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<h1 class="gmail-reader-title">Analysis: Is West Asia on the Brink of War or a Strategic Standoff?</h1>
<div class="gmail-credits gmail-reader-credits">Ali Jezzini</div>
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<div class="gmail-reader-estimated-time" dir="ltr">February 18, 2026</div>
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<div class="gmail-moz-reader-content gmail-reader-show-element"><div id="gmail-readability-page-1" class="gmail-page"><p>Tensions
in West Asia rise as US-Israeli deployments expand, with scenarios
ranging from status quo to limited strikes or full war. What will
happen?</p><div><ul id="gmail-content-slick-0"><div aria-hidden="false"><li>
<a href="https://alpha-en-media.almayadeen.net/media/image/2026/2/17/a3b5bd7f-78f6-4663-b689-8c0ff76590a7.png?width=1000" tabindex="0"><img src="https://alpha-en-media.almayadeen.net/media/image/2026/2/17/a3b5bd7f-78f6-4663-b689-8c0ff76590a7.png?width=1000&preset=w750" alt="Analysis" class="gmail-moz-reader-block-img"></a>
What the model presents is simply an attempt to outline the
options available to the various players; it does not imply
inevitability. Ultimately, such models cannot measure many critical
variables, most importantly, the resilience of the Iranian people, their
cohesion, and their capacity to endure sacrifice (Illustrated by Mahdi
Rteil to <strong>Al Mayadeen English</strong>)
</li></div></ul>
<p>The following analysis examines the evolving military posture in West
Asia amid rising tensions between the United States, the Israeli
occupation, and Iran. Building on a previous assessment, it shifts focus
from detailed force positioning to the broader strategic picture,
exploring what current deployments signify and outlining the most
probable scenarios in the coming days.</p>
<p>Through a combination of force analysis, escalation pathways, and a
game-theory framework, the article evaluates possible outcomes ranging
from continued status quo to limited strikes or full-scale war, while
considering the political, economic, and strategic constraints shaping
each actor\u2019s decisions.</p>
<h2>Force disposition update</h2>
<p>Up to this moment, there has been no large-scale evacuation of bases
in the Gulf. There remains a significant deployment of refueling
aircraft, large drones, electronic warfare platforms, and signals
intelligence assets. At Muwaffaq al-Salti Air Base, the number of
aircraft has increased as follows:</p>
<ul><li>24xF-15E: Most likely interceptors or offensive in later stages</li><li>30xF-35A: Stealth aircraft for ground attacks and especially the destruction of air defenses</li><li>6xEA-18G: Electronic warfare aircraft.</li><li>12xA-10C: Ground attack aircraft that will use their slow speed and 30mm cannon to intercept attacking drones.</li><li>36xF-16: Same as F-15s.</li><li>12xF-22s: Air superiority fighter for deep penetration and leading sorties.</li></ul>
<p>Additionally, several extra Patriot batteries have been deployed
across Gulf states to defend against Iranian short-range ballistic
missiles. An image has circulated showing a Patriot battery at Al Udeid
Air Base in Qatar. The surrounding Gulf states will most likely play a
role in intercepting Iranian drones targeting American bases.</p>
<p>The US aircraft carrier USS Abraham Lincoln remains in the Arabian
Sea, sailing no closer than 500\u2013600 km from Iranian coasts, and at times
increasing that distance to 800\u20131,000 km. Such distances do not allow
offensive operations from the carrier without aerial refueling, except
through air-launched long-range munitions such as the JASSM and similar
long-range munitions.</p>
<p>As for the aircraft carrier USS Gerald R. Ford, there is no confirmed
information. It is rumored to have begun sailing toward West Asia and
would require approximately a week to reach the Mediterranean. Most
likely, it would position itself for air defense operations through its
destroyers and missile strikes if it remains west of the occupied
Palestinian coasts.</p>
<p>Numerous shipments of unidentified equipment from Russia and China
have arrived in Iran. While some were confirmed to be upgraded Mi-28NME
helicopters, which would be important for intercepting suicide drones
and rapid intervention in the event of a landing, it is likely that most
shipments relate to radar systems, electronic warfare, or air defense
capabilities in general, rather than fully integrated systems.</p>
<p>An air engagement occurred recently when American forces shot down a drone that the Islamic Revolution Guard Corps <a href="https://english.almayadeen.net/news/politics/irgc-drone-completes-lawful-recon-mission-before-contact-los">identified as a Shahed-129</a>,
which was reportedly pursuing the Abraham Lincoln carrier group in the
Arabian Sea. Notably, the drone was flying roughly 700 km from Iranian
coasts, beyond the line-of-sight guidance limits of approximately 200
km. This suggests it was either connected to a chain of relay drones or
equipped with satellite communications enabling operations at that
range.</p>
<p>It is important to note that the key element currently lacking in
Iran\u2019s targeting strategy is ISR, intelligence, surveillance, and
reconnaissance, particularly at extended ranges. The persistent
publication of Chinese civilian satellite imagery may indicate possible
future Chinese support in this domain, support that China could
plausibly deny. In practice, such assistance would be more valuable than
any individual weapons system that will most likely require training.</p>
<h2>A game theory model</h2>
<p>If we apply a game theory model, which was constructed using the
previously mentioned data and the risks and payoffs every party expects,
or tries to avoid, the results are as follows:</p>
<ul><li>Option A is a continuation of the status quo, including US presence and pressure.</li><li>Option B is limited strikes with escalation potential.</li><li>Option C is a full-scale war.</li></ul>
<p>Payoffs are between -10 as a minimum and +10 as a maximum.</p>
<p>The model accounts for Israeli sensitivity to time constraints and
concerns that the strategic window may not recur (Trump\u2019s
exceptionalism, US strategic pivot eastward, diminishing public support,
etc.). The results suggest the United States prefers Option A, though
Israelis lose slightly under this scenario.</p>
<p>Option B slightly benefits the Israeli regime and less so the United
States, excluding considerations of regime change. I modeled two
regime-change probabilities: 10% under limited strikes and 50% if
decision-makers believed the odds were high. The overall calculations
did not change significantly, except for Iran, which, in reality,
prefers open war over that particular scenario.</p>
<p><strong>Original Strategic Equilibrium Summary</strong></p>
<table>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Option </strong></td>
<td><strong>US</strong></td>
<td><strong>Israeli regime</strong></td>
<td><strong>Iran</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>A</strong></td>
<td>+2.8</td>
<td>-0.5</td>
<td>+2.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>B</strong></td>
<td>+1</td>
<td>+0.45</td>
<td>-4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>C</strong></td>
<td>-7</td>
<td>-8</td>
<td>-4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
<p><strong>Adjusted to 50% possibilty of regime change to simulate high US-Israeli hopes, Israeli expectations if B</strong></p>
<table>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Option</strong></td>
<td><strong>US</strong></td>
<td><strong>Israeli regime</strong></td>
<td><strong>Iran</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>A</strong></td>
<td>+2.8</td>
<td>-0.5</td>
<td>+2.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>B (P regime change=50%)</strong></td>
<td>+1.38</td>
<td>+1.75</td>
<td>-5.95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>C</strong></td>
<td>-7</td>
<td>-8</td>
<td>-4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
<h2>Possible battle scenarios</h2>
<p>During the writing of <a href="https://english.almayadeen.net/news/politics/analysis--why-us-using-jordan-as-main-base-in-possible-attac">the article previously published on January 23</a>, amid a limited American presence and rumors of a <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/live/2026/jan/14/iran-protests-live-updates-trump-us-action-death-toll-protester-executions-erfan-soltani">January 14 possible strike</a>, US aircraft numbers were insufficient except for launches from outside Iranian airspace during heightened Iranian alert.</p>
<p>At that time, large-scale air defenses and electronic intelligence
assets were not fully deployed. The previous assessment then was that
the probability of a strike was moderate, and that an Iranian response
targeting Muwaffaq al-Salti base in Jordan appeared to align with
possible American preferences, treating the base as a \u201cpunching bag\u201d for
a limited exchange while shielding the Israeli regime from
consequences.</p>
<p>Iran\u2019s message was clear: any strike would mean full war. That
message altered the American position and caused Trump to reconsider.</p>
<p>Currently, forces are still not on the scale of the Gulf War or the
invasion of Iraq, when 5 US aircraft carrier groups participated, nor
the 1991 Gulf War, where 6 participated, but the present posture enables
scenarios A and B, and could lead to C despite the US trying to avoid
it.</p>
<p>Trump undoubtedly prefers to extract concessions without war, yet he
is unlikely to secure concessions regarding the total halt of Iran's
nuclear program. The more probable scenario appears to involve a
campaign lasting several days or weeks, structured around successive
stages/goals depending on outcomes of the previous stage:</p>
<ol><li>Destroying Iranian air defenses to ensure operational freedom.</li><li>Disrupting ballistic missile launches, reducing launch capacity as
much as possible, and intercepting most missiles, particularly those
targeting vulnerable areas within the occupied territories.</li><li>Activating intelligence cells to destroy related equipment.</li><li>Conduct assassination or sabotage operations similar to prior disruptions during internet shutdowns.</li><li>Work toward regime change in Iran or impose destabilizing conditions
similar to Lebanon\u2019s, leading to internal fragmentation and loss of
legitimacy.</li></ol>
<p>All these steps are extremely difficult and uncertain. They could
produce disastrous outcomes if Iran remains resilient, preserves launch
capability, exhausts air defenses, or succeeds in destroying air defense
radar systems, particularly in the Gulf, where strong intelligence
could make such actions feasible.</p>
<p><strong>The scenario is still unclear, and there are three main possibilities if the strike occurs:</strong></p>
<p><strong>1-</strong> An Israeli initial attack, as happened in the
previous 12-day war. The United States hopes in this case that Iran will
not strike Gulf and Jordanian airports, as these airports carry out
intelligence duties, refueling, and serve as launch points for aircraft
that will intercept Iranian drones without their hangars and runways
being exposed to danger and without the risk of rising oil prices or
destabilizing these countries. It is highly unlikely that the Iranians
would do that, because it would resemble fighting with one hand tied
behind your back.</p>
<p>If \u201cIsrael\u201d achieves good results, the United States intervenes and
works through the steps mentioned previously with minimal costs. If it
fails and is struck, America intervenes by threatening to use its forces
to obtain a ceasefire, as it did previously, playing the role of
mediator and saying that we are only protecting oil. This scenario is
likely if the strike occurs because it is the least damaging to America
and its allies, but the most harmful to Iran if successful.</p>
<p><strong>2- </strong>A comprehensive joint American-Israeli operation
from the start, and this would lead to a comprehensive Iranian response
across the region if early success in destroying Iranian forces is not
achieved, especially since the arsenal designated for dealing with
American forces in the Gulf is completely different from that designated
for the Israelis in terms of missiles, munitions, operations, and
intelligence.</p>
<p>It is highly unlikely that such a scenario would not be read by the
Iranians as a full regime-change war, leading ultimately to what was
stated in outcome C. It is a very dangerous outcome for the Americans
more than the Israelis themselves, and looking at Trump\u2019s precedents in
dealing with major risks, he appears to try to avoid high-risk actions.
He may see this as \u201cIsrael\u2019s\u201d battle; "let it attack while we defend,"
which strengthens the first scenario.</p>
<p><strong>3-</strong> The salami-slicing strategy, meaning continuously
tightening the siege on the Iranians and beginning to confiscate
Iranian oil ships, as was done with Venezuela, given that 80% of Iranian
oil exports go to China. This scenario was presented to Trump
previously, according to the <em>Wall Street Journal</em>, and he
rejected it earlier because of the countermeasures the Iranians could
take that would raise oil prices. Here, oil is a sensitive issue because
any prolonged rise toward $90\u2013100 per barrel threatens America with
economic recession, a disastrous scenario ahead of the midterms.</p>
<p>This strategy could be accompanied by threats of brute force in case
of an Iranian response, or promises, for example, that some settlement
could be reached in case of no Iranian response, relying on what the US
might perceive as divisions within the Iranian elite. This is what the
Biden administration did during the first year after the al-Aqsa Flood
with the Iranians, as in Lebanon, and the result overall was clear. In
light of that, the Iranians continue to show that this scenario would
lead to retaliation, even if it causes a comprehensive war.</p>
<p>Up to this moment, the Iranians are sending messages that all roads
lead either to an agreement or to outcome C, full war, where everyone
loses, with major differences in losses as shown in the model. We may
disagree on the numbers, so the matter is not one of madness or merely a
martyrdom mentality as some Western analysts describe it, but rather
rational calculation.</p>
<h2>Limits of war modeling and the illusion of strategic certainty</h2>
<p>What the model presents is simply an attempt to outline the options
available to the various players; it does not imply inevitability.
Ultimately, such models cannot measure many critical variables, most
importantly, the resilience of the Iranian people, their cohesion, and
their capacity to endure sacrifice. If numerical models were fully
reliable, US Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara would not have
resigned during the Vietnam War. Coming from Ford with a data-driven
mindset, he left the administration in humiliation after his
calculations failed to account for the Vietnamese willingness to
sacrifice for their freedom and independence.</p>
<p>I believe that a significant portion of Israeli confidence does not
stem solely from intelligence networks inside Iran or from access to
specific knowledge. Iranian losses would certainly occur and are almost
inevitable. However, this confidence may also reflect excessive
self-assurance, a sense of grandiosity after recent achievements, and
even a religious conviction that this could be the decisive war after
which they will dominate West Asia, coupled with a genuine fear that the
current opportunity may not present itself again.</p>
<p>The Americans, in contrast, appear far less prudent. I believe they
genuinely assume that a substantial bloc of Iranians would align with
their strikes and are waiting for them eagerly. This tendency is common
among major powers, not just individuals, to indulge in wishful
thinking. Such assumptions often lead to catastrophic miscalculations,
with leaders overrelying on projections of their own expectations and
underestimating an adversary\u2019s willingness and ability to endure
hardship, at the expense of material realities and adequate preparation.</p>
<p>The probability of war is not certain, but it now exceeds fifty
percent. Military positioning is nearing completion, particularly with
the withdrawal of the Boeing RC-135 air defense reconnaissance aircraft
from Qatar to Crete and the deployment of E-3 AWACS aircraft to the
region.</p>
<p>In any case, under these variables and in the event of a major blow
to the United States, the regional viability of \u201cIsrael\u201d would be called
into question amid potential American retrenchment. Only God knows how
such a war would unfold if it occurs. Personally, I believe the best
scenario would not see war break out. The resistance axis requires
several years to rebuild what it has lost, and during that period, and
this is not merely my assessment, the United States will likely be
compelled to reduce its presence in the region. That is why \u201cIsrael\u201d is
working toward reducing its dependence on America, aiming in the future,
in cooperation with local allies such as India, Ethiopia, and European
states, to dominate the region independently.</p>
<h2>Conclusion </h2>
<p>In conclusion, the current moment represents a highly unstable
strategic intersection rather than an inevitable march toward war. The
military positioning underway expands the range of possibilities without
guaranteeing any specific outcome.</p>
<p>While limited confrontation may appear manageable on paper, the
margins for miscalculation are thin, and escalation dynamics are
difficult to control once activated, since Iran might prefer a total war
if it reads the current goals of US and Israeli attacks as regime
change, a goal that US and Israeli officials spared no opportunity
declare as a main goal of any military actions.</p>
<p>Each actor is weighing time, deterrence credibility, domestic
constraints, and regional balance differently, creating asymmetry in
risk tolerance and strategic preference. Ultimately, endurance,
political cohesion, and the ability to absorb sustained costs will
matter more than opening strikes or technological advantages.</p>
<p>Whether events move toward negotiation or confrontation will depend
not only on military capability, but on judgment, restraint, and the
accuracy, or inaccuracy, of each side\u2019s assumptions about the other.</p></div></div></div>
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