterally released four Puerto
Rican nationalists, and ten days later Cuba reciprocated by releasing
four United States citizens who were in prison in
Cuba.<a name="_ednref2"></a>2<br><br>
It is curious to note that the phrase <i>gesto-a-gesto</i> that Raúl is
now using to urge the release of the Cuban Five is the same one that his
brother, Fidel, used in 1978, when he told US diplomats Robert Pastor and
Peter Tarnoff, <br><br>
</font>
<dl>
<dd>I do not understand why you are so tough on the Puerto Ricans.
The U.S. could make a gesture and release them, and then we would make
another gesturewithout any linkagejust a unilateral humanitarian
gesture.<a name="_ednref3"></a>3 <br><br>
</dl>US government documents confirm that discussions between the U.S.
and Cuban governments occurred during 1978 and 1979 regarding an exchange
of prisoners. National Security Advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski said in a
letter in 1979 to the Justice Department: <br><br>
<dl>
<dd>Castro and his representatives have said publicly and told us
privately that, if we release the four Puerto Ricans, they will, after an
appropriate interval, release the four United States citizens imprisoned
in Cuba. . . . . while we should not accept nor even consider an
exchange, the fact that a positive decision by the U.S. is likely to lead
to a positive decision by Cuba to release U.S. citizens is a welcome
prospect. <a name="_ednref4"></a>4<br><br>
</dl><font face="Verdana" size=2 color="#990000">THE PRISONERS WHO WERE
FREED<br><br>
</b></font>At the time of their release in 1979, the Puerto Ricans,
Lolita Lebrón, Rafael Cancel Miranda, Irving Flores Rodríguez, and Oscar
Collazo, had been in prison in the United States for over 24 years.
The Americans who Cuba released ten days later, Lawrence Lunt, Juan Tur,
Everett Jackson, and Claudio Rodriguezhad spent more than 10 years in
Cuban prisons. <br><br>
<font face="Verdana" size=2 color="#990000">THE BRZEZINSKI AND PASTOR
MEMOS<br><br>
</b></font>One of the most interesting of the declassified documents is a
memorandum written by National Security Adviser, Zbigniew Brzezinski, in
early 1979 to John R. Standish, Department of Justice Pardon
Attorney. In the memo, Brzezinski recommends that the US government
commute the sentences of the four Puerto Ricans. <br><br>
The Obama Administration could well learn from the Brzezinski memo the
benefits of a gesture-for-gesture negotiation that, if used now, could
reap diplomatic benefits for both countries. In his memo to the
Department of Justice, Brzenzinski pointed out that the continued
imprisonment of the Puerto Ricans lends fuel to critics of US policy, and
that commuting their sentences would be welcomed as a compassionate and
humanitarian gesture</i>. Brezenzinski goes on to argue that:<br><br>
<dl>
<dd>the release of these prisoners will remove from the agenda of the
United nations, the Non-Aligned Movement, and other international fora, a
propaganda issue which is used each year to criticize the U.S., and is
increasingly used as an example of the inconsistency of our human rights
policy.<a name="_ednref5"></a>5 <br><br>
</i>
</dl>Robert Pastor makes a similar point in a memorandum dated September
26, 1978. After conducting a cost-benefit analysis of the
situation, Pastor concludes: <br><br>
<dl>
<dd>I have come to believe that the risks of releasing (the Puerto Rican
nationalists) unconditionally are minimal, while the benefits, as a
humanitarian, compassionate gesture, are considerable. I also
believe that the President would obtain considerable political benefit in
Puerto Rico as there is widespread support for such a move
there.<a name="_ednref6"></a>6</i> <br><br>
</dl><font face="Verdana" size=2 color="#990000">THE CASE OF THE CUBAN
FIVE<br><br>
</b></font>Critics of US policy today point to the case of the Cuban Five
as an example of American double-standards: the terrorists are
allowed to roam free in Miami and those who went to Miami to protect Cuba
against the terrorists are thrown in jail. The Cuban Five are part
of a team of agents that Cuba sent to Miami to gather evidence against
those guilty of orchestrating a campaign of terror against civilian
targets in the island: a campaign of terror that has claimed over 3,000
lives. The team infiltrated Cuban-American terrorist groups in
Miami, and using the evidence that the Five gathered Cuba provided the
Federal Bureau of Investigations (FBI) with the names and whereabouts of
the terrorists. Rather than arrest and prosecute the terrorists,
the FBI learned that Cuba had penetrated the Miami-based terrorist
network and arrested the Cuban Five in 1998. On June 8, 2001, they
were convicted and sentenced to four life sentences and 75 years
collectively. <br><br>
The United States Supreme Court is expected to rule sometime this year
whether the Court in Miami that convicted and sentenced them erred by
forcing their trial in a Miami consumed with hostility and prejudice
against Cuba. Ten Nobel Prize winners have submitted amicus
curiae</i> (“friend of the court”) briefs asking the Supreme Court to
review the case. The Nobel laureates are joined by hundreds of
parliamentarians around the world, including two former Presidents and
three current Vice Presidents of the European Parliament, as well as
numerous US and foreign bar associations and human rights
organizations.<br><br>
The United Nations Human Rights Commission noted that a climate of bias
and prejudice in Miami</i> surrounded their trial, and the Commission’s
Working Group on Arbitrary Detentions concluded that the trial did not
take place in the climate of objectivity and impartiality that is
required to conform to the standards of a fair
trial.<a name="_ednref7"></a>7</i> <br><br>
However, even if the Cuban Five were to win their case before the United
States Supreme Court, their case would be far from over. Instead,
it would mean the beginning of a new trial in a jurisdiction other than
Miami. A far more elegant and swifter solution to their continued
imprisonment would be a Presidential Order of Executive Clemency that
would permit their immediate return to Cuba.<br><br>
<font face="Verdana" size=2 color="#990000">POLITICAL PRISONERS?<br><br>
</b></font>One important point of diplomatic disagreement between the two
countries is that to Cuba they are political</i> prisoners, whereas to
the United States the Five are common criminals. <br><br>
Innocent of the conspiracy charges against them, Cuban officials maintain
the Five were convicted in a biased and hostile environment in violation
of their constitutional rights. <br><br>
The issue of classifying the Five as political prisoners is particularly
thorny, since President Obama will certainly reject the implication that
the US is holding political prisoners. Yet, President Barack Obama
has consistently called for Cuba to release its political prisoners,
before any normalization of relations. <br><br>
Cuba, in turn, claims that its own prisoners are serving sentences on the
island for violations of the law and that they are not political
prisoners. <br><br>
A direct prisoner exchange runs the risk of the public equating the
crimes, but a unilateral gesture that is followed by a gesture from the
other side softens the criticisms. <br><br>
Again, history illuminates our way out of political gridlock. Prior
to the mutual exchange of prisoners in 1979, both Cuban and American
negotiators initially tripped over the use of the adjective political
</i>to describe the prisoners. That is why they shied away from a
direct prisoner exchange that would have been seen as a tacit acceptance
of the notion that each country was holding political prisoners.
<br><br>
In a letter to Congressman Benjamin Gillman in 1979, Brzezinski said “we
want to avoid making any connection between the two cases, and certainly
the appearance of equating their crime.<a name="_ednref8"></a>8 And
in a memorandum immediately after release of the Puerto Rican
nationalists, Brzezinski said:<br><br>
<dl>
<dd>we rejected the possibility of a prisoner exchange since we did not
consider the Puerto Ricans political prisoners . . . Now that President
Carter has decided to commute the sentences of the Puerto Ricans, it
occurs to us that it is Castro’s turn to fulfill his
promise.<a name="_ednref9"></a>9 <br><br>
</dl>The key to a mutual release of prisoners is therefore to avoid a
linked prisoner exchange and instead engage in gesture-for-gesture
negotiations.<br><br>
<font face="Verdana" size=2 color="#990000">THE PRISONERS IN
CUBA<br><br>
</b></font>If the Obama Administration extended a gesture to Cuba and
unilaterally released the Cuban Five, what reciprocal gesture could Cuba
offer? What prisoners could it free and send to the United
States?<br><br>
Miami’s El Nuevo Herald</i> recently cited the cases of several prisoners
in Cuba that may be of particular interest to the United States,
including some of those who were arrested in March of 2003 and convicted
in Cuba for working under the direction and control of the U.S. Interests
Section in Havana, as well as other Cuban citizens imprisoned for
espionage in Cuba.<a name="_ednref10"></a>10<br><br>
Through diplomatic channels, the United States can signal which of Cuba’s
prisoners are a priority. That is not a problem.<br><br>
<font face="Verdana" size=2 color="#990000">THE POWER OF EXECUTIVE
CLEMENCY<br><br>
</b></font>The power to commute a sentence is the President’s
alone. It is not a pardon. It simply reduces the period of
incarceration. The President need not comment on the convictions,
or on the alleged crimes. He need not condition the commutation of
sentences on another country’s actions. He simply orders that the
prisoners’ sentences be reduced.<br><br>
<font face="Verdana" size=2 color="#990000">CONCLUSION<br><br>
</b></font>First as a candidate and now as President, Barack Obama has
let it be known that he is interested in improving relations with Cuba
through direct diplomacy. The case of the Cuban Five is a major
stumbling block to any rapprochement</i> between the two
countries.<br><br>
If President Obama extends executive clemency to the Cuban Five and
commutes their long prison sentences, thus facilitating their return to
Cuba and to their families, it would be quite a significant gesture and,
after reciprocal gestures from Cuba, could eventually lead to the
normalization of relations between the two countries. <br><br>
José Pertierra</b> is an attorney. He represents the government of
Venezuela in the extradition case involving Luis Posada Carriles.
His office is in Washington, DC.<br><br>
<font face="Verdana" size=2 color="#990000">Notes.<br><br>
<br>
</font><a name="_edn1"></a>1 Raúl Castro marca su lógica a
Washington</i>, por Patricia Grogg, IPS, 20 de diciembre de 2008.
<br><br>
<a name="_edn2"></a>2 See TIME Magazine</i>, Monday October 1,
1979. “A diplomatic issue involving Cuba was resolved last week
when Havana released four Americans from its prisons. For four
years, Fidel Castro had said that they would be freed if the US released
four Puerto Rican nationalists who were in prison for trying to
assassinate President Truman and House leaders in the 1950s. Carter
granted them clemency two weeks ago. . . . On arrival in Miami, one of
the former prisoners in Cuba, Lawrence Lunt . . . readily admitted that
he had been spying for the CIA.” <br><br>
<a name="_edn3"></a>3 That Infernal Little Cuban Republic: the
United States and the Cuban Revolution</i>, by Lars Schoultz, the
University of North Carolina Press, Chapel Hill, 2009 at page
324.<br><br>
<a name="_edn4"></a>4 Undated letter from Zbigniew Brzezinski to John R.
Standish, Pardon Attorney, for the Department of Justice. Found on
pages 267 and 268 of volume 2 of Futuros Alternos (Documentos
Secretos)</i> Edited by Jaime Rodríguez Cancel and Juan Manuel García
Passalacqua, EMS, 2007.<br><br>
<a name="_edn5"></a>5 Ibid. <br><br>
<a name="_edn6"></a>6 Memorandum from Robert Pastor of the National
Security Council to Zbigniew Brzezinski and David Aaron regarding Lolita
Lebron, dated September 26, 1978. Futuros Alternos</i>, Ibid, at
pages 228 and 229.<br><br>
<a name="_edn7"></a>7 Grupo de Trabajo sobre la detención arbitraria
(Naciones Unidas), Opinión No. 19-2005. Opinión adoptada el 27 de
mayo de 2005.<br><br>
<a name="_edn8"></a>8 Letter to Congressman Benjamín Gillman, US House of
Representatives, from Zgigniew Brzezinski. See Futuros Alternos at
page 213.<br><br>
<a name="_edn9"></a>9 Memorandum from Zbigniew Brzezinski to Frank Moore
regarding US Prisoners in Cuba, See Futuros Alternos</i> at page
214.<br><br>
<a name="_edn10"></a>10 Abogados de espías cubanos no descartan
“negociación política”,</i> por Wilfredo Cancio Isla, El Nuevo Herald, 25
de enero de 2009. <br><br>
<br><br>
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