[Ppnews] The Mumia Exception
Political Prisoner News
ppnews at freedomarchives.org
Tue May 5 17:31:45 EDT 2009
The Mumia Exception
by <http://crimemagazine.com/poconnor.htm>J. Patrick OConnor
http://crimemagazine.com/mumia_exception.htm
Since his conviction in 1982 for the murder of
Philadelphia Police Officer Daniel Faulkner,
Mumia Abu-Jamal, through his numerous books,
essays and radio commentaries, has become the
face of the anti-death penalty movement in the
United States and an international cause célèbre.
Paris, for example, made him an honorary citizen
in 2003, bestowing the honor for the first time
since Pablo Picasso received it in 1971. The
Free Mumia slogan is seen and heard around the
world. Over the last 27 years he has become the
most visible of the invisible 3,600 Death Row inmates in the United States.
The case of Mumia Abu-Jamal cries out for justice
not because he is famous but because he is
innocent. Kenneth Freeman, the street-vendor
partner of Abu-Jamals younger brother, Billy
Cook, killed Officer Faulkner moments after
Faulkner shot Abu-Jamal in the chest as he
approached the scene where Faulkner had pulled
over the car Cook was driving. When Faulkner
began beating Cook with an 18-inch long
flashlight, Abu-Jamal ran from his nearby taxi to
come to his brothers aid. After Abu-Jamal was
shot and collapsed to the street, Freeman emerged
from Cooks car, wrestled Faulkner to the
sidewalk and then shot him to death. Freeman fled
the scene on foot. Numerous witnesses told police
they saw one or more black men fleeing right
after the officer was shot. A drivers license
application found in Faulkners shirt pocket led
the police directly to Freemans home within hours of the shooting.
But the police did not want Freeman for this
killing, releasing him without him even having to
call his attorney. The police, led by the corrupt
Inspector Alfonzo Giordano who took charge of the
crime scene within minutes of the shooting,
wanted to pin Faulkners death on the
blacked-out, police-bashing radio reporter at the
scene. Freeman they would deal with later, meting
out their own brand of street justice in the dead of night.
Five days after Faulkners death, the Center City
newsstand where Freeman and Billy Cook operated a
vending stand burned to the ground at about 3
a.m. Freeman told a Philadelphia Inquirer
reporter hours after the arson that there was no
question in my mind that the police are behind
this. The Inquirer also quoted a Center City
police officer who was on patrol in the area that
morning as saying, Its entirely possible that
certain sick members of his department were
responsible. All I know is when I got to the
station to start my shift at 7:30 this morning,
the station house was filled with Cheshire
grins. Although the unsolved arson bankrupted
Freeman and Cook, a worse fate awaited Freeman.
On the night in 1985 when the police infamously
firebombed the MOVE home and burned down 60 other
row houses in the process, incinerating 11 MOVE
members including five children, Freemans dead
body would be found nude and gagged in an empty
lot, his hands handcuffed behind his back. There
would be no police investigation into this
obvious murder: the coroner listed his cause of
death as a heart attack. Freeman was 31.
Abu-Jamal had been well known to local police
since he joined the Philly chapter of the Black
Panther Party at age 15. The next year he was
named lieutenant of information, an appointment
the Inquirer ran on its front page, picturing the
young radical at Panther headquarters. Even
though the chapter would soon dissolve, both the
police and the FBI continued to monitor Abu-Jamal
when he left Philadelphia to attend Goddard
College in Vermont and on his return to
Philadelphia to take up his radio career. As his
career took wing, landing him a high-profile job
at Philadelphias public radio station, that
scrutiny intensified due to his overtly
sympathetic coverage of the radical
counter-culture group MOVE. Throughout the 1970s
and well into the 1980s, police confrontations
with MOVE were brutal displays of civic discord
and police abuse that culminated in the 1985 firebombing.
Abu-Jamals case has been politically charged
from the beginning. By the time he was arrested
for the murder of Officer Faulkner, he was a
marked man to the police for his Black Panther
Party association and his favorable reporting of
MOVE. Inspector Giordano, who detested both
Abu-Jamal and MOVE, would set the framing of
Abu-Jamal in motion by falsely claiming that
Abu-Jamal had told him in the paddy wagon that he
had killed Faulkner. (Giordano would not be
called by the prosecution to reiterate his
fabrication at Abu-Jamals trial. Instead, on the
first business day following Abu-Jamals
sentencing, Giordano would be relieved of his
duties by the police department on what would
prove to be well-founded suspicions of
corruption. An FBI probe of rank corruption
within the Philadelphia Police Department the
largest ever conducted by the U.S. Justice
Department of a police force would lead to
Giordanos conviction four years later. The FBI
investigation would ensnare numerous other
high-ranking Philadelphia police officials and
officers, many of them involved in Abu-Jamals
arrest and trial. Deputy Police Commissioner
James Martin, who was in charge of all major
investigations, including Faulkners death, was
the ringleader of a vast extortion enterprise operating in City Center.)
The trial of Abu-Jamal was a monumental
miscarriage of justice from beginning to end,
representing an extreme case of prosecutorial
abuse and judicial bias. A pamphlet published by
Amnesty International in 2000 stated it had
determined that numerous aspects of Mumia
Abu-Jamals case clearly failed to meet minimum
standards safeguarding the fairness of legal proceedings.
The trial judge, Common Pleas Court Judge Albert
F. Sabo, presided at more trials that resulted in
the defendants receiving the death penalty than
any judge in the nation. Of the 31 so sentenced,
five won reversals on appeal, an indication of
extreme judicial bias. The Inquirer called him a
defendants worst nightmare, a prominent defense
attorney referred to him as a prosecutor in
robes. A former court stenographer said in an
affidavit in 2001 that during Abu-Jamals trial
she overheard Sabo tell someone at the
courthouse, Yeah, and I am going to help them fry the nigger.
During the third day of jury selection, Sabo
stripped Abu-Jamal of his right to represent
himself and interview potential jurors despite
the fact that the Inquirer reported Abu-Jamal was
intent and business like in his questioning. On
the second day of the trial, Sabo removed
Abu-Jamal from the courtroom for insisting that
MOVE founder John Africa replace his court
appointed backup counsel, Anthony Jackson. In
turn, Sabo appointed Jackson to represent
Abu-Jamal. This would put to rout the possibility of a fair trial.
Abu-Jamals first major appeal issue developed
during jury selection when the prosecutor,
Assistant D.A. Joseph McGill, used 10 or 11 of
the 15 peremptory challenges he exercised to keep
otherwise qualified blacks from sitting on this
death-penalty-vetted jury. In a city with more
than a 40 percent black population at the time,
Abu-Jamals jury ended up with only two blacks.
In 1986 four years after Abu-Jamals trial
the U.S. Supreme Court ruled in Batson v.
Kentucky that it was unconstitutional for a
prosecutor to exclude potential jurors on the
basis of race. The ruling was retroactive.
The second major constitutional claim that would
arise occurred at the end of the guilt phase of
the trial when the prosecutor referenced the
appeal process in his summation to the jury. He
told the jury that if they found Abu-Jamal guilty
of murder in the first degree that there would
be appeal after appeal and perhaps there could be
a reversal of the case, or whatever, so that may not be final.
Although Officer Faulkner had been killed by
Kenneth Freeman, the prosecution mounted its
evidentiary case against Abu-Jamal on the
perjured testimony of a prostitute informant and
a cab driver with a suspended license for two
DUIs who was on probation for throwing a Molotov
cocktail into a school yard during a school day.
Both of these witnesses had been handpicked by Giordano at the crime scene.
The Mumia Exception
As Amnesty International established in its 2000
pamphlet entitled The Case of Mumia Abu-Jamal: A
Life in the Balance, his tortuous appeal process
has been fraught with judicial machinations.
Claims that won the day in other cases were repeatedly denied him.
In 1989, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court turned
down his first appeal even though one of his
claims was almost identical to one that had
persuaded the same court to grant Lawrence Baker
a new trial in 1986. In that case, Commonwealth
v. Baker, the court overturned Bakers death
sentence for first-degree murder on the grounds
that the prosecutor improperly referenced the
lengthy appeal process afforded those sentenced
to death. That prosecutor Joseph McGill was
the same prosecutor who used similar almost
verbatim language in his summation during both
the guilt and sentencing phases of Mumias trial.
The judge who failed to strike the language in
the Baker case was the same judge who presided at
Mumias trial, Common Pleas Court Judge Albert F. Sabo.
The State Supreme Court ruled in Baker that the
use of such language minimize[ed] the jurys
sense of responsibility for a verdict of death.
When Abu-Jamals appeal included the very same
issue, the court reversed its own precedent in
the matter, denying the claim in a shocking unanimous decision.
A year later, in Commonwealth v. Beasley, the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court reinstated the death
sentence of Leslie Beasley, but exerted its
supervisory power to adopt a per se rule
precluding all remarks about the appellate
process in all future trials. This rule not only
reinstated the Baker precedent but it ordered all
prosecutors in the state to refrain once and for
all from referencing the appellate process in
summations to the jury. The court could have made
this new rule retroactive to Mumias case, but did not.
As Amnesty International declared in its pamphlet
about the case, the Pennsylvania Supreme Courts
judicial scheming leave the disturbing
impression that the court invented a new standard
of procedure to apply to one case only: that of
Mumia Abu-Jamal, Temple University journalism
professor Linn Washington aptly dubs this and
subsequent court decisions denying Mumia a new trial the Mumia exception.
Abu-Jamals Post-Conviction Relief Act hearing in
1995 was doomed from the beginning when Judge
Sabo the original trial judge would not
recuse himself from the case and the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court would not remove him for bias.
Abu-Jamals federal habeas corpus appeal
decided by Federal District Judge William Yohn in
2001 should have resulted in at least an
evidentiary hearing on Abu-Jamals Batson claim
that the prosecutor unconstitutionally purged
blacks from the jury by using peremptory strikes
to exclude 10 or 11 otherwise qualified black
jurors from being empanelled. Abu-Jamals
attorneys had included a study conducted by
Professor David Baldus that documented the
systematic use of peremptory challenges to
exclude blacks by Prosecutor McGill in the six
death-penalty cases he prosecuted in Common Pleas
Court in Philadelphia. Abu-Jamals trial was one
of the six trials studied by Baldus. Judge Yohn
barred the study on the erroneous grounds that
the study was not from a relevant time period
when, in fact, it was completely relevant. Judge
Yohns error was egregious and could have been
easily avoided if he had held one evidentiary
hearing on that defense claim. But during the two
years that Judge Yohn considered Abu-Jamals
habeas appeal, he held no hearings.
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit
should have corrected that district court mistake
by remanding Abu-Jamals case back to Judge Yohn
to hold the evidentiary hearing on the Batson
claim, but in another example of the Mumia
exception, the court instead continued the long
and tortured denial of Mumias right to a fair
trial. In a 2 to 1 decision released on March 27,
2008 that reeked of politics and racism, the
court ruled that Abu-Jamal had failed to meet his
burden in providing a prima facie case. He
failed, the majority wrote, because his attorneys
were unable to establish the racial composition of the entire jury pool.
In the decision written by Chief Judge Anthony
Scirica, the court stated that Abu-Jamal had the
opportunity to develop this evidence at the PCRA
evidentiary hearing, but failed to do so. There
may be instances where a prima facie case can be
made without evidence of the strike rate and
exclusion rate. But, in this case [i.e., the
Mumia exception is in play], we cannot find the
Pennsylvania Supreme Courts ruling [denying the
Batson claim] unreasonable based on this incomplete record.
In a nutshell, the majority denied Mumias Batson
claim on a technicality of its own invention, not
on its merits. It also broke with the sacrosanct
stare decisis doctrine the principle that the
precedent decisions are to be followed by the
courts by ignoring its own previous opposite
ruling in the Holloway v. Horn case of 2004 and
the Brinson v. Vaughn case of 2005. It is a
general maxim that when a point has been settled
by decision, it forms a precedent which is not
afterwards to be departed from. In a Ninth
Circuit Court of Appeals ruling in 1989 in a case
entitled United States v. Washington, the
decision stated that an appeal courts panel is
bound by decisions of prior panels unless an en
banc decision, Supreme Court decision, or
subsequent legislation undermines those
decisions. None of those variables were in play
when the Third Circuit Court majority ruled against Mumias Batson claim.
Judge Thomas Ambros dissent was sharp:
I do
not agree with them [the majority] that Mumia
Abu-Jamal fails to meet the low bar for making a
prima facie case under Batson. In holding
otherwise, they raise the standard necessary to
make out a prima facie case beyond what Batson calls for.
In other words, the majority, in this case alone,
has upped the ante required for making a Batson
claim beyond what the U.S. Supreme Court
stipulated. When ruling in Batson in 1986, the
U.S. Supreme Court did not require that the
racial composition of the entire jury pool be
known before a Batson claim may be raised. The
high court ruled that a defendant must show only
an inference of prosecutorial discrimination in
purging potential jurors. Prosecutor McGills
using 10 or 11 of the 15 peremptory strikes he
deployed is just such an inference and an
extremely strong one. McGills strike rate of
over 66 percent against potential black jurors is
in itself prima facie evidence of race
discrimination. Prima facie is a Latin term
meaning at first view, meaning the evidence
being presented is presumed to be true unless disproved.
In commenting on Holloway v. Horn, a Batson-type
case with striking similarities to Abu-Jamals
claim, Judge Ambro the lone Democrat-appointed
judge on the three judge panel demonstrated
just how disingenuous the panels ruling against
Abu-Jamals Batson claim was. In Holloway, Judge
Ambro wrote in his 41-page dissent, we
emphasized that requiring the presentation of [a
record detailing the race of the venire] simply
to move past the first state the prima facie
stage in the Batson analysis places an undue
burden upon the defendant. There we found the
strike rate 11 of 12 peremptory strikes against
black persons satisfied the prima facie
burden. In Holloway, the Third Circuit ruled
that the Pennsylvania Supreme Courts decision
denying Holloways Batson claim was contrary to
and an unreasonable application of the Batson standard.
In fact, in rendering both its Holloway and
Brinson decision, the Third Circuit specifically
rejected the requirement that a petitioner
develop a complete record of the jury pool. In
making its ruling in Abu-Jamals appeal, it
reversed itself to make the pretext of an
incomplete jury record his fatal misstep. Basing
its ruling against Abu-Jamals Batson claim on
this invented pretext demonstrated how desperate
the majority was to block Abu-Jamals Batson
claim. What the majority was implying was that
Abu-Jamals jury pool may well have consisted of
60 or 70 percent black people and that therefore
the prosecutors using 66 percent of his strikes
to oust potential black jurors was statistically
normal and did not create a prima facie case of
discrimination. This hypothesis is, of course,
absurd on its face. Blacks have been
underrepresented on Philadelphia juries for years
and remain so today. What was likely was that
the jury pool at Abu-Jamals trial was at least 70 percent white.
The Third Circuit if it had followed its own
precedent would have found the Pennsylvania
Supreme Courts ruling denying Abu-Jamals Batson
claim contrary to and an unreasonable
application of the Batson standard and remanded
the case back to Federal District Court Judge
Yohn to hold an evidentiary hearing to determine
the prosecutors reasons for excluding the 10
potential black jurors he struck. If that hearing
satisfied Judge Yohn that all of the prosecutors
reasons for striking potential black jurors were
race neutral, the Batson claim would fail. If,
conversely, that hearing revealed racial
discrimination on the part of the prosecutor
during jury selection even if only concerning
one potential juror Judge Yohn would have been
compelled to order a new trial for Abu-Jamal.
Abu-Jamals final opportunity for judicial relief
was filed with the U.S. Supreme Court in November
of 2008 in the form of a Petition for a Writ of
Certiorari. On February 4, the high court
docketed and accepted that filing. According to
Abu-Jamals lead attorney, Robert Bryan of San
Francisco, The central issue in this case is
racism in jury selection. The prosecution
systematically removed people from sitting on the
trial jury purely because of the color of their skin, that is, being black.
For at least two compelling reasons, it appeared
that the U.S. Supreme Court would grant
Abu-Jamals petition. In its last term, the high
court expanded its 1986 Batson ruling in its
Synder v. Maryland decision to warrant a new
trial if a minority defendant could show the
inference of racial bias in the prosecutors
peremptory exclusion of one juror. Under Batson,
the defense needed to show an inference i.e., a
pattern of racial bias in the overall jury
selection process. Ironically, the Supreme
Courts 7-2 decision strengthening and expanding
Batsons reach was written by Justice Samuel
Alito, most recently of the Third Circuit Court of Appeals.
The second reason was that the Third Circuits
ruling denying Abu-Jamals Batson claim
undermined both the Batson and Synder decisions
by placing new restrictions on a defendants
ability to file a Batson claim. The Third Circuit
ruling against Abu-Jamal had the effect of
creating new law by tampering with a long-established Supreme Court precedent.
As a result, there seemed to be something more
than a remote possibility that the Supreme Court
would agree to grant Abu-Jamals writ.
A Writ of Certiorari is a decision by the Supreme
Court to hear an appeal from a lower court.
Supreme Court justices rarely give a reason why
they accept or deny Cert. Although all nine
justices are involved in considering Cert
Petitions, it takes only four justices to grant a
Writ of Certiorari, even if five justices are
against it. This is known as the rule of four.
Despite needing only four votes to have his
Batson claim argued, the Supreme Court on April
6, 2009 tersely denied Abu-Jamals request for a
writ. The so-called liberal block of Justices
Stevens, Ginsberg, Souter, and Breyer
disintegrated, yielding to the awesome political
power of the Mumia exception.
Abu-Jamal who turned 55 on April 24, 2009
will, barring the most unlikely intervention by a
future governor of Pennsylvania, spend the rest
of his life in prison for a crime he did not commit.
Freedom Archives
522 Valencia Street
San Francisco, CA 94110
415 863-9977
www.Freedomarchives.org
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