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<h1 class="reader-title">Campesinos Defending Chavez’s Project:
A Conversation with Andres Alayo</h1>
<div class="credits reader-credits">By Cira Pascual Marquina –
August 27, 2019<br>
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<p><em>For more than two months now, members of the
Campesino Struggle Platform (Plataforma de Lucha
Campesina), a Chavista organization bringing
together small producers fighting for land rights,
have been camping out in front of the Venezuelan
Land Institute (INTI) in Caracas. There dozens of
campesinos are engaged in ongoing conversations
about the situation of the country and the
injustices that they face in rural areas. The
activists also work on documents, organize marches
and meetings before retreating to their hammocks at
the end of the day. Andres Alayo is one of the key
leaders of the Campesino Struggle Platform. In this
exclusive Venezuelanalysis interview, we talk to him
about the history of the Chavista agrarian
revolution.</em></p>
<p><strong>I would like us to begin with the Venezuelan
<a href="https://venezuelanalysis.com/analysis/1310">Land
Law of 2001</a>, which marks a turning point in
the Bolivarian Revolution. The law sought to improve
and preserve the lives of Venezuela's small
agricultural producers. However, it also met with a
furious response from the landowning class, which
reacted with an astonishing degree of violence.</strong></p>
<p>The Land Law was a powerful attempt to guarantee
people’s lives in the rural areas. The Independence
Wars [1810 to 1823], the Federal War led by Zamora
[1859 to 1863], and the Bolivarian Process are the key
milestones in our struggle to build a sovereign nation
and achieve social justice. The Land Law got the
Bolivarian Revolution going, but at the same time,
along with the Hydrocarbons Law and the Fishing Law,
it provoked the <a
href="https://venezuelanalysis.com/analysis/11924">2002
coup</a>. That’s the case because the Land Law
impacted the rural oligarchy’s interests. It opened
the way for a new understanding of property.</p>
<p>Not surprisingly, implementing the Land Law unleashed
terrible violence from the landowning class, which was
allied with the most reactionary sectors of our
society and also with Colombian landowners… it marks
the beginning of a series of bloody practices that,
little by little, begin to enter Venezuela’s rural
areas, leading to hundreds of campesino deaths.</p>
<p>The law brought with it a profound change in land
tenancy in Venezuela. For the first time, thousands of
previously landless <em>campesinos</em> had access to
the land. The Land Law represents an enormous step
forward in the process of democratizing the land,
which until then had been in the hands of a handful of
families.</p>
<p>The spiral of violence began in November 2001, when
FEDENAGA [national association of large livestock
owners] President Jose Luis Betancourt publically tore
up the law in a symbolic gesture. It was a war cry.
The first campesino to fall was Licino Lago, from the
Caño Caiman homestead in Sur del Lago [in Zulia
State]. To date, oligarchic violence has led to the
deaths of some 350 to 400 <em>campesinos</em>.</p>
<p>But for those of us who are <em>campesinos</em>, we
don’t give up. Our calling is to produce, and
Venezuela’s landscape began to be reconfigured during
the revolution. At that time, [because of the previous
oil booms] the country imagined itself as the “Saudi
Venezuela.” It was the country of “plenty” which
nevertheless expelled millions of <em>campesinos</em>
from the rural areas and forced them into the growing
slums of the large cities. However, in the early years
of the 21st-century, the situation began to change and
people started to go back to the rural areas. They
began to occupy unused land, making thousands of small
homesteads. In villages, <em>campesinos</em>
gradually constructed their humble homes, their <em>caneys</em>
[open bungalows with thatched roofs], and they shared
production spaces. Thus there emerged a culture that
puts life at the center of things.</p>
<p>So, on the one hand, we have a wager for life and for
the democratization of the land and, on the other
hand, we have the landlords' culture of death and
terror.</p>
<p><strong>To understand the agrarian revolution as it
has developed within the Bolivarian Process, it is
important to consider the different periods that
have shaped that struggle, from the enacting of the
Land Law right up to the present.</strong></p>
<p>The process of democratization of the land can be
periodized. The first years were characterized by an
enormous popular momentum. Hundreds of campesino
cooperatives were formed, and the Venezuelan people
witnessed thousands of cases of vacant land being
occupied, and we celebrated it.</p>
<p>It was at this time – beginning in 2002 but
especially in 2003 and 2004 – that the true enemies of
the people begin to show their faces. They are the
landowning class, but also the nation’s courts, the
judges who make common cause with landlords, and the
local police... These latter groups and institutions
were quick to collaborate in the eviction of <em>campesinos</em>.
That was a time when the popular movement was
advancing, but it was also a period characterized by a
great deal of repression that favored the oligarchy.</p>
<p>By 2006, they had killed dozens of <em>campesinos</em>.
The law was there, bestowing rights upon us, but the
repression was on the rise and impunity was rampant.
In those circumstances, we organized the march,
“Zamora Toma Caracas” (Zamora Takes Over Caracas) in
partnership with the Ezequiel Zamora Campesino Front.
The goal was to denounce the landowners’ rampant
violence, on the one hand, and the state’s inaction,
on the other. On that summer day, tens of thousands of
<em>campesinos</em> (many of them on horseback) took
over Caracas.</p>
<p>The truth is that the state’s institutions – the
Prosecutor’s Office, the Office of the Ombudsman, the
courthouses, the judges, and the justice system as a
whole – never showed much willingness to bring to
justice those responsible for murdering <em>campesinos</em>.
That is something that, even today, pains us and makes
us indignant! The period when the popular movement was
on the offensive closes with the march in Caracas.</p>
<p>Around 2006 or 2007 a new period begins, with a
change in the government's policies toward the rural
areas. Around that time, state businesses begin to
emerge, and these enterprises begin to directly assume
control of occupied lands. The peak of this period is
around 2008 and 2009, and it lasts through 2012.</p>
<p>Here we are talking about a time when the grassroots
initiative is no longer centerstage. Instead, the
state takes the lead, recovering many vacant farming
estates. This includes (to mention just a few): Hato
El Frío and Hato El Cedral in Apure; La Compañia
Inglesa in Apure, Guárico and Falcón; La Vergareña in
Bolívar State; Hacienda Bolívar-La Bolivariana and Oya
Grande in Sur del Lago, Zulia; the whole Valley of the
Turbio in Lara; and La Productora in Portuguesa.</p>
<p>All these estates passed over to the direct control
of the Agriculture Ministry. Thus, as an outcome of
the process of recuperating vacant and underproductive
lands, the Venezuelan state became the largest
agricultural landholder. We are no longer talking
about vacant land being occupied by <em>campesinos</em>.
We are talking about public, state-operated
enterprises.</p>
<p>In this process, a large contingent of <em>campesinos</em>
became wage workers for the state enterprises.</p>
<p>This is the period when the oil bonanza reached its
peak. Oil prices rose to historical records, and that
means that a lot of resources became available, an
important part of it being invested in agriculture.
During this time, for instance, the Pedro Camejo plant
for farm machinery was founded, and thousands of
tractors, harvesters, and other heavy machinery were
imported into the country.</p>
<p>The <a href="https://venezuelanalysis.com/news/5976">AgroVenezuela</a>
Mission was also created during this phase, while
enormous resources were earmarked for rural
investment. The budgets of CVAL [state agriculture
corporation] and other state enterprises figured in
millions of US dollars, with the object of developing
an infrastructure to support production. This is also
the time when Chavez ordered the (compensated)
expropriation of Agroisleña [seed and agricultural
input corporation], which then became <a
href="https://venezuelanalysis.com/analysis/6578">AgroPatria</a>.</p>
<p>So we could say that 2006 through 2010 are the years
that bring to an end the scenario defined by the
19th-century plantation.</p>
<p><strong>Would it be correct to say that this last
period you refer to closes with Chavez’s illness?</strong></p>
<p>Yes, this period comes to an end when Chavez’s
illness begins. Around 2012 we begin to witness the
dwindling of the state agricultural enterprises and,
shortly after, a process of gradually dismantling them
begins.</p>
<p>The truth is that between 2011 and 2016, the state
had vastly reduced resources, and the government chose
to privilege other sectors [that were not
agriculture]. Investment and credit for <em>campesinos</em>
plummeted, and the building and maintenance of rural
infrastructure came to a halt. It was a period of
evident decay and was accompanied by the active
dismantling of the large agrarian state enterprises
such as CVAL. These state businesses had been the
result of enormous human effort and huge investments,
so it was a serious setback for agricultural
production.</p>
<p>This period’s dynamic became even harsher over the
last couple of years. Around 2016, the imperialist
attack on Venezuela became more aggressive. During
this time, the nation’s food security became a public
issue, and the contradictions between reform and
revolution became more obvious – side by side with the
more evident revolution‐counterrevolution
contradiction.</p>
<p>As far as the reform versus revolution contradiction
is concerned, we find sectors of the government that
are overtly aiming to restructure land ownership based
on “strategic” partnerships with private capital, be
it national or international. These sectors claim that
<em>campesinos</em> don’t know how to produce, that
they are lazy by nature, that the stilted agrarian
development is the fault of the small producers
themselves.</p>
<p>According to this group, the <em>campesinos</em>
received millions of dollars in credits, machinery,
land, etc., but they weren’t able to operate
efficiently with those resources. To state the
obvious, that is false, since the bulk of those
resources didn’t go to the <em>campesinos</em>
directly, but rather to the enterprises that we
mentioned earlier or even to the private sector.</p>
<p>These sectors believe that the Land Law should be
abrogated and the struggle against large plantations
needs to stop. They are against <em>campesinos</em>
occupying idle land. All this is no secret! They
publicly affirm that it is necessary to ally with
private interests to be able to produce.</p>
<p>What characterizes the government’s agricultural
policy today is that it works to consolidate an
agroindustrial model led by supposedly patriotic
business people. In our time, private businesses with
a lot of resources (of unknown origin) are beginning
to pop up, and they are on the fast track. To mention
just a few of these businesses: El Tunal, JHS,
Ebenezer Group, and Los Tres Grandes. All are private
agro-industrial enterprises, and they have become
powerhouses extraordinarily rapidly.</p>
<p>On the flip side of the coin, small producers and
communards are witnessing the disappearance of the
state’s social and productive presence in the <em>campo</em>.
We should explain here that the state has a monopoly
on seeds, machinery and other inputs, even
agricultural credits. It is the state that administers
them, but its presence in the rural areas is
practically null, leaving <em>campesinos</em> exposed
to dangerous mafias that buy supplies.</p>
<p>The priority in agriculture is now large capital –
both new and old. As it turns out, the government is
casting its lot with those producers whose aim is
exporting, not with the <em>campesinos</em> who
provide produce for urban, internal markets in
Venezuela.</p>
<p>One of the heroes in this “special period” in
Venezuela – the period characterized by imperialist
attacks – is the campesino, the small producer in the
rural areas. Even now ocumo, yuca, ñame, plantain,
topocho, and fruits are always available in the
markets, and they are produced in terrible conditions.
That is to say, there are crop thefts, skyrocketing
prices of agrarian inputs (which are managed by the
state but sold in black market channels), scarcity of
fertilizers, mafias that operate in the rural areas,
and police repression. In fact, small producers have
supplied the cities with food when there were no other
sources of staple foods. In doing so <em>campesinos</em>,
with their hard work, have hampered the possibility of
a social explosion, which is one of the US State
Department’s aims.</p>
<p>Many of the state’s “productive partners” are active
in the longstanding counterrevolution (whereas others
are newcomers). Who are the new owners of Hato Garza
in Barinas State, an enormous pig farm which was
formerly the state’s property? They are the same
people who in November of last year, killed Tomas
Ribas, a campesino activist, who was safeguarding the
infrastructure from pillage and privatization… These
are the state’s “productive partners”!</p>
<p>The state has given preferential treatment to Alejo
Hernandez, owner of El Tunal, who is known as “El
Tornillo.” Recently a video showing him calling for an
uprising against Nicolas Maduro went viral… He is the
“spoiled child” of the current wave of these
“productive alliances”! The government had awarded him
5000 hectares in Portuguesa.</p>
<p>This is a huge contradiction. The small producer and
the communard have demonstrated that they can produce
and deliver, and they have also proved their
commitment to the revolution. That being the case, why
is it that the state is privileging large private
capital? Why is the state channeling resources, almost
exclusively, to the agrarian capitalist sector? And
through what channels have these private “investors”
accumulated their fortunes?</p>
<p>We are facing a covert politics of restoration [of
the old order]. The discourse goes as follows: the
state is not able to maintain public enterprises due
to the economic crisis. That means we have to turn
over the state’s enterprises to private “investors,”
since they have capital, knowledge, relationships, and
professionals who can guarantee that the businesses
come back to life. But we must ask: what is the cost
of all these resources that we are handing over to the
private sector?</p>
<p>One of Chavez’s most important legacies was that he
opened the path to building a sovereign economy in a
strategic alliance with the <em>campesinos</em> and
the communards. Chavez’s stated objective was to build
the communal state, but with these alliances that are
taking shape, we are getting further and further from
that objective every day!</p>
<p>So this period we are in is a very dark one, not only
due to the imperialist blockade – which itself creates
serious problems – but also because the policies that
are supposed to foster internal production contradict
the objective of attaining collective sovereignty. The
government has chosen the agroindustrial model, which
has many limitations if we consider that the aim is to
satisfy the needs of the majority in a time of
imperialist siege.</p>
<p>In this period, our main slogan should be: “Produce
to resist.” That’s because there is no possible
resistance and no fighting army if it doesn’t have
food. And the food for an army must be produced in a
sovereign way here in Venezuela. Only the small
producer, the campesino, and the communard can
guarantee that. To resist the imperialist attack and
the internal restorationist tendencies, we must
guarantee agricultural practices that are also capable
of resistance. To be honest, there is no other way.</p>
<p><strong>Just a few days ago, hundreds of people from
the Plataforma de Lucha Campesina and other
organizations gathered in Caracas. They marched with
the slogan “Against assassinations, plantations, and
paramilitarism.” The march also sought to defend the
<em>campesinos</em>’ right to the land and to have
access to agricultural supplies, which is all the
more important in the face of the imperialist
blockade. Can you tell us something about this march
and what was at stake in it?</strong></p>
<p><a href="https://venezuelanalysis.com/news/14620">On
August 6</a>, we marched against paramilitarism and
the targeted assassinations of <em>campesinos</em>,
to bring an end to impunity, and in defense of
campesino and communal life.</p>
<p>This march happened one year after the <a
href="https://venezuelanalysis.com/news/13975">meeting
between President Nicolas Maduro</a> and the <a
href="https://venezuelanalysis.com/analysis/14142">Admirable
Campesino March</a>. Twelve months ago, dozens of <em>campesinos</em>
came by foot from Portuguesa State to Caracas to
protest the grave conditions in rural Venezuela. Even
though the media sought to criminalize the march (and
despite the lies disseminated even by state media), we
arrived in Caracas on August 1, 2018.</p>
<p>Thousands of committed Chavistas came out to greet
us. But we were also received by a huge contingent of
riot policemen as if we were the worst <em>guarimberos</em>
[violent, right-wing protestors] – as if our intention
was to assault Miraflores!</p>
<p>We met with President Maduro on August 2, 2018, and
there we reached some important agreements, which in
turn became presidential orders.</p>
<p>The first point concerns the land. All the land that
has been taken from <em>campesinos</em> should be
returned. That was a clear order that the president
issued. However, out of 111 cases that we brought
before the president, only 28 were resolved, while
another 15 are in a process of review for the granting
of the titles. The rest are still in a process of
investigation.</p>
<p>The second agreement was about justice for the
victims of targeted assassinations. Between 350 to 400
<em>campesinos</em> have been killed since the Land
Law was signed in 2001, and their killers enjoy
absolute impunity.</p>
<p>Since we began the Admirable March on May 12, 2018,
there have been assassinations of 19 <em>campesinos</em>.
Most recently, six members of the <a
href="https://venezuelanalysis.com/tag/crbz">CRBZ</a>
were <a
href="https://venezuelanalysis.com/images/14612">killed
in Ticoporo</a>. We expect to learn the truth and to
have justice for all our dead! Impunity must cease to
be the state’s policy. A revolution cannot live side
by side with impunity. Justice is a synonym of
revolution.</p>
<p>The third agreement – which was backed up by a
presidential order – was to put an end to the judicial
persecution of <em>campesinos</em>. Hundreds of <em>campesinos</em>
are facing legal cases, because they produce in lands
desired by people who are more powerful or have better
connections. Maduro assured us that the day after the
meeting, Supreme Court Justice Maikel Moreno would
initiate a process that would eliminate all the cases
involving judicial persecution of <em>campesinos</em>.
We are still waiting for that process to begin, and a
growing number of <em>campesinos</em> have been
criminalized since.</p>
<p>The fourth point of agreement was the “Crop to Crop
Sowing Plan.” The plan was for cultivating 45 thousand
hectares during the “Summer Growing Season” [the
Venezuelan summer coincides with the dry season that
begins in October], but nothing came out of that
promise. For the Winter Season [beginning with the May
rains], we presented a plan for cultivating 37
thousand hectares. The government approved 12 thousand
hectares for planting beans, corn, and rice but it was
later reduced to seven thousand. Of that, we received
seeds and inputs for 1700 hectares.</p>
<p>The fifth point concerns the making of a campesino
congress. The idea is to hold a congress to build
unity within the campesino movement and to develop
plans to face the challenges that the current war
scenario presents. The Agriculture Ministry, National
Constituent Assembly, and the Vice Presidency were to
coordinate this project with us, but there was never
an agreement about how to proceed.</p>
<p>Now there is a new (more grassroots) effort to
organize the congress. We hope that this effort will
succeed. The aim is to build a large campesino
movement that will guarantee, on a local level, the
defense of the revolution, making the rural areas into
a socialist vanguard.</p>
<p>The August 6 march in Caracas was organized to defend
those agreements, on the first anniversary of the
presidential orders. The Admirable Campesino March
last year ran into a number of hurdles before it
reached its destination, and the same could be said
for the recent march in Caracas.</p>
<p>The police attempted to prevent our march from
advancing. There were confrontations with the police,
where the willingness of the campesino movement to
struggle became clear. The marchers were indignant
because the impunity [enjoyed by those who have killed
campesinos] makes us angry, as does the judicial
harassment of <em>campesinos</em>, and the state’s
neglect of the rural areas.</p>
<p>They wanted to prohibit a peaceful march! To that we
said, “Nobody will prevent our advance!” So we
advanced through Caracas, and we broke through three
police barricades. Our initial aim was to get to
Miraflores, but to avoid conflict we ended the march
in front of the National Constitutive Assembly, where
we delivered a document to Diosdado Cabello, its
president. In that document, we made a balance sheet
of all the agreements struck earlier with the
president. It was a kind of status report. We also
delivered the report to the office of the president.</p>
<p>There, in front of the ANC, we had a political act.
We sang, danced, and shouted our slogans. We also read
our report in public. In doing so, we were defending
Chavez’s legacy and the orders that President Nicolas
Maduro gave on August 2, 2018.</p>
<p>There are institutional actors that don't like to see
the pueblo expressing itself. They are the same people
who want to make the country believe that all is
well... We say to them and to President Maduro: “Take
a tour around Sur del Lago, around the Andean paramo,
talk to the producers in Trujillo, go to the
Portuguesa plains, get yourself to Barinas and listen
to the <em>campesinos</em>. Go to the street, Mr.
President!” Maduro himself told his ministers to visit
the <em>campesinos</em>, to talk directly to
producers in the rural areas, and to do so without
cameras and without mediation. Anybody who visits the
rural areas in Venezuela will find very difficult
conditions, on the one hand, and a tremendous
willingness to defend Chavismo, on the other.</p>
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