<div dir="ltr">
<div class="gmail-inner-article-top"><h1 class="gmail-">Caspian lifeline redraws the Iran\u2013Russia war map</h1><p class="gmail-">As
Washington and Tel Aviv squeeze Iran from the south, the Caspian is
becoming the northern artery of a Eurasian supply network built beyond
western reach.</p><div class="gmail-another-name"><p><a href="https://thecradle.co/authors/aidan-j-simardone" style="color:rgb(164,4,4)">Aidan J. Simardone</a></p></div><div class="gmail-another-name" style="margin-top:16px"><p><span style="color:rgb(84,88,94)">MAY 22, 2026 - </span><font size="1"><a href="https://thecradle.co/articles/caspian-lifeline-redraws-the-iran-russia-war-map">https://thecradle.co/articles/caspian-lifeline-redraws-the-iran-russia-war-map</a></font></p></div></div><div class="gmail-inner-article-img"><img src="https://thecradle-main.oss-eu-central-1.aliyuncs.com/public/articles/c94e625a-5600-11f1-be24-00163e02c055.jpeg" alt="" width="497" height="235" style="margin-right: 0px;"><span>Photo Credit: The Cradle</span></div><div class="gmail-inner-article-content"><div class="gmail-row"><div class="gmail-col-md-8 gmail-col-sm-7"><div class="gmail-article-content"><span class="gmail-article-body"><p>The
war pressure on Iran has always been mapped from the south. US bases
ring the Persian Gulf, Israeli intelligence probes the region from
Azerbaijan and beyond, and Washington\u2019s naval power has long treated the
narrow waterways around Iran as a pressure point. </p><p>But the more
the US\u2013Israel axis leans on the Gulf, the more Tehran\u2019s strategic depth
shifts northward, across a closed body of water that western planners
cannot easily dominate.</p><p>The <a href="https://thecradle.co/articles/under-fire-moscow-and-tehran-close-ranks">Caspian Sea</a>
now matters because it gives Iran and Russia something both states
urgently need, a direct, politically controlled route outside the reach
of hostile land corridors. </p><p>Overland trade must pass through
states that are either aligned with Washington or unwilling to risk US
secondary pressure. The Caspian, by contrast, links the two countries
without a third-party gatekeeper.</p><p>Ships can still be hit by drones
and missiles, but reaching them requires far deeper penetration into
Iranian space and carries the danger of confrontation with Russia. In
the short term, the Caspian offers Tehran a reliable supply line. Over
the longer term, it could deepen <a href="https://thecradle.co/articles/iran-and-russia-three-steps-into-strategic-convergence">Iran\u2013Russia integration</a> and become a central route connecting Russia to West Asia, India, and the wider world.</p><p><strong>The legal battle over a closed sea</strong></p><p>Is the Caspian really a sea? It\u2019s not a <a href="https://www.scielo.org.mx/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&pid=S1870-46542020000100235">trivial question</a>.
If it\u2019s a sea, it\u2019s subject to the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea
(UNCLOS), under which territory extends 12 miles from the coastline,
after which free navigation applies. If treated as a lake, the territory
extends to borders mutually agreed upon by the surrounding states.</p><p>Until 1991, only two states occupied the Caspian: Iran and the USSR. In 1921, the <a href="https://www.mohammadmossadegh.com/news/russian-documents/iran-russia-treaty-of-friendship-february-26-1921.pdf">Russo\u2013Persian Treaty of Friendship</a>
prohibited other countries from navigating it. But when the Soviet
Union fell, three new states joined the Caspian: Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan,
and Turkmenistan. These former Soviet Republics disputed the 1921
treaty, insisting on negotiations that took UNCLOS into <a href="https://www.researchgate.net/publication/320183299_LEGAL_STATUS_OF_THE_CASPIAN">consideration</a>. </p><p>All the former Soviet Republics, including Russia, wanted the Caspian to be <a href="https://www.researchgate.net/publication/372824912_LEGAL_STATUS_OF_THE_CASPIAN_SEA_IN_INTERNATIONAL_LAW">treated like a sea</a>,
but because Iran\u2019s short coastline would give it less territory, it
insisted the Caspian was a lake. The potential for UNCLOS to apply would
have also allowed the entry of foreign military vessels 12 miles away
from Iran. This was not a hypothetical fear, given Azerbaijan's close <a href="https://jacobin.com/2023/11/israeli-weapons-gaza-nagorno-karabakh-colonialism-displacement">alliance</a> with Israel. Were it to host the Israeli navy, Tel Aviv could <a href="https://thecradle.co/articles-id/31846">open a front</a> in Iran\u2019s north. </p><p>The
failure to come to a consensus made the Caspian\u2019s legal status
ambiguous, depriving the region of further integration. For instance,
the proposed Trans-Caspian Pipeline would connect Turkmenistan with
Azerbaijan, bringing oil and gas from Central Asia to Europe. But with
no clarity on who owned the seabead, the project <a href="https://behorizon.org/why-upcoming-convention-will-not-solve-trans-caspian-pipeline-problem/">stalled</a>.</p><p>In
2018, the five states came to a decision. The Caspian was not a lake or
a sea, but a unique body of water that would be subject to the
Convention on the Legal Status of the Caspian Sea, also known as <a href="https://valdaiclub.com/multimedia/infographics/convention-on-the-legal-status-of-the-caspian-sea/">The Caspian Sea Treaty</a>. </p><p>Similar
to UNCLOS, states would have 15 miles of territory from the coastline
and a further 10 miles for fishing. The remaining area would be shared,
and any state party to the treaty could lay submarine cables and
pipelines. </p><p>But unlike UNCLOS, states not party to the treaty were
prohibited from stationing their armed vessels. Iran did not secure its
maximalist demand to have the Caspian classified as a lake, but the
exclusion of outside militaries gave it the protection that mattered
most.</p><p></p><div class="gmail-columns-box gmail-web-view-poll"><div class="gmail-columns-section"><div class="gmail-columns-row"><div class="gmail-poll-card"><div class="gmail-options"><div><p style="float:right;margin-top:23px;font-weight:600;font-size:0.875rem;display:block;color:var(--cdl-secondary)"></p></div></div></div></div></div></div><p></p><p><strong>Caspian cooperation</strong></p><p>The
treaty gave the littoral states a framework for cooperation, but for
Iran\u2013Russia ties, the Caspian remained underused as long as land routes
were available. As cooperation over Syria deepened, Moscow proposed the
International North\u2013South Transport Corridor (<a href="https://eabr.org/en/analytics/special-reports/the-international-north-south-transport-corridor-promoting-eurasia-s-intra-and-transcontinental-conn/">INSTC</a>)
in 2013, a network of pipelines, railways, and highways linking Russia
through Azerbaijan to Iran, then onward to India and the wider world.</p><p>Everything
changed when Russia invaded Ukraine in 2022. While Azerbaijan did not
impose its own sanctions against Russia, it did provide <a href="https://caliber.az/en/post/sybiha-azerbaijan-s-humanitarian-aid-to-ukraine-exceeds-45-million-since-2022">humanitarian aid</a> to Ukraine and vocalized support for its <a href="https://carnegieendowment.org/russia-eurasia/politika/2026/05/azerbaijan-ukraine-cooperation">territorial integrity</a>, and claimed it was <a href="https://en.apa.az/foreign-policy/hikmat-hajiyev-baku-is-very-vigilant-on-the-sanctions-story-485065?utm_source=chatgpt.com">complying</a> with secondary sanction rules. </p><p>Meanwhile, Iran\u2013Russia <a href="https://thecradle.co/articles-id/280">cooperation</a>
accelerated. With Russia joining Iran in being sanctioned, there was no
longer an incentive for Moscow to restrict trade with Tehran. Moscow
also had to look for other suppliers for its military. Iran provided
drones that were <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/25751654.2022.2149077">decisive</a> on the battlefield.</p><p>Why
rely on Azerbaijan when the Caspian was right there? Nearly 1,000
kilometers away from the Russia\u2013Ukraine frontline, it provided a direct
and <a href="https://www.caspianpolicy.org/research/security/russias-weapons-transport-via-the-caspian-sea?utm_source=chatgpt.com">covert route</a> for weapons heading from Iran to Russia. In return, Russia supplied more goods to Iran. </p><p>In 2022, the Iranian port of Noshashr hosted its <a href="https://valdaiclub.com/a/highlights/expanding-maritime-trade-between-iran-and-russia/">first</a> Russian cargo ship in 21 years. That same year, Iranian and Russian shipping companies <a href="https://www.hellenicshippingnews.com/russias-astrakhan-region-iran-to-form-joint-shipping-co/">teamed up</a> to form a new corporation that would develop the INSTC. In 2025, shipping at Iran\u2019s port of Anzali was <a href="https://wanaen.com/caspian-port-sees-56-increase-in-ship-dockings/">up 56 percent</a>.</p><img style="aspect-ratio: 1141 / 1255; margin-right: 0px;" src="https://thecradle-main.oss-eu-central-1.aliyuncs.com/public/articles_media/a99f0aae-5600-11f1-b817-00163e02c055.png" width="452" height="497"><sup>Map of the International North\u2013South Transport Corridor (INSTC).</sup><p><strong>The northern route under fire</strong></p><p>After
the US-Israeli war of aggression on Iran, Washington blockaded the
Persian Gulf. Land transport also became riskier, with neighboring
states such as Azerbaijan, Pakistan, and Turkiye maintaining close ties
with the US.</p><p>The Caspian became crucial again, this time with the flow reversed as Russia sent weapons and critical goods to Iran. A recent <i>New York Times</i> (NYT) piece <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2026/05/09/world/middleeast/caspian-sea-iran-russia.html">alleges</a> that Russia has been sending drone parts to Iran through the Caspian. </p><p>Drones
proved vital for Russia in Ukraine, and they have also helped Iran
strike US military installations across West Asia. Russian ships have
reportedly carried basic goods, including food, to help Iranians
withstand the blockade.</p><p>The US and Israel can strike ships or
ports on the Caspian Sea, but the risks are significant. The Caspian
sits far from Israel and US military bases near the Persian Gulf. Any
attack on Iranian assets there also risks drawing Russia directly into
the conflict, particularly when those ports serve as docking points and
logistical nodes for Russian vessels.</p><p>That is why the publicly confirmed Israeli strike wave on Bandar Anzali in March 2026 triggered a sharper <a href="https://www.aa.com.tr/en/world/russia-would-view-iran-war-spillover-into-caspian-sea-extremely-negatively-kremlin/3877321">Russian response</a>
than a routine condemnation. The attack hit the largest Iranian port on
the Caspian, a commercial and military hub tied into the same maritime
route Russia uses to move cargo to and from Iran. </p><p>Russian Foreign Ministry spokesperson Maria Zakharova <a href="https://mid.ru/en/foreign_policy/news/2087229/?">warned</a>
that the strike affected \u201cthe economic interests of Russia and other
regional countries\u201d with transport links to Iran, and said such
\u201creckless and irresponsible actions\u201d risked \u201cdragging the Caspian states
into the military conflict.\u201d</p><p>The warning was <a href="https://english.aawsat.com/world/5254321-russia-expresses-concern-over-spread-iran-war-caspian?">repeated</a>
at a higher political level. After Russian Foreign Minister Sergei
Lavrov spoke with his Iranian counterpart Abbas Araghchi, Moscow said
both sides expressed concern over the \u201cdangerous spread of the conflict
provoked by Washington and Tel Aviv to the Caspian Sea area.\u201d </p><p>Kremlin spokesperson Dmitry Peskov then <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/russia-says-it-would-be-very-concerned-by-iran-war-spillover-into-caspian-sea-2026-03-24/?">said</a>
Russia would view any spillover of the Iran war into the Caspian
\u201cextremely negatively,\u201d while declining to comment directly on reports
that Israeli strikes had targeted vessels allegedly carrying Russian
weapons to Iran.</p><p>Tehran also moved to turn the strike into a Caspian-wide security issue rather than a narrow bilateral matter. Araghchi <a href="https://www.aa.com.tr/en/americas/iran-demands-firm-stance-from-caspian-coastal-states-after-us-israeli-attack-on-bandar-anzali/3880936?">warned</a>
that attacks on Bandar Anzali had \u201cseriously endangered security and
stability in the Caspian Sea,\u201d calling on the coastal states to take a
\u201cfirm and unified stance\u201d against the destabilizing act. </p><p>The
message was clear enough. Once the war reached Iran\u2019s northern coast, it
touched the interests of every littoral state that depends on the
Caspian remaining outside the US-Israeli battlefield.</p><p>Ukraine has struck the Caspian <a href="https://defence-blog.com/ukraine-strikes-russian-naval-vessel-in-caspian-sea/">three times</a>
in recent months. The timing, against the backdrop of the Iran war, is
suspicious, though the targets so far have been Russian military assets.
For Tehran, that means the Caspian route remains largely secure,
especially when compared with the exposed southern approaches around the
Persian Gulf.</p><p><strong>Eurasian depth beyond the blockade</strong></p><p>When
the war ends, the Caspian will remain critical for both Russia and
Iran. More than a decade ago, Moscow saw the INSTC as a way to reach
India while bypassing Europe. Under conditions of western sanctions, war
pressure, and the expansion of Atlanticist containment, that old plan
has gained new weight.</p><p>If sanctions are eventually lifted and
India moves further away from western dependency, the corridor could
become one of the key arteries of a multipolar order. It would give
Russia a route to the Indian Ocean, give Iran a central role in Eurasian
trade, and weaken the US ability to isolate either state through
maritime pressure or financial coercion.</p><p>Given its advantages, the
Caspian took a surprisingly long time to reach its current importance.
Its legal status was only clarified in 2018, and before the Ukraine war,
overland routes still appeared viable. But as Moscow and Tehran tighten
cooperation in a hostile international environment, the Caspian is no
longer a secondary route. It is becoming one of the quiet pillars of the
Eurasian answer to US hegemony.</p></span></div></div></div></div>
<br></div>