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<h1 class="gmail-reader-title">The NATO to TikTok Pipeline: Why is TikTok Employing So Many National Security Agents?</h1>
<div class="gmail-credits gmail-reader-credits">by
Alan Macleod - April 29, 2022<br></div>
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<hr>
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<div class="gmail-moz-reader-content gmail-reader-show-element"><div id="gmail-readability-page-1" class="gmail-page"><div><p><b><span>C</span>ULVER CITY, CALIFORNIA – </b>As
the bloody conflict in Ukraine continues to escalate, so does the
online propaganda war between Russia and the West. A prime example of
this is the White House directly briefing influencers on popular social
media app TikTok about the war and how to cover it. As the crisis
spirals out of control, Americans have turned to TikTok to view real
time videos and analysis of the invasion. With the app <a href="https://wallaroomedia.com/blog/social-media/tiktok-statistics/" target="_blank">estimated</a>
to have around 70 million U.S. users, the White House is keenly aware
of its impact. “We recognize this is a critically important avenue in
the way the American public is finding out about the latest … so we
wanted to make sure you had the latest information from an authoritative
source,” President Joe Biden’s director of digital strategy, Rob
Flaherty, <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/technology/2022/03/11/tik-tok-ukraine-white-house/" target="_blank">told</a> 30 top TikTok influencers.</p>
<p>TikTok itself has taken steps to align itself with U.S. government policy, <a href="https://newsroom.tiktok.com/en-us/bringing-more-context-to-content-on-tiktok" target="_blank">deleting</a>
more than 320,000 Russian accounts and removing at least 41,000 videos
peddling misinformation about the war. In addition to this, it has
placed warning labels marked “Russia state-controlled media” on 49
accounts linked to the Russian government. Like other big social media
platforms, it has not done the same to Western state-owned outlets such
as the <a href="https://www.tiktok.com/@bbcnews?lang=en" target="_blank"><i>BBC</i></a>, <a href="https://www.tiktok.com/@rteone?lang=en" target="_blank"><i>RTÉ</i></a>, or the <a href="https://www.tiktok.com/@cbcmusic?lang=en" target="_blank"><i>CBC</i></a>.</p>
<p>All this is a far cry from 2020, when President Donald Trump signed
an order that would shut down TikTok within 45 days unless it was sold
to an American buyer. The Chinese-owned platform, the U.S. government
alleged, posed a severe national security threat to the United States.
Although TikTok is a Chinese company, it is, ironically, completely
blocked inside China, their domestic market being served by a sister
app, Douyin, which functions in a similar way but is separated by the <a href="https://www.politico.com/news/magazine/2020/09/01/china-great-firewall-generation-405385" target="_blank">Great Firewall</a>.
Thus, there is no contact or overlap between the two. After Douyin’s
success in China, its parent company ByteDance launched a global
platform.<span id="gmail-add-6272790d31f72"><br>
</span> <br>
ByteDance first reached a <a href="https://www.mintpressnews.com/microsoft-purchase-tiktok-us-tightens-grip-international-media/269945/">deal</a> to sell TikTok to Microsoft, then to Oracle and Walmart. Yet the new Biden administration, without explanation, quietly <a href="https://www.wsj.com/articles/tiktok-sale-to-oracle-walmart-is-shelved-as-biden-reviews-security-11612958401" target="_blank">dropped</a>
the sale requirement indefinitely in early 2021, saying in a court
filing that it had begun a review of security concerns cited by the
Trump administration.</p>
<p>That <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/technology-58719674" target="_blank">decision</a>
left buyers and onlookers alike perplexed. Yet studying the backgrounds
of dozens of key TikTok employees brought on since the 2020 scare
suggests that, instead of destroying TikTok, perhaps the U.S. national
security state has co-opted it instead.</p>
<h2>High-placed NATO recruits</h2>
<p>Since 2020, there has been a wave of former spooks, spies and
mandarins appointed to influential positions within TikTok, particularly
around content and policy – some of whom, on paper at least, appear
unqualified for such roles.</p>
<p>For example, while simultaneously being the Content Policy Lead for TikTok Canada, Alexander Corbeil is also the <a href="https://natoassociation.ca/about-us/alexander-corbeil/" target="_blank">vice president</a> of the NATO Association of Canada, a <a href="https://natoassociation.ca/partners-sponsors/" target="_blank">NATO-funded</a>
organization chaired by former Canadian Minister of Defense David
Collenette. In order to join TikTok, Corbeil left his job at the SecDev
Foundation, a U.S. <a href="https://docs.google.com/file/d/0B-szos-lFcMSYmZLaVZXS3R3ZG8/edit?resourcekey=0-YpytchspE6WGeJZAPVpQVg" target="_blank">State Department-funded</a> security think tank. Corbeil’s <a href="https://natoassociation.ca/category/ncc-authors/alexandercorbeil/" target="_blank">work</a> focused on Middle Eastern security and in particular on the war in Syria and what NATO’s role should be.</p>
<p>Another NATO-linked new recruit is <a href="https://www.linkedin.com/in/ayse-k/" target="_blank">Ayse Koçak</a>,
a Global Product Policy manager at the company. Before joining TikTok
last year, she spent three years at NATO. Like Corbeil, Koçak had
special expertise in Middle Eastern politics, including a year’s tour in
Iraq as the organization’s deputy senior civilian representative.</p>
<p><a href="https://www.linkedin.com/in/foardcopeland/" target="_blank">Foard Copeland</a>, who works on TikTok’s trust and safety policy, is also an ex-NATO man. Copeland previously worked as a <a href="https://fdocuments.net/document/cfc-complex-coverage-review-26-february-2012.html" target="_blank">desk officer</a>
for NATO, as well as for the Department of Defense. Between 2011 and
2021, he also worked for U.S. contractor Development Alternatives
Incorporated (DAI), spending much of that time in Afghanistan. DAI has
long been <a href="https://venezuelanalysis.com/analysis/5000" target="_blank">accused</a>
of being a CIA front group, perhaps with some justification. In 2009,
for example, DAI agent Alan Gross was arrested in Cuba and<a href="https://thehill.com/blogs/pundits-blog/international/230794-the-real-story-behind-alan-grosss-work-in-cuba/" target="_blank"> sentenced</a> to 15 years in prison for spying, espionage, and his part in efforts to destabilize the government.</p>
<p>Perhaps the most worrying NATO alumnus, from a public perspective, is new Feature Policy Manager <a href="https://www.linkedin.com/in/greg-j-andersen/?originalSubdomain=ie" target="_blank">Greg Andersen</a>.
According to his own LinkedIn profile, until 2019, Andersen worked on
“psychological operations” for NATO. This fact, according to <i>MintPress</i> contributor <a href="https://www.mintpressnews.com/author/lowkey/">Lowkey</a>, was removed after his <a href="https://twitter.com/Lowkey0nline/status/1502630581775048720" target="_blank">tweet</a> raising concerns about the relationship between big tech and the national security state went viral. Lowkey wrote:</p>
<p>Andersen’s profile continues to identify him as a former NATO
employee, but there is no reference to “psychological operations” or
“soldier-system lethality.” Lowkey provided <i>MintPress</i> with a screenshot of what he said was Andersen’s pre-tweet profile, which has been included below.</p>
<h2>Not just NATO</h2>
<p>NATO, however, is far from the only organization newly connected to
TikTok. The company’s new Global Lead of Integrity and Authenticity, <a href="https://www.linkedin.com/in/chris-roberts-0a81a51b/?trk=nav_responsive_tab_profile" target="_blank">Chris Roberts</a>, is a<a href="https://www.linkedin.com/in/chris-roberts-0a81a51b/?trk=nav_responsive_tab_profile" target="_blank"> former</a>
senior director of Technology Policy at the Albright Stonebridge Group
(ASG), a powerhouse strategy and consulting firm started by
late-Secretary of State Madeleine Albright. The ASG has been perhaps the
major staffing source for President Biden’s administration, with at
least 10 ASG employees <a href="https://www.politico.com/newsletters/transition-playbook/2021/03/23/the-blob-abides-492214" target="_blank">appointed</a> to key positions in national security, state and foreign policy positions.</p>
<p>Before ASG, Roberts worked, in his <a href="https://www.linkedin.com/in/chris-roberts-0a81a51b/?trk=nav_responsive_tab_profile" target="_blank">own words</a>,
on “special projects” for the National Democratic Institute (NDI). The
NDI was founded by the Reagan administration after a series of CIA
scandals necessitated the creation of a network of front groups to take
the heat off the agency. The NDI exists to channel U.S. government
money, training and support to political and social groups around the
world. This could charitably be described as “democracy promotion,”
although cynics might label it “overthrowing governments.” As Roberts
himself <a href="https://www.albrightstonebridge.com/news/asg-associate-chris-roberts-interviewed-alma-mater-dickinson-college" target="_blank">said</a>,
“The nature of democracy promotion is that the most important countries
to work in are also the ones where the government may not want your
‘help.’”</p>
<p>At TikTok, Roberts’ role is to “Lead the Integrity and Authenticity
policy team. This team covers misinformation, synthetic and manipulated
media, covert influence activity, and spam and inauthentic engagement.”</p>
<p>One group infamous for peddling misinformation and carrying out
covert operations is the CIA. Yet rather than identifying operations,
they might be conducting, TikTok has instead recruited a former agent to
serve in an important position. Since January, <a href="https://twitter.com/bopatteson" target="_blank">Beau Patteson</a>
has been working as a threat analyst for TikTok’s Trust and Safety
Division. Between 2017 and 2020, however, Patteson was a targeting
analyst for the CIA, after which he joined the State Department to
become a foreign service officer. In addition to his role at TikTok,
Patteson is also, according to his social media <a href="https://www.linkedin.com/in/beau-patteson/?trk=people-guest_people_search-card" target="_blank">profile</a>, a military intelligence officer in the United States Army.</p>
<p>One step closer to the halls of power is <a href="https://www.linkedin.com/in/victoria-mccullough-3523755/details/experience/" target="_blank">Victoria McCullough</a>, who previously worked for the Department of Homeland Security and for the <a href="https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/blog/author/victoria-mccullough" target="_blank">White House</a> itself. Like Patteson, McCullough now works on trust and safety at TikTok. Another trust-and-safety TikTok staff member, <a href="https://www.linkedin.com/in/christian-h-cardona/details/experience/" target="_blank">Christian Cardona</a>,
spent nearly 13 years in senior roles at the State Department across
the Middle East and Europe before seamlessly moving to the social media
giant.</p>
<p>Virtually every former spook or state official this investigation
found works in very specific (and highly politically sensitive) fields
such as trust, safety and content moderation, rather than in banal areas
like marketing, customer service or sales. Yet TikTok’s new recruits
come from some of the least trustworthy organizations anywhere in the
world – organizations that should not be anywhere near the levers of
power of such a popular platform.</p>
<p>The national security state has been the source of some of the most
outlandish and damaging fake news claims in recent years. This includes
lurid allegations about so-called “<a href="https://www.jacobinmag.com/2021/10/havana-syndrome-microwave-energy-weapon-fake-news-us-diplomats-spies-intelligence-national-security-media-liberal-outlets" target="_blank">Havana Syndrome</a>” and the “<a href="https://taibbi.substack.com/p/aaugh-a-brief-list-of-official-russia?s=r" target="_blank">BountyGate</a>”
hoax. Going further back, falsehoods about weapons of mass destruction
or an immiment genocide helped push the U.S. to war in Iraq and Libya,
respectively. Yet individuals from many of these institutions are now in
charge of deciding what is real and what is fake, and which content to
promote or suppress.</p>
<p>In this light, the 2020 pandemonium about TikTok being a national
security threat looks increasingly like a power play from the national
security state. These dire warnings, and even the threat to completely
shut down its platform, subsided only after TikTok began appointing
Western officials to important positions within its organization,
thereby giving the state considerable influence over the content and
direction of the app.</p>
<h2>Serious business</h2>
<p>Readers who consider TikTok little more than a fun app to watch short
videos of people dancing are behind the times. From a modest beginning,
it has exploded in popularity, <a href="https://www.businessofapps.com/data/tik-tok-statistics/" target="_blank">growing</a>
exponentially from 85 million global users in early 2018 to 1.2 billion
by late 2021 (with a similar monstrous growth in revenue to boot).</p>
<p>It is exceptionally popular among the younger generations. The 2021 Reuters Institute Digital News Report <a href="https://reutersinstitute.politics.ox.ac.uk/sites/default/files/2021-06/Digital_News_Report_2021_FINAL.pdf" target="_blank">found</a>
that 9% of people aged between 18 and 24 worldwide had gone to TikTok
to get news over the past week, while 31% of that age group used the app
in that period (and therefore likely passively consumed news to some
extent). Furthermore, it has a very loyal user base, with the tens of
millions of U.S. TikTok users <a href="https://www.businessofapps.com/data/tik-tok-statistics/" target="_blank">spending</a> an average of 68 minutes per day on the platform.</p>
<p>Thus, TikTok has become an enormously influential medium that reaches
over one billion people worldwide. Having control over its algorithm or
content moderation means the ability to set the terms of global debate
and decide what people see and do not see. <i>MintPress</i> invited TikTok to comment on its relationship with the government, but has not received a response.</p>
<h2>Surveillance Valley</h2>
<p>This is far from the first time the national security state has
pulled this trick, however. In 2018, Facebook came under enormous
pressure from the U.S. government, with CEO Mark Zuckerberg himself
being hauled in front of both the House and the Senate to face hours of
grilling over the platform’s role in privacy, content moderation and
spreading Russian disinformation. Only weeks after this, Facebook <a href="https://www.mintpressnews.com/facebook-partners-hawkish-atlantic-council-nato-lobby-group-protect-democracy/242289/">announced</a>
a new partnership with the Atlantic Council, whereby the group would
serve as Facebook’s “eyes and ears,” taking considerable control over
its content moderation, supposedly in an effort to weed out fake news
and disinformation. The Atlantic Council, however, is NATO’s think tank
and serves as its brain trust, with no fewer than seven former CIA
directors on its board. Since then, Facebook (or Meta, as it is
officially known), appointed <a href="https://www.mintpressnews.com/censorship-way-facebook-hires-nato-press-officer-intelligence-chief/275154/">former</a> NATO Press Officer and <a href="https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/expert/ben-nimmo/" target="_blank">current</a>
Atlantic Council Senior Fellow Ben Nimmo to serve as its head of
intelligence. In addition, Facebook’s new global director of content
policy, <a href="https://about.fb.com/news/2021/11/update-on-ethiopia/" target="_blank">Mark Smith</a>, was formerly <a href="https://morningstaronline.co.uk/article/w/facebook-and-insta-under-fire-allowing-calls-death-russians" target="_blank">employed</a> by NATO as an advisor to its deputy commander.</p>
<p>The Atlantic Council has also found its way into Reddit’s management. In 2017, Jessica Ashooh <a href="https://www.mintpressnews.com/jessica-ashooh-reddit-national-security-state-plant/277639/">went</a>
straight from being deputy director of Middle East strategy at The
Atlantic Council to director of policy at the popular news aggregation
service – an unusual career move that <a href="https://www.mintpressnews.com/jessica-ashooh-reddit-national-security-state-plant/277639/">drew</a>
few remarks at the time. Like Corbeil, Koçak and others, Ashooh was a
Middle East specialist and was intimately involved in the West’s war in
Syria. For years, Reddit took a free-speech absolutist position, even
defending <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2012/oct/15/reddit-free-speech-gawker" target="_blank">hosting</a>
clearly illegal sexual content. However, Ashooh’s arrival coincided
with a new era of far more forceful moderation. Reddit recently took the
decision to not only <a href="https://www.dailymail.co.uk/sciencetech/article-10579301/Social-media-platform-Reddit-block-links-coming-Russian-domain-name.html" target="_blank">ban</a> links from Russian state media outlets, but all websites with a Russian (.ru) domain.</p>
<p>Likewise, a number of key Twitter personnel raise eyebrows. Chief
among them is Head of Editorial for Europe, the Middle East and Africa <a href="https://www.middleeasteye.net/news/twitter-executive-also-part-time-officer-uk-army-psychological-warfare-unit" target="_blank">Gordon MacMillan</a>,
who, in addition to his duties at Twitter, is an officer in the British
Army’s 77th Brigade – a notorious unit dedicated to online warfare and
psychological operations. Like Facebook, Twitter has <a href="https://www.mintpressnews.com/aspi-think-tank-controlling-twitter/279490/">partnered</a> with some highly questionable state-linked organizations, giving them considerable influence over its content moderation.</p>
<p>Meanwhile, Google’s current global head of Developer Product Policy,<a href="https://www.cnas.org/people/ben-renda" target="_blank"> Ben Renda</a>,
was formerly a strategic planner and information management officer for
NATO, before working for both U.S. Cyber Command and the Department of
Defense.</p>
<h2>Big Tech a big weapon</h2>
<p>The U.S. government, it appears, refuses to allow any competition to
its hegemony over the digital realm. Huawei has effectively been banned
throughout much of the West, with the United States refusing to allow
the Chinese giant to control the new network of 5G communications. U.S.
attempts to convince other nations to block Huawei have elicited
significant pushback in the Global South. “If you are ahead, I will ban
you, I will send warships to your country…That is not competition, that
is threatening people,” <a href="https://jacobinmag.com/2020/02/digital-cold-war-china-huawei-donald-trump" target="_blank">said</a>
Malaysian Prime Minister Mahathir bin Mohamad, commenting on U.S.
actions. Decades earlier, the U.S. government effectively destroyed the
Japanese semiconductor industry, <a href="https://www.mintpressnews.com/china-tech-ban-mirrors-1980s-attempts-to-destroy-japanese-competition/274429/">forcing</a>
Japan to sign a one-sided trade deal while imposing a 100% tariff on
Japanese electronics – a power play that led to a decades-long recession
from which the island nation has never recovered.</p>
<p>In 2020, the U.S. government even <a href="https://techcrunch.com/2020/03/06/grindr-sold-china-national-security/?guccounter=1&guce_referrer=aHR0cHM6Ly93d3cuZ29vZ2xlLmNvbS8&guce_referrer_sig=AQAAAHCvBYQhxPE4-wwf6oXS6up2ms6eHxrdRHTvVpYRMBBYnRa-l2L6FyLWGQFGhSDNrM3lxnpxgRf-wBRP7cD3M38rzihb-uCJ3Bpk-7TSqF-L4Z2BmvGhmqKMZj9L-tNp9yc6blqgfH7HY3OTMnzSH7N0ehu7pbLDRfG-n_Xp5EBe" target="_blank">forced</a> Chinese-owned Grindr to be sold to a U.S. company, <a href="https://www.theverge.com/interface/2019/3/28/18285274/grindr-national-security-cfius-china-kunlun-military" target="_blank">deeming</a> the LGBT dating app to be a “national security threat.”</p>
<p>In every accusation, it is said, there is a confession. That
Washington considers even frivolous hookup apps to be too important to
be outside of U.S. control, lest they be used to influence the public,
suggests they know exactly what they are doing, infiltrating big tech
companies. Indeed, this was more or less confirmed earlier this month by
a <a href="https://punchbowl.news/wp-content/uploads/Open-Letter-Cyber-Intel-Defense-HS-1.pdf" target="_blank">letter</a>
written by a host of top natsec officials, including former CIA
Directors Michael Morell and Leon Panetta, and former Assistant to the
President for Counterterrorism and Homeland Security Frances Townsend
(all of whom also sit on the Atlantic Council’s <a href="https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/about/board-of-directors/" target="_blank">board of directors</a>).</p>
<p>The officials advised that breaking up Silicon Valley giants, as many
have advocated, would “inadvertently hamper the ability of U.S.
technology platforms to … push back on the Kremlin.” “The United States
will need to rely on the power of its technology sector to ensure [that]
the narrative of events” globally is shaped by the U.S. and “not by
foreign adversaries,” they explain, concluding that Google, Facebook,
Twitter are “increasingly integral to U.S. diplomatic and national
security efforts.” In other words, they see big-tech as a key weapon of
the U.S. empire.</p>
<h2>Mockingbird 2.0</h2>
<p>In the 1970s, the Church Committee unearthed the existence of
Operation Mockingbird, a secret CIA project to infiltrate newsrooms
across America and place agents masquerading as journalists inside.
Investigative reporter Carl Bernstein’s work <a href="https://www.carlbernstein.com/the-cia-and-the-media-rolling-stone-10-20-1977" target="_blank">found</a> that the CIA had cultivated a network of over 400 individuals it considered assets, including the owner of <i>The New York Times</i>.</p>
<p>Today, it appears that the links between big media and big government
are, if anything, closer than they were in the 1970s. The monopolistic
power of big social media platforms gives them – whether they like it or
not – extraordinary influence over public opinion. And within their
opaque Silicon Valley offices, a small cadre of individuals set the
algorithms and decide the moderation policies that shape what billions
of us see every day. With a host of former officials taking positions in
these companies, the U.S. national security state is acquiring some
measure of influence over the means of communication. It’s Operation
Mockingbird for the 21st century – and on a global scale.</p>
<p>It is not normal for NATO officials or CIA agents to suddenly be put
in charge of TikTok content policy. This did not happen purely by
accident, just as it did not occur by chance at the other big tech
platforms. One might reasonably argue that some of the only people who
have the skills to highlight, spot and counter disinformation campaigns
are those who have done similar work in the military or secret services.
However, these organizations are the last ones that many would want in
control of big-tech platforms, given their history of subterfuge and
deceit.</p>
<p>Put another way, if these were Russian-based social media companies
filled to the brim with former FSB, KGB or Kremlin officials, we would
immediately recognize them as blatant government-controlled platforms.
Yet many of the most popular apps are heading in the same way.</p>
<p>There is certainly a huge problem with fake news and disinformation
online. And a fair chunk of it emanates from Russia. But while some
might argue that poachers can become gamekeepers and use their skills
for good, this situation feels far more like foxes being in charge of
the digital henhouse.</p>
<p>Feature photo | MintPress News</p>
<p><em><strong><a href="https://twitter.com/AlanRMacLeod" rel="noopener" target="_blank">Alan MacLeod</a></strong> is Senior Staff Writer for MintPress News. After completing his PhD in 2017 he published two books: <a href="https://www.routledge.com/Bad-News-from-Venezuela-Twenty-years-of-fake-news-and-misreporting/Macleod/p/book/9781138489233" rel="noopener" target="_blank">Bad News From Venezuela: Twenty Years of Fake News and Misreporting</a> and <a href="https://www.routledge.com/Propaganda-in-the-Information-Age-Still-Manufacturing-Consent-1st-Edition/MacLeod/p/book/9781138366404?fbclid=IwAR2xQQWJd98C25wapG4ynmlEnGvL5wxG_mp5RwpBwtwPDxInjNZ1Oo7KD-E" rel="noopener" target="_blank">Propaganda in the Information Age: Still Manufacturing Consent</a>, as well as <a href="https://journalcontent.mediatheoryjournal.org/index.php/mt/article/view/65/56" rel="noopener" target="_blank">a</a> <a href="https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/abs/10.1177/0306396818823639#articleShareContainer" rel="noopener" target="_blank">number</a> <a href="https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/blar.12940" rel="noopener" target="_blank">of</a> <a href="https://www.frontiersin.org/articles/10.3389/fcomm.2018.00064/full" rel="noopener" target="_blank">academic</a> <a href="https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/abs/10.1177/0896920518820934" rel="noopener" target="_blank">articles</a>. He has also contributed to <a href="https://fair.org/author/alan-macleod/" rel="noopener" target="_blank">FAIR.org</a>, <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/profile/alan-macleod" rel="noopener" target="_blank">The Guardian</a>, <a href="https://www.salon.com/writer/alan-macleod" rel="noopener" target="_blank">Salon</a>, <a href="https://thegrayzone.com/author/alan-macleod/" rel="noopener" target="_blank">The Grayzone</a>, <a href="https://jacobinmag.com/author/alan-macleod" rel="noopener" target="_blank">Jacobin Magazine</a>, and <a href="https://www.commondreams.org/author/alan-macleod" rel="noopener" target="_blank">Common Dreams</a>.</em></p>
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