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<a class="gmail-domain gmail-reader-domain" href="https://english.almayadeen.net/articles/analysis/iran-s-strikes-on-the-gulf-are-not-a-detour--they-follow-the">english.almayadeen.net</a>
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<h1 class="gmail-reader-title">Iran\u2019s strikes on the Gulf are not a detour; they follow the logic of the war</h1>
<div class="gmail-credits gmail-reader-credits">Amro Allan</div>
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<div class="gmail-reader-estimated-time">April 2, 2026</div>
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<div class="gmail-moz-reader-content gmail-reader-show-element"><div id="gmail-readability-page-1" class="gmail-page"><p>Once
the centre that sustains the system comes under real pressure, its
regional instrument becomes more vulnerable as well. This is not a
matter of rhetoric. It is a strategic sequence.</p><div><ul id="gmail-content-slick-0"><div aria-hidden="false"><li>
<a href="https://alpha-en-media.almayadeen.net/media/image/2026/4/1/88beb4c8-f215-4737-9625-07154412133c.jpg?width=1000" tabindex="0"><img src="https://alpha-en-media.almayadeen.net/media/image/2026/4/1/88beb4c8-f215-4737-9625-07154412133c.jpg?width=1000&preset=w750" alt="Iran\u2019s strikes on the Gulf are not a detour; they follow the logic of the war" class="gmail-moz-reader-block-img"></a>
Iran\u2019s operations target American influence across the
region, not only Israeli sites (Illustrated by Zeinab al-Hajj; Al
Mayadeen English)
</li></div></ul>
<p>It is easy to explain Iran\u2019s heavier targeting of Gulf states in
narrowly operational terms. Gulf-based early warning systems, radar
networks, and military infrastructure can help detect, intercept, or
facilitate attacks on Iran, making them obvious target in wartime.</p>
<p>That explanation is not wrong. But it is incomplete. It does not
fully explain why this pattern of fire has emerged in the present war,
nor does it capture the deeper strategic logic behind it. To understand
that logic, two points need to be recognized. The first concerns the
transformation "Israel" has undergone since October 7, 2023. The second
concerns the wider structure of the Arab-Islamic struggle against the
US-Israeli order in the region.</p>
<p>Since October 7, "Israel" has not fought as a "state" engaged in yet
another limited round of deterrence. It has fought as a "state" that
believes it is confronting an existential threat. That shift matters
more than many observers are willing to admit. An adversary fighting for
what it sees as its own survival does not calculate pain in the same
way as one fighting for prestige, influence, or regional positioning.
Its tolerance for loss expands. Damage that might once have generated an
internal crisis or forced a search for de-escalation becomes easier to
absorb. This has already been visible in "Israel\u2019s" wars on Gaza and
Lebanon, where levels of destruction, risk, and strategic overreach that
would once have seemed politically intolerable were instead folded into
a wartime logic of necessity.</p>
<p>This is precisely what Iran appears to understand in the current war.
In this confrontation, "Israel" may in fact be more capable of
absorbing direct punishment than the United States itself. "Israel", in
its own self-understanding, is fighting a war of existence. The United
States is not. Washington is fighting for power, posture, and strategic
primacy. It is fighting to preserve hegemony, not survival.</p>
<p>That distinction is decisive. A state fighting for hegemony often
proves less capable of enduring prolonged attrition than one fighting
under the pressure of existential fear. Within the United States itself,
there are influential circles that do not regard this war as an
unavoidable strategic necessity. Some have even suggested that
Washington was drawn more deeply into confrontation by Israeli
calculations than by any urgent American national imperative. If that is
the case, then the weaker link, in terms of political tolerance for
sustained costs, may be Washington rather than Tel Aviv.</p>
<p>Even if Iran were to intensify its strikes on "Israel", that would
not necessarily be the shortest route to ending the war or forcing a
decisive shift in its trajectory. The more consequential route lies in
targeting the real centre of gravity in the confrontation: American
power itself, both militarily and strategically, and the regional
architecture through which that power is projected, and this is where
the Gulf enters the picture.</p>
<p>The issue is not simply that there are American bases in the Gulf
that can be used in a war against Iran, although that alone is enough to
make them militarily relevant. The deeper issue is that several Gulf
states have, at a strategic level, accepted integration into the network
of American power in the region. They are not merely neighbouring
states unfortunate enough to find themselves near the battlefield. They
are embedded, to varying degrees, in the infrastructure of US primacy:
its bases, defense systems, alliances, supply chains, and command
networks.</p>
<p>In wars of this magnitude, declared intentions matter less than
actual positioning. That is the point often obscured by moralistic
commentary. In a fateful confrontation, the decisive question is not
whether a state presents itself as moderate, peace-seeking, or
reluctant. The decisive question is where it stands within the larger
structure of the conflict. Which order does it sustain? Which power does
it host? Which side\u2019s strategic depth does it protect? In such moments,
the room for ambiguity narrows sharply. What remains is strategic
placement.</p>
<p>From that perspective, striking American interests and instruments of
influence in the Gulf is not an inexplicable escalation. It is a direct
reading of how the war is actually organized. The matter is not only
about radar, interception, or battlefield convenience. It is about the
source of power in the conflict itself.</p>
<p>At the level of structure, the issue becomes clearer still: "Israel"
cannot be defeated, or even durably weakened, without first weakening
the United States, or at the very least diminishing its ability to arm,
shield, replenish, and sustain "Israel". The experience of the past two
years has made that plain enough. "Israel\u2019s" regional endurance is
inseparable from open-ended American support: military, political,
intelligence, and diplomatic. Without that support, its capacity to
sustain a prolonged war would be radically reduced.</p>
<p><strong>That is why Iran\u2019s strategy is aimed not merely at the
immediate manifestations of the war, but at the power structure that
makes it possible. </strong>The United States is the principal source of
that power: the actor that arms, protects, and sustains the regional
order within which "Israel" operates. "Israel" may be the most visible
instrument of that order, but it is not its ultimate foundation. As long
as Washington remains able to underwrite that system, striking "Israel"
alone cannot fundamentally alter the balance. But once the centre that
sustains the system comes under real pressure, its regional instrument
becomes more vulnerable as well. This is not a matter of rhetoric. It is
a strategic sequence imposed by the nature of the struggle itself.</p>
<p>For the same reason, it is not enough to condemn Iranian strikes on
Gulf states as if they were simply a moral lapse or a breach of regional
etiquette. Such language replaces analysis with sentiment. It asks
readers to dwell on emotional discomfort while ignoring the structure
that produced the battlefield in the first place.</p>
<p>If someone insists that Iran\u2019s strikes on the Gulf are misguided,
they should be able to offer a serious strategic reading of the war that
justifies that judgment. They should explain why spaces that host,
enable, or protect the projection of American military force ought to be
treated as politically innocent and strategically untouchable. They
should explain why a war prosecuted through a regional system should
somehow be answered only at one of its visible fronts. That is not an
easy case to make, because it would require denying the basic
architecture of the conflict.</p>
<p>Iran\u2019s strikes on the Gulf are not a diversion from the war, nor do
they reflect confusion about who the enemy is. They reflect a harder
conclusion: that the war on Iran is being waged through a wider
American-Israeli regional order and that any response serious enough to
matter must confront that order where it is operationally present and
strategically vulnerable.</p></div></div></div>
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