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<h1 class="gmail-reader-title">Palestinian Resistance’s Tactical Triumph: Missiles Multiply Despite Losses</h1>May 26, 2023</div>
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<p>In its <a href="https://thecradle.co/article-view/24600/israeli-blitz-on-gaza-kills-13-palestinians-including-women-and-children" target="_blank" rel="noopener">latest act of aggression</a>
against the besieged Gaza Strip, Israel dealt a severe blow to the
resistance movement Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ). High-ranking
commanders, including the majority of the members of the group’s
military council in Gaza, were assassinated in rapid succession during
the battle.</p>
<p>These targeted killings sought to weaken the PIJ’s leadership
structure and disrupt the organization’s command and control. However,
despite these setbacks, the PIJ pulled some new tricks out of its hat,
managing to expand the range of its missile strikes, which reached as
far as <a href="https://thecradle.co/article-view/24681/palestinian-rockets-rain-down-on-tel-aviv" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Tel Aviv</a>.</p>
<p>To gain a deeper understanding of these strategic PIJ developments
and its advancements in retaliatory strikes, it is important to examine
two significant past military operations: “Black Belt” (2019) and
“Breaking Dawn” or “<a href="https://thecradle.co/article-view/13976" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Unity of Fronts</a>” (2022).</p>
<p><strong>Learning from the past</strong><br>
Those two battles were triggered by the killing of prominent leaders in
the PIJ’s military wing, the Quds Brigades, which appears to have
further emboldened Israeli occupation forces in their policy of targeted
assassinations. From Israel’s perspective, the perceived political
gains outweighed the costs incurred during these two rounds of conflict.</p>
<p>In November 2019, following the assassination of Quds Brigades commander <a href="https://www.jpost.com/arab-israeli-conflict/article-714475" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Baha Abu al-Ata</a>,
the fighters responded recklessly without proper planning. Rocket
launchers were emotionally fired immediately after the assassination,
making the missile unit vulnerable to Israeli detection.</p>
<p>As a result, the Quds Brigades suffered significant losses, with
around 27 missile force staff members, including three field commanders,
being killed. This battle also had a secondary, more dangerous
consequence: It established an Israeli policy of singling out a specific
resistance group, leaving the PIJ to face their fate alone without the
participation of other key resistance elements like Hamas.</p>
<p>During the 2022 “Unity of Fronts” battle, a similar fate befell the Quds Brigades following the <a href="https://thecradle.co/article-view/13760" target="_blank" rel="noopener">arrest of PIJ leader Bassam al-Saadi</a>.
Although they fired over 400 rockets at Israeli settlements in
retaliation and employed improved tactics compared to the previous
battle, Palestinian public opinion fell victim to Israeli propaganda.</p>
<p>The Israelis’ narrative portrayed the PIJ as endangering the lives of
two million people in the Gaza Strip—and neglecting the plight of 4,500
Palestinian prisoners in Israeli jails—for the purpose of securing the
freedom of just one person. Furthermore, when some errant rockets fell
in Gaza due to technical errors, doubts were raised about the PIJ’s
ability to successfully wage war independently.</p>
<p><strong>Trying new tactics </strong><br>
But on May 9, a significant shift occurred in the conflict. Despite the
initial heavy blow from Israel’s first strike, which resulted in the
loss of three prominent PIJ leaders—Khalil al-Bahtini, Tariq Ezz al-Din,
and Jihad Ghanem—the movement’s response was purposefully delayed for
approximately 35 hours.</p>
<p>This unusual stalling tactic confused Israeli calculations. During
the brief lull, discussions were held between the PIJ, Hamas, and other
resistance factions to ensure coordination and readiness for the
upcoming fight. On May 10, “Operation Revenge of the Free” was launched,
as announced by this Joint Operations Room.</p>
<p>The PIJ’s initial missile response unfolded in three stages. The
first stage employed a “dumping and neutralization” tactic, focusing on
Israeli settlements bordering the Gaza Strip within a 15-kilometer
range. These targets included Sderot, Nahal Oz, Nativ Ha’atsarah, and
Kerem Shalom.</p>
<p>The resistance’s aim was to first deplete the batteries of Israel’s <a href="https://www.timesofisrael.com/idf-iron-dome-malfunction-to-blame-for-deadly-rehovot-rocket-strike/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Iron Dome</a>
missile defense system. Following this, missile barrages were launched
at about 30 cities, reaching depths of 20 to 75 kilometers into Israeli
territory. Targets included Ashkelon, Ashdod, Beersheba, and extended
all the way to Tel Aviv, Rishon Lezion, and Palmachim. By the end of the
first day, the Quds Brigades had fired approximately 400 rockets.</p>
<p><strong>Discussions in the joint command center</strong><br>
Amidst these developments, discussions were ongoing in the Joint
Operations Room, while reports in the Arab and international media
hinted at an imminent ceasefire. Egyptian news channels reported that
Cairo’s intelligence efforts had led to a truce agreement between Israel
and the Joint Ops Room.</p>
<p>This aligned with the Israeli security establishment’s assessment
that the scale of retaliation would not surpass what was witnessed in
the 2019 and 2022 rounds. The Israeli assessment viewed the PIJ as
incapable of waging a prolonged battle, even with the involvement of
smaller military factions such as the Al-Nasser Salah al-Din Brigades of
the Popular Resistance Committees, The Martyr Abu Ali Mustafa Brigades
of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, the National
Resistance Brigades of the Omar al-Qasim Forces, and the Mujahideen
Brigades.</p>
<p>Informed sources reveal to <em>The Cradle</em> that Egyptian
intelligence did indeed reach an agreement of sorts with the leadership
of Hamas, as a representative of the Joint Ops Room, on the first day of
the conflict. However, a deal did not take place because it excluded
any significant achievements for the Palestinian resistance.</p>
<p>During this time, Egyptian mediators attempted to establish contact
with PIJ Secretary General Ziyad al-Nakhala, but he did not respond to
the call. Subsequently, a phone conversation took place between Ismail
Haniyeh, the head of Hamas’s political bureau, and Nakhala. Then, at
approximately 7:00 p.m. on May 12, the Quds Brigades responded to the
Egyptian proposal by launching a series of missile strikes targeting
Israeli cities.</p>
<p><strong>‘Deterring’ the Resistance </strong><br>
Despite the ongoing and surprising resilience displayed by PIJ, a <a href="https://www.israelnationalnews.com/news/371464" target="_blank" rel="noopener">statement</a> on May 14 by Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu boasted that the balance of deterrence had been altered in Israel’s favor:</p>
<p>“Since Guardian of the Walls [<a href="https://thecradle.co/article-view/11011" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Sword of Jerusalem or Sayf al-Quds</a>],
Hamas has not fired a single rocket into our territory. They are
deterred. Operation Guardian of the Walls dealt Hamas the hardest blow
in its history and caused a change in the deterrence equation and it has
been working for two years now.”</p>
<p>“Our intention in Operation Shield and Arrow was to change the
balance of deterrence against Islamic Jihad. The difference comes not
only because of the targeted assassinations that we have been doing for
the 16 years that I have been prime minister, but that we did so so
calmly and effectively. We took down half of Islamic Jihad’s leadership
in a surprise blow, and the other half during the operation.”</p>
<p><strong>Assassinations: A failed policy</strong><br>
Despite the heavy losses suffered in the initial strike, the subsequent
days of fighting proved equally devastating. Israel continued its
targeted assassinations, eliminating key figures such as the commander
of the missile force in the Quds Brigades, Ali Hassan Ghali, and his
deputy, Ahmed Abu Daqqa, followed by the assassination of Operations
Staff Commander Iyad al-Hassani on the fourth day.</p>
<p>Remarkably, after each targeted killing, the Quds Brigades
intensified its missile strikes and introduced new tactics into the
battle. This had the effect of shrouding the Israeli ground forces,
which had misread the PIJ’s capabilities, in the fog of war.</p>
<p>The Quds Brigades employed tactics such as utilizing suicide drones,
anti-tank missiles, and launching intensive mortar attacks. Its
intention was clear: to demonstrate through firepower and brute force
that the policy of targeted <a href="https://english.almayadeen.net/news/politics/assassination-of-resistance-commanders-not-to-end-struggle:" target="_blank" rel="noopener">assassinations had not diminished</a> its effectiveness in the field.</p>
<p><strong>Not taking the bait </strong><br>
A source in PIJ tells <em>The Cradle</em> that the Quds Brigades
leadership had carefully analyzed the lessons learned from the previous
two battles. According to the source, Israel’s objective was to provoke
another “emotional reaction” from the Brigades, through heavy firepower.
To counter the Israeli tactic, the Brigades have focused on
strengthening the discipline of field fighters. “The instructions were
clear: do not shoot and wait for orders.”</p>
<p>This discipline led to an expansion of the area of missile launch
sites, which reduced the effectiveness of Israel’s technological
monitoring of the firing points, and weakened the possibility of
identifying and targeting them.</p>
<p>The source explains: “When we decide to launch 50 missiles, we do so
from 10 launch points, although we are able to launch them all from one
or two points. By doing so, we preserve the safety of fighters and
launchers.”</p>
<p>According to Israeli statistics, PIJ alone <a href="https://www.timesofisrael.com/liveblog_entry/idf-statistics-on-gaza-fighting-1500-rockets-launched-400-pij-targets-struck/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">fired about 1,500 missiles</a>,
“which completely paralyzed the cities of the south, and caused the
evacuation of 12,000 settlers,” killing an Israeli and a foreign worker,
and injuring 77 others, in addition to hundreds of minor injuries and
panic attacks.</p>
<p>These numbers, according to Palestinian researcher Ismail Muhammad,
show that the PIJ was able, during only a 10-month interim between
operations “Unity of the Fronts” and “Revenge of the Free,” to rebuild
its missile stockpile and to address all previous technical problems. As
Muhammad tells <em>The Cradle</em>:</p>
<p>“Despite the losses at the command level, no significant field losses
were recorded. Four field fighters from the artillery unit and the
armor unit were martyred, while the losses in the missile unit remained
zero.”</p>
<p>“The continued firing of missiles at the same pace until the last
moment indicates that that the assassination of the commanders did not
affect the effectiveness of the field, and that the Brigades were able
to assign new commanders, whom Israel described after the bombing of the
city of Jerusalem on the last day as crazier than their predecessors.”</p>
<p><strong>Down but not out </strong><br>
Shortly before the <a href="https://thecradle.co/article-view/24795/ceasefire-reached-in-gaza-as-resistance-declares-victory" target="_blank" rel="noopener">ceasefire</a>
took effect, PIJ launched over 120 rockets targeting Ashkelon, Tel
Aviv, Palmachim, Rishon Lezion, and Rehovot. This was an attempt by the
PIJ to remind Israelis that its military capabilities remained intact
and plentiful and that it retained the upper hand, even though the
ceasefire deal did not accurately reflect PIJ’s gains on the ground.</p>
<p>During the ceasefire negotiations, the PIJ was successful in
persuading mediators to include the phrase “stop targeting individuals”
in the agreement, signaling a halt to assassinations. However, it is
widely acknowledged that Israel is unlikely to honor this commitment.</p>
<p>The military assessment of Operation Revenge of the Free is that it
allowed the Quds Brigades to increase the cost for Israel by singling
out PIJ cadres. Despite the <a href="https://thecradle.co/article-view/24780/israel-assassinates-sixth-palestinian-commander-in-span-of-four-days" target="_blank" rel="noopener">loss of six commanders</a>, a source confirms to <em>The Cradle</em> that the Brigades appointed new commanders during the battle who effectively resumed operations without missing a beat.</p>
<p>Predictably, Israel has already deviated from the spirit of a ceasefire by supporting the controversial <a href="https://thecradle.co/article-view/24951/israel-to-deploy-3200-officers-in-jerusalem-ahead-of-flag-march" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Flag March</a>
of Jewish extremists through East Jerusalem, assisted and emboldened by
the presence of 3,200 Israeli security forces. This visceral challenge
to Palestinians represents a crucial test <a href="https://thecradle.co/article-view/24836" target="_blank" rel="noopener">not only for PIJ</a> but also for all resistance factions that have pledged to disrupt Israel’s provocative actions in Jerusalem.</p>
<p>The Flag March aims to project a false “image of victory” for
Netanyahu and restore Israel’s deterrence – something he failed to
achieve during the five-day confrontation with the second most powerful
organization in the Gaza Strip in terms of strength and military
capabilities, and arguably, the <a href="https://www.middleeastmonitor.com/20210927-a-history-of-palestinian-islamic-jihad-faith-awareness-and-revolution-in-the-middle-east/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">most militant</a> and uncompromising in its armed struggle for national liberation.</p>
<p>(<a href="https://thecradle.co/article-view/24977/pijs-tactical-triumph-missiles-multiply-despite-losses" target="_blank" rel="noopener">The Cradle</a>)</p>
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