[Ppnews] May 6th another court date for Palestinian National Leader Ahmad Sa'adat

Political Prisoner News ppnews at freedomarchives.org
Wed May 2 10:39:10 EDT 2007

Ahmad Sa’adat (Abu Ghassan): Secretary General of 
the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine 
(PFLP), the second largest faction in the PLO and 
the leading Palestinian party of the 
left.  Sa’adat has been held without trial in 
Jericho jail under U.S./U.K. monitoring since May 
2002, accused by Israel of ordering the 
assassination of former Israeli Minister of 
Tourism Rehavam Zeevi.  He was nominated by the 
PFLP to run as a Parliamentary candidate in the 
PLC elections scheduled for January 2006, as a 
means of publicizing his continued detention and 
bringing pressure to bear for his release.

Sa’adat is a veteran of the first Palestinian 
intifada, and has spent a total of 10 years in 
Israeli jails for PFLP activism.   He rose to 
prominence within the PFLP for his activities as 
an organizer and leader of Palestinian prisoners. 
Although not well-known internationally or in the 
media, Sa’adat -  a PFLP “insider” who has always 
stayed in the West Bank and Gaza rather than 
going into exile -  >is highly regarded in the 
Occupied Territories as a charismatic leader who 
remains in touch with the grassroots.

A math teacher by training, Sa’adat is married 
(to Abla) and has four children.  He lives in al-Bira, near Ramallah.


The PFLP is the largest party on the Palestinian 
left, with an ideology that combines Arab 
nationalism with Marxist-Leninism.  It was 
founded in 1967 by George Habash, a Palestinian 
Christian (and Palestinian Orthodox Christians 
have historically been prominently represented in 
the movement).  The PFLP does not recognise the 
existence of Israel as a Jewish state, and 
rejects the Oslo process.  It reserves the right 
to use all means, including armed intifada, in 
pursuit of a single, secular democratic state of 
Arabs and Jews on all of Mandate Palestine.  It 
sees the Palestinians’ struggle as an integral 
part of the wider struggle against U.S. 
imperialism and its client regimes in the Middle 
East.  With the fall of the Soviet Union and the 
rise of political Islam, the PFLP has been 
eclipsed as Palestine’s second political party by 
Hamas.  (It polled about 7% in the Palestinian 
local elections in the fall/winter of 2005).  One 
of Ahmad’s Sa’adat’s declared aims as party 
leader is to re-establish the popular base of the 
PFLP and establish it as 
third pole in Palestinian politics, alongside Fatah and Hamas.

Some historical background on the PFLP from 
Joffe: Said to be the second largest faction 
within the PLO apparatus after Yasser Arafat's 
own Fatah, the Popular Front was officially 
created in the wake of the Six Day war, in 
December 1967. Since 1948, Palestinians had felt 
grievously let down by other Arab leaders. Fatah 
chose the path of galvanising the West Bank and 
Gaza masses to throw off the yoke of their new 
Israeli rulers. When this proved a failure, Fatah 
effectively took over the discredited PLO, and 
over time sought friends and money in the Arab world.
The PFLP, by contrast, interpreted the Palestine 
problem as merely the worst symptom of a general 
Middle Eastern malaise. They eschewed support 
from Gulf potentates, turning instead to the 
patronage of Russia and China. The PFLP saw the 
elimination of Israel as a means towards the 
ultimate goal, of ridding the Middle East of 
dictators who kow-towed to Western capitalism. 
Under the rule of Habash, they fused together a 
heady brew of Maoism and Arab nationalism. Soon 
the group gained international notoriety for 
hijackings and terrorist attacks. In Amman, 
Jordan, the belligerency of their cadres was 
blamed for the onset of the Black September 
crackdown of 1970, which crushed the PLO and 
forced its flight to safer climes in southern Lebanon.
But with the decline of the Soviet economy, the 
onset of detente and eventual collapse of the 
USSR, the PFLP lost ground to the distinctly 
unsecular radicals of Hamas. [Habash’s successor, 
Abu Ali] Mustafa was prominent in promulgating 
the 1987 intifada through radio broadcasts, but 
in time the group showed signs of schism, as 
"insiders" on the West Bank, like Riad al-Malki, 
forged links with Fatah and even Israeli left-wingers.
Attempting to regain the initiative after the 
supposed PLO-Israeli breakthrough of Oslo in 
1993, the PFLP joined forces with a 10-member 
rejection front, based in Damascus. It forbade 
members to participate in the Palestinian 
elections in 1996, but three years later, 
Mustafa, accepting the Palestine Authority as a 
fait accompli, rushed to Cairo to negotiate better terms with Yasser Arafat.
The PFLP’s election of Ahmad Sa’adat in October 
2001 to replace its assassinated 
Secretary-General, was generally regarded as a 
sign that the movement was shifting moving away 
from the more pragmatic positions of Abu Ali 
Mustafa, and reverting to the more hardline 
rejectionism of its original founder.
More background on the PFLP from:
o                    <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/PFLP>Wikipedia


1953 – Born in al-Bira, to 1948 refugees from the 
destroyed village of Dayr Tarif (nr al-Ramleh).

1967 – Became a student activist following the 
Israeli occupation of the West Bank and Gaza 
Strip, in the PFLP-led Palestine Student Union.

1969 – Formally joined the PFLP, attracted by its 
combination of Marxism-Leninism (which he felt 
most suitable for the son of a refugee peasant 
family) with traditional pan-Arab nationalism.

Feb 1969 – First arrested by Israel for PFLP 
activities; 3 months detention.  Arrested again 
in 1970 (28 months), 1973 (10 months), 1975 (45 
days).  Credits his early years in prison with 
giving him the opportunity to advance his 
understanding of Marxist theory and consolidating his commitment to the PFLP.

1975 – Graduated from the UNRWA Teachers Training 
College in Ramallah, specializing in Mathematics.

1976 – Rearrested by the Israelis (detained for four years).

Apr 1981 - Elected to the Central Committee of the PFLP.

1989 – Arrested and held in administrative detention for 9 months.

1992 -  Arrested and held in administrative detention for 13 months.

Mar 1993 - Elected to the Politburo of the PFLP 
while still in administrative detention, 
reportedly in recogition of his education and 
organizing activities with other detainees.

1993 – Released from administrative detention, 
but declared a “wanted person” liable to re-arrest, shortly after release.

1994 – Elected leader of the PFLP in the West Bank.

1995 – Arrested by the PA and briefly detained in 
a sweep of PFLP members, under Israeli pressure.

Mar 1996 – Briefly detained without charge again 
by the PA in a sweep of known activists.

Dec 1996 – 
by the PA in a roundup of PFLP members on the 
West Bank, following a PFLP attack on Israeli 
settlers in Beit-El/Surda on 11 
December.  Released without charge on 27 February 
1997 after conducting a 
strike, the PA fearing the consequences if he 
should die in jail. (Collapsed hours after 
release, and spent several days comatose and on a 
respirator in Ramallah Hospital).

2000 – George Habash steps down as General 
Secretary of the PFLP, at the party’s Sixth 
National Conference. Replaced by Mustafa Zibri 
(Abu Ali Mustafa), a member of the 'old guard' of 
exiled leaders based in Damascus, and regarded as 
a pragmatist in relations with Arafat and with Israel.

27 Aug 2001 - 
Ali Mustafa assassinated when an Israeli 
helicopter fired rockets at his office in the West Bank town of Ramallah.

3 Oct 2001 – Ahmad Sa’adat elected 
Secretary-General of the PFLP, regarded as a 
shift away from the pragmatism of Abu Ali Mustafa 
and in line with the more hardline principles of 
George Habash.  Sa’adat declares at his inaugural 
press conference that the goals of the 
Palestinian people are "our right of return, and 
our independence, with Jerusalem as the capital” 
He also vows to avenge the assassination of Abu Ali Mustafa.

17 Oct 2001 – Four members of the PFLP 
assassinate the far-right Israeli Tourism 
Zeevi.  (Zeevi is known as a supporter of the 
forced expulsion of the Palestinians from the 
Occupied Territories, and as a proponent of 
assassinations”.  His assassination is a popular 
move among militants, and reinvigorates support 
for the PFLP in the Occupied Territories). Israel 
accuses Sa’adat of having ordered the assassination.

22 Oct 2001 – The PA 
the killing of Zeevi as contrary to wider 
Palestinian interests as it gives Israel an 
excuse to take military action in the Occupied 
Rajoub, head of the West Bank Preventative 
Security Service, outlaws the military wing of 
the PFLP - the Martyr Abu Ali Mustafa Brigades - 
and issues an ultimatum to Ahmad Sa’adat to turn himself in or face arrest.

24 Oct 2001 – IDF attacks the West Bank village 
Rima, apparently in an unsuccessful attempt to 
Sa’adat, shooting dead nine Palestinians 
including 5 local 
sleeping in an olive grove.

15 Jan 2002 – Sa’adat is arrested by Palestinian 
special forces after being lured to a meeting in 
a Ramallah hotel with PA Intelligence chief 
Tirawi.  The PFLP 
the PA for caving to U.S. and Israeli pressure, 
and putting its own 
ahead of the national consensus by arresting the 
head of a PLO faction.  Its military wing warns 
that it will 
Arafat aides if Sa’adat is not released.  PFLP 
supporters protest the arrest in the streets of 
Ramallah, Gaza City and Bethlehem.

2 Feb 2002 – The PFLP's politburo announces that 
the movement will suspend its participation in 
the PLO 
Committee until Sa’adat is released.

21 Feb 2002 – The PA’s General Intelligence 
in Nablus the cell of the Martyr Abu Ali Mustafa 
Brigades believed responsible for the 
assassination of Zeevi.  They are held with 
Sa’adat at Arafat’s Ramallah compound.

Mar-Apr 2002 – Sa’adat besieged with Arafat in 
the Muqata by the IDF, beginning 29 Mar.

29 Apr 2002 - Under heavy U.S. pressure, Arafat 
a deal to end the siege of his compound.  The 
terms of the deal are not made public but it is 
apparent that Israel has agreed to lift the siege 
on Arafat in return for the PA agreeing to 
imprison under international supervision Ahmad 
Sa’adat, the four PFLP members accused of killing 
Zeevi (Basel al-Asmar, 'Ahed Abu Ghalma, Majdi 
al-Rimawi and Hamdi Qar'an), and Fuad Shubaki - 
the PA official accused of organising the Karine 
A weapons shipment.  The four PFLP members are 
cursorily tried by a military tribunal inside the 
Muqata, and sentenced to terms up to 18 years’ 
imprisonment for killing Zeevi.  Arafat rules 
that Sa’adat is a political leader, not a 
military leader, and so his case must be decided 
by the Palestinian 

1 May 2002 – All six are transferred to Jericho 
Prison on the evening of 1 May, where they are 
nominally under the control of the P.A. but 
actually guarded by U.S. and British 
monitors.  Arafat is widely criticised in the 
Occupied Territories for winning his own freedom at the expense of Sa’adat’s.

2 May 2002 – IDF withdraws from the Muqata.

3 Jun 2002 – The Palestinian High Court of 
Justice in Gaza rules that there is no evidence 
linking Sa’adat to the assassination of Zeevi, 
and no legal grounds for his continuing 
detention.  It orders his immediate 
Gissin, an Israeli government spokesperson, 
implies that if the PA releases Sa’adat, he will 
be assassinated (“if he is not brought to 
justice, we will bring justice to him”

4 Jun 2002 - The Palestinian Cabinet 
to implement the High Court ruling, 
because it fears that Sa’adat will be 
assassinated if released. (More realistically, it 
is probably because releasing Sa’adat will 
contravene the terms of the 29 Apr agreement that 
removed the Isrelis from the Muqata).

13 Jun 2002 – 
International calls for the PA to respet the 
finding of the High Court and release Sa’adat 
immediately, and for Israel to guarantee it will 
not take extrajudicial measures against 
him.  Palestinian 
call upon Arafat to uphold the rule of law. Sa’adat remains in jail.

20 Aug 2002 – Israeli Special Forces troops 
assassinate Sa’adat’s younger 
Mohammed, a low-ranking 
of the PFLP, at his home near Ramallah.

Muhammed Sa'adat (22) was assassinated in his house
in Al-Bireh by an Israeli special unit yesterday
(al-Quds al-Arabi, 21 August 2002).

26 Aug 2002 – Sa’adat begins a 72-hour 
strike to protest his continued detention.

14 Jan 2003 – In a 
from prison, Sa’adat expresses his opposition to 
the Road Map, on the grounds that it is designed 
solely to provide security for Israel’s 
occupation and criminalize opposition to it as terrorism.

23 Jan 2003 – Sa’adat’s wife, Abla, is 
by Israeli troops at the Allenby Bridge border 
crossing, and prevented from addressing the 
Social Forum in Porto Alegre, Brazil, where she was a scheduled speaker.

15 Mar 2005 – PA President Mahmoud Abbas suggests 
that Sa’adat will be 
when the PA resumes security control of Jericho 
later that month.  Other PA officials deny they 
have any such intention, and Sa’adat himself 
whether the PA even has the power to release him.

23 Nov 2005 – The PFLP announces that Sa’adat 
will run in the 
elections of Jan 2006, in the hope that this will 
raise awareness of his imprisonment and bring pressure to bear for his release.

Other Biographical Information Online
o                    Profile of Ahmad Sa’adat 
from <http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/middle_east/1763912.stm>BBC NEWS
o                    Biographical notes from Glen 
East Reference
o                    And from the Palestinian 
Academic Society for the Study of International 


Sa’adat is regarded as a "hardliner" within the 
PFLP, strongly opposing compromise with Israel 
and less inclined to recognise the authority of 
the PA than Abu Ali Mustafa.  He regards the 
right of return for Palestinian refugees as the 
central issue in the Palestinian/Israeli 
conflict, which can be ultimately resolved only 
through a non-sectarian single state solution.

Sa’adat regards international law and U.N. 
resolutions as the basis for realising 
Palestinian aspirations, and rejects the idea 
that U.S. mediation can ever take the place of 
international law or  lead to a just solution, as 
it is U.S. imperialism in the Middle East (and 
Israel’s role in it as a U.S. proxy) that lies at 
the heart of the conflict. He does not believe 
that the PA can do anything to bring the 
occupation to as end, as it depends for its 
survival on providing security for the Israeli 
occupier.  Inasmuch as the PA opposes the armed 
struggle and seeks to end it in favour of a 
negotiated solution, Sa’adat regards it as a 
vehicle of the capitalist ruling classes and an 
obstacle to Palestinian freedom  rather than a means of achieving it.

Sa’adat advocates intifada by all means 
available, including education and mobilisation 
of the masses alongside continuation of the armed 
struggle, and regards the Palestinian intifada as 
an integral part of the wider international 
struggle of the left against U.S. imperialism in 
its militaristic (e.g. the invasion of Iraq) and 
economic (e.g. “globalization”) forms.

Comments by Sa’adat

On the right of return:  The Right of Return is 
neither a knee-jerk emotional reaction, nor an 
abstract legal right, nor right-wing chauvinism. 
On the contrary, it is realistic, and constitutes 
the only basis for a permanent and everlasting 
 Any solution that ignores the Right of 
Return as a basis for a permanent peace between 
the Palestinians and the Jewish settlers who 
forcibly expelled the indigenous people of 
Palestine and colonized the land may produce 
short periods of quiet and calm, but will not 
eliminate the objective conditions that produce 
the conflict between our people and the Zionist movement.

Therefore, the implementation of international 
resolutions and international law pertaining to 
the Right of Return, as a first step, may prepare 
the foundation for a permanent peace and end the 
struggle in Palestine and around Palestine. This 
right, as the essence of the Palestine question, 
represents the bridge for a democratic and 
comprehensive solution of the conflict between 
the Jewish settlers and the Palestinian people. 

On the two state solution:

1.  Some have argued that the current reality is 
pushing towards a two-state solution - an Israeli 
state next to a Palestinian state based on the 
pre-1967 borders. Of course, this solution 
involves ignoring the Right of Return, or 
replacing it with reparations. We in the PFLP 
argue that forcing such a solution on the 
Palestinian people will not end the struggle, 
because the facts and reality contradict such a 
solution. The two-state solution that is based on 
the racist notion of 'a national, homogeneous 
Jewish state' totally disregards the fact that 
over 1.3 million Palestinians - 20% of the entire 
population - live inside 'Israel.' This will 
continue to permit the causes of conflict to 
remain inside Israel. Therefore, the solution 
based on two states is a myth 

2.  The two state solution is a starting point 
which will create the necessary climate for a 
peaceful solution. Of course, the fight for a 
single democratic state, without any kind of 
ethnic or religious discrimination, should never 
end, because it is the only possible solution 
that can solve the problem of the Palestinians of 
1948 and of the right to return.  In this fight 
we need international solidarity and unity from 
those who struggle along with us.  As 
Palestinians and also as PFLP, we are proud of 
all these actions of solidarity with the 

3.  In the PFLP, we don’t think that “two states 
for two peoples” is a viable solution.  Even if 
we reach this goal, the problem will be far from 
resolved, primarily because the state of Israel 
will continue to exist exactly as it is.  Above 
all, two major questions would remain:  What 
about the refugees?  For us, the question of the 
right of return for refugees, who represent more 
than half of all Palestinians, is a fundamental 
question inasmuch as the right of return is an 
inalienable right.  Now, the two state solution 
leaves out the refugees.  It is out of the 
question that they can live in the West Bank or 
in Gaza
 you see, the main problem remains.  And 
what happens to the Palestinians of 1948?  This 
problem is equally important.  There are more 
than a million of them, and they are first and 
foremost Palestinians, and they too live under 
the oppression of the state of Israel.  I won’t 
spell it out but you can see, the two state 
solution can only be at best a temporary solution.

A real solution to the conflict would have to 
meet three fundamental needs:  the end of the 
occupation, the return of the refugees, and the 
creation of a truly democratic government on all 
of historic Palestine.  When you look at history, 
this is the only legitimate 

On the Oslo agreement – These agreements were a 
project – almost entirely economic in nature – 
drawn up between the Palestinian bourgeoisie and 
the Israeli occupier.  Through these accords, 
Israel succeeded in making the PLO give up its 
platform and strategy, to the detriment of the 
Palestinian population’s living 
conditions.  Remember that at that time, after 
the Gulf War, the PLO had enormous financial 
difficulties. The Oslo Accords offered the 
possiblity of financial recovery thanks to 
important commercial agreements.  Oslo is not a 
political agreement that might have led to a 
solution for the Palestinian people.  Instead it 
was a plan that involved only security 
and  commercial issues, with Israeli security as one of its goals.
There was with Oslo a passing of the baton 
between the Israelis and the Authority in a 
number of regions, including in those areas that 
the Authority did not completely control.  The 
years passed, with the results that you already 
know, and there was one fundamental rule 
contained in the Oslo Accords:  namely,  it was 
forbidden to seek any “solution” except through negotiation with the Israelis.
Then there was the Camp David episode, and the 
scandalous proposals of Barak and Clinton.  The 
PFLP was (and still is) in favour of stopping all 
negotiations with the occupier, which would have 
meant that the Palestinian Authority would have 
had to become a real resistance movement, in 
touch with the people.  But it didn’t choose that 
route.  And so today we have reached this 
situation in which the only opposition that 
remains between occupier and occupied is the 
opposition of the Palestinian people against the 
state of Israel.  Meanwhile the Authority looks 
in from the outside, a spectator that wants only 
one thing, which is to recover its power at any 

On the road map:
1.  The Road Map seems like a reward for the 
Palestinian people or, if you will, the carrot 
that has to be given to the Arabs of Palestine in 
place of the stick that’s been used against the 
Iraqis.  In reality, it must be said that the 
Road Map is above all an attempt to contain the 
Palestinians and to stop the intifada: so 
completing what the Israelis have done with the 
“stick” with America’s international 
backing.  The Road Map tries to skirt round UN 
resolutions, which recognise the right of our 
people to have their own independent state.  This 
plan has the aim of reshaping Palestinian 
aspirations, so that their state will be designed 
according to the needs and limits laid down by 
Israel.  I too wonder how the PNA can be so 
attached to it, and I can’t give any logical 
explanation.  Because the Road Map doesn’t offer 
anything new, but leads to a return to 
negotiations under the terms of the Oslo Accords, 
which led ultimately to the dead end called Camp 
2.  The illusions of the Palestinian Authority 
were offset by the reality contained in the Road 
Map. The PA thought, or perhaps wished, that the 
Road Map would provide the pathway and mechanisms 
towards an independent state on the Palestinian 
lands occupied in 1967, based on the address by 
George Bush in which he called for the formation 
of a Palestinian leadership that would seriously 
fight terrorism (in other words, the Palestinian Resistance).
It was clear that the primary aim of this new-old 
security project was to contain the Palestinian 
issue, to provide security for the Zionist 
occupier and its settlers, and to transfer the 
entire crisis onto Palestinian society. 
much has been said about the Road Map. Suffice to 
say that the Road Map is a political initiative 
that is based on the criminalization of the 
Palestinian people and condemnation of the 
Palestinian resistance as terrorism. It is also a 
blatant intervention in the Palestinian internal 
affairs. The Road Map can only serve as an 
American political umbrella to manage and contain 
the crisis in Palestine, providing more space for 
“Israel” to impose its logic on both our people 
and on the Palestinian Authority.

We are asked to exchange the Intifada for the 
Road Map. Such exchange will not be beneficial 
for our people and will only re-create the wheels 
of Oslo but in a much worse version! It might 
have benefits, but only for specific layers in 
the ruling class within the Palestinian 
Authority, which took advantage of Oslo and the 
political negotiation to build its own private 
projects and to partnerships with Zionist 
investors. (<http://www.alhadafmagazine.com/dpPLO/dp.asp>Source)

On the role of the Palestinian Authority:

1.  The Palestinian bourgeoisie has chosen the 
path of negotiations and conciliation with the 
Zionist entity keeping the struggle as a tactical 
option that it uses to improve its position every 
time its negotiations with Israel reach an 
impasse that aggravates its internal 
contradictions. Regardless of their intentions, 
the strategic path that they have chosen for 
settling the struggle of the Palestinian people 
with the Zionist enemy and for attempting to 
attain the components of the national 
establishment - this chosen path, in light of the 
real balance of forces on the ground locally, 
regionally, and internationally, leads 
objectively to frittering away the national 
rights of our people. If, as a supposition, this 
choice in the beginning was by way of an 
erroneous analysis, today after the emergence of 
the Authority and the concentration of ruling 
class coalition interests it represents, the 
chosen path has come to express a vital and 
strategic interest in remaining in power. 
Abandoning the path of conciliation would 
threaten to destroy the agreements that brought 
the bourgeoisie outside and inside the homeland 
to the pinnacle of the self-rule government. 
2.  As for the silence surrounding us, primary 
responsibility for that rests I think with the PA 
itself and with the NGO’s associated with 
it.  They have chosen to put the emphasis on 
those held in Israel because for them our case is 
really embarrassing.  As I said, they put us here 
because the Americans insisted, and the fact that 
Palestinian leaders agreed to arrest members of 
the Palestinian resistance looks very 
contradictory. This is why the PA and its NGO’s 
have chosen to keep quiet about our case.  It is 
an enormous admission of weakness.
We are here because we did away with Zeevi, a 
racist minister of the extreme right, who 
advocated the “transfer” of all Palestinians to 
Jordan, who was a member of the Israeli cabinet 
and consistently supported every proposal to 
assassinate leaders of the Palestinian 
resistance.  He was one of the people who asked 
for the assassination of Abu Ali Mustafa [former 
secretary of the PFLP, killed in August 
2001].  We have the right to respond in kind, 
i.e. by killing one of their leaders.  What the 
Authority should have done and should do now, 
rather than submitting to Israeli demands, is to 
do exactly what the Israelis do:  demand that all 
the Israelis who order or carry out the murder of 
Palestinians be handed over to them.  Instead of 
that, it says nothing and just avoids talking 
about us.  All that it has succeeded in doing is 
to help the Israelis, who have been demanding for 
some time that the PFLP be included on the 
European Union’s list of terrorist organisations. 
3.  The Authority would like the resistance to 
end completely in order to negotiate with the 
Israelis, but this is not how the general 
population or the political parties feel.  We 
want much more: after the failure of Oslo, we 
want a real strategy of struggle that will make 
it possible for Palestinian claims to be 
realised, and for us to build a truly democratic 
Palestinian society at the same time.  Fatah 
agrees with this.  I would go so far as to say 
that our political parties are collectively of 
one mind today that we need a temporary 
leadership to direct the Palestinian 
resistance.  Obviously the PA doesn’t want to 
discuss a temporary leadership that would take away some of its own power.
It is clear that today the Authority is an 
obstacle to the resistance, inasmuch as it 
represents the interests of only the Palestinian 
bourgeoisie, interests which they share with the 
Israelis but not with the Palestinian 
population.  They have no interest in what the 
intifada is trying to bring about.  On the 
contrary,  what they want is to stop the 
resistance; in other words, you could say that 
their interests go against the interests of the 
people.  You see, even if we manage to create 
unity between the Palestinian political parties, 
an obstacle will remain, and it is called the 

4.  [I]n response to the whispers of those who 
call for the end of the Intifada under the claim 
of protecting the national interest of our 
people, I would like to state clearly that the 
continuation of the Intifada might harm the 
interest of the Palestinian Authority. That is 
logical and possible. However, the existence of 
the Authority, any authority, is not a goal in 
itself, except for those who see it as a mean to 
self-interested gain. The Palestinian Authority 
in our situation was supposed to be, according to 
the defenders of Oslo, a mechanism for transition 
from the occupation to a real Palestinian 
sovereignty in order to end the occupation. Such 
a view could be understood. However, if the PA 
was no longer capable of such a task, and 
responded to international pressure to justify 
its existence, then the PA would be a tool of 
oppression against the Palestinian people, the 
Intifada and the resistance.& nbsp; Therefore, in 
this case, what would justify the PA existence 
and would it represent the highest national 
interest of the Palestinian 
?  (<http://www.alhadafmagazine.com/dpPLO/dp.asp>Source)

On the intifada: The uprising is a popular 
initiative. It is a state of rebellion which is a 
response to the failure of the political 
negotiations which reached a dead end in Camp 
David 2000, and a rejection of the attempts by 
Barak’s Zionist government to impose its 
conditions on our people and marginalize the 
Palestinian national rights. In other words, the 
uprising was a natural response to the Zionist 
political escalation against our people. And the 
methods and weapons used by the resistance were 
also a natural result to the Zionist military 
escalation against our people. The weaknesses 
which accompanied the uprising stemmed from the 
absence of a unified political decision and the 
absence of a unified leadership, as well as from 
the state of political division that our people 
have lived through since the birth of Madrid-Oslo 
path. In addition the lack of harmony and balance 
between the armed struggle and the popular mass 
initiatives also weakened the uprising. There are 
attempts to hold the uprising responsible for the 
pain and the suffering of our people rather than 
holding the occupier responsible. This is an 
unjust judgment which holds no objective 
understanding. It is only natural that the losses 
of the occupied are larger than those of the 
occupier, especially when the occupying power 
posses a superior military machine. 

On the international context of the I/P conflict –
1.  [W]e should never forget that our struggle 
must be seen in an international context, i.e. 
within the imperialist world order.  Israel is a 
state whose fundamental role is to protect the 
interests of imperialism in our region.  That has 
strong resonances with the situation of South 
Africa in the time of Apartheid. Our fight is 
basically anti-imperialist.  The Palestinian 
question is today at the heart of world problems, 
which is why we must build a resistance that is 
linked to the anti-imperialist movements of the 
whole world.  The solidarity that we need is an 
anti-imperialist solidarity.  I’m thinking here 
particularly of the anti-globalisation movement 
which has developed over the last few years. If 
we want to succeed, we must certainly build a 
popular resistance, but we must also never 
separate the local from the global and take care 
to ensure that our struggle is integrated more 
fully into the struggles against imperialism and 
capitalist globalisation, both of which we must 
2.  This leads us to stake out a position that 
condemns the form of terrorism exported by 
Americans as globalism, the latest form of their 
imperialism ; to use this position to forge 
alliances between the Arab regimes and the Arab 
popular forces that are opposed to the latest war 
of aggression against the peoples ; and to strive 
to form the broadest possible world front to 
stand in the face of the new imperialism. Of 
overarching importance is that this three-fold 
tactic be applied in tandem with an escalation of 
the intifada and the resistance. Otherewise, if 
the intifada and the resistance decline while 
more moderate parallel activities are being 
pursued, the self-interest of our Palestinian people will be forfeited.

One may choose to avoid confronting a bull while 
it is stampeding around him, but avoiding 
confrontation at such a moment does not 
allevieate the eventual or present danger of 
falling under its hooves. Avoiding confrontation 
might appear "wise" and "logical" to one who 
draws up his policies in the coffee houses, 
offices, and parlors of diplomatic activity. But 
this approach appears impotent to one who builds 
his political position on the results of battles 
in the field. The contrast likens that between a 
slave who sees his master angry and breaks his 
strike out of fear of punishment and the free man 
who works as a slave, confronts his master, and 
starts a slave revolt that sweeps away his 
master’s authority, liberating all slaves and 
returning bread, humanity, and dignity to each 
one of them. The point of departure in this 
situation is in defining the goals of the mad 
bull. We all agree that these goals are evident 
in America’s efforts to achieve total world 
hegemony. This hegemony means that even if the 
bull does not trample us today, it will trample 
us under its hooves and finish us off tomorrow. 
So which is the more useful policy, then, to 
resist this bull, or to throw ourselves under its 

o        Interview with Ahmed Sa’adat, on his 
election as Secretary General of the PFLP – 
published by 
Hadaf magazine, 
here with easier formatting.

o        An interview with Ahmed Saadat - by 
Julien Salingue for 
Presse Association, 9 Sept 2002.  Translations 
English, and 
<http://www.arcipelago.org/palestina/News/saadat_intervista.htm>in Italian.

o        A 
from Ahmad Sa'adat, rejecting the road map - 14 Jan 2003.

o        An interview with imprisoned PFLP 
General Secretary Ahmad Saadat – published by 
Back News, 20 May 2003.

o        Saadat:  The Road Map, an attempt to 
reshape Palestinian aspirations -  an interview 
online magazine, 25 May 2003; and in 

o        The Popular Palestinian Intifada 
is it heading? -  Reflections on the third 
anniversary of the Intifada; 
Hadaf magazine, 28 September 2003.

o        Arafat and Abu Ala have abandoned not 
only me, but all Palestinians - interview with 
Español ABC, 4 February 2004, and in 

o        On The Strategic Level, We Want To 
Create A Pole Of The Democratic Left - interview 
Court and Chris Den Hond, August 2004; and in 

o        The struggle for a single, democratic 
state, without any kind of ethnic or religious 
discrimination, should never end – Interview by 
Mireille Terrin & Chris den Hond for the 
Palestine Solidarity Association, 5 Jan 2005; 
Italian and 
<http://www.geocities.com/lawrenceofcyberia/palbios/pa12005.html>in English.

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